After the fall of the Libyan regime and the physical destruction of his favorite all the attention of global media, professionals and political scientists has shifted to a new object of Western interests — Iran.
South American democracy, having finished with one more objectionable government continues to implement its growing appetite for oil in South-West Asia, aiming to Iran. Painfully delicious piece — that Iran! The country produces about 180 million tons of oil a year, more than half of which is exported. About 85% (!) Cash receipts to the budget of the country is provided by the sale of oil. By the volume of proven oil supplies Iran ranks fourth in the world. Country-largest daily oil production (about 4 million barrels per day) is in the middle of the OPEC second after Saudi Arabia.
Go to war with Iran, the United States vigorously pushes Israel, concerned about Tehran's nuclear applets. Analysts believe that Tel Aviv is likely to strike first without the help of others, vsekrete from Washington.
But the question of when exactly, what forces will be hit by Iran, who will join the Western coalition, is still open. More or less clear is what will be the strategy of attacking — it has worked perfectly in the past conflicts. Of course, the purpose of the operation coalition group will reach by air strikes in the process of conducting an air campaign lasting from a few weeks to 2 or 3 months. According to the principal objects will be several blows precision instrument. The primary object of the attack will be the factory for the production and processing of nuclear fuel, uranium mines, the production of its enrichment. Get and oil refineries, other factory centers.
But first task will be solved oppression (complete destruction) air defense system. Massive use of cruise missiles of various purpose, guided aerial bombs will be out of action command and control system of Iran, in fact suppressed intelligence system and conducting anti-aircraft missile fire. With all of this task will be the aggressor in the settlement of the first two or three days to 70-80% of the radar, and the next — up to 90%. A similar fate should be understood and firepower, but these losses will try to avoid an air defense system. He graduated from the deal manned aircraft, which will begin only after the bombing of the oppression of the air defense system. West saves its own pilots, professionals, and not a failure, with all this hurt and the civilian population of Iran.
What did respond to anger Iran? Will it be easy prey? Will the Iranian air defenses to rebuff the aggressor? Try to understand.
In general, Iranian Armed Forces are quite severe force. They are equipped with modern weapons, staffed with the highest level of training. In preparation for war, the country itself produces and acquires abroad modern efficient service. Tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, missile systems, tactical and ballistic missiles, artillery systems, aircraft — everything is there to conduct effective military operations. Iran has provided the experience of war. In the 80 years of the last century (by historical standards at all so long ago — 25-30 years ago) Iran led a fierce war with the coming neighbor — Iraq. In war, then used all the available types of weapons, including force and air defense systems. As part of air defense groups were locators, missile systems and the production of various states, including Russian. Iranian anti-aircraft gunners, together with other well prepared and Russian experts at. Patrons Iranian heaven knew how to wage war and have not forgotten how to do it.
By the way, Russian experts at once assisted by both warring parties then. Creator of these lines happened to be at the meeting 2-Poltava antiaircraft school classmates, who recalled the lieutenant years and suddenly found out that at one and the same time, wage war on different sides of the barricades almost against each other!
Secured MILITARY EXPERIENCE
Now the battle of the anti-aircraft defense of Iran, there are more than 3,000 units firing anti-aircraft missile systems and systems as anti-aircraft artillery. Besides, there are the means of combat as outdated, but the last upgrade, and the most modern systems. The abundance of types of reconnaissance, air defense systems running on different physical principles that have a wide range of performance characteristics, allows for the use of their competent enough to build a strong, robust air defense system. Not the case a few years back in an interview with a large Russian military leader, he headed the powerful grouping defense, gave the very highest assessment of Iran's air defense system, concluding its ability to withstand an air strike by the United States.
Quantitative and high-quality composition of the forces and air defense of Iran defines the principle of building air defense system. More obvious to implement and adequate conditions of zone-site-principle. Now no one country can not allow ourselves to building a system of air defense, capable of firmly, with no gaps in the affected areas, with the highest density of the impact on air enemy to protect the principle of individual objects, not to mention the protection of all areas of the country. A more telling example in this sense, was a system of air defense GSVG first 90 years of the last century. In those days it was the most powerful, reliable system that has all the constituent elements: management, scouting enemy aircraft and alerts about it, fighter-jet cover (IAP) and the anti-aircraft missile (artillery) cover (ZRAP).
