The historiography of Mongol-Tatar invasion (or the Mongols or Tatars and Mongols, etc, as you like) to Russia has more than 300 years. This invasion was an accepted fact since the end of the XVII century, when one of the founders of the Russian Orthodox Church, Teuton Innocent Giesel wrote the first textbook on the history of — "Synopsis". According to this book the story of his native Russian digging all of the following 150 years. But so far none of the historians took it upon myself to make a "road map" campaign of Batu Khan's 1237-1238 winter in the North-Eastern Russia.
In other words, take and calculate how many were tireless Tartar warriors and horses than they get better, and so on. Interpreter blog because of their own limited resources, tried to correct this deficiency.
At the end of the XII century in the middle of the Tatar tribes have a new favorite — Temujin, who was able to unite around their huge part. In 1206, it announced at the Congress (the analog of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR), a pan-Mongol Genghis Khan under the name, who made the unfortunate "state of the nomads." Without losing any then a minute, the Mongols began the conquest of surrounding areas. By 1223, when the Tatar detachment commanders jab and Sabutai encountered on the river Kalka with Russian-Polovtsian army zealous nomads managed to capture the area of Manchuria in the east to Iran, the South Caucasus and the modern western Kazakhstan, the government Khorezmshakh defeating and capturing the passing of northern China.
In 1227 Genghis Khan died, but his successors continued the conquest. By 1232, the Mongols reached the middle of the Volga, where the war with the nomadic Cumans and their allies — the Volga Bulgars (ancestors of modern Volga Tatars). In 1235 (according to other sources — in 1236) at the Congress decided on a global campaign against Kipchaks, Bulgars and Russian, and further west. Lead the campaign had grandson of Genghis Khan — Khan Batu (Batu). Here we must digress. In the years 1236-1237 the Mongols, were leading at the time the act to combat the tremendous field of modern Ossetia (against the Alans) to modern Volga republics seized Tatarstan (Volga Bulgars) and the fall of 1237 began a campaign against the concentration of Russian principalities.
In general, what nomads from the banks of the Onon Kerulen and took the conquest of Ryazan, or Hungary, did not really understand. All samples historians forced a similar zeal to prove the Mongols look quite palely. Regarding the Western March Mongols (1235-1243 years), they came up with the bike that the attack on the Russian principalities was a measure to ensure the destruction of his own keeper and possible allies own main opponents — Polovtsian (kind of Kuman went to Hungary, as their main mass became the forefathers of modern Kazakhs). However, neither the Golden Horde or the Vladimir-Suzdal, nor the so-called "Novgorod republic" were never any Polovtsian allies nor the Volga Bulgars.
Also, virtually all historians of the Mongols did not really says nothing about the principles of formation of their armies, the principles of management, and so on. With all of this it was thought that the Mongols sformirovyvaetsya their tumens (field operational compounds) including of conquered nations, for serving soldier did not pay anything for any offense they were threatened with the death penalty.
Advances nomads scientists have tried and so one of two ways to explain, but each time came out pretty funny. Although, as a result, the level of organization of the army of Mongols — from exploration to communication would be the envy of most developed countries the army of the XX century (although after the era raschudesno hikes Mongols — only 30 years after the death of Genghis Khan — instantly lost all his abilities). For example, it is believed that the head of intelligence of the Tatar warlord Subuday, supported the business with his father Roman, Germanic-Roman king, Venice and so on.
In this case, the Mongols, of course, at the time of its own military campaigns operate without radio communication, railways, road transport, and so on. In Russian, historians punctuated normal by the time of the steppe yubermenshah fantasy, not knowing weakness, hunger, fear, etc., with the traditional rite in the field of class-formation approach:
With a total enrollment in the army every dozen tents have been set from 1 to 3 depending on the needs of soldiers and provide them with food. The gun in peacetime stored in special warehouses. It was the property of the country and issued warriors in a campaign speech. Upon returning from a trip every soldier had to pass gun. Warriors did not receive a salary, but they paid the tax horse or other livestock (one head with 100 goals). In war, every soldier had an equal right to seize prey, some of which had to pass Khan. In periods between campaigns army is sent to public works. One day a week was allocated for the service Khan.
