On the other side of the South American officials push Iranians to the allegations. How Not so long ago, said U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton branch BBC Persian, "We are ready to start [negotiations], if the desire is mutual, and we use sanctions to support the international community to make enough pressure for the configuration mode position."
In the tense region, where competitors with an enviable vsepostoyanstvom suit each other provocations, you need to go beyond this aggressive rhetoric in order to better understand the Iranian government to look at its geopolitical position. Thirty-two diplomatically lack of direct channels between the U.S. and Iran has led to a wave of unsafe failures, misunderstandings and conflict escalation. Salehi's comments reflect the opinions of Iran, based on misunderstandings and miscalculations, now — from Tehran.
Contrary to Washington vserasprostranennomu opinion, the Iranian government's skepticism regarding the negotiations is not based on ideological confrontation of the United States. More likely that Tehran perceives external and internal political constraints, do not go to Washington to give independent diplomacy. As can be seen, to create memories that Iran's favorites wish to wait and perform subsequent attempt at a more appropriate events.
Fundamentally recognize that Iran does not consider himself a weakened strain bilateral and regional movements of the state. Errors USA assign confidence of the hard-band in Tehran that oppose all ties with the U.S., Iran seeking recognition status quo in the region and undermine its independence.
In the long term, Iran sees no flaws in the rejection of at least some agreement with Washington, which will turn it into obedient ally of the United States. Iranian favorites do not behold the Middle East countries, which would be an equal partner of the United States. Norma cases are superior and subordinate, and this rate Iran do not accept.
Words of the Minister of foreign affairs Salehi indicate that the Iranian government is interested only in strategic negotiations relating to the problems of principle for both sides, and can lead to certain results.
Taking into account the impact of Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Congress on American favorites, Tehran considers the change of U.S. strategy is very unlikely. Because Iranian hardliners believe it appropriate to postpone the band closer to the long box and continue to "legitimate resistance", in which, while avoiding direct military confrontation, Tehran trying to convince Washington to withdraw its troops from the region.
Taking into account the sanctions Stuxnet worm (Stuxnet) and killing of Iranian nuclear physicists, favorites are taking a big risk. Yet, geopolitical calculation of the Islamic Republic is impressive.
Tehran understands that in the current international situation, America will be able to impose severe sanctions on Iran. Limitation of the oil and gas sector and the central bank raised the price on energoelementy above all reasonable limits, and it will not blow on Iran, and on to themselves. Iranian favorites also understand the concern of international society response to the growing pressure Tehran. What would happen if the Islamic Republic will be released from the contract on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons? It seems that Washington has a chance encounter with neuvvyazkami that it is too tough.
Moreover, Tehran believes that Washington stands in front of the problem of distrust, because Iraq did not find the claimed weapon of mass destruction. Iranian favorites understand that the address accusations of Iran's plotting to kill the Saudi ambassador in Washington, in fact not confirmed by evidence, further undermine that trust. Tehran believes that the composition of these reasons will not give the West use the same arguments for a hard counter Iran.
This geopolitical calculation indicates why the Iranian favorites correctly assigned values are not enough military threat emanating from Washington and Tel Aviv. In assessing the likelihood of a military strike Iran considers two main points.
In 1-x, the Iranian government understands that the U.S. Army is overloaded, the army and administration knows it. Many South American commanders agree that the opening of another 1st Front will be very costly from a political, economic and military terms.
Therefore Tehran assigns the leading role of Tel Aviv, whose hands were tied. Favorites of Iran believe that military strikes against the U.S. and Israel — are one and the same punch. Many sources report back that the last President Bush forbade Israel to bomb Iran before the end of his presidential possibilities, and Tehran even fewer believe in that burnished the Obama administration will give a greenish light. Netanyahu danger perceived by Iran as a bluff with a view to introducing a more formidable sanctions. Most likely, Iran will continue to play in this confrontation on the brink of war and saber weapon until such time as the militancy of Israel will not be limited internal resources and will change its strategic calculus.
In-2, the leaders of Iran are convinced that military strikes will affect his neighbors, who are wary of the conflict. The Saudis might ask America to "cut the snake's head," but Iran thinks that Saudi Arabia will want to wage war with Iran just before the last South American fighter. No matter what kind of attack on Iran will claim of Riyadh air space and military bases, and Saudi politicians understand the inevitability of retaliation from Iran.
So Makar, Iran sees the United States trapped in a trap. None of the options is not intuitively good, and suffer defiant Iran is also impossible. For Tehran, South American "policy of containment" is the best option, because Washington can not move to the bombing, is not willing to negotiate and can not cause economic harm sufficient to configure the Iranian policy of resistance. Because Tehran expects to endure the growing pressure from the U.S. and wait for improving their own positions.
Acts of Tehran demonstrate that at least some long-term strategic decision may claim the crotch of worsening relations. For Iran, it means the organizational support of politicians in Iraq, Afghanistan and other countries, as the announcement of the actual results of current nuclear programs from their own, so that Washington could not ignore this deterioration or bypass it with a short-term strategy, and specifically the growth pressure and the delay in making the decision to start military intervention or establishing relations diplomatically in the hope that Iran will change its behavior.
It seems that Iran poses to the fact that South American national security organizations that can not afford another war and have no viable options for the configuration of U.S. policy in the end will change its attitude toward Iran as a regional growth impermanence, which reclaims the collective decisions.
Iran and the U.S. play in a very terr
ible game based on incorrect guesses. Any of the parties to properly assess the strength and determination opponent. In this game, which can be called "Chicken is a" small mistake can lead to a military confrontation. And, according to game theory, one can overcome an opponent whose actions seem irrational and even insane. This awareness in Tehran could lead to a deterioration of the situation.
Iran holds such an approach since the accession of Ahmadinejad to the presidency in 2005. This is partly explained by the fact that until then nedavneshnih Iran's system does not try to limit it. During my time at the State Department in political society entirely true crystallized the feeling that Ahmadinejad wants to draw Iran into the war in order to hasten the coming of the Imam Shelter (According to the beliefs of the Shia Twelfth Imam (the Hidden Imam, the Mahdi), who disappeared under mysterious circumstances in the 9th century, at the time complete victory of good over evil should come back to earth to save the world's population — approx. lane.). Few understand why Iran is not holding him back in the presence of the respective abilities, taking into account the impasse which went to the US-Iranian affairs.
Iran knows that he is playing a terrible game, but his self-confidence in relation to the United States grew after he survived eight controversial years of the Bush administration. Regional rebellions heated that confidence. Because, most likely, Iran will continue to expect from Washington right steps to dialogue. Misunderstandings and miscalculations, most likely, will not allow the Iranian government to give in this debate, because it believes that if it does not give way, the geopolitical realities will force America to change course in the relatively near future.