Acts of the Georgian army in South Ossetia

Goals and objectives set for the Georgian army

The main goal — "the establishment of constitutional order" in South Ossetia, to return the rebellious autonomy within Georgia, and then to "restore constitutional order" in Abkhazia.

The military task — to defeat the army of "separatists", immediately neutralizing the Russian peacekeeping forces in the next block the Roki pass. Check the concept of NATO and U.S. combat operations in mountainous terrain.

The political task — to get rid of the Ossetian people, who do not wish to go to Georgia. Begin talks on Georgia to NATO. Begin relocation of Georgian refugees to South Ossetia.

Geopolitical objectives — to reduce the impact of the Russian Federation on the countries of the South Caucasus. Provide aviation Israeli and U.S. airfields in the event of military action against Iran. Accelerate the construction and laying another pipeline.

Techno task — to hold a general test of the upgraded weapons systems in real-world criteria. Experience the practice of "centers of organization of fire" that were made by Israeli military professionals.

"Operation Clear Field"

This operation has been developed by Georgia with workers of the company Military Professional Resources Incorporates (MPRI) and was aimed against South Ossetia. Specifically, the company MPRI, signing an agreement with Saakashvili long years engaged in the development of military operations and combat training of military personnel in Georgia. The consultants of the company were retired U.S. Army generals and a number of senior "military retirees." These people and so far occupy 4th floor of the Ministry of Defense of Georgia, where the entrance is closed by the Georgian military.

Actions of the Georgian army in South Ossetia

Georgian army numbering about 20 thousand people was prepared South American instructors, the cost of its creation was 2 billion. bucks. The army tried by the ability to abandon an old technology of the Warsaw contract and prepared to conduct "local" wars, first with the separatist enclaves in Georgia's borders, and for use in peacekeeping operations abroad. Due to the presence of radar data, air and gallakticheskoy intelligence, command the armed forces of Georgia has extensive information on the structure and military capabilities of the armed forces of South Ossetia and Russia. The strategy of the Georgian army was focused on carrying out blitzkrieg. For the base of the preparation had taken lessons Middle East conflicts in Israel, the experience of Iraq and Afghan wars. The strategy of using infantry brigades included the creation and action separate assault teams and acts much sniping and sabotage groups from the army Interior Ministry special forces "Gia Gulua" and "Omega." The structure of the assault groups included two companies of infantry, a platoon of tanks and combat engineers office.

For the base of the plan of military operations against the rebel enclave strategy was based on the application of 2-strokes converging towards Tskhinvali. Main attack from the south of the district Blaze the main group of troops, the main force of 4 mpbr. assumed the deepest poluohvat Tskhinvali from the east, dissecting the defense of South Ossetia and exit near the village of Tamarasheni Fri. Another blow was delivered from the Karelian areas with 3 mpbr and assumed poluohvat Tskhinvali from the west and domestic coverage of Tskhinvali from all sides on the outer boundary environment. Surrounded Tskhinvali group planned to tie down blows MLRS and aircraft. Artillery strikes were very weaken the enemy, disorganize it and force the surrender of the town.

The first echelon of the advancing troops, and was 3 and 4 of the Georgian infantry brigades, the 2nd echelon remained mpbr 1, provided support to the advancing troops: a single artillery brigade, division MLRS, separate tank battalion and Air Force Electronic Warfare Center Georgia. During the operation was planned very well use a sniper and sabotage groups numbering 10-12 people. In the puzzle of the "wandering Ranger" was to mining roads in the rear of the enemy, disrupt and demoralize defending forces, prompting its own aircraft and artillery on the detected targets, and the nomination of the Russian army in the conflict zone, they had to switch to sabotage its nodes and communications .

The basic rate Georgian army was doing to achieve the greatest fire for a small period of time. In the first step a large role massive use of rocket and artillery fire, the corrected using drones and air strikes. According to the plans 72 hours in the Georgian army was to capture Tskhinvali, Dzhavu and the Roki tunnel, 3-4 day or troops were to capture about 75% of the territory of South Ossetia and transfer efforts by Abkhazian direction in which the act of ground troops could be supported by naval and air assault .

The Georgian side is intensively used a stratagem: purposefully deduced troops of previously occupied quarters of Tskhinvali, with the following shelling and bombardment during the occupation of enemy troops.
The focus of Georgia paid for combat at night. Specifically NIGHT MODE Georgian army getting an edge over the Russian troops. Georgian tanks T-72 SIM-1, which were modernized in Israel have imagers recognition system "friend or foe», GPS and building equipment.
Thanks to the ESM, radar and direction-finding Georgia stalked cell phone signals, and inflicted on them fire strikes. In the Georgian artillery gunners were found excellent topographical maps and high resolution image from space areas of South Ossetia and Tskhinvali. In preparation for a war Georgia tried to take into account the strengths of the Russian army an advantage in absolute languid arms in the air, on the sea and his feeble hand: shortage of active means to fight against enemy aircraft over much of its territory and the general weakness of the defense. With all of this army was trained and perfectly suited up combat units that had adopted an instrument of Turkish, German and Israeli-made. And yet Georgia did not believe, that our homeland will respond to her coming in South Ossetia, and was not ready to counterattack.

Actions of the Georgian army in South Ossetia

To achieve the effect of strategic and tactical surprise the President of Georgia at 8 pm Aug. 7 announced on television about a ceasefire and use guns Georgian forces in the conflict zone, knowing that the first-Rakta massive air strike will take place at 23:30.

Feeble hand of the Georgian army

By shortcoming is the absence of a government. Each brigade ruled two deputy defense minister and deputy minister of internal affairs. The army was unprepared for "bunker" war — the capture of fine fortified positions in the southern part of Tskhinvali. Multiple launch rocket systems "Grad", which is located Georgia, designed to work on the areas and are not applicable for precision strike. Most of the T-72 SIM-1 is located in the 2nd tier, as the command-sparing more modernized tanks.

Do not attempt to justify itself transition to digital technology in management. She gave herself to k
now the missing training professionals "centers of organization of Fire", made by the Israeli military. The data center should be responsible for coordinating artillery and air assault teams with infantry and tanks. In actual combat the criteria for the interaction of these centers with the troops was a weak, particularly apparent in the efficiency of defeats the purpose.

In the process of fighting and MLRS artillery for almost 14 hours led fire the defeat at Tskhinvali, as a result the city has received severe injuries, suffered 70% of the buildings. But the result of this continuous fire exposure tank units were not able to use it. The battle for the city in what or repeated lessons learned from the army of the Russian Federation Severe storm: the criteria of urban development is inefficient use of tanks and associated with tangible losses from the fire well-trained groups of grenadiers.

From 10 August, the Georgian army have waged war only through "self-organization". Artillery support was given to the troops only in this case, if the commander was personally acquainted with any of the mobile artillery officers. Failed job rear services, many of the out of the battle, having exhausted his ammunition. Because of the hideous interaction Georgian troops were not able to avoid cases of "friendly fire." Air defense, the criteria advantages Russian aviation has used a strategy similar to the strategy of defense of Yugoslavia — a temporary patchy inclusion of air defense, ambushes with the introduction of mobile systems "Buk" proposed operations on the routes of Russian aviation.

To the main shortcomings include the same lack of unprepared defensive lines and positions. Management of Georgia not to believe in the possibility of a counterattack by Russia, even more so for the bombing of their own country. Fighter in companies and battalions fighting abilities are not taught in the defense, actions for environment and waste. As a result of the Georgian troops retreat turned into a chaotic retreat.

Actions of the Georgian army in South Ossetia
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