First interrogation of General Vlasov

What did the Germans prisoner said Russian commander

The first interrogation of General VlasovThis document was kept in an envelope taped to the album "Volkhovskaya Battle", which was produced in a limited edition in December 1942, 621 th company of propaganda of the 18th German Army. He was in possession of German collector, approached me with a request to assist in the search for Russian museum or colleagues who are interested in, so got to find Russia.

The pieces below the published protocol has been published in number 4, "Military History Magazine" for 1991 (translated from the instance, which lies in the archives of KGB), but the full text of his I have read the first time. Here it is.

"Confidential.

A report on the interrogation of Commander 2nd Soviet-Russian Shock Army Lieutenant General Vlasov.

Part I

Short biographies and information regarding military career.

Vlasov was born on 01.09.1901, in the Gorky region (as in the text. — BS). Father: the farmer, the owner of 35-40 morgen of land (Morgen — 0.25 hectares, as it should, space allotment — about 10.9 hectares, in other words, was the father of the Vlasov middle peasants, and not with his fist, as claimed by Russian propaganda. — BS .), an old family farm. Received his secondary education. In 1919, he studied one year at the Institute of Nizhny Novgorod. In 1920, he joined the army reddish.

"Vlasov nothing hid from the Germans, and said opponent all he knew or heard of. But nothing indicated the possibility of switching to the service of the enemy "

B. initially was not accepted into the Communist Party, as last seminarian.

1920 — attends school junior commanders. Then he commanded a platoon on the Wrangel front. Continued military service before the war ended in 1920, then to 1925 — the platoon commander and the acting company commander. 1925 — attends secondary school leaders. 1928 — School senior commanders (in his autobiography, dated April 16, 1940, Brigadier General AA Vlasov, reported: "In the period of 1928-1929. Graduated tactical rifle-service training commanders of the Red Army," The Shot "in Moscow." — B . C.). 1928 — Commander of the battalion in 1930 — join the Communist Party for the purpose of promotion of the Red Army in. 1930 — teaches strategy at the officers' school in Leningrad. Since 1933 — assistant chief of 1a (Operations Division) at the headquarters of the Leningrad Military neighborhood (in his autobiography Vlasov, written April 16, 1940-go, said: "Since February 1933 transferred to the headquarters of the Leningrad Military neighborhood where he held the positions: pom. Chief of the 1st sector of the 2nd Division — 2 years; pom. chief of combat training — 1 year, after 1.5 years was head of the department of educational courses of military translators Intelligence Division of the Leningrad Military District. "2nd the department at that time really called the Operations Department. — BS). 1930 — Commander of the Regiment. 1938 — during the non-long-time chief of staff of the Kiev military neighborhood, after starring in the Soviet-Russian military delegation to China. During this period, promoted to the rank of colonel. At the end of a business trip to China in 1939 — the commander of the 99th Division in Przemysl. 13 months, the commander of the division. 1941 — Commander of the mechanized corps in Lemberg (Lvov. — BS). In the battle between Lemberg and Kiev motomehkorpus was destroyed. After that, appointed commander of the Kiev fortified area. At the same time, moved to just-formed 37th Army. From the environment in the area of Kiev came out with a small group of people. After which he was temporarily assigned to the disposal of the general (in reality the marshal. — BS) Tymoshenko in order to return the unit to ensure the real South-Western Front. A month has already moved to Moscow to join the command just formed 20th Army. Then — in the role of defensive battles around Moscow. March 7 — Commander of the 20th Army. March 10 — Transfer to the headquarters of the Volkhov front. Then began the activity tactical advisor to the 2nd Shock Army. After the dismissal of the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, General Klykova took command of the army on April 15.

Data on the Volkhov front and 2nd Shock Army.

The composition of the Volkhov front in mid-March: 52th, 59th, 2nd shock and the 4th Army.

The commander of the Volkhov Front: Army General Meretskov.

The commander of the 52nd Army Lieutenant-General Yakovlev.

