Before us is another example of the hypocrisy and inconsistency that are inherent to non-proliferation policy, particularly in the Middle East its nuance. That which is formally considered to concerns about a certain type of instrument, is actually fears of political positions or rhetorical modes that can get this kind of weapon. No one is worried that nuclear power can begin to behave rudely with its neighbors and to put pressure on them — in the unlikely event we have paid a little more attention to the trivial fact of the presence of Israel's large nuclear arsenal. Acts of the Security Council show that he professes and krivodushny inconsistent approach not only to the dilemma of nuclear weapons, and to the dilemma of nuclear programs that do not have a military purpose.
Increases the irony of the fact that one of the most common concerns about the likely development of nuclear weapons by Iran, is precisely that it could trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and to force Arab countries begin to acquire their bombs. But the list of candidates for the role in an arms race with Iran, Iraq, who led him in the 1980s, a bloody war, obviously must take one of the first places. Even if, as earlier than focusing on the Israeli arsenal, Iran stupidly assume the root of all evil — or possible evils — related to nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. The security problem in its nature is a two-way nature. Acts neighbors can serve as a prerequisite for the reaction of Iran, as well as the actions of Iran — the reaction of neighbors. (For the record: The Iran-Iraq war began in Iraq, not Iran.) But we very much focus on the likely dangers posed by Iran, and very rarely take into account that Iran itself also takes almost all the danger.
Fear Iran over Iraq could dispel strengthening of Iranian influence in post-Saddam Iraq. But this would, in turn, would cause fear in us. In general, we have and without it there are a number of circumstances not very cheering probable attainment of nuclear weapons by Iraq, even for a moment that prospect seems very distant. Iraq — a very unstable country, shrouded in ongoing violence. Political Order in it really is not formed, the main questions rassredotachivaniya power — are not permitted. Prime Minister Maliki is increasingly showing authoritarian habits. In fact, the establishment of an authoritarian regime — if not by Maliki, then someone else-in this case, perhaps, the main chance to approve the order and end the violence. The internal political dynamics in the country as before, such that for obtaining and maintaining power look better recent efforts. With all of this all the internal conflicts that existed in the days of Baathist dictatorship, as previously saved and the enmity between Shiites and Sunnis even worse and has become even hotter. The basic premise of this was the intensification of sectarian conflict in Iraq, although, of course, do not forget about the accident and Iranian influence.
In the United States these disturbing realities of Iraqi mostly prefer to gloss over. Blame this tendency to separate into distinct regions and bad combined with the desire to enroll post-Saddam Iraq to great. The previous administration was, of course, is keenly interested in how to present the positive results of the society's own ill-fated war. The current administration in turn is interested in order to show that if the situation in Iraq, it is not out of control, and that South American men will be able to quietly leave the country by the end of 2011. Complementing these trends have a habit of Yankees spring personalize danger and give them a certain image of the favorites, in this case — the late Saddam Hussein. But the political and strategic calculations decomposed, lying in the base of previous attempts by Iraq to develop nuclear tool, enthusiasm to which the Iraqis continued to show and after the overthrow of Saddam obviously can not be attributed to the views and ambitions of 1 person.
All this obviously does not mean that Iraq really has developed nuclear tool. Moreover, I do not believe that the decision taken by the Security Council this week, will certainly fail. We are talking only about how to glance at a different angle on the universal obsession with Iran's nuclear applets.
You should also remember the predictions made before the war, the South American intelligence community, who predicted the main difficulties that have been encountered post-Saddam Iraq. At the time, the Bush administration and Congress have ignored these forecasts, but most of them in their own true — especially in the part that foreshadowed the conflicts and instability of Iraq. The document in which they were presented, also stated that Iraq as before would take their own neighbors danger and that this will inevitably affect its position on the issue of weapons of mass destruction:
"This idea of the danger, coupled with the haughty perception of Iraq as a regional power, is likely to push the Iraqis to rebuild their army. If Iraq does not guarantee protection from strategic rivals, it again at some point will start to show interest in weapons of mass destruction. "