"The Shot" Uzbekistan on the Tajik economy was helpful, although very massive. With all this, he was accompanied by a signal about the ability of a show of military strength in the area of border Farhad dam from the disputed status. Here, according to local residents, there was a cluster of armored vehicles from the Uzbek side.
Termination of deliveries of Uzbek gas for a small period of paralyzing the Tajik economy. It became clear that the "control shot" Tashkent would be fatal for the ruling regime in Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon. Specifically for the regime, as it is directly recognized in the official report of the Tajik Embassy in Moscow, accusing the Uzbek side in the "inspiration centers of social tension and the growing discontent of the population in the management of Tajikistan."
But Uzbek "don'ts" but indirect effects — through society, priemuschestvenno were aimed at providing a direct negative effect for the president personally Rahmon. After all, businesses were left without gas, which the local media called a "personal pocket" in Chapter Tajikistan, including the giant Dural — Talco.
Of course, the resumption of gas supplies in the criteria as a prerequisite for their formal termination was "the lack of resources in connection with contracts with Russia and China," was adopted by the Uzbek side as a result of the intervention of an influential mediator. Especially since immediately after the resumption of gas supplies were calm passions, and on the border of 2-states. In the town Bekabad accomplished working meeting Commanders of Frontier 2-states which have agreed to strengthen confidence-building measures at the border along a protected state.
Judging by the following sensory performance of Tajik President Emomali Rahmon on April 17, in other words, for the next day after the resumption of deliveries of Uzbek gas, this proxy was not our homeland.
The collapse of the system in Tajikistan in this step could be a nasty surprise for the United States, the leading practical talks with Tajik President regarding the future arrangement and protection of borders with Afghanistan. It is possible that the mediator between Tashkent and Dushanbe are specifically Americans. In this case, claim Rahmon the address in the "not appreciating" Partnership Moscow seem more than logical.
But this does not alter the brain. The target of the Uzbek side is specifically Rahmon regime. In other words, we are in this case, apparently, is about interpersonal or, rather, "intermode" confrontation that invalidates any hints and tips to improve the Tajik-Uzbek relations in general. That's why, for example, even redefine Dushanbe on the construction of the Rogun hydroelectric power station — the main theme of the conflict between the two countries-name — is unlikely to contribute to mitigating the struggle. Of course, the population actually collected under the pressure of the money that had to be put on the construction of the power plant could be used, for example, for the development of gas energy potential in the mutual interest of the country of the supplier of raw materials — Uzbekistan. Alternatively, it is possible to predict the role of the Uzbek side in the Rogun project. But in the heavy current socio-economic situation of millions of the people invest nearly frozen to obscure accounts, and some of them on incoming data, and quite used to maintain the current balance affiliated with the family Rahmon banks.
On languid external background, the internal policy of the Tajik president becomes impulsive and risky. First of March this year at one of the websites (zvezda.ru) was established disk imaging leak of a secret meeting of the management of Tajikistan with the role of managing security agencies. As stated in the posted documents president Tajikistan instructed security agencies to draw up lists of party activists of the "Islamic Revival of Tajikistan" (IRP), to find the sources of their funding and make arrangements for the withdrawal from the party ranks of active supporters. As if to confirm the accuracy of these data, state agencies began testing in the offices of the IRP, which is heating up the case as a result of prohibitive measures in the sphere of control of the Tajik religious rights. It is no coincidence favorite IRP Kabiri April 17-18, held consultations with the ambassadors of Russia and the United States in Tajikistan, apparently, the last acquainted with the possible countermeasures own countless organizations.
In view of the foregoing, the appeal of President Emomali Rahmon with an appeal to the Russian Federation in relation to respect partnership with Tajikistan can be regarded as a subsequent stroke in the multistate game Rahmon's foreign policy, almost under temporary patronage of the United States. The upcoming withdrawal of U.S. allies in Afghanistan can dramatically alter the regional situation, as is happening in the Middle East, with the weakening of the U.S. military presence in Iraq.
It is a question, first, on the radicalization of public sentiment (and here the ideological base of the IRP can be a major pole of attraction potential for protest), and increasing cross-border problems and threats. This possibility is even more so high that the Americans and their NATO allies will leave Afghanistan largely through Central Asia by promising local regimes exported surplus weapons.
Appeal in a situation marked by the Russian Federation to the Tajik President's quite silly. It would be more honest, at least, to sign an agreement to extend the deployment of the 201st Russian military base, especially because it is already discussed during the visit of Dmitry Medvedev in Dushanbe. Better yet, call on Moscow to support Tajikistan in the protection of the borders with Afghanistan. What it will bring dividends to the Tajik side — it is difficult to predict. Maybe it will cause new difficulties, it is now with the United States and China. Even more difficult to judge how such a presence in time and perfect for the most of. Yet, such a policy would not contradict the current challenges faced by Tajikistan, as would be consistent with the logic of claims Rahmon to the address in Moscow.
President Tajikistan on the one hand calls to take into account the active membership of their country in the union with the Russian Defense bloc CSTO, and the other systematically reduces the Russian role in the increasingly complex and operational prepyadstviya — outside the boundaries of one (with Russia) place security on the Afghan frontier. With all of this Tajik side trying to insinuate that she sovladevaet with this daunting task, even though they say the facts about the reverse situation.
The lack of logic in the actions of Emomali Rahmon in Russian direction can be explained by only one — the presence of other logic in its relations with other centers of power, intensely active in the Central Asian region. How will the Tajik president for this maneuver, time will tell.
While it is clear only that Tajikistan is facing severe internal transformations, by reminding "wick" for the probable future, "spring", but the Central Asian.