The commander of the 59th Army: Major General Korovnikov.

The commander of the 4th Army: unknown.

Army Gen. feature Meretskova.

Selfish. Measured, dispassionate conversation between the commander of the army and commander of the front passed with great difficulty. Personal antagonism between Meretskov and Vlasov. Meretskov tried to shoot Vlasov. Very poor orientation and unsatisfactory orders Front headquarters 2nd Shock Army.

Brief description of Yakovlev.

Sturdy headed for success in the military, but is not satisfied with its implementation. Personnel officers often avoided it with promotion. Known as the zapivoha …

The structure of the 2nd Shock Army.

Known brigades and divisions. Noteworthy that those parts of the 52 th and 59 th Army, which were located in the Volkhov boiler, not in manual 2nd Shock Army.

As of mid-March 2nd Division attack army looked very exhausted. They suffered heavy losses in the fighting over the languorous winter. Armament had in sufficient quantity, but there was no ammunition. In the middle of March was already bad situation with the supply and deteriorating every day or a day.

Information about the opponent for mid-March was the low of the property.

Prerequisites: shortage of intelligence sources, was captured a few prisoners.

Headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army of thought in the middle of March that the army opposed to about 6-8 German divisions. It was clear that in the middle of March, these divisions have received substantial replenishment.

In the middle of March to the 2nd Shock Army were following tasks: taking Luban and connection with the 54th Army.

In connection with the subordination of the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov front, and the 54th Army — Leningrad Front failed to agree on a joint attack orders to Luban.

For information about the real state of the 54th Army reached the staff of the 2nd Shock Army is very rare and most did not match reality and increase the success of the army. With these methods Meretskov wished to encourage the 2nd Shock Army to move faster Luban.

After connecting the 2nd Shock and 54th Armies further challenge was the defeat of the German forces concentrated in CHudovo — Luban. The ultimate objective of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts in the winter of '42, according to Vlasov, is the liberation of Leningrad military means.

In the middle of March the plan of the 2nd Shock Army with the 54th Army was reduced to the subsequent: concentration of forces 2nd Shock Army to strike in Luban a reddish Gorka, strengthening flank in Dubovik — Eglino with the 13th Cavalry Corps, holding subsidiary attacks For the latest on Krivine and Village.

According to the views of the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, the plan failed on the subsequent reasons: missing punching power, very harried personnel, missing supply.

They held a promotion plan to Luban until the end of April.

First
of May, Lieutenant General Vlasov was summoned to Malaya Vishera a meeting with the staff of the front, the head of which was temporarily Lieutenant General Khozin from the Leningrad Front (MS Khozina, who commanded the Leningrad Front, from April 23 to June 8, which included the as troops temporarily abolished the Volkhov Front, was made a scapegoat for the death of the 2nd attack. 8 June he was dismissed with deadly wording: "For failure rates of first order timely and faster withdrawal of the 2nd Shock Army, for paper-bureaucratic ways command and control, with the separation of forces, with the result that the enemy cut the communication 2nd Shock Army and the last one was delivered in just a difficult situation. "But, strictly speaking, the enemy cut the communication 2nd attack even before Khozin took command of the troops Volkhov front. — BS). At this meeting, Vlasov was ordered to evacuate the Volkhov boiler. 52th and 54th armies were to cover the retreat of the 2nd Shock Army. May 9 meeting accomplished commander of the 2nd Shock Army with the division commanders, brigade commanders and commissars in the army headquarters, which he first announced his intention to withdraw.

Note. Indications defectors on the 87th Cavalry Division for the first time came on May 10 in the headquarters of the 18th Army, following the news received between 10 and 15 May.

Between 15 and 20 May the troops were given orders to retreat. Between 20 and 25 May retreat began.

To evacuate the Volkhov boiler had a follow-up plan.

