Military reform accompanied by some hasty and poorly obmyslennymi decisions that have to be corrected after the fact as certain steps are taken. For example, the situation with the ensigns, who initially wanted to remove from the armed forces, but later left all the same.
Against the backdrop of a heated debate about the need for such structural transformation of many experts have pointed out that the cause of such change had been.
Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov at the hearing, "A new kind of Russian Army: Results, challenges and prospects" in the Public Chamber stated that the evaluation of the armed forces at the beginning of the reform can be concluded that the old one to follow the plan (up to 2015) has led would lead to the virtual absence of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, given the state of technology and weapons.
According to the Chief of the General Staff, in 2008 only 17% of Russian army units were in constant combat readiness, in other words, had deployed a full staff of personnel and equipment ready for battle. Most of them belonged to the airborne troops, also parts that are deployed in the North Caucasus military environment — in areas of tension.
To bring all the other parts in the state of readiness would be required prior to the 1st of the year for the mobilization measures. Such a long period of threat for the deployment will have no army peace in modern conditions.
According to Makarov, during the period from 1996 to 2008 in the first three years of service in the armed forces to lay off 60-90% of officers, graduates of military academies, the third part of which went specifically after release.
There was 83% of the operational deployment of military equipment and weapons. It was located in warehouses and storage bases, with 90% of that equipment was stored in a state of disrepair.
In 1991, more than 30% of the soldiers from the ranks of the Russian army was busy servicing depots and warehouses for the storage of military equipment and weapons. But this situation has only worsened in the Russian army.
The process of conservation structures Russian Army in the Russian army was accompanied by a large disparity with the inevitable reduction of personnel. In the new army willingly cut staffing linear units. Number of ordinary conscripts declined, including as a plan of conscription was reduced by more than 30%.
Furthermore, control structures, especially not become better. For example, part of the Russian troops that were previously in Eastern Europe, displayed "a spotless field" — are eliminated compounds, mixing, and the officers suffered much less than the average. Operational control essentially tied the hands and the law, is prohibited without the expense of the Ministry of Defence of the dwelling fire officer. For this reason, the officers remained in service for even the smallest capacity.
As a result, says Makarov, a unique situation for a person in the ranks of the Russian army at the beginning of 2008 the percentage of officers in the Armed Forces headed for 34% or 50% (including warrant officers). Even in the Russian Army, this fraction was slightly more than 26%, while in the United States at the present time is 15.5%.
Moreover, in 2008 year was an acute shortage of lieutenants while excess okoloshtabnyh colonels, because 66% of officers belonged to the senior officers. There was an obvious imbalance of the pyramid positions.
At this point in the reform plans — to align the pyramid: 20-30% increment in the number of lieutenant positions, while reducing the number of senior officers (at the level of major-colonel) by 70-80%.
Deputy Director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, Konstantin Makiyenko, estimating word Makarova, I saw that the chief of staff multiplies, but this is, but in fact the case.
Makiyenko said that in order to understand what was the situation in the Russian army in 2006-2007, rather look at the current state of the armed forces of Ukraine. There was a reduction of the number of combat-ready personnel to the retention of the number of staff and connections at the same level, and in fact the entire staff of the transformed guards at bases in the storage of military equipment.
As clearly seen from the above there were indications for radical changes in the armed forces is even then — in 2006-2007. Despite this, she reform as the will of the Kremlin and the system of certain activities only started in the late 2008 year.
The final push to the top of the reform was the performance of the Russian army in-permanent clashes with Georgia in August 2008. Given the fact that they were involved in more combat-ready units, the results of the war later deemed unsatisfactory.
As a result, Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and his team are given a free hand to transform the armed forces.
The fact that at the moment is in the Russian army — a unique situation that can only be associated with the era of Peter the Great, and he, as you know, deliberately destroyed the army gear to the latest build it anew.
The situation came to a standstill so that the way to "blow up and build anew" fits perfectly. The brain comes another expression, "you can not make an omelet without breaking eggs." So is the case with carrying out military reform — goes to everyone: forcibly laid off staff officers, the defense industry is suffering. In this regard, the General Makarov aggressively criticized gunsmiths, comparing the properties of the products in Russia and abroad equipment of the Army. But the correctness of similar comparisons have caused a lot of vibration present when discussing the professionals.