Anatoly Hrulev. For me, the war started on my work. August 7 at Army Headquarters arrived commander of the district, Colonel-General Sergei Makarov Afanasevich with him a group of staff officers neighborhood. Almost day or two earlier, on August 5, he approved the decision of the Commander of the 58th Army to strengthen the Russian military contingent in the mixed peacekeeping forces in the zone of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict. This plan has been developed for those cases in danger of hostilities. During the day or we have worked with the commander of the garrison in Vladikavkaz in the evening and returned to the army headquarters. About 22 hours commander departed to rest for myself, and I stayed in the office to work with documents. The situation was alarming. The situation heated up every day. Shelling from both sides, moving equipment and troops from the Georgian side, tough talk, evacuation ladies and kids Ossetians. A week earlier ended the Georgian military exercises, which were held together with South American advisers and with their active participation. We also exercises were held and ended in early August, and we just got back its troops in paragraphs unchanged dislocation. I already knew that in 16 hours, Saakashvili said that Georgia is in the order of one-sided cease fire, but I'm his demonstrative peacemaking after weeks of discharge of the situation made me think. I know the saying that if the enemy holds out the bread for you, look for it second hand, it can be a dagger. In general, it was disturbing. At 00.00 hours the phone rang. The telephone operator reported:
— Comrade Commander, you urgently Kulahmetov …
…A moment later he heard a tube Marat Minyurovicha:
— Anatoly, I just went to the Minister of Defense of Georgia, he informed me that Georgia began a military operation to restore its territorial integrity. A massive artillery barrage. Conducted fire on positions of peacekeepers. This is the beginning of the war.
— Are you sure about this?
He told me:
— Yes, I am officially reporting to. This is war!
Immediately duty officer received a report from Army duty peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia to start fighting the Georgian side.
And here I give the command operational duty:
— Open the package, begin the alarm actions for peace-keeping forces to bring the signal as it relates to them, to formations and units allow notification. Operational duty to report Squaw.
It was at 00.03 a minute.
At 00.07 on August 8 came confirmation signal from the headquarters of a neighborhood. I am at this moment was sitting in his office, reflecting on all that happened. I remember very well my feelings at this moment. There was anger that this fool Saakashvili still waged war, and now so much blood will be spilled, so many people will die, and in fact could have been resolved peacefully by all …
And then all the feelings are gone. Began combat work. At the headquarters of the 58th Army had cooperated constant alert task force officers. They have to give a signal, immediately decrease at CBU, and immediately began to prepare military documents to collect information. In 0015 I arrived at the CCU, a senior operative group reported on the readiness to work. I said to him puzzle to collect data on the situation of peacekeepers and early action to signal their own forces and means. This coming after the collection of all operational personnel of the army, according to the combat crew began work on the emerging situation. In the main these were questions alerting, the march on their routes in the areas of concentration, to what tasks to be ready, as interaction and comprehensive support. At 00.15 on the CBU arrived commander of the district, Colonel-General Sergei Makarov Afanasevich, I told him the situation and received permission to continue the combat work. That's how the war started …
IMPORTANT — TIME TO WIN
VS Why did the Georgians chose to attack on South Ossetia on August 8, a day specifically? Why not earlier or later? This has some logic, or is it simply a case of the chosen date?
AH Niskolechko I have no doubt that in terms of the attack on South Ossetia in choosing the command of the Georgian period and their advisors to take into account everything, and the date of the attack was chosen very carefully. It was a waste plan, which takes into account all aspects. Even those who seemed to be able to know just quite have served in the Russian army people. Well, for example, as I read, under the guise of teaching the Georgians to work out issues focusing on the borders of South Ossetia, a strong attack force. With all this exercise date they are specifically shifted so that their teachings have ended a two-day or three earlier than ours. And that's when the war began, when the units and my army returned to their FPD equipment stood in the pits and in need of maintenance, the instrument has been put in the room to store guns. After the exercises, usually two-day or three leaves on all organizational matters: personnel wash, change clothes, the officers left Grozny rest, in other words, the troops after the exercise are usually less alert. It has also been taken into account and where there were military and political control of the country in which the system was able to control the armed forces and personnel changes. All of this was taken into account. In addition, the Olympic Games began. All the attention was on her. With pinpoint accuracy the time he was elected. And I'm sure — not elected by Georgians. Think of what organized information campaign has been launched across the world immediately after the start of the war? Is that Georgia could organize? I knew their military control — there was a proper level of thinking, and here was a totally different mindset, a different school. It is now trying to distance itself advisers to say: we do not know, but defeat is an orphan. It is clear that no one is eager to become the creator of a lost war.