At first outlet rear services, languid equipment and artillery protected infantry mortars. Then comes the rest of the infantry retreat for three successive abroad:

1st limit: Dubovik — Chervinskaya Luke;

2nd limit: Finev Meadow — Olhovka;

Third sector: the limit of the river Kerest.

The retreat of the 2nd Shock Army was to cover the flanks forces of the 52nd and 59th armies. Part of the 52 th and 59 th Army, stationed inside the Volkhov boiler had to get out of it in an easterly direction at last.

Prerequisites woes aside, the very bad condition of the roads (spill), very bad supply, especially ammunition and provisions, no one controls the 2nd attack, 52nd and 59th Armies of the Volkhov front.

The fact that on May 30 to break through the encirclement was again closed by the German troops, the 2nd Shock Army became clear only after day or two. In this regard, the closure of the environment, Lieutenant General Vlasov claimed from the Volkhov Front: 52-th and 59-th German armies to bring down barriers at any cost. In addition, he traveled all that were in his possession Force 2nd Shock Army in the East Krechno to open up the west German screener. Lieutenant General Vlasov was not clear why from the front staff did not follow all the three armies of the total order on the German breakthrough barrier. Any army was fighting a more or less independently.

On the part of the 2nd Shock Army was made on June 23 last exertion of effort to make our way to the east. Immediately forces the 52nd and 59th armies employed to cover the flanks to the north and the south, did not keep under control the situation (in practice: kamen … ins Rutschen — slipped, slid. During the interrogation piece, placed in the "Military Historical Journal ", this more gentle to command the 52 th and 59 th Armies, but no corresponding translation of the original German text:" At the same time to cover the flanks began to move from the north and south of the 52 th and 59 th Army. "- BS). May 24 (possible typo, it should be: on June 24. — BS), the unified management of the 2nd Shock Army was unreal and the 2nd Shock Army is divided into separate groups.

Lieutenant General Vlasov particularly emphasizes the impact of destroying the German Air Force and the very highest of loss caused by the artillery barrage.

According to Lieutenant General Vlasov, about 3,500 of the wounded 2nd Shock Army out of the environment in the east, along with the remains insignificant parts.

Lieutenant General Vlasov said that about 60,000 people from the 2nd Shock Army were either captured or destroyed. (In all likelihood, Vlasov was referring to the loss of the March — June. For comparison: in this period 18th German army lost 10,872 killed and 1,487 people missing and 46,473 injured person, and only 58 832 people, which is less than one only transient loss of Vlasov's army. German irrevocable loss are five times less than the losses of non-performing alone, the 2nd Shock Army. Lindemann But the army at that time was fighting against the 52-th and 59-th army, a significant portion of the compounds which also found in the boiler and suffered not the least damage than army Vlasov. In addition, against the 18th German operated the 4th and the 54th Army. One can imagine that the transient loss of these 3 armies were at least three times more than the losses of non-performing 2nd attack. — BS). About the size of parts of the 52 th and 59 th Army, stationed in Volkhovsk pot, he could not tell any details.

The intentions of the Volkhov front.

Volkhovsky front wished to withdraw the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov boiler to the east and to concentrate it in the area of the Little Vishery for recovery, while holding all this Volkhovsky bridgehead.

After the restoration of the 2nd Shock Army planned to deploy it in the northern part of the Volkhov springboard in order to push for CHudovo with the 2nd Shock Army in the south and the 54th and 4th armies from the north. In connection with the development of the situation, Lieutenant General Vlasov did not believe in the incarnation of the plan.

According to the views of Lieutenant General Vlasov, plan the release of Leningrad military will continue to be carried out.

Implementation of this plan will depend on a meaningful way from recovery divisions Volkhov and Leningrad fronts and on receipt of new forces.

Vlasov said that with the forces available at the current time, the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts are not able to deploy large-scale coming in the Leningrad area. In his view, the available forces just enough to delay the Volkhov front and the line between Kirishev and Lake Ladoga.

Lieutenant General Vlasov denies the need to commissioners of the Red Army. In his view, in the aftermath of the Finnish-Russian War, when there were no commissioners, commanders felt better.