In the base of the organization has been put troops decimal system. The army was divided into the 10's, hundreds, thousand and ten of thousands (or darkness Tumen), headed by the foremen, centurions and tysyatskih. The chiefs had separate tents and reserve horses and guns.
The main arm of the service was the cavalry, which was divided into light and languid. Languid cavalry led the fight with the main forces of the enemy. Light cavalry was carrying the guard service and conducted reconnaissance. She was tying fight, frustrating with arrows the enemy ranks. The Mongols were good archers with a stallion. Light Cavalry led the pursuit of the enemy. The cavalry had a huge amount of clockwork (spare) horses, which allowed the Mongols to move very quickly over long distances. The peculiarity of the Tatar army was a complete lack of wheeled baggage. Only tent Khan and especially authority figures transported on carts …
Each warriors was file for sharpening arrows, awl, needle, thread and a sieve for sifting flour or straining muddy water. The rider had a small tent, two tursuka (leather bags), one for water and one for the steep (dried sour cheese). If food supplies ran low, the Mongols allowed the horses and drank her blood. In this method, they can enjoy up to 10 days.
In general, the term "Mongol-Tatars" (or the Tatar-Mongols) is very bad. It sounds about as Croat-Hindus or Finno-negros, if we talk about its meaning. The fact that Russian and Polish, are facing the XV-XVII centuries with the nomads, called them the prototype — the Tatars. In the upcoming Russian is often transferred to other nations who had no business to stray Turks in the Black Sea steppes. His contribution to this mess made, and Europeans, who for a long time believed Russia (then Muscovy) Tatar (more precisely, Tartary), resulting in a very unusual design.
Either way, that attacked Russia and Europe "Tatars" were also Mongols, the company found out only in the early XIX century, when Christian Kruse published "Atlas and tables for viewing the history of all European countries and from the land of their first population to our times. " Then idiotic term gratifying already picked and Russian historians.
Increased attention is also paid to the issue and the number of invaders. Naturally, any records on the number of the army of Mongols come down to us, and the oldest and enjoying unconditional trust among historians is the source of the creators of the landmark work of the team under the control of the Iranian bureaucrat country Khulaguids Rashid al-Din's "List of Histories." It is believed that he was the first written XIV century in the Persian language, however, it emerged only in the early XIX century, the first part of the French language edition was published in 1836. Right up to the middle of the XX century, this source was not at all well translated and published.
According to Rashid al-Din, in 1227 (year the death of Genghis Khan), the total size of the army of the Tatar empire was 129 thousand people. If you believe in Plano Carpini, the army after 10 years of phenomenal nomads was 150 thousand actually Mongols and another 450 thousand people, recruited in the "voluntary-compulsory" right of subject peoples. Pre-revolutionary Russian historians estimate the number of the army of Batu, concentrated in autumn 1237 at the frontiers of the Ryazan principality, from 300 to 600 thousand people. With all of this for granted seemed that every nomad had 2-3 horses.
By the standards of the Middle Ages, like the army looked quite Straseni-fetched, it is recognized. But blame the pundits fantazerstvo — very cruelly for them. Hardly anyone of them could ever imagine for myself even a couple of 10-s of thousands of mounted warriors from 50-60 tyschami horses, not to mention the trivial dilemmas with the management of such a mass of people and providing them with sustenance. Since the story — an inexact science, and of science in general do not, the researchers estimate the run fantasy everyone can here. We will take advantage of the now traditional assessment of the army in Batu 130-140 thousand people, which was proposed by Russian scientist VV Kargaly. His assessment (as well as all the others, absolutely sucked from the finger, as if read seriously) in historiography, though, is prevalent. Namely, it divides and the biggest modern Russian historian of the Tatar Empire RP Hrapachevsky.
From Ryazan to Vladimir
In autumn 1237 Tatar troops, provoevavshie all spring and summer to tremendous places from the North Caucasus, the Lower Don and the Volga region to the middle, pulled together to a place of public gathering, river Onuza. It is believed that the question of the river Cna in the modern Tambov region. Perhaps also some teams were going to the Mongols in the upper reaches of the rivers Don and Voronezh. Precise date of the speech of the Mongols against the Ryazan principality not, but one can imagine that it took place in any event no later than December 1, 1237. In other words, the steppe nomads with almost half a million herd of horses decided to go for a hike is almost winter. It is crucial for the reconstruction.
