Land Forces of Ukraine

Land Forces of UkraineThe army (CB), a day which Ukraine once a year notes on Dec. 12, according to law are the basis of combat power of government armed forces. It is completely natural for a continental power, surrounded by massive militarily states and coalitions of countries. In almost all the advantages criteria "eventual opponents" (in general, the creator prefers a clearer, though less "politically correct" statement "potential adversary") of Ukraine in the amount and quality of military assets (both in general and on all major and species separately), as other powers to wage war, they are truly the last inventory protect national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and territorial integrity of Ukraine in case of armed conflict — particularly the average, and even more so of the highest intensity.

And despite all the fashionable (yes, in military construction also has its own "fashion"!) "Aerospace" and "spetsnaz" trends there is no reason to believe that the role of the Land Forces of Ukraine for any significant will change not only in the the coming years, but even in the coming decades. With all of this at once specifically Land troops are basic, but immediately, and the only component of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (MAT) to be received for solving problems "below the level of war" — including here at first various peacekeeping, military and humanitarian operations.

Because the development of the Army (70,753 armed forces personnel in staff numbers 73 million people, accounting for 48.7% of the total number of troops APU — it's statewide 150 thousand people — at the end of 2009) would direct attention. All the more so that in the years 1992-2009 (even despite the fact that 2009 has been declared the Year of the Army) questions of their fighting capacity remained in the shadow of both formally and practically used the enormous value of air and sea components of the APU. In general, there is one more way to have to direct more attention to the reform and development of state forces — it's more "conservative" elements of the Russian military machine.

Land Forces of UkraineGround forces are the countless views of the APU is not only on the number of personnel, weapons and military equipment, and on the number of connections. As part of their two operational command (almost — some army), one of the territorial administration (military-administrative district), 17 combat brigades (two armored, eight mechanized, airborne, airmobile two, three rocket and artillery), 14 separate combat regiments (mechanized, airmobile, three special purpose — including the Presidential Regiment, three rocket artillery, three anti-aircraft missiles, two helicopters and army aviation regiment REB) and nine individual regiments of combat support (four engineering, four — communication, one — radiation, chemical and bio-defense), a substantial number of other separate units and institutions of the regiment level and below, also of the 169th Training Centre "Desna" (approximate mechanized divisions). With all of this in the East of Ukraine have the proper disposal of virtually all types of guns (not including combat aircraft and Navy), including a brigade tactical missile systems such as "Tochka-U" (24 launchers) with ballistic missiles, "ground-to-ground", 735 main battle tanks, 2,155 armored vehicles, 892 artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket launchers large (100 mm) caliber, and 126 military transport and combat helicopters, 12 unmanned aerial vehicles.

Prepyadstviya and inconsistencies …

All these data are well known. It is often said about the famous and the "inefficiency" of organizational and personnel structures SE from a management point of view (in general, it is not in the least degree applies to other types of APU). In 1-x, is a question of excess amounts supernumerary arms (some tanks in the hands of public Armed Forces have 2978 pieces in staff numbers, remember, 735 units), some samples of which (for example, the average T-55 tanks or armored personnel carriers BTR- 60) completely obsolete. In-2, there is a relatively low number of formations and units: in the NE Ukraine 6.33 is referred to as design divisions, giving full strength (even without taking into account the individual agencies and units) is less than 11 thousand people in the settlement division). But even less attention is drawn to the fact that the existing organizational structure and disposition of weapons the Army does not allow this component of the Armed Forces successfully perform combat tasks.

In this case, refers to "systemic" failure — Land Forces of Ukraine will inevitably be faced with severe neuvvyazkami during combat operations against even approximately equal in size and quality of the technical equipment of the enemy, even if you expand them to full strength and allocate enough money and material resources for military training.

Examples of this huge amount. It is usually assumed that the major organizational reform prepyadstviya NE rooted in the levels of Army / Operational Command — Army Corps — Division — team/ Regiment and, accordingly, on the whole have been resolved. Significant bit of truth in this. But this — though not all. All the same the truth is that even more purposefully organized gang is less than a very expensive toy, if the structure of its battalions, divisions, mouth, and the batteries do not meet the requirements of the fighting. And in the East Ukrainian armored forces can not operate as small units of the organization, for example, a tank company such that it can only fight as a unit. Moreover, the tank Battalion Tank Brigade without the help of others to act can not, because they do not have to own a part of other weapon systems, not counting themselves tanks, mechanized infantry again. Accordingly, it does not matter what kind of anti-position, inaccessible to fire armored vehicles, it is converted to virtually insurmountable obstacle.