In preparing this war, taking into account all the reasons Georgian generals and their advisers have not considered the head: the fact that we are constantly kept a close watch on the situation and, in spite of "the average temperature in the clinic," it was the responsibility of the band of the 58th Army. Because we beat the Georgians and their American trainers and advisers. After completing the exercise, and knowing that the Georgians continue to obscure maneuver forces and means that the situation is diverse, disturbing — some units and the army did not return to the barracks, and remained in the mountains on the way to the Roki tunnel, two battalion tactical groups (BTGr) 2 uh-motorized rifle regiments with their commanders and control groups, a total of a little
more than seven hundred people. Both were excellent BTGr dispersed, masked and it is staffed by people, equipment, ammunition, fuel. Specifically, these BTGr decided the final operation …
VS Is not there more to tell what the battalion task force?
AH To ensure that the fight against terrorism in the 58th Army in each regiment was formed battalion tactical groups, which were staffed by 100 per cent, and technology, and personnel. These task forces have been made on the experience of the first and second Chechen campaigns for each group went motorized infantry battalion with attached units of intelligence, tank, artillery, air defense, engineering, communications, NBC, and units of maintenance and logistics support with the necessary supplies. Within 6 months, they were in a two-hour readiness to fulfill the objectives, then changed their personnel. In the main, these battalion tactical groups were designed to perform counter-terrorism measures in the band of responsibility, but were prepared to deal with all manageable tasks. Here was, say, a regiment in Ingushetia, the personnel of his battalion tactical group for 2-hours after receiving the alarm was on full alert and was able to do assigned tasks. All BTGr were manned, who served for more than 6 months! They had neither the 1st fighter who served for a least 6 months. None 1st! The main contractors were, and, as I have read, all the soldiers and officers were well aware tasks facing them and were prepared to implement them. Specifically, these BTGr played a decisive role in the defeat of the Georgian army. In addition, to ensure that the actions of these additional BTGr remained in the mountains of artillery units, and logistical and technical support. Because quite clear statement Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov, what with the war waged war Squaw some parts of the unorganized and understaffed, and that the management of the operation were collected in all districts of the officers. This statement is simply not true and throws a shadow on the soldiers and officers of the 58th Army with honor its own duty to the homeland.
VS And what happened after the announcement of the excitement?
AH 1.30 In all the staff officers were on their own ground combat, I brought them into the environment, brought to their preparatory elements of the plan the operation, caused the calculations. The work has begun. He joined the action great fighting mechanism — 58th Army! Need to introduce yourself, this scale! Formations and units stationed on the territory of 9 subjects Russian Federation, the furthest Army Brigade, 136th — 380 kilometers in Dagestan. And all this in motion. Finding the District Commander Colonel-General Sergei Makarov Afanasevicha very assist business, this rapid and faster resolution of all issues related to the decision, also on the organization of interaction with the units and formations neighborhood. Thus, the 42th Division was subordinate to me, but had as its main focus Chechnya. And the commander of the neighborhood, do not hesitate to give the nod to the planning and her too. There were a lot of questions, and these tense hours Sergei Afanasevich showed his very best properties of the management and organizer.
By 6 am most of the work on the assessment of the situation, the embattled troops, their deployment and development of solutions has been completed. On the basis of the decision were given orders to the units and on the march and indicating areas where they need to come in, where to stay, focus, what kind of actions to be prepared. And the wheel started to happen!
VS I can not ask about intelligence. You talk about the beginning of the war, as if you did not have any pre-emptive disk imaging. As if we were Georgians plans are unknown. Worked as a military intelligence? Have opened the manufacture of Georgia to the war?