On the plains of rivers and forest Entirely Voronezh, also tributaries of the river Pronya Tatar army, moving one or several columns passes through the wooded watershed of the Oka and the Don. They come Embassy Ryazan prince Theodore Jurevicha, which proved inconclusive (Prince killed), and in some places in the same region meet the Mongols in the Ryazan army. In a fierce battle, they destroy it, and then move up the river Prone, plundering and destroying the small town of Ryazan — Izheslavets, Belgorod, Pronsk, burn Mordovia and Russian village.
Here it is necessary to make a small clarification: we have no clear data on the number of people in what was then the North-Eastern Russia, but if you follow the reconstruction of modern scholars and archaeologists (VP Darkevich, MN Tikhomirov, A. Cuza), then It was not huge, and, in addition, for it was characteristic of the low density of settlement. For example, the city of Ryazan land naikrupneyshy — Ryazan, consisted of the evaluation VP Darkevich, a maximum of 6-8 thousand people, and about 10-14 thousand people could live in a small town surrounded by farm (within a radius of 20-30 km). Other town had a population of a few hundred people, in the best case, as Moore — up to a couple thousand. On this basis, it is unlikely the total population of the Ryazan principality could exceed 200-250 thousand people.
Certainly, for the conquest of itself "proto" 120-140 thousand soldiers were more than odd number, but will stick to the traditional version.
December 16, after the march of the Mongols in the 350-400 km (in other words, the average daily rate of transition is here up to 18-20 km) go to Ryazan and start its siege — around the town they build wood fence, build kamnemetnye machines with which they are shelling of the town. In general, historians recognize that the Mongols have gained untold — by the standards then — success in siege is. For example, historian RP Hrapachevsky seriously believes that the Mongols were capable of almost a day or bungled in place from the available forest kamnemetnye any machine:
To assemble kamnemetov had all the right — in the United Mongol army was quite professionals from China and Tangut … and the Russian woods in the abundance of tree species supplied the Mongols to build siege weapons.
In the end, 21 December Ryazan fell after a fierce storm.
We also do not have any precise evidence of what the weather conditions were in December 1239, but as a method of movement of the Mongols chose ice rivers (another method to pass through a wooded area was not the first constant of the road in the North-Eastern Russia are documented Only in XIV century), you can imagine that it was already the usual winter with frosts, maybe snow.
The principal is also the question of what got better Tatar horses during this campaign. Of the works of historians and modern research steppe horses understood that it was a very undemanding, malehankih — increasing the withers to 110-120 cm, conics. Their main meals — this hay and grass. In the natural habitat of the criteria they are quite hardy and undemanding, and in winter during tebenevki they are able to break the snow in the desert and there is last year's grass.
On the basis of this together historians believe that due to these properties, the question of subsistence of horses during the winter 1237-1238 campaign to Russia's not an issue. Meanwhile easily see that the conditions in this region (the thickness of the snow cover, an area of grass stands, the overall quality of plant communities) are different from, say, or Halha Turkestan. In addition, winter tebenevka steppe horses represents the subsequent: a herd of horses slowly, passing in day a few hundreds of meters, moves across the steppe, looking withered grass under the snow. Animals such makarom save up your energy costs. But in the campaign against Russia these horses had to go through a day in the freezing cold on 10-20-30 and even more km (see below), carrying lugga
ge or fighters. Horses ever managed in such criteria to fill their energy costs?
After taking the Ryazan Mongols began to move towards the fortress of Kolomna, which is typical of a "gateway" in the Vladimir-Suzdal. After going 130 km from Ryazan to Kolomna, according to Rashid al-Din and RP Hrapachevskogo, the Mongols in the fortress "stuck" to 5 or even 10 January 1238. On the other hand moves to Kolomna powerful, the Vladimir army, which may majestic Prince Yuri Gromov outfitted immediately after receiving the news of the fall of Ryazan (Ryazan assistance he gave the prince of Chernigov). The Mongols are sending an envoy with an offer to become their vassal, but also proves inconclusive negotiations (according to the Laurentian Chronicle — Prince agrees to pay tribute, but still sends troops under Kolomna).
