Reduced to a new kind of

Forces the efforts of third-party sunk to yet another round of self-adjustment. Leftover officer's body, a little shaking its wings, takes a breath — had passed. Where to go — up, down? Well, here are well fed. The new minister of defense — excellent! Veterans unhappy. The public is still silent. Reformers in anticipation. It's time to make a decision. Something needs to be corrected. Here I would like to not only kill the tradition and the first positive results of the transformation. It may be worthwhile in the end to listen to Russian military science. If it still remained …

Reduced to a new image

Now everyone is on the case reads "Oboronservis." The leitmotif of all applications, including the officials began large-scale real theft. Meanwhile, virtually no one directs attention to the consequences of the team Serdyukov for the country's defense. In other words, the results in the crotch of bringing Russian army to a new species, for which adjustments will need a lot of time and money, and did not prevent the military would take into account the world-expert community.

The need for real reform of the Armed Forces, no one is in doubt, since none of the characteristics — fighting and membership, technical equipment, accepted methods, methods and forms of warfare in the foreseeable military conflicts they do not meet modern requirements.

But whether a new kind of status of Russian Federation and the appointment of its army — the big question.

Running in circles

The process of reforming the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation has already acquired a continuous nature — about 20 years is their transformation. Each new defense minister and chief of the General Staff, starting to fulfill its commitments, says another restructuring departments on their own way. Military science in this process is not so much to develop more effective ways of reforming how to justify political decisions already taken by one or another course of action.

But launched in 2008 military reform in this country is superior to all previous degree Shattering, including Yeltsin's massacre of the Armed Forces.

Let's try to analyze the number of conducted during this period of change, having a severe impact on the Russian defense of the country.

Focus only on those that are critical to combat readiness and social stability in the country, namely:

1. Full contraction joints and parts of the frame, saving in the Russian Armed Forces units and only constant readiness.

2. Reduction of almost two and a half times the officer corps, the dissolution of the warrant officers and warrant officers.

3. The substitution of the majority of military positions in government, formations and units at the rear of the civilian staff, active implementation in logistics business organizations.

Mobilization unavailability

The implementation of the 1st part of the cornerstones of the reform — a complete reduction of the frame and units affected priemuschestvenno Army.

According to the Chief of the General Staff, Army General Nikolai Makarov, at the beginning of the transformation of the constant readiness were only 20 percent of the total number of units. Other — compounds and the frame. In the opinion of the "reformers" reduction of military units representing unfitness' headquarters and warehouses ", will allow significant rescue funds for the maintenance and upgrading of the remaining, the Tipo increase combat capability of the whole Russian army, and most importantly — reduced costs for its maintenance. With all of this overall size of the armed forces will be reduced by 340 thousand — up to 1 million people.

Among the compounds left 85 permanent readiness brigades, in other words 12-16 design divisions, which account for 3,000-4,000 km land border state.

The compounds of the frame and designed for deployment in the event of a general mobilization. Their elimination means destruction of the established order of military build-up and numerical strength of the Armed Forces during a specific reduction in the country's readiness to wage war.

In the absence of base mobilization deployment of ground forces in the best case, exposing all other destinations will be able to allocate less than 100 thousand people at one armed conflict. Make a grouping that is sufficient for the conduct of local war is impossible in principle, since the overall size of the armed forces is one million and 500 thousand in the focus of similar criteria just not from anyone. Available in the country to call reservists silly — for them there is no serviceable weapons and military equipment or supplies necessary material and technical equipment, nor orgyadra for the formation of combat-ready units and formations.

Meanwhile, the very fact that we had a 20 percent permanent readiness units, meant: with full mobilization deployment of our homeland would increase the number of combat-ready military units to 5 times during the period of threat. And if any of formations and units of the frame ground forces could form a group that is sufficient for the latter measure in quantitative terms to allow a local war.

Means to reform Russian armed forces were capable of without the introduction of nuclear weapons which reflect military anger the local scale, but now it has become impossible. In other words, in a similar case, we will have to use a nuclear weapon. Will this to our political governance? It's unlikely.