AH Of course, the war did not start suddenly. It's at this point some in the General Staff, said that from that moment the war will start without the threat period, that's so sudden and rovnenky place. This stupidity will leave without comment. At least some of the war has its own period of threat. We slowly and unavoidable situation grew tense all the last two years. It was clear that the case goes to war. Naturally, I wanted to avoid it, there were hopes that the diplomats are somehow able to agree, would not allow a military scenario, but we do not base their work on the hopes and in reality, and that was disappointing. Because of the fact that the military will act, we meant. But, unfortunately, our intelligence has not worked. We were not very definite enough disk imaging of the enemy, his movements, his plans. Came some scattered reports and telegrams approximate nature. I got a lot more disk imaging from their own scouts who "trawled" broadcast, discussed with people who have had any relatives in Georgia, or with those who have been there myself. It was a much more accurate information than what was going on. We learned more disk imaging of radio transmissions Georgian taxi drivers who were discussing among themselves which roads are now closed due to the passage of troops or where customers were taken in uniform. We might have to order more disk imaging, if they could work on the ground in South Ossetia, but I can testify — and this is true — before the war, we were strictly forbidden to conduct reconnaissance of the Caucasus range. This is foreign territory! There can not climb! It was only possible to conduct radio interception. Naturally, something reported peacekeepers who were on duty monitoring the peace zone and had to hunt down any movements of armed people and technology in this area. And they did not go beyond their own capabilities. They understood that the Georgians are very closely tracked down our behavior, and all around was a lot of their residency. Therefore, you need to be honest, our intelligence on the initial stage of the war can not cope with the task. The Georgian group was not actually opened. Were not opened any extension of artillery in position, no extension of mechanized parts. Need to pay tribute to the enemy: it is perfectly camouflaged their production for the war and was able to achieve tactical surprise.
VS How you managed to capture the strategic Guftinsky bridge?
AH Before making BTGr I put commanders task: how to break through to faster Tskhinvali, preventing Georgians to close the road and take over positions. All outposts and checkpoints to shoot down, and most importantly — to capture the strategic Guftinsky bridge, fold away the Georgians as far as possible, then one BTGr go in the direction of Tamarasheni, and the second — on the Zar road to the peacekeepers to be enabled and the gain.
And that you realized the level of training of people, I have to report that the first BTGr already in the 40 hour night passed the Roki tunnel and double-quick with the release of the combat reconnaissance patrol went down, and the second BTGr came into the tunnel!
They went to the bridge Guftinskomu in 4 hours and 40 minutes — just at the moment when the other side of the bridge was approached by the Georgians. And Georgians us just are not expected. They could not imagine that four hours after the declaration of war, Russian troops will be virtually Tamarasheni. Georgians took to the bridge and began to block it. The regimental commander, Colonel Andrey Kozachenko reported that he went out to the bridge and watching it Georgians. I gave him a puzzle — a tank platoon on the move to capture the bridge, to bring down the Georgians and swing from the bridge. And the commander of the puzzle completed. He practically dared Georgian fire from the bridge and forced them to retreat. In this battle, we have lost the BMP, which was in the best patrol. Georgians are trying to organize a defense, it was hit and she lost control, fell off the bridge.
"THEY DID NOT fool"
VS And what happened at that time behind your back? How
was organized by the invasion of South Ossetia?
AH By morning on Transkam troops were already without annoying. At the forefront of the three battalion tactical groups and immediately after them artillery regiment of the 19th Division and missile parts. BTG were the first to cover the artillery. The main was possible to reach faster through the "hole", as we called among themselves the Roki Tunnel, the artillery. The pass that it can be quickly deployed to positions in the mountains and to support fire fighting battalions and nominate Transkam column. At 10.30 minutes on August 8, the commander of the neighborhood, who worked on the CPU with the officers gave me task: "to fly to South Ossetia — except you, there's no one will understand. Here is all debugged. Troops began to advance, tasks are defined, and at the moment you have to be there to understand on-site conditions. As there at the moment is really going on, where are the peacemakers, where Georgians? problem: first — to prevent the destruction of peacekeepers, unlock them. 2nd — peaceful inhabitants. Prevent the destruction of residential neighborhoods and villages. third — do not let the Georgians in the case of the capture of the town prepared him for defense. know what capabilities are not many, but these forces and resources you need to perform these tasks until you fit the troops. "
It was absolutely the right decision. It is unrealistic to control troops in such a difficult situation through the Caucasus Mountains. And I immediately went to the helipad. At this point, we already know that the air is working Georgian aircraft. Known and what is not destroyed and the Georgian radars work and means — we can detect. But it was necessary to fly. The pilots were aces, we walked along the very bottom of the gorge, almost over the very tops of the trees and broke through undetected. At 11:45 on August 8th I was in Java, proparhali virtually Georgian bombs. Almost a few minutes before landing at the Georgian attack planes bombed the town of Java, and even dust has settled, we sat down. With me was a group of staff officers: gunner, scout, engineer, operator. Board sat down, we jumped — and went overboard. I am here on the spot led to where the battalion groups, and said to them tasks — to break through to the town by the Zar road. Here's why I had to be there, so in place to respond to changing circumstances and to make decisions.
There also was a reconnaissance platoon of the 135th Regiment, commanded by Captain seized upon them, he was tasked to conduct reconnaissance along the route of movement, not to get involved in the fight, only to monitor and report, not counting the 1st exception — in the case of missile systems, multiple rocket launchers , to destroy them, as one such volley installation could make some very many ills. We were also BTGr rocket launchers systems "Grad", but had to hold them in reserve for the last time, because there was only one unit of fire rockets and supply in the event of exhaustion of it was very hard to organize, as the only road was packed with refugees exposed to fire and Georgians. By 22.40 BTGr focused on Galuanskih Heights, dispersed and camouflaged. Commanders was specified task: to prepare for the morning fighting, reconnaissance — and he went back on the road to the Roki tunnel. There she worked task force headed by the Army Chief of Staff Major General Zhuravlev, organizing wiring columns through the Roki tunnel. And there is at this moment arrived commander of the neighborhood, we met with him in the morning from the eighth to ninth in the tunnel.
In general, the wire troops Transkam was complicated and well-conducted operation. The pressure was tremendous. In 1-x, the movement along the mountain serpentine road, where of the driver requires experience and caution, because no matter what a mistake can end tragically: in the quiet time in the gulf frustrated car, people died, and hundreds of units are multi-ton combat vehicles , heavy traffic, maximum speed, and, many drivers at this point behind was not the one weaving km march. Columns continuous procession stretched upward to the Roki pass on the pass road slimming first into the concrete gallery, and behind it — a very long narrow tunnel.
When I pulled up to the tunnel, columns practically flew through it. Traffic density was such that the gas content of the circuits to be seen walking in front of the machine, but its parking lights. Ventilate no time, and on arrival at the tunnel all drivers were given wet gauze bandages, so it was easier to breathe. But thanks to the good organization and coordination of work of the task force, we have not lost any of the 1st person! Car broke down, yes, it was. Tech-it was totally new. Two Chechen war has passed. But on the track were organized collection points for faulty equipment, duty trucks, which immediately evacuated the faulty equipment and hauled it to the site, where it engaged repairers.
It must be said that after the exercise was not collapsed full point for technical and logistic support. We expected when in the adjacent countryside all Georgian troops return to the PDP. I realized that if zagremit over the ridge, the time for deployment rears we will not. And where to begin, except in the mountains We will go and FEMA, and the doctor to meet and handle a large flow of refugees. And everyone will find a comfortable area close to the Roki tunnel. And them and so — cat narevel. This mountain — there do not turn around. Because in the course of the exercise have been deployed in the most appropriate place of all-encompassing TTO items that do not interfere with the work of other departments. Ran it on the rear of the Deputy General Yuri Rukovishnikov. He had and has its own security, and its relationship to be defined in advance of posts that were on the routes are highlighted were the means of evacuation, Rembate was deployed, stores of food and fuel, and it was all very well disguised. The Georgians did not take into account or not appreciated, even such telltale signs.
VS Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov said that the problem with the introduction of troops serviceability technology was critical.
AH This does not apply to the formations and units of the 58th Army, he confused with the Siberian Military District, commanded for many years, and where the equipment was looted, where it sent out to repair the factories. I was Chief of Staff of the 41st Army in this environment and I know the situation. He moved the data to all the other armed forces. But it is not. In the 58th Army equipment was serviceable and staffed. We were warring district. Because repair technology has been the cornerstone. Already in 2007, due to redistribution inside the army formations and units were equipped with the same type of cars. Equipment with gasoline vehicles put on diesel, which allows us to simplify the preparation of professionals, software and maintenance. This great work was carried out under the control of Deputy armament Colonel Alexander Arzimanova.
VS How do you assess the conduct of aviation? As was generally cooperated interaction with the Air Force?
AH As part BTGr were forward air that coordinated actions of aviation. But generally very nearly everything was kept on the fact that we and the pilots were cooked long enough in one pot North Caucasus Military District. We knew each other personally, and this is a critical moment to help out. So, I personally knew Budennovsky regiment commander Sergei Kobylasha. We have a lot of Chechnya led by the interaction of his squadron were part of the group in the Chechen Republic. And later, we constantly work on exercises practiced interaction. And as the army was put on alert, I immediately contacted him directly and explained the situation.
The last commander of the North Caucasus Military District, General of the Army Alexander Baranov, when he ran for teaching us always very picky about the issues of interaction with a
ircraft and other services, and it has played a positive role in the process of following. At one point, Alexander on the day delayed the exercise until the headquarters is not representative of the Caspian flotilla arrived with capacity to make decisions and set goals.
In general, there is a lot of hard, depending on how the interaction cooperated as well aware of puzzles solved in time and place. Was in the early days when the scouts spotted unfolding Georgian mortar battery. It was necessary to score a fire strike until she opened fire on us. But before communication with the CPU for about a kilometer, had to use satellite communications correspondent of "Komsomolskaya Pravda" Alexander Kotz. I am here for the same memory cell phone call the Secretary of the military council, "Climb this one issue urgently." He immediately picked up the phone. "I -" blizzard ", write down the coordinates of where to strike!" Check the coordinates. "Done!" After 10 minutes of intelligence reports — the goal struck before the opening of fire!
In the process of fighting with us is a correspondent for many Russian media, which also risked their lives for the benefit of the management tasks. Unfortunately, the next too little about the actions of the troops wrote our beloved "reddish star." Lighting actions only led by Colonel-General Anatoly Nogovitsin. But the organization of disk imaging Western media we have voices. And what conclusion is made of this campaign in a new form of information support?
VS On TV there was much talk about the role of the Navy in the conflict. How do you assess it?
AH I can not assess the deeds Airborne. By the time they entered South Ossetia, I was injured, and the situation was already brokenfooted, ending the war is practically solved ground forces from the 58th Army. Whether it was necessary to use such highly troops as the Army? This is a question for those who make decisions on their use, especially because it is the supreme commander of the reserve.
VS A unified air defense system has been covered or any part of itself?
AH Defense has been a single, it was governed by defense chief, who was on the CBU army. But air defenses were in Ossetia within combat battalions and artillery. I could not keep the defense before the troops — first troops had to go through the tunnel, and later have air defenses. But after passing the tunnel, they immediately turned around and, therefore, the Georgians have the finale of the first day finished flights. I only remember one of their attack on the town of Java and then back to the approach of our troops. When the troops came, they were not bombarded …
VS How to you manage to break in Tskhinvali?
AH I have already said above that the first step we had only two battalion tactical groups and two batteries of self-propelled guns to 5 guns, MLRS battery against the whole of the Georgian group. And I realized that if Georgians usvoyut sorted out and how many of us, it just will crush and kill. On their side was full an advantage. Moreover, not only numerically. Their was a new technique, good communication, a beautiful organization. These were trained and perfectly cooked pieces and nonsense now they say those who call the Georgian army operetta. It was a very serious and terrible opponent. And I'm not exaggerating niskolechko. Yes, there were military actions in Chechnya, but it can not be associated. There were bandits organized, but the gang that could knock out an ambush, but could not keep fighting these acts against a standing army. And then the enemy was smart, stubborn, trying to impose their scheme of the fighting, which has the most modern weapons and perfectly cooked fighter. On my eyes Georgian tanks in an ambush with the first shot destroyed moving in small open areas at high speed passenger cars. The real snipers! Our artillery is more than 10 minutes in the same position was not, as the Georgians were good reconnaissance and counter-battery fight worked. After only fifteen minutes after opening fire at the place where our artillery fired, Georgian shells rained down. Only once the gunners were wrong — and here is the loss suffered. Dead battery commander. There was a fight, infantry fire support requested, and he was the 1st and the same site performed fire on the second task. Immediately after that began to leave, but did not have time and came under fire. Four cars were gone, he does not have time to get out of the fifth …
And wage war against such an enemy could only be breaking all the templates, forcing his initiative, not giving him opamyatovatsya, dealt blows small units on several fronts. By keeping a permanent military intelligence, find breaks in combat formations, because it can not be a continuous strip of hostilities. All of this was inherent in the actions in the mountains a long time ago, but some just for the moment has come.
Because, knocking Georgians from the bridge, throwing them to the Tamarasheni, I have decided to divide into separate company commander BTGr group, and from time to time and platoon, and that these groups are very "take away" Georgians hamper their fight, daring and instant action, struck — gone, dealt a blow — left, also drawing fire damage forced to run across the defense. Impress upon them that we are many, we are coming from all sides. Do not let them come to his senses and break their control. Maintain constant exposure units and fire.
For this it was necessary to have a highly trained personnel and perfectly cooked commanders. And I can say with pride — the soldiers and officers of the 58th Army coped with this task. An important role is played by patriotism, moral and psychological spirit, loyalty oath and standards of the country, self-confidence and a willingness to exploit.
Despite the agreement reached by surprise, despite the extensive role of advisers and trainers, despite the highest trained troops and poorly armed, the Georgian army was defeated. And it's not magic, as some people are now trying to present. This victory was a large, long-standing work of many people, which I should like to say.