The air defense system of the Islamic Republic has 4 air defense area, a very simplistic view on the scheme. In each area, which consists of groups of air defense, all have the necessary elements, including control systems, intelligence, and PAI ZRAP. Better protected from air attack in the strategic principle for objects in the west of the country, also on pobe-rezhe Persian, Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman. In these areas, deployed by 5-7 defense groups to protect large cities, industrial areas, refineries, centers for nuclear fuel reprocessing.
In fact, no anti-aircraft missile (artillery) covering the eastern area of the country, bordering Afghanistan and Pakistan, will also come from the threat of air attack.
Air defense command and control system is an integral part of the management of state of the Armed Forces. SU is based on the common traditional pattern that combines management and headquarters areas, groups of air defense, command posts (control points) anti-aircraft missile (artillery), radio units and subunits that make up the group of air defense. System communication channels represented tropospheric relay, short-wave radio. Extensively used a wired connection.
Available in the press data indicate the presence of a control system of a number of problems that require solutions Eager.
od condition. The coefficient of technical readiness of technology information system with such terms and criteria of operation does not exceed the level of 0.3-0.4 at least some army even tuned very patriotic.
In-2, the ideology implemented in the ACS guidelines as management tasks, based on the ideas and the technical abilities of the last century, does not meet the requirements of today's inflated. Dramatically increased the volume of the circulating disk imaging at all levels of the hierarchy in the SU, significantly increased the requirements for speed and quality of tasks in the planning of military operations, and in particular in the process of reflection of air strikes, as the level of automation of management processes.
In the conditions of the transience of attacks of air attack (IOS), the need for rapid decision-making in the reconnaissance and fire at a very acute shortage of time available to CP (CP), the virtual absence of modern inclusive of automatic control systems (AIMS) causes the problem of effective use of rather large potential fire ability of subordinates SAM (AAMS). In fact, no parts support systems for decision-making on the CP (CP) in the process of reflection attacks in SVN existing system of command and control air defense Iran does. Meanwhile, the current criteria for the organization and management of transient anti-aircraft combat really need the highest degree of automation of the collection, processing, transfer and sharing of disk imaging radar (SAR images), decision-making at the reflection of shock and conducting anti-aircraft missile fire.
B-3, the ability of the CS has a significant negative impact of mountainous terrain. The deployment of the team shall be performed on Fri commanding heights at low power of choice position areas for PU (KP). The shielding effect highlands significantly reduces the range and reliability of radio, microwave and tropospheric communication. The change of position areas in a period of threat, especially in wartime, is difficult because of the difficulty of movement in the mountains, the problems of choice routes, problems of engineering equipment, limited maneuver. Of course, the operational equipment of areas of future military operations should be carried out in peacetime, performing engineering works, deploying spare channels of communication, preparing routes extension, fulfilling plans for bringing the troops on alert, etc.
In the end, you need to clearly understand that the management system and enemy reconnaissance aircraft will be prime targets destruction with the outbreak of hostilities. All PU positioning areas (KP), communication, radar position, the frequency of peacetime has long been known to the enemy and threatened by its WTO. In the conditions of saturated fire and electronic countermeasures centralized management areas and groups of defense would probably be lost. So now it is at the moment to work out options for independent action anti-aircraft formations in the event of loss of control at all levels. To do this, they must be practiced for detailed instructions on conducting fire and interaction, providing different options shield block EHV regardless of the air situation.