How to find VV Kargaly and RP Hrapachevsky, scramble near Kolomna started no later than January 9 and it lasted the whole 5 days (by Rashid al-Din). It immediately appears legitimate question — historians believe that the military forces in the Russian principalities were generally mild and consistent with reconstructions of that era, when the army of 1-2 thousand people was standard, and 4-5 and more than thousand people presented a large army. It is unlikely that the Grand Duke Vladimir Gromov could collect more (if you make a digression: the total population of the land of Vladimir, according to various estimates varied in the range of 400-800 thousand people, but they were scattered over a large area, and the population of capital city of the earth — Vladimir, even for the most daring renovations did not exceed 15-25 thousand people). Yet, near Kolomna Mongols were stuck on some days, and the heat of battle points to the fact of death Chingizid Kulkana — son of Genghis Khan.
After the victory at Kolomna, or three, or five-day battle Mongols are moving briskly across the ice of the Moscow River in the direction of the future Russian capital. Distance of 100 km, they are virtually day or 3-4 (the rate of average daily march — 25-30 km) on the views of RP Hrapachevskogo nomads began the siege of Moscow on January 15 (according to the views of NM Karamzin — 20 January). Muscovites nimble Mongols caught off guard — they did not even know the outcome of the battle of Kolomna, and after a five-day siege of Moscow shared the fate of Ryazan city was burned all its inhabitants — the destroyed or driven into captivity.
Here it should be noted that all historians is the fact of the Mongol-Tatar movement without the baggage. Like, undemanding nomads it was not needed. Then it is not entirely clear is the fact, how does and what the Mongols moved their kamnemetnye car bombs to them, forges (for repairing guns, filling losses arrowheads, etc.), how the prisoners were driven. Because for always archaeological excavations in areas of the North-Eastern was not found or the 1st burial "of the Mongol-Tatars", some historians have even agreed to the version that the nomads and their own dead were taken back to the steppe (VP Darkevich , VV Kargaly). Obviously, to raise the question of the fate of the wounded or sick in this light, and not even worth (otherwise our historians thought of what they ate, joke) …
Yet, in the districts of Moscow after spending about a week and ransacking her farm kontado, the Mongols already moved across the ice of the river Kliazma (clicking forest watershed between that river and the Moscow River) to Vladimir. After going up to 7 days up to 140 km (average daily rate of march — about 20 km), nomads February 2, 1238 beginning the siege of the capital of Vladimir land. By the way, particularly at this transition Tatar army in the 120-140 thousand people "catch" a tiny detachment of the Ryazan princes Evpatii Kolovrat or 700, or 1,700 people, against whom the Mongols — from powerlessness — are required to apply kamnemetnye the car to beat him (it should take into account that the story of Kolovrat was recorded, according to historians, only in the XV century, so … consider it quite difficult documentary).
We define an academic question: what is the army general in 120-140 thousand people with little tyschami 400 horses (and it is not clear whether the convoy?) Moving over the ice of a river Oka or Moscow? Simple calculations show that even moving in front of 2 km (in fact, the width of these rivers is much less), such an army in the most immaculate criteria (all going the same speed, keeping the smallest distance) stretches at least 30-40 km. Curiously, none of the Russian scientists in the last 200 years, not even asked such a question, believing that the huge army of horse fly virtually through the air.
In general, the first step of the invasion of Batu Khan in North-Eastern Russia — from 1 December 1237 on February 2, 1238 Tatar notional horse was about 750 km, which gives the average rate of movement in the 12 km. But if you throw out the calculations, at least 15 days of standing in the flood plain of Oka (after taking Ryazan December 21 clash near Kolomna), and a week of rest and looting of Moscow, the rate of the average daily march of the Tatar cavalry seriously improve — up to 17 km a day.
It is not that it is any record rates of march (the Russian army during the Napoleonic Wars, for example, committed, and 30-40-kilometer-long daily transitions), the enthusiasm here is that all this is happening deep in the winter, and these rates were maintained fairly long.