Comparison of the Army Corps NE of Ukraine with the standard Mechanized Infantry Division of the U.S. Army makes one notable reflection. So, if we have 155 tanks (if you take for example the 8th Army Corps, the organizational structure of which is considered to be more perfect) spread across five tank battalions and there in 6 battalions of 174 tanks, but once into their own 12 more mechanized infantry companies, 6 mortar platoons of eight 120-mm self-propelled mortars in each (each such line with our platoon mortar battery) and 6 platoons of four "combat vehicles with languid arms" (practically a light tank with medium tank weapons on the chassis battle infantry vehicles) M7 each. Mechanized Infantry Division "in the Washington" has three combat brigades and nine battalions, our 8th Army Corps — four brigade combat battalions and 19, but with all this, the total number of personnel in the Mechanized Infantry Division of the U.S. even slightly higher (approximately 16,000 people against about 15,500 people). But hardly anyone will argue that the efficiency of the personnel of the Army of Ukraine is higher than in the U.S. Army …

Land Forces of Ukraine

The organization of the battalions and brigades in the form of autonomous tactical battle groups is not some know-how. So makarom organized ground troops Federal Republic of Germany, right up to the beginning of the 1990s. In the army Bundeswehr were tank (three tank companies), mixed tank (two tank and one motorized infantry company), mixed motorized infantry (two mechanized infantry and one tank company), motorized infantry (three motorized infantry companies) and the infantry battalions (three infantry companies). That is the path to go for more than half a century, the Army of France, where in addition to the homogeneous tank and infantry regiments were mechanized infantry (three motorized infantry and tank companies) and mechanical (three armored and motorized infantry company) shelves. By this way and CB were first Ukrainian-2000s.

In general, it is better to give the floor to one of the founders of the reform battalion, Lieutenant-General Nikolai Nikolaevich Palchuk From 2000-2003, he held the post of Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: "If they had previously (mechanized and tank battalions. — SG) were actually in a pure state, then at this point we ran across a tactical battle groups. Apart from the 3-mechanized mouth will tank company, mortar battery, engineering and combat engineer platoon, a reconnaissance platoon, a platoon of rocket artillery. This battalion task force, able to operate without the help of others, stand-alone, in isolation from the main force. " Such a structure is proposed for tank battalions (only with 3 tank and one mechanized companies of respectively). Changed and the organization of tank companies — among them had to be 13 tanks (three platoons of four vehicles).

But later — by not fully understood and hitherto reasons — it was decided to reshape the battalion tactical groups again in virtually unblemished battalions. Returned to the "desyatitankovoy" and the structure of the tank company. By the way it is curious that naval forces of Ukraine — in contrast to the NE — the concept of 'battalion tactical group 2002 "stored 36 separate brigade of coastal defense coastal defense navy government organized specifically for this type. So, maybe there is a case where the army should learn from the Navy?

The situation exacerbated by the fact that more guns in combat units is not always quite enormous firepower. You can not, in truth, associate 122-mm self-propelled howitzer 2S1 "Carnation" (maximum firing range of about 22 km), for which there is at the Missile Forces and Artillery NE corrected (controlled) missiles, with modern highly automated 155-mm self-propelled artillery systems …

In store not pull pocket — NO Pripasov

Above the ground forces of the country are also constantly dominates the threat of depletion of supplies of old times. Yes, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the storage bases and arsenals in a lot of things left. But occasionally deteriorate not only preserves, and TNT. And at some point, the problem arises: where to get the ammo?

With all of this it should be emphasized that the modern experience of European countries in the construction of the Army to be perceived by Ukraine with great care. This is due to the fact that modern East countries — members of NATO and the EU are built based on a very different war than the one to which should be prepared by CB Ukraine. For example, the Europeans are guided by the fact that the conduct of land warfare, they will benefit from the support of massive high efficiency particulate air forces providing air superiority, and believe that their armed forces will lead to the main "expeditionary" operations (for remote — usually overseas , theaters).

Ukraine also has to prepare national NE at first to protect areas of the country and from the perspective of that of the air is, unfortunately, not for us (which, as it calls into question the effectiveness of introducing us to the armed conflict armored brigades and airborne units larger than battalion ). That is why Ukraine can not go by who are in the armed forces of large European countries that reduce their CB to a minimum (for example, the British are going to throw in a battle of their own SE of 6 combat brigades, the French — 10, Italians and Spaniards — 12 combat brigades). Have been named the country about the proper Ukraine in terms of population, and in the least big European countries downward trend is also visible NE — indeed, sometimes manifests itself in an even more severe degree. For example, NE Poland reduced to eight combat brigades, Romania — to 9 NE Hungary and Slovakia in general account for two or three combat brigades, respectively.

If we talk about the study and borrow foreign experience, the more pressing issues for us is the experience of NATO-1980s, when the union was obliged to build their coalition NE based on confrontation with the numerically superior and (at least) maloustupayuschim on all the main types of technical equipment opponent, and able to fight for supremacy in the air. In general, however, quite evident that there is an urgent need to promote the reform of the Russian NE at "grassroots" level: the battalion, company, and in the future, maybe, and a platoon-office. With all this foreign experience should be seen, as already mentioned, carefully, with an eye on of mandatory national geostrategic, military-political and military-technical realities.

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