EXPLORATION AND NOTIFICATION
Intelligence system air attacks and alerts is represented by several components. Reconnaissance by air carriers created a network of early warning of an air attack. For disk imaging and delivery of EHV system ZRAP deployed a network of ground radars, summarized in radar stations (RFP). Posts are deployed along the state borders of the country in threatened areas. As part of SFM has an old fleet radar of foreign production, the main U.S. and Britain. How should rely on the secrecy of the frequency spectrum of peace and war, places of deployment of the radar in advance is not necessary. Existing network created RFP radar field reconnaissance aerial targets at medium and large heights, which has a focal character. Read about the full area of intelligence on the multiplicity of overlapping detection zones is not necessary because of the small number of radars. All existing radars are built on the principles of active sonar and are easy prey for modern detection and suppression of electrical energy emitters. For example, such a pride of the Iranian air defense radars as English AR-3D, which has megawatt transmitter, probably will be out of commission by the first fire impact on it.
Creator of these lines a couple of years back had a chance as a consultant to visit one island nation where during the visit of local commanders proudly showed a strong ability that has no equal for themselves the radar of foreign production. The station launched on the largest hill, gives electronic environment within a radius of about 300 km, instilling confidence defense officers. But when was followed by questions about radar jamming, her ability to recognize the classes and types of aerial targets, the use of special operating modes (including stealth), the momentary electrical frequency tuning, perspectives change positions the organization to combat subversive groups, etc. ., the interest of the owners immediately once dried up.
The principal indicator of the effectiveness of the air space exploration (SRVP) is required removal of the radar field. The composition of the existing parts of the defense radar site in Iran, including intelligence capabilities being on the radar equipment, provided the required take-out only only at altitudes above 3,000 meters in some areas. The low degree of automation of the collection, processing and transmission of radar data, coupled with the main (Tablet) by displaying traffic situation leads to unacceptably huge time delay warning on air enemy, reaching 4-6 minutes.
In such criteria detection task SVN on small and low-level maximum must be borne by the reconnaissance anti-aircraft units, which, in turn, will inevitably lead to an early opening of enemy air defense systems and its oppression.
So Makar, despite the fairly highest potential ability of reconnaissance resources enemy aircraft in the air defense system of the Islamic Republic is shown a number of problems, both technical and organizational nature.
First you need a union embracing system of reconnaissance resources the Air Force, Navy, Army groups, border guards, civilian air fleet and other agencies. In this case, the association should be implemented on the basis of the modern standard of AIMS, capable of creating an automatic collection, processing (identification), the sheer volume of radar data, to provide an operational exchange of information between sources and targets for the timely reduction of troops in readiness to repel aggression, and to issue precise coordinates of EHV fire weapons defense. This must be done by the ability within the area of air defense and air defense certainly for the group, particularly in the missile-threat (threatened) directions. An example of such AIMS may be available in the AD CB RF modernized version of the ACS "Glade-D4M1" is a complex of automated battle management of the mixed air defense group. Specifications funds and software of the AIMS allow for the collection, processing and disk imaging radar warning of air and ground situation, control the forces and means of mixed groups of air defense, secure private aircraft flown; produce advice on managing subordinate units and support interaction with them by automatic target distribution and targeting. The complex is able to process and accompany immediately to 255 aerial targets.
Certainly, there is an urgent need to update the fleet radar equip it with modern radars operating in different frequency spectrum available in the totality of its own arsenal of special operating modes for use in the criteria for saturated electronic countermeasures the enemy. For the detection of modern SVN made by technology "Stealth" are needed locators operating in the VHF spectrum of waves. In this sense, an indispensable developed in Russia radar of the "Sky-IED", capable of detecting and accompany aerial targets with RCS of about 1 m2 at an altitude of 500 m — up to 65 km at an altitude of 20,000 m — at distances up to 380 km. Time to deploy the radar position is about 20 minutes.
It is important to perform a set of follow-ups to ensure the survival of parts SRVP: frequent changes of position radar, communications, deployment wrong with imitation products on their performance electronic means, high-quality engineering machinery products, the widespread use of passive reflectors traps, mimics thermal radiation; deployment nearby RLP anti-aircraft fire, the organization of protection against subversive groups, etc.
Intelligence system should be supplemented by a network of stations visual observation to be effective in the detection of low-flying targets. Chain DID deployed on the commanding heights, furnished the means of visual observation and data, will allow to solve a number of problems SRVP.
As you know, at least some radio-electronic means (RECs) on the opening of the air in the small clearance time is the enemy, opened its frequency properties with the following firing or radio-electronic effects. Because in recent years the developed systems of passive (non-emitting) locations. An example of such a system is a set of Russian electronic intelligence (KRTR), which has excellent performance characteristics — huge range of detection of air targets and higher accuracy for the purposes of issuing coordinate air defense systems (course objectives, delete, altitude). In addition, the method of the KRTR RES radiation characteristics of the aircraft with the highest probability of finding its identity, type, class, etc. According to open sources of information, such complex single copies already purchased by Iran. With enough samples KRTR intelligence system will be capable of stealthy techniques to provide air defense system accurate data on enemy air raid in threatened areas with a range of about 400 km, which will allow time to bring the troops in readiness to repel attacks SVN and issue clear targeting air defenses fired.
The system of anti-aircraft missile (artillery) is a cover for air defense groups, the base of which are anti-aircraft battalions. Regardless of the type of weapon, its complete set consisting of divisions distinguished anti-aircraft missiles, anti-aircraft missile and artillery or anti-aircraft artillery battalions.
In the base of the formation of divisions on the principle of a mixed acquisition of weapons systems that sets out a number of advantages in comparison with the uniform. Mixed air defense group, kitted SAMs with different mechanisms of operation, a wide range of frequency characteristics having different firing capabilities complement each other, compensating for frail hand, provide a huge performance impact-absorbent SVN.
The group has a radar post, issuing target coordinates fire weapons, and several mixed divisions. Usually, one of the zrdn is armed with long-range air defense missile systems (C-200, C-75), one — the medium-range (like Hawk, «Square"), zradn complex close to the zenith of action (such as Rapier) and anti-aircraft artillery systems memory -23-2, ZSU-23-4, C-60, Oerlikon.
This acquisition provides the complete autonomy of the fighting groups air defense system allows you to do multi-layered anti-missile and anti-aircraft artillery fire. With all this the presence of different anti-aircraft group can make the system of fire-layered for depth, height, to ensure the continuity of the fire impact on air targets as they are reaching is to hide behind objects. In addition, with this group formation will best implemented mutual cover for air defense systems, created besprovalnaya the affected area with a cover of "dead" air defense system funnels.
The principal feature of the system is the density of fire fire impacts on air target air defense means. The physical meaning of this value is close to the number of damaging effects of fire. With its calculation takes into account characteristics of the affected area (fire) SAM (ORD), the probabilities of different types of lesions in those goals or other criteria, timing of combat operations and other characteristics of affected areas (fire) the main types of air defense missile systems (ORD), available in the defense groups are shown in Fig. 1.
Despite the highest (as it seems at first glance) firing capabilities of S-200 (huge value distant borders the affected area and height), a decisive contribution to the effectiveness of anti-EHV from this complex should be expected. S-200 — dated complex with low immunity and technical readiness. The ideology of its construction begins in the middle of the last century and does not meet current requirements. The need for continued work RES complex with access to air, the absence of special covert operation modes makes it very vulnerable. A very limited number of SAMs of this type does not allow a density of at least some anti-aircraft fire in threatened areas. Within the boundaries of its own zone of destruction C-200 would lead antiaircraft fire fight without the organization of interaction, mutual cover-fire concentration.
Range of the engagement S-200 of up to 17 km is the need to organize his defense. Such prepyadstviya peculiar and complex
C-75, to the same characteristics of its affected areas are much smaller than SAM
C-200. Low maneuvering capabilities of both air defense system makes it difficult to timely change their starting positions during combat operations. At distances of 20-25 km ZRAP complement system affected areas Hawk SAM and "Square". These SAMs are more mobile, maneuverable. The available number of them in threatened areas to protect the fundamental polygon objects may be to create a system with a multiplicity of overlapping fire up 2-3 in the low and medium altitudes. This will enable the fire concentration on key objectives to ensure mutual cover, interactions with target tracking, etc.