From Vladimir to Kozel'sk
Grand Duke of Vladimir Gromov learned of the approach of the Mongols, Vladimir left, stepping down with a small retinue in the Volga — there among the windbreaks on the river Sit he broke camp and waited for reinforcements from their own brothers — Yaroslav (the father of Alexander Nevsky) and Svetoslav Vsevolodovichi. The town remained completely insignificant warriors led by the sons of Yuri — Vsevolod and Mstislav. Despite this, the city Mongolians Baggage 5 days, firing it from kamnemetov took him only after the assault on February 7. But before a small detachment of nomads led by Subuday time to burn Suzdal.
After the capture of Vladimir army of Mongols divided into three parts. First and larger part under the command of Batu comes from Vladimir to the northwest through the impenetrable forest and watershed Klyaz'ma Volga. 1st March — up from Vladimir Yuriev-Polsky (about 60-65 km). Further divided army — part goes smoothly in the north-west on Pereiaslavl (about 60 miles), after a five-day siege of the city fell, and then go to the Mongols Ksnyatin (about 100 km), to Kashin (30 km), later turned to the west and the ice to move Volga Tver (from Ksnyatin in a straight line a little more than 110 km, but are on the Volga, there is every 250-300 km).
The second part is the dense forests watershed of the Volga, Oka and Klyaz'ma of Yuriev-Polsky at Dmitrov (in a straight line approximately 170 km), then after its capture — in the Portage-Lamsky (130-140 km), from there to Tver (about 120 miles), after the capture of Tver — to Torzhok (together with units of the first part) — in a straight line about 60 km, but apparently walked along the river, so it will be more than 100 km. By torzhka Mongols have already entered on February 21 — 14 days after the departure of Vladimir.
So Makar, the first part of the squad for the Batu 15 days passes, at least 500-550 km in dense forests and along the Volga. However, you need to throw away a few days of the siege of cities and comes out to ab
out 10 days of the march. For any of the nomads who pass through the woods by 50-55 km a day! The second part of his unit goes in totality at least 600 km, which gives the average rate of march to 40 km. Given a pair of three days of the siege of cities — up to 50 km a day.
Under Torzhok — rather modest by the standards of the city, the Mongols were stuck for at least 12 days and it only took 5 March (VV Kargaly). After taking the torzhka one of the Tatar groups moved toward Novgorod by 150 km, but then turned back.
Second detachment of the Tatar army under the command of Kaduna and the Storm came from Vladimir to the east, moving across the ice of the river Kliazma. After going 120 km to Starodub, the Mongols burned the city, and then "cut" wooded divide between the lower and middle Volga Oka, coming to Gorodets (this is about 170-180 km, if a straight line). Next Tatar troops across the ice of the Volga reached Kostoromy (this is about 350-400 km), individual units have gained even Galic Merskogo. From Kostroma Mongols and Storms Kaduna went to join up with the third squad under the command of Burundi for the west — to Uglich. Moved probably nomads on the ice rivers (at least, again recall so accepted in Russian historiography), which makes for about 300-330 kilometers.
In early March Kadan and Storm were at Uglich, going for three weeks with little to 1000-1100 km. The average daily rate in March was nomads around 45-50 km, which is close to that of Batu squad.
3rd squad under the command of the Mongols Burunday was the most "slow" — after taking Vladimir he spoke at the Rostov-on-Don (170 km in a straight line), then overcame more than 100 km to Uglich. Part of the forces Burunday did march to Yaroslavl (70 km) from Uglich. First, on March Burunday unmistakably found in the woods beyond the Volga camp Vsevolodovich, whom he defeated in the battle of the river Sit on March 4. The transition from Uglich to the City and back — about 130 km. In totality Burunday troops were about 470 miles in 25 days — it gives us only 19 km average daily march.
In general, the conditional averaged Tatar horse has wound "on the speedometer" from December 1, 1237 on March 4, 1238 (day or 94) of 1200 (the smallest estimate, suitable only for a small part of the Tatar army) to 1,800 km. Conditional day shift ranges from 12-13 to 20 km. In fact, if we throw distance in the floodplain of the river Oka (about 15 days), 5-day assault on Moscow and 7 days of rest after her capture, a five-day siege of Vladimir, also another 6-7 days for the siege of Russian cities during the second half of February , it appears that the Tartar horse for any of the 55 days of its own motion passed to an average of 25-30 km. This excellent results for horses, given that all this happened in the cold, in the woods and snow, with the apparent lack of feed (unlikely Mongols could commandeer farmