Joseph S. Nye — a modern South American political scientist who develops a number of areas within the framework of neoliberalism, including the all-encompassing theory of interdependence, a leading expert on international issues. At the current time is a Doctor of Public Schools Administrative them. Kennedy Institute at Harvard. Also takes an active role in the project on the reform of state security.
— The need for consensus in particular increases when we talk about international political and military actions. Cool During the war the U.S. and its allies opposed and the only significant risk — the Soviet Union, which is self-facilitated negotiations and agreements. What are the causes of helping the United States reach agreement now?
In principle to keep in mind two things. 1st: Cool during the war was not always a consensus, even among the allies, and in 1960 refused action within NATO France. You have to be very usmotritelnym not to overestimate the fact that in a bipolar world generally agreed.
In-2, an agreement will be reached or not — it always depends on the context and criteria. In 2003, George W. Bush failed to achieve the support of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, but about a decade before that his father managed to get approval for the same reason. The difference is that different kind of conditions in which had to operate in both the U.S. and the UN partly different nature and circumstances of the war. During "Operation Desert Storm" was the exact cause — the seizure of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein's troops, and in 2003 there were so many varieties of interpretations of U.S. actions in Iraq
Yes, to reach agreement — it's very basic. But the types of arrangements — this product is not bipolar or multipolar, but quickly what benefits pursued by each of the parties. Context, the details are important, and not just the type of polarity.
— What is the significance and role of specific internal consensus in the maintenance of state power in the international arena?
— The president is likely to be more successful, if for his own back feels the support of the country. On the other hand, there are exceptions when the President can go ahead without consensus. However, in such cases, it is unlikely to get additional resources to support their actions. Build domestic consensus is very difficult. There are studies by George Edwards and others, which demonstrate that the rhetoric of the president is often less effective than people expect, often it is more depending on the events and how these actions are interpreted.
— How can we calculate the right amount of force in the international arena?
— I wrote about it in the first chapter of my book "The Future of Power." In fact, the definition of the desired strength is dependent on the resources, in other words, what allows you to get or want to conduct faster, achieving the desired result of a show of force.
The three main sources of power — it is military power, financial luck and "soft power." Any one of them has its limits, but whether he would be effective or not — depends on the context. For example, if a country has 10,000 tanks, and the other country has 1,000 tanks, it is painfully easy to come to the conclusion that the first country is 10 times stronger than the second. But if the war is fought in a swamp, as it was in Vietnam, and not in the desert, as in Iraq, the results can not be, not looking at any predictions.
— If we talk about the Middle East, can the United States using his power assist young democracy on his feet? Can we use our power not only to conquer other nations, and to form them?
— Talking about the "power", you should always keep in mind the screening question: "power to do what". Always what-nibudt break easier said than done. "Nation-building" is not a very successful term, but all the same it is a very complicated set of different kinds of behaviors, actions, and not any one single purposeful action. After all, the strength that the United States was used to overthrow Saddam Hussein within weeks of the military campaign in 2003, obviously not enough for the municipal building.
It is necessary to distinguish between the concept of "nation-building" and "nation-building". Very often people confuse the two concepts, which are in fact mean very different things. Civilization is usually defined as a large group of people who share a common identity, or having a common identity. Nation-building refers to the institutions — the police, the bureaucracy, the army and other top universities, which are crucial for the functioning of society. Very often it can be hard to "build a nation" of the people who do not love each other, for example, of the Sunnis and the Shiites since the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
In part, the failure of the United States to make a measured government in Iraq is exactly the confusion of these concepts and their inherent purpose. When there is a profound divisions and differences by ethnicity, people become less inclined to cooperate, and even less inclined to agree about the institutions, in accordance with which they will live. After the recent elections in Iraq, for example, has become very difficult to keep consent between Sunnis and Shiites over exactly how the "run" the Iraqi government.
— As for Syria. Her government seems to have a huge amount of power, but at the same time seems to lose its effect. Can we say that a huge amount of force can act as a double-edged sword, in other words, a lot of power — it is self-destructive?
— We can say that can be self-destructive, if you have a lot of the 1st kind of power and lack of other species, but it seems stupid to read that a lot of force as a whole can be devastating. In Syria, Assad in a significant number of military and police forces, but not enough "soft power" but 15% Alawites and Christians.
— You have put into operation the term "soft power." As the Syrian government now it is best to find a balance between "soft" and "hard" power?
— I do not think that Assad is now able to find such balance. "Soft power" — the ability to influence others to merit the desired result due to the attractiveness and persuasion. In general, Assad does not take much of the Sunni population.
Although it is possible to use "soft power" in the middle of his own clique, but he lost this ability in relation to the majority.
— In recent years, carried out the harsh debate over a possible reduction of U.S. forces. As analysts estimate the possibility that, given the multifaceted nature of power?
— Americans go through cycles of beliefs in the collapse of their own country every 10 years or so. I write about what America's strength is not decreases since 1990, when I published the book "The Limits of Leadership", the same thing I say, and in his work "The Future of Power," published last year.
— Is the power of the universal concept, in other words, is to "force" of America look through historical lenses?
-History may provide some clues, but there is no flawless historical metaphors. Contexts change, and the strength is dependent on the context. History can give those or other examples, but I associate would not.
— Some an
alysts have pointed out that there is a difference between the constructed reality and the true situation in international politics. Is the idea of "the power of Heaven" is really what will turn international political leaders face the true reality?
— There is a risk of unreliable perception of reality. Regardless of whether you are creating a danger or drawback of many forces. It is another matter. At the time, Fulbright said the same thing about the Vietnam War, when he described the "arrogance of power": the Yankees were not so little force of the 1st type it into their heads that they can do in Vietnam, all they want, but in the reality could not do anything about it. This idea can be applied to the modern Middle East.