Optimization cleaning

In the same direction, and worked cutting measures almost two and a half times the size of the officer corps, and the dissolution of the warrant officers and warrant officers. With all that, the main blow fell on senior officers. Based on the outstanding data, the number of colonels had been reduced to about 5, lieutenant colonels — in the 4 majors — 2.5, captains — 1.8 times. Increased by 5 thousand people only the number of senior lieutenants and lieutenants. Gromozvuchnoe reduction in senior officer positions in comparison with these figures nekordinalno — about 200 (less than 20% of the existing structure). In other words, was knocked over cooked piece of the officer corps.

Total of the Russian Armed Forces have been laid off more than 200 thousand officers. Of these, more than half did not curry favor with deadlines and dismissed without corresponding output support, and in fact the case thrown out on the street.

Meanwhile, the highest fraction of the officers mentioned in the armies of several countries, which involve a significant increase in combat-ready units in wartime. They constitute the reserve for officers and authorities. By reducing this scale officer corps, "reformers" destroy the ability to recover the mobilization deployment base of — not of who will be as required forms the new management structure of the operational and tactical units, commanders of the new units. Not lieutenants will start to command regiments, brigades and divisions.

Another more severe consequence of such mayhem of the officer corps was the loss of command and staff schools, developed over the years of our army.

It is impossible not to note the extreme danger of such a step for the social stability of Russian society in the criteria of the developing economic crisis. Cast out into the street a large contingent of highly trained military experts, many of whom have combat experience, offended by the government and power, is an excellent base for the recruitment of personnel in the ranks of professor different factions of political ad
venturers, provocateurs and just criminal.

Dissolution of the warrant officers and warrant officers knocked on over cooked secondary technical personnel of the Armed Forces — those who own the majority of the personnel of the base was serving a more sophisticated military equipment.

As a result of these cuts was defeated not only the officer corps as a single system, and the base of junior officers of the Armed Forces.

Often remember Stalin's treatment of the officer corps of the Red Army and Red Navy in the thirties. Compared with today is the optimization of cleaning a slight misunderstanding.

Rear-Commerce

Can not be said of the transfer of the majority of military, more officer positions in government, formations and units in the rear of civilians while the active implementation in Russian army logistics business organizations.

From the case of "Oboronservis" it became clear why and how the commercialization of the Armed Forces.

The result of such "reforms" was the defeat of the Russian Armed Forces Rear Services with following the loss of combat capability of even parts of permanent readiness. For all this, experience has shown that the transfer of logistic support to commercial structures even in the smallest increment in times of appropriate costs of the military budget and enriched attracts for this company.

Believe also in the fact that traders successfully cope with the logistical support of the Armed Forces of the factions in the course of the war, can only complete layman in these matters.

Pretty cause such example. Division to solve tactical puzzles within 3 days of moderate-intensity combat operations requires from 4 to 6 different levels estimated supply (only 300 artillery ammunition for tanks on the day or three to about six levels of settlement). And they should be delivered, being formed in different parts of the country. Specifically, in the combat zone of logistic functions would have to make their massive firepower under the influence of the enemy, as the isolation of the area is one of the important tasks in the management of operations, though what the army of the world. That in these criteria are able to do business organizations? The question is rhetorical.

The great harm inflicted on other structures of the Armed Forces, for example by governments. Only one transfer of the Head of Staff of the Navy in St. Petersburg almost broke a strategic link in the system.

Brand new broom

Acts of the new Minister of Defence and his team are encouraging. Many of the more unsafe endeavors that Serdyukov and his team did not have time to finish, suspended. Thus, the actual liquidation of discontinued the Military Medical Academy. SM Kirov. Other measures are taken to repair the damage.

But of course, that the elimination of the consequences of the reform Straseni Serdyukov — Makarova will take many years and a large real costs.

Only the restoration of military medicine may take 5 — seven years. And how much time and effort will be needed to bring in the required state for the mobilization base deployment, management systems and logistics, the organizational structure of the Armed Forces, find this difficult time.

Judging by the volumes of financing for development of the Russian Army, and orientation of the first steps of the new defense minister, in control of the country there is a determination to bring order to the country's military organization. It's fun. Alarm only inspire fear, like zeal to achieve good goals and rapidly by ordinary measures, sometimes for the sake of short-term political enthusiasm, did not prevent rely on the advice of military science.

In principle, that in the framework of the forthcoming development of the Armed Forces (namely development, not reform — already doreformirovalis) lay down science-based military doctrine of the Russian Federation and the Concept of the Armed Forces. A military expert society of, will certainly help in this really generous.

Sweep the dirty linen in public hard, but necessary!

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