The success of operations of the 58th Army of the former big reward District Commander General of the Army of the Hero of the Russian Federation Alexander Ivanovich Baranov. A brilliant military officer, vysokoerudirovanny, competent, intelligent, over the years it own leaders did a great job, raising the combat readiness of units and the neighborhood, educating and nurturing us subordinates. Alexander has put a lot of strength and health in our training, helped by word and deed, in fact, not at the theoretical level. All exercises were held only at the standard technique in the regular units. Of interacting entities involved only people who had the right to make decisions and give instructions to subordinates, not observers and advisers. As a result, vehicles and weapons despite the fact that she had passed two campaigns, was intact, equipped, combat-ready, the personnel trained to operate at arms, and the officers had the experience and ability to manage the fighting.
The brunt of management, decision-making and the organization of interaction of forces and means of species and genera of the armed forces during the war in South Ossetia took over the direction of the Chief of Land Forces, Army General Vladimir Boldyrev A. — with the arrival on the CCU to the headquarters of the 58th Army. This performance characteristic only highly organized internally, literate and have experience of combat commanders.
And the reality — is the fulfillment of state tasks personnel from general to soldier. Not begging awards, and acts that less time and with fewer losses are made.
It is a pity that there is no deep analysis on the initial period of wa
r, as the experience of forcing Georgia to peace. But there is a vision of individual commanders and their personal vision, they are transferred to a new look and give it as a conclusion. And the conclusions are made, but are made by the adversary: as 08.08.2008 Russian armed forces were combat ready — and means necessary, that they were not so.
VS How do you feel your opponent? And in general, if you feel it?
AH The ability to sense the enemy — it is a very fundamental skill for the commander. If you do not feel the enemy, it is very difficult to achieve victory. Until the evening of the ninth August Georgians were actively acts have tried to reverse the situation, seize the initiative. Stormed and generally felt in their excitement, but by the evening were run out of steam. It became more and more erratic movements, less coordination. Of them seemed to let the air. Apparently, before they became to realize that time is lost, more Russian troops in South Ossetia comes, and an advantage of the original ways and means of fading away like smoke, and the puzzles have remained unfulfilled. 10th was the turning point. The Georgian part of the first tier, advancing on Tskhinvali, began to retreat.
Two BTGr completed their puzzle! They did not give the Georgians quite capture Tskhinvali and cook it on the defensive. In practice, BTGr showed that "network-centric warfare," the idea that there are so worn today management of the General Staff, but not controlled from the center and on-site. The battalions operating in isolation from the main forces that behind them to march through the Caucasus Mountains, drawn into South Ossetia and turning in battle formations. Divided into separate groups from the BTGr, often without providing the flanks, compensating for this mobility, constantly reconnaissance, feeling for gaps in the defense of the Georgians, they struck at the most vulnerable areas. This strategy is almost blinded Georgians linked opponent is allowed to fight and win time until the main forces.
At 10:00 on August 9 out of town for us broke BMP Defense Minister of South Ossetia Vasily Lunev. He reported the situation, said that in the town of "layer cake": Ossetian units were fighting with the Georgians. I had said: "The route you know you can pull units in the city, so that the inside?". Lunev said, "I can!" And at 10.30 BTGr 693rd Regiment under the command of Colonel Andrew Kozachenko By attaching advance for the start of the strike on the northwestern outskirts of Tskhinvali. At about 11.00 hours on Galuanskoy height to us out of the off-campus detachment President of South Ossetia Eduard Kokoity. Their practically no ammunition. We immediately joined them, I said to him puzzle on a strike in the center of the town, organized a mutual determination, and gave him to interact communication with the signalman.
Now a lot of different writing about Eduard Kokoity, his, allegedly, was not in Tskhinvali. This is not so! From the town of his squad came out only on 9 August, having spent all their ammunition, and adding to them, has returned. In general, the Ossetians bravely fought wars. Not to say that artfully — yet to a standing army militias far. But for their homes, for their villages, they fought to the last. The strength of the party, of course, was the knowledge of terrain, in some degree offset the shortage of combat abilities.
VS It is understood that around that time there were 10 intensive Brigade GRU. Was with them you have a contact?
AH Yes, the reaction was cooperated, but they acted on their task, put a senior military chief.
VS There is a report that they were giving your army artillery targeting.
AH Maybe they gave them, leaving a group of command and control at CBU. The fact that Special Forces teams are ordered by the senior military commander. In their own special tasks. If they have a need — they are interacting with us through the center of command and control, but I was working with a group of officers in advanced combat formations, and my staff has worked for many miles away from me, coordinated actions unfolding on the ground yuschihsya-South Ossetian forces. My group operated in isolation from the staff, maintaining contact with him. Such were the conditions: the beginning of hostilities, the decision is made, tasks are delivered, the troops are put forward and occupy the designated areas in their own lane. I was given a certain task commander of the neighborhood, we have already read as above, the commander must be at the right time in the right place, and for merit winning the fight place to come before the enemy, it is an ancient truth. We fought at the initial stage against numerically superior to us and at the technical level of the enemy. You see, the fighter does not go into battle without a commander. And even more so — in the criteria of the rapidly changing environment, when making the right decisions were a matter of a minute. In critical situations personnel looking for the commander, and if the commander is calm — which means everything is normal, the situation is under control.
In Tskhinvali, we broke from Khetagurova. Before that spent two diversionary attacks, portraying a suitable reinforcement to us, and there, where they decided to break into the city — on the contrary, pointedly turned around, popylili, demonstrating that we move away from a height. We went with her, but only to a small depressions on which stretched into the mountains gas pipeline. This lowland has passed our intelligence, and we are along the gas pipe, hiding behind her, went to the ravine overgrown with bushes on the side elevation. And for the valley through the bushes came to the outskirts of Tskhinvali, to the area of houses and a private sector group of the battalion of the 135th regiment of Colonel Gosteva rushed to Tskhinvali. One company from the BTGr went to unlocking peacekeeping battalion and one company covered from attack on the flank of the Zemo-Nikozi, 3rd squadron remained in reserve and immediately covered the artillery and rear. It was immediately cooperated interaction with the South Ossetian militia units led by Eduard Kokoity, they stabbed in the center of town. It was 14 hours 10 minutes August 9 …
"LAYER CAKE" in Ossetian
VS As it so happened that you, the commander of the army, were in the thick of the fight and was injured?
AH At the moment, there was the force majeure situation of "peacekeepers" — they were shot at point-blank Georgian tanks in the town was a "layer cake" of Georgian troops, South Ossetian militias, with 3 hours earlier from the northwest BTGr 693rd Regiment stormed into the city, but at this time the Georgians brought up their reserves. Staying Galuanskoy height did not make sense, and I made the decision together with the management team to move to the southern outskirts of Tskhinvali in the company, running on Release of peacekeepers. In the area of road fork company has moved forward, and I lingered with the militia, elaborate on the situation. The reserve I had one platoon from the company, which covered the rear and artillery. With the fork in the road, going in the direction of peacekeeping forces in the APC of the 135th regiment, we are faced with the retreating unit of Georgians to 30-40 people who fled directly to us on the road. We had to dismount and fight, but it turned out there in the bushes hiding the Georgian special forces, and we were practically surrounded, and was covering us from behind the reserve has not yet come. During the brief battle riot police threw grenades at us, and fled from the road Georgians were repulsed by fire from machine guns. I had a machine of the driver APCs with shops and a grenade in the pocket as usual, and one bound, and full-time gun. But no Georgian ambush or a special tracking me or control group was not, it's just a coincidence of events. In war as in war!
VS How many people were with you?
AH About eight or nine, no more, and a group of journalists who have joined us in the morning. In this battle, died Major Ham, I was seriously injured, and wounded correspondent Alexander Sweet and cameraman RTR Leonid Losev.
VS Anatoly, you mentioned the Georgian "special forces" in the bushes. A general in the three day or war, in which you have been there, felt the presence of Georgian special forces, I somehow felt the impact of intelligence and sabotage enemy groups?
AH No, not felt. We had so firmly initiative that did not give them no wake, no pop out.
VS Were there any certain set of puzzles to defeat Georgia, for example up to 5 days to a certain man of August?
AH No, such was not. There were certain tasks. But there is no standard for the temporary defeat of Georgia was not put. August 9, around 9:00, I was called to communicate the Minister of Defence. I reported the situation to him, his decision, he said puzzle on Tskhinvali and approved of my actions. But no time standards did not show.
VS Some restrictions were placed on the use of weapons during operations?
AH No, I have not been performed.
VS Clear. What kind of control points have been deployed?
AH CBU in the headquarters, mobile command post at the entrance to the Roki tunnel, and as part of the NP, which is where I was. In addition, TPU deployed within a concentration of logistics supplies and weapons. The reserve was the emergency command post.
VS Was there a plan in case, if something happens to the Roki tunnel? Perfected there any alternate routes
AH Anxiously declare — with a tunnel nothing could happen. We have it covered so that there is no danger of it could not be. Even thought itself was not responsible for it's 58th Army, and that is enough. But the alternate routes were.
