Besides, aces in the Reich was more than 3 thousand pilots — who knocked over 5 enemy aircraft, and 13 200-275 aircraft pilots shot down, 92 asa — 100-200 aircraft, 360 people — 40-100. It turns out that the German fighter aces of our packs felled? In the Pacific, it was the same Japanese aces shot down more than a South American: Tetsudzo Iwamoto — 202 wins (according to other sources — 80), Hiroesi Nishizawa — 147-150 (on the other — 87), Shoichi Sugita — 120 (other — 70 ). The best South American fighter pilots: Richard Ira Bong — 40 aircraft, Thomas Buchanan McGuire — 38, David MakKempbell — 34.
Richard Ira Bong
During the war, Halkin-Gol conducted very intense air battles: the best Russian pilot (in terms of downed opponents) Sergei Gritsevets — 12 Japanese planes, Japanese ace Hiromichi Shinohara from May until his own death on August 27, shot down 58 aircraft, 27 June 1939, he per day shot down 11 Russian planes.
Various creators raised this issue, but not to the same beliefs came, someone thinks that the enemy pilots lied, in fact it was shot down about as much as the best Russian and aces, while others believe that the German pilots were simply better and shoot down dozens of untrained the pilots of the enemy. Still others believe that the problem in the method of calculation. But the curious thing is that Japan and Germany lost the war, including the air.
Methods of calculation
Blame the Japanese and Germans in serious errors may be conscious, with the method of counting, does not come out. If you examine the aerial combat, it appears that there are severe errors on all sides, not only in German or Japanese.
So, after fighting in the Halkin-Gol, the Soviet Union announced that it was shot down 588 Japanese aircraft and another 58 killed on the earth, the inhabitants of the country of the Rising Sun have reported winding up 1,162 aircraft in the air and 98 on the ground. But in reality, Russian Alliance lost 207 aircraft in combat and 42 — non-combat losses, the people of the country of the Rising Sun said the loss of 88 aircraft in combat and 74 were scrapped due to battle damage. In other words, Russian enemy casualty figures were inflated by 4 times, 6 times in Japanese. This ratio, about 1 in 4, remained in the Air Force of the Red Army and the Russian war majestically.
The main cause of the discrepancy reality and messages pilots — not their heresy, and the sheer complexity of the fight and the unknown fate of "downed" aircraft. Many of the planes there were virtually riddled but vorachivalis airfields. Not infrequently plane shied away from a fight, for example: running out of fuel, ammunition, left the battle, fell into a tailspin, going from enemy fire, but then could level off — it could also count the downed. Hence fi shooters accounts of "flying fortresses": German "Messerschmitt" when coming out of the attack, by reason of the engine, always smoked, they are also recorded in the "downed".
Thus, in July 1941 Moscow air defense aircraft made 89 fights, reflecting 9 raid enemy bombers in August — 81 bout at 16 raids. They said they shot down 59 aircraft in July, 30 in August. According to the Germans in July lost 20-22 aircraft in August — 10-12, in other words, the difference is approximately three times. Just as the Germans were wrong: June 30, 1941 took place the air battle over the Dvina, our bombers, only 99 units, bombed bridges, they stormed the German fighters. They declared 64-65 downed aircraft, to our knowledge has been lost 34 aircraft, and another 18 were able to successfully padded back on airfields, in other words, the difference is about 2 times.
Another example is the Western Front, March 6, 1944 raid on Berlin Americans (fighter aircraft, bombers arrows) stated that they had killed 179 enemy aircraft (83% reflecting the raid German aircraft), the Germans also lost 66 fighters. The German pilots said they shot down 128 bombers and fighters still allegedly shot down 12 planes, in fact the Americans have lost 69 bombers and 11 fighters.
Battle of Kharkov May 13, 1942, the Germans said they shot down 65 aircraft, our loss on that day — 20 aircraft. May 14 report to the Germans on 47 airplanes from their 6 shot down a German Count Adolf Dikfeld — 9 aircraft. Our real loss — 14 aircraft.
And the attempt to clarify the difference between "points" and "wins" does not solve anything — these systems exist in parallel to the Luftwaffe — "points" (a twin-engine plane — 2 points, four-engine — 4) were taken into account for the award and to assign ranks. Also in the Russian Air Force in parallel accounting "victories" was a system of monetary awards from the accounting value of the downed plane.
