For the Japanese in Manchuria good strategy just was not

For the Japanese in Manchuria good strategy just was not

By the time of the entry of the USSR into the war with Japan, almost all of its combat-ready divisions and modern weapons were deployed to the Pacific theater of war. Russian commanders apparently overestimated the power of resistance of the Kwantung army in August 1945 the vast majority of its divisions were the formation in 1945, priemuschestvenno July. Of course the Japanese command evaluated their combat only 15-20 percent? Ordinary level of a full-blooded Infantry Division.

Japanese troops did not have a hell of arms, ammunition and fuel, and new formations dominated by untrained conscripts of the students and the disabled. At their disposal in Manchuria was less than 50 combat-ready aircraft. There was no anti-tank artillery. Lightweight and with all this obsolete tanks due to lack of fuel and cooked crews have not been able to join the battle.
At number 16, the intelligence staff of the Trans-Baikal Front on 10 July 1945 stated that "only for 1944 and the first half of 1945 from Manchuria and Korea to other theaters had lost seventeen infantry divisions. It is established that all the divisions from Manchuria to Korea subsided with fewer than 13-15 thousand people every leaving in the areas where 30-50 percent of the personnel, and then served as the basis for the formation of new divisions. "

In reality, no backbone for the new divisions of old did not leave, that's why they were virtually incapable of fighting.

Ready for the August storm

Assessing the current state of the Japanese army in Manchuria should refer to the work of the famous South American military historian David Glantz "August storm. Russian strategic coming in Manchuria in 1945, "published in 1983. By August 9, 1945 the Kwantung Army, under the command of General Yamada Otodzo consisted of a 2-fronts (army groups) and a separate army of mixed composition, supported by one of the Air Force and the Sungari river flotilla. The first front, the defending eastern Manchuria, including 3 and 5 Armies, each of which had three infantry divisions. In addition, specifically the first front was represented by four infantry divisions and one brigade of mixed composition. First of all the troops of the front, there were 222,157 people.

Third front defended the central and western Manchuria from the Amur to Lyaodunskogo Peninsula. It included the 30th (four infantry divisions, one independent mixed brigades and one tank) and the 44th Army (three infantry divisions, one single mixed team and one tank). Specifically, the command of the Third Front subordinate one infantry division and two separate teams of mixed composition. Total Japanese third front had 180,971 people.

4th single army with headquarters in Qiqihar was responsible for the defense of the north-central and north-western Manchuria. It consisted of 3 infantry divisions and 4 separate mixed brigades and numbered 95,464 people. 125th Infantry Division in Tunghua obey the command of the Kwantung Army specifically.

After the outbreak of hostilities — August 9, the Imperial High Command subordinated to the command of the Kwantung Army stationed in Korea, the 34th Army and the Seventeenth front, consisting of one of the 58th Army. The troops of the Seventeenth Front (seven infantry divisions and two separate mixed teams), and the 11th Tank Regiment, 3rd Armored Division were located in South Korea, to take part in the hostilities did not have time. The 34th Army, which had headquarters in Hamhung (North Korea), included 59 and 137th Infantry Divisions in Hamhung and Chonpionge — 50 194 people.

The Kuril Islands and southern Sakhalin were three infantry divisions, as the 11th Tank Regiment, 2nd Armored Division, subject to the Fifth front.

Although the Japanese infantry division across the state had 20 thousand people, in 1945, their numbers ranged from 9 to 18 thousand, almost always making 14-16 thousand. In the divisions around the state must be 36 guns in the artillery regiment of 3 battalions. By August 1945, most of the able-bodied compounds and virtually all modern languid arms and military equipment deployed from Manchuria and Korea in the Pacific theater of war. 63 and 117th Infantry Division of the 44th Army garrison were, in other words, had only eight instead of nine infantry battalions and artillery did without. Average number of individual mixed brigades did not exceed 5,300. Prior to January 1945 there were only six divisions of the Kwantung Army, including two garrison. From the "old" divisions only 108-I, together with the two garrison divisions placed against the front of the Trans-Baikal. The other 16 divisions of the Kwantung Army formed as early as 1945. All Japanese divisions damn lacked weapons, fuel and ammunition.