Part II

questioning Commander 2nd Soviet-Russian Shock Army Lieutenant General Vlasov

Acquisition.

The older the age group of numbers called, popular him — 1898 p., The youngest age group — born in 1923.

The new formation.

In February, March and April, conducted a large-scale deployment of new regiments, divisions and brigades. The main area of new units must be located in the south, on the Volga. He Vlasov, disoriented in new formations inside Russia.

Military industry.

In the Kuznetsk industrial area in the south-eastern Urals, created a significant military industry, which is now enhanced by industry, evacuated from the occupied territories. Here all are the main raw materials: coal, ore, metal, but no oil. In Siberia, there may be only a small underutilized oil fields. Creating products increased by reducing the length of the production process. Vlasov worldview is that the industry in the Kuznetsk region will be small enough to ensure that the needs of the Red Army in the languid arms, even if they lose the Donetsk region.

The food situation.

The food situation, we can say sustainable. Absolutely can not do without Ukrainian grain, but in Siberia there are significant excavation area not so long ago mastered.

Foreign supplies.

The newspapers pays great attention to supplies from the UK and America. According to newspaper reports Tipo received arms, ammunition, tanks, aircraft, and food in bolshennom quantity. He has only been in the army telephone
s South American production. Foreign weapons in their own army he beheld.

About the development of a second front in Europe, he heard the subsequent: Russian in the Russian Federation there is a universal outlook, which found also reflected in the papers that even this year the British and the Americans will create a second front in France. It was Tipo firmly promised to Molotov.

Operational plans.

According to Stalin's orders number 130 of May 1 the Germans were supposed to be for this summer just driven out of Russia. The beginning of the huge Russian summer coming was coming near Kharkov. To this end, a huge number of divisions in the spring airlifted to the south. Northern Front neglected. This may explain the fact that the Volkhov Front was unable to obtain new reserves.

Advent Tymoshenko failed. Vlasov, despite this, believe that, maybe, Zhukov will mean either a multitude coming from Moscow. He is still pretty reserves.

If brand-new strategy Tymoshenko, "elastic defense" (slip fit), would be used on the Volkhov, he Vlasov may be left with its own army from the environment unharmed. He is not qualified to assess how broadly this strategy can be used, regardless of the operating unit.

According to the views of the Vlasov, Tymoshenko is in any case a more capable control of the Red Army.

When asked about the significance of our coming on, he explained to Don that gasoline supplies from the Caucasus could have on the critical importance of the Red Army, because the substitution of the Caucasian oil almost can be found in Siberia. Consumption of gasoline inside the Russian Federation had already been severely limited.

In general terms, he notes that it is very striking is the fact that he, as commander of the army had not been informed about the operational situation on a larger scale, it is stored in such a secret that even the army commanders do not possess information about scheduled command in their own areas of responsibility.

Weaponry.

He had not heard about the construction of a 100-ton heavy tanks. In his opinion, is the best tank T-34. 60-ton KV, in his view, it is very cumbersome, especially taking into account that its armor protection needs to be strengthened.

The relatives of defectors.

In principle, they are not in Russia began to shoot, except for relatives defected commanders. (Here the Vlasov case or intentionally misinformed the Germans. Decree number 270 of the Supreme High Command of the August 16, 1941 foresaw only arrest deserters families, in other words those who voluntarily surrenders the enemy, and even then only if the defectors are commanders or commissioners. True , GK Zhukov, when he was the commander of the Leningrad Front, sent a coded telegram number 4976 of 28 September 1941 the Political Administration of the Baltic Fleet, "Explain to all personnel that all the family will be surrendered to the enemy and shot on his return from captivity as they will all be shot . "It is unlikely that this threat is not made available to the military and on the Leningrad front. But she had only propaganda value. In practice, shoot deserters family of beetles arms were too short. fact engaged NKVD executions, and it is run by the order number 270, is not so terrible repression provide. Vlasov could hear something about Zhukovsky order, formally repealed as illegal only in February 1942. Maybe he knew about Stalin's telephone message Military Council of the Leningrad front of 21 September 1941, in which the leader claimed, did not hesitate to use a weapon against women, old people and kids, which the Germans as if sent to the advanced lines of Russian troops to persuade them to surrender. general, there is no mention of the likely shooting families of defectors. It is possible that the last commander of the 2nd Shock Army was thinking to do the service of the Germans, and filled to the cost: say, then I would have to risk the life of loved ones. — BS).