Gunther Rall (second from left) after his own 200-th Air victory. Second right — Walter Krupinski.
Help fotopulemetov, posts VNOS
Fotopulemety improved ability to correct count, but also did not solve prepyadstviya. Our planes fotopulemet "PAC-22" started to put before the war. Fotopulemet shot at the lowest rate than the camera — about 8-10 frames per second, and most importantly, it stopped working after releasing the trigger, fire control, because defeating the purpose of the last projectile did not fix it, and it did not fix the behavior after being hit by enemy aircraft. Practically, he was able to fix the death of an enemy aircraft only when he died during the shooting. Their general introduction did not change anything, the problem remained.
Posts airborne surveillance, warning and communication system (included) also could not give a true picture, usually battle was far away, and it was hard to find the type of shot down and crashed the plane visually. Just one example: April 19, 1943, battle near Murmansk, VNOS recorded four downed aircraft, they are recorded in the "victory." Later the search parties found the 4 planes: one enemy "Messer" and three of ours.
What result can be drawn from these data: the number of wins is overestimated in a couple of times on each side, and if you reduce the victory of German aces in a couple of times, they actually shot down, you should also reduce and winning pilots Hitler coalition. The gap still remains. So what's the reason? The Germans and citizens of the country of the rising sun were the best pilots than the Russian and Americans?
The main reason for the differences in the downed a
Germany took full advantage of its air force, about 6 flights a day to the pilot during major surgery. In addition, taking into account that the enemy had more planes, they could often meet the German pilots. So, Erich Hartmann made 1525 sorties, Gerhard Barkhorn more boevyletov 1104, Walter Krupinski scored 197 aerial victories of 1100 sorties. For comparison: in I. Kozheduba only 330 sorties. In the end, if you divide the number of flights to the German aces and the best pilot of the USSR, it turns out that 4-5 departures — 1 victory. If Kozhedub did the same missions, Skolkov and German aces, the number of his victories could also be total with two or three hundred square meters.
But the Air Force Russian Union did not need to use the pilots to "wear and tear", and we have enough cars and drivers, because they made the least number of departures. The German pilots fought wars almost continuously, from the Third Reich's simply not enough resources for the creation of the required number of aircraft and training a huge number of pilots. In addition, the Luftwaffe units were required to constantly flip from site to site. Thus, the rearmament "Focke-Wulf" the first group of the 51st Fighter Squadron was thrown into the battle of Leningrad in September and October 1942, then took part in Operation "Mars", after its completion until January 1943 led war in Lofty Bow; then the operation "Baffel" — removal of the 9th Army Models with Rzhev salient. Either the first and second groups of the 54th Fighter Squadron "Green Heart": since the beginning of the war until the 1943 war led to the Army Group "North" from May 1943 transferred to the Army Group "Center" — fighting in the area Falcon Operation "Citadel", after the defeat — a departure for "line of Hagen." In August 1943 the first group waging war in the strip The "South" at Poltava remain until October, and then transferred back to the Army Group "Center" — fighting near Vitebsk, Orsha, in the summer of 1944 were transferred to the Army Group "North". second group of the slack in the Ukraine after the " citadel ", in March 1944 vorachivaetsya in the Army Group" North ". Also tossed and other fighter units.
Russian aviation units used in the main only to "own" the front, not shuffled, and even every 1-2 months led out to the rear to re-form — the completion of the materiel, re. Only from mid-1943 began to fill up immediately on the front part of the Germans. For example, the 16th Guards Regiment A. Pokryshkina departed for retraining for "Airacobra" at the end of December 1942, and returned to the front only 9 April 1943. 434 th Regiment Major Klescheeva (380 boevyletov, 16 individual air victories and 15 per group) from May to September 1942 three times rewrites. Naturally — this reduced the ability to make up a personal account.
The same prepyadstviya were the Japanese on Halkin-Gol — 4-6 sorties a day, because the Germans and the Japanese pilots were "most people tired of war." They have had more opportunities to become aces, but lost the war, including the air.
Bell P-39 "Cobra" — the plane Pokryshkina in 1943-1944.
Isaev Antisuvorov. 10 legends of the second world war. Moscow, 2006.
Yuri Mukhin Asa and propaganda. Hollow victory Luftwaffe. Moscow, 2006.