On the small and the maximum low-level ranges from 10-12 km in ZRAP cut one SAM HQ-7 (FM-80) and "Tor-M1". In the near field objects will hide behind the anti-aircraft artillery and MANPADS. With all of this, small and low-level maximum density of antiaircraft fire can be close to 4.6, which will allow to achieve the desired performance impact-absorbent SVN. In addition, tasks cover specific groups of troops on the battlefield will do untold units of MANPADS "Strela-2 (3)", "Igla-1", etc., are available in standard structures, land forces. Unfortunately, all available in the ZRAP system (not counting the "Tor-M1") have a very low possibility of destruction of small low-flying targets: cruise missiles, ASD, SD, UAVs, etc. It is very difficult to beat these systems and combat helicopters because of the small time finding them in the affected areas (fire).
A fundamental condition for the effective functioning of the system ZRAP is to ensure its viability in t
he process of reflection strikes SVN. This is achieved by repeating the change of positions, and their immediate change after the launches missiles (fired anti-aircraft missiles), engineering equipment start (fire) positions, camouflage, equipment, incorrect positions imitation of RES to the transmitter SAM (AAMS), the use of passive corner reflectors, etc .
So Makar, the available quantitative and high-quality composition of forces and air defense may be the creation of unsafe directions on separate fragmented systems ZRAP echelonment with its depth, height, fronts with providing the required multiplicity of fire impact on specific types of EHV. But the creation of a strong effective system ZRAP to cover the entire totality of fundamental objects, including troops on the battlefield, from shock at the technical level and awareness superior enemy air is very problematic because of the circumstances indicated.
A particular weakness of the system is its acquisition ZRAP legacy SAM and ZAK. Vehicles with the use of three to four years, the 10-ka intends such difficulties (as well as with the system) to maintain the required level of combat readiness. In the absence of supply of spare parts of devices, virtually depleted spares often used "barbaric" method of recovery of AME due to combat-ready disassembly of such samples.
In the hope for a renewal
So, on closer examination capabilities of Iran's air defenses opened lots of problems, demonstrating its inability to present the appropriate resistance against an aerial target. Need to carry out a complex of urgent measures for the technical equipment of all components of the air defense system, including the purchase of modern process control systems, radar, AIMS, electronic warfare, communications, development of own production WME models using modern technology. Acquisition of 3-10-s military vehicles "Tor-M1" will not solve the problem of retrofitting air defense system to Iran's new weapons.
For the creation of the system in depth ZRAP with multiple overlapping zones of destruction must have totality of antiaircraft weapons: long range — C-300PMU (C-300SV) medium-range — of the "Buk-M1 (M2)," close-acts — such as "Tor- M1 (M2) "," Armour-C. "
The principal direction of strengthening the air defense system can be equipped Iranian Armed Forces Russian electronic warfare systems of production. The complex electronic warfare systems capable of a process of "proximity" effects on RES SVN significantly reduce the ability of strike aircraft to search, locate and destroy ground targets, disrupt the on-board equipment of cruise missiles in the satellite navigation system GPS; distort the radio altimeter readings strike aircraft, cruise missiles and UAVs ( it is very difficult to make flying over mountainous terrain), to cause failure in the flight of complex electronic equipment of the aircraft.
Available EW may not be only the "blinding" the airborne radar, but the distortion of electronic environment, the generation of false targets, the distortion coordinate these goals, coordinate input errors, etc.
There is also a mass of developments for modernization of anti-aircraft artillery, which is very effective in the fight against low-flying air targets (combat helicopters, attack aircraft, flying low-speed cruise missiles). Improving FOR done by increasing the bandwidth efficiency of the shooting, process automation and training of fire, the development of guided munitions, sensors, undermining the projectile in the target area, the control rate of fire. Work is underway in Iran.
PS All the information about the battle of the armed formations, quantitative properties of the combat abilities are taken from the press.