Manchukuo army, numbering 170 thousand people, the Japanese disbanded in July 1945, to arm the new Japanese division. Command understood perfectly unreliability of Manchu troops. The soldiers and officers of the army of Manchukuo aware that the defeat of the Land of the Rising Sun is not far off, and were not eager to breathe for the Japanese ruler and of his own for the Manchu ruler Pu Yi

A significant re-evaluation of forces

In June 1945 the command of the Kwantung Army beginning of the redeployment of troops and fortifications in the depths of Manchuria. On the border was supposed to throw only one third of the combat units. Two-thirds planned to concentrate in the interior of the country, so there weary of the stubborn Russian resistance. Living in the country of the rising sun was calculated as the overpowering for vehicles and tanks rugged terrain. But by the time of the Russian invasion of Manchuria or regrouping of troops or fortifications have not yet been completed. What to conclude if many divisions were formed only in July?

In the journal of fighting the Trans-Baikal Front for 22-31 August 1945 stated: "The frontier areas of the enemy were covered sufficiently feeble pogranpolitseyskimi units, and in important ways: Khailar — one infantry brigade (80) and parts of the 119 TR, at the direction of Solunskom — 107 rb . These parts of the puzzle had to delay and wear down our forces, in order to give time command of the Kwantung Army to assess the situation and deploy its main strength. "

The Japanese command followed to evaluate their own fighting ability of compounds that have been deployed against the Trans-Baikal Front (in brackets — the date of formation)

  • 119th Infantry Division (October 1944) — 70%;
  • 80-th separate brigade of mixed (January 1945) — 15%;
  • 107th Infantry Division (May 1944) — 60%;
  • 108th Infantry Division (September 1944) — 65%;
  • 117th Infantry Division (July 1944) — 15%;
  • 63rd Infantry Division (June 1943) — 15%;
  • 133rd separate mixed team (July 1945) — 15%;
  • The 9th Armored Brigade — NA;
  • 125th Infantry Division (January 1945) — 20%;
  • 138th Infantry Division (July 1945) — 15%;
  • The 39th Infantry Division (June 1939) — 80%;
  • The 1st Armored Brigade — NA;
  • 130th Separate Mixed Brigade (July 1945) — 15%;
  • 136th Infantry Division (July 1945) — 15%;
  • 79-th separate brigade of mixed (January 1945) — 15%.

    So Makar
    , fighting ability of the Japanese troops fighting capacity of approximately corresponded to 3.55 and 0.6 Infantry Division mixed brigades, and considering two separate brigade of infantry divisions — approximately 3.85 Infantry Division. Two armored brigades formed just hardly had the fighting capacity of more than 15 percent each and together would be equivalent to 0.3 Tank Brigade. We have the connections were completed to full strength and fighting ability were close to 100 percent, without experiencing shortcomings in weapons, fuel and ammunition. With this in mind, Trans-Baikal Front had about 34 settlement and mechanized infantry divisions and about 18 settlement tank brigades, which gave him the advantage of 8,8:1 and 60:1, respectively, and if you translate armored units in the settlement division, the preponderance of the Trans-Baikal Front with about 40 is calculated divisions 10:1.

    Together 63 and 117-I-IME division? Whether older than 18 mountain guns, with the 148th Division was virtually no small arms and light weapon for their own infantry regiment, 138th Division was in the process of mobilizing and counted less than 2-thousand people fighting strength and more from all the battle-39th division, bounced from Central China, had less artillery than was required by the state. Formed just two armored brigades armed with tanks, seized the army of Manchukuo. Due to the lack of fuel and the crew prepared both Japanese armored brigades have not entered the fray.

    Before other Russian fronts the Japanese position was even worse. Against the 2nd Far Eastern Front, they had three separate mixed brigades and three infantry divisions, two of which, like all teams, had only 15 percent of any combat capability. 149th Infantry Division in general had no artillery. The only infantry division with 35 percent of the combat capability — 123rd, in contrast to the other is not formed in July, and in January of '45, had almost no transport for their own artillery. All of these compounds were equivalent to 1.1 of this Infantry Division. 2nd Far Eastern Front was about 18 design divisions, which gave him the advantage of 16.1 times.