VS Himself as assessed how long the war?
AH This timing for you, no one will determine.
VS At the end of the campaign there was no hesitation?
AH We were sure of victory. All perfectly understood their puzzle. And we are done. This is the real result of many years of careful work of personnel who participated in forcing Georgia to peace.
VS Have you spent a long time in the hospital after being injured? And at the moment feel?
AH In August he was wounded. In December, was discharged from the iron in the leg. In such cases, the joint is typically one hundred percent blocked, yet doctors could maintain a small mobility. In general, our military medicine — it will work for decades, built a system in which the masters are fighting for every human life. And the faster the wounded fell into the hands of doctors, the earlier will be helped, the more likely that his life would be spared. My little bow medical professionals Squaw Peter G. Kolosov, Musa Mutalibov and many other physicians. Prices do not they! But, unfortunately, and here is the place to be "new look" with his cuts, which will inevitably affect the lives and health of military personnel of all categories. Alas …
VS There is something that you regret?
AH What do I regret? I regret that invaluable combat experience was simply written off today's military rule for "inconvenient." What was virtually offset by military work of thousands of people who, sparing their own lives, showing a better proficiency and skill, defeated a very formidable opponent, but instead received recognition accusations that they acted clumsily and backward. I regret that the army was obliged to leave masters such as General Vladimir Boldyrev, A., Sergey Makarov Afanasevich, and not only they, but also many other worthy and experienced officers …
In general, I think that all the distortions and errors of today's military reform come from the fact that the higher military command no awareness of the real, and not the alleged hostilities. And ignorance of the realities of war is the most naughty way affects the form of thinking. That's why reforms are carried out, which is named with the knees, in any way without any coordination with the times and even trying them for earlier in some places to check. Without any support on the experience of past wars over the years. In August 2008, we spent most complex military operation to force Georgia to peace. But instead of a serious analysis of the fighting were made resounding statements about the war, allegedly, revealed a lack of readiness of our Armed Forces in this war, and that the bad experience of the war was the impetus for reform. But it is not so! Specifically, the existing organization of the Land Forces, the structure of "district-army-division" and ensure success in this highly complex military campaign. First, because at all levels of command and control was built and any "stage" was engaged in the business, that the waste in the process of many years of searching, based on the experience of 2-Chechen wars CHPG structure, parts unchanged battle readiness — did his best side.
But these findings were very uncomfortable against the reforms will make come true. They almost went against them. And after the North Caucasian District virtually alone carried out the operation in South Ossetia, his acts were forcibly crossed, called the poor and tailored to the plans for future reform. Was made a number of statements about the loud that the war against Georgia revealed the discrepancy existing military structure of the task and what exactly it was the last straw that forced to launch a military reform. But you look pretty newspaper files since then to make sure — all the statements about the transition to the "three-tier" structure, the elimination level army-District-division teams and the development of a "new kind" were made before the war. And before these statements were experienced teaching to study the ability to plan for a "strategic command" under the control of the Army General Yuri Baluyevsky, and the results of these exercises then forced to abandon the hasty steps.
Can be modeled as if this was a war, start it in the current criteria. It seems to be ruled by the actions of the troops in the criteria of "layer cake" when the situation changed once an hour, "directly from Moscow?" As can be seen from there? Yes, even if the military actions carried out on several fronts? It seems to have coped with the transaction for the transfer of troops across the Caucasus Mountains utterly crippled "operational command"? Earlier in the headquarters of the army across the state had 242 officers, and with the start of hostilities, they were all absolutely loaded with work, now in a similar structure of three times less. Because no one on exercises no operational command was unable to cope with the problem of command and control, even as "satisfactory." It seems to have passed the transportation of troops to the railway transport, when almost completely eliminated the structure of Wausau? How to be without rears, no logistics, no preparatory deployment and the creation of stores in the area? On the "outsourcing" would pass this transfer? And it would all have ended?
Reforms should be dealt with masters of military affairs, not "advisors" who have no relationship to the Armed Forces.
VS If Homeland will call, go serve another?
AH Looking to anyone. Much to the chagrin of real experts — those who have the experience and skill — is now almost gone. And those who have — do not need them for anything not ask. But from year to year more and more in the army those with ecstasy knows how now everything is good, what unseen exercises are held, and what the impressive results achieved.
We — those who have passed the Soviet military school, who beheld the true teachings of those who passed through the real war — these criteria when the important thing is no
t the case and the report, just do nothing.
But if there is a threat of war, if the motherland will call, I will go without a second thought. For the Motherland, for Russia …