Attitude to Russian prisoners of war in Germany.

People do not believe, like Russian prisoners of war in Germany shot. There are rumors that under the influence of Hitler attitude to Russian prisoners of war in the near future better.

Leningrad.

The evacuation of Leningrad and the last day or NIGHT MODE. The city will be held by military means in all circumstances of judgment prestige.

Individual information.

For about 3 months, Colonel-General Vasilevsky holds the position of Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.

Marshal Shaposhnikov left the position for health reasons.

Marshal Kulik no longer in charge. He was stripped of the title of marshal.

Marshall Budennyi, according to unconfirmed disk imaging, has received a new mission — forms the new connections in the rear of the army.

Voroshilov — a member of the Supreme Military Council in Moscow. He no longer has the troops under his command. "

Comment-epilogue

In principle, one can not say that the questioning of the former army commander has promoted the Germans get some very valuable information. Since June 24, when lost contact with the headquarters of the front, and to capture the moment on July 12 Vlasov had no disk imaging on the situation of troops. Not the case mentioned by General of the 2nd shock not even recorded in the minutes: German intelligence they have long been identified.

Did not present enthusiasm for the enemy and the properties of those or other Russian commanders. What's the use of that Meretskov — "very nervous, scattered personality" ('re nervous after having spent several months visiting Beria)? And what benefited the German command post that the commander-52 Yakovlev really drink? All the same, the attack on the position of the army under its commander did not binge timing. And information about the Lend-Lease Act and the timing of opening a second front, set Vlasov, were at the level of rumors.

But historians majestically Russian, I believe, should pay attention to the analysis of Luban operation. Vlasov main blame for the trouble it had offered to the command of the front and adjacent armies. In this particular reasons in the testimony of General prisoner there. After all, the lack of interaction between the 2nd attack and armies, who tried to release it, then, that Vlasov were not subject to division adjacent associations find themselves together with him in the "boiler room" — wine front command. And if Stalin would not bring charges against the army commander, surrounded by the army led by him, as one by one removed from the post of commander of the front and Meretskova Khozina specifically for failure to render aid Vlasov. The failure of a supply of the 2nd attack, as indicated by Vlasov as one of the main causes of the defeat was predetermined weakness of Russian transport aircraft.

Interestingly, the Vlasov put Tymoshenko as a leader above Zhukov, although specifically for the start of the last general managed to achieve great success. Perhaps Andrei Andreyevich more impressed "elastic defense" Tymoshenko, almost everything has saved reddish army in the period of the plan, "Blau" than Zhukovskoye eagerness to attack at any cost. It is possible that the Vlasov Zhukov took some conflict and Jora K. tried to fuse the opposite commander to the Volkhov front.

I think Vlasov did not hide from the Germans, and said opponent all he knew or heard of. But nothing, apart from reading about the executions families commanders defectors did not indicate the possibility of switching to the service of the enemy. This Andrey significantly different, for example, was taken prisoner by a Viaz'ma Lieutenant General MF Lukin, who at first questioning the commander of Army Group "Center" Field Marshal von Bock December 14, 1941 proposed the formation of anti-Bolshevik government in Russia, which "may become the newest hope for the people." From becoming a collaborato
r Mikhail Fedorovich bailed out that von Bock was soon removed from his post and was unable to do anything to support the initiatives of the commander-19. Vlasov, as you know, ended his life on the gallows.

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