    Against the 1st Far Eastern Front of the Japanese troops were not much more and their fighting ability was not as large:

  • 15th Border Regiment (July 1945) — NA;
  • 135th Infantry Division (July 1945) — 15%;
  • 126th Infantry Division (January 1945) — 20%;
  • 124th Infantry Division (January 1945) — 35%;
  • 132-th separate brigade of mixed (July 1945) — 15%;
  • 128th Infantry Division (January 1945) — 20%;
  • 112th Infantry Division (July 1944) — 35%;
  • 1st Mobile Brigade — NA;
  • 79th Infantry Division (February 1945) — 15%;
  • 127th Infantry Division (March 1945) — 20%;
  • 122th Infantry Division (January 1945) — 35%;
  • 139th Infantry Division (July 1945) — 15%;
  • 134th Separate Mixed Brigade (July 1945) — 15%;
  • The 59th Infantry Division (February 1945) — NA;
  • 137th Infantry Division (July 1945) — 15%.

    Should be noted that assessment of the combat capability of the 128th Division of 20 percent in the presence of 14 thousand people instead of the regular 23 thousand reads about the lack of weapons, ammunition and prepared fighters. 15th Border Regiment instead put under state 12 infantry companies and 3 artillery batteries had only four companies and one battery, its fighting capacity does not exceed 35 percent. The 59th Infantry Division was hardly a great fighting capacity than it once formed 79th Division, in other words, 15 per cent, while the 1st Mobile Brigade, formed in July of '45 — more than 15 percent of combat power. With this in mind, the total combat effectiveness against Japanese troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front can be estimated at 2.8 Infantry Division. The forces of the 1st Far Eastern Front was 43 settlement division, which gives the advantage of 15.4 times.

    Not counting on success

    In the band Trans-Baikal Front residents of the country of the rising sun itself had a more appropriate balance of power. This explains the greater length of the Trans-Baikal Front (2,300 km, including 1,700 km — active hostilities) compared with 1 and 2 of the Far Eastern (respectively 700 and 1610 km, of which € 500 miles — active hostilities).

    In the journal of fighting the Trans-Baikal Front for 22-31 August 1945 admitted: "In general, the strategic plan Manchurian operation, as shown by the course of fighting, the Trans-Baikal Front did not act on the main line, had great power and was instrumental in the defeat of the Japanese-Manchurian troops.

    The direction of head impact on Loubet, Changchun and implementation in this area of the 6th Guards Tank Army, reinforced with 2 motorized divisions and artillery, August 11-13, has brought a massive force moving the main groups on the front and rear communication of the Kwantung Army, putting it in critical position.

    During the Manchurian operation was not big fights and the Army did not implement all the fire and striking power.

    But the troops had to work in very difficult criteria deserts and mountains, in the rainiest time Khingan and in Manchuria. In the period 12-20 August Khingan in Manchuria were torrential rains, which knead the road, already very bad, made them hard, and in some places completely impassable by all modes of transport … Japanese tanks backward design, low power and at no comparison even with our light tanks can not go. Self-propelled artillery and machine guns in the Kwantung Army was not there. Artillery, mortars and machine guns also were not many. With such technology, and in such a quantity of insignificance Kwantung army could not only count on success in fighting of the Red Army, and in general how to win-or stern of modern warfare.

    The Kwantung Army in reality turned out to be significantly weaker than it was listed by our intelligence documents. "

    For the Japanese, it was like losing prototype meet Russian troops at the border, and to relocate the main forces in central Manchuria. In any case, no chance to reflect and Russian punch, to avoid prosecution. Russian mechanized forces probably would have caught up with the Japanese, deprived of fuel and tf. But even the immediate departure to sea ports Kwantung Army not rescued, because she did not have to evacuate any ships or aircraft. In all cases differed only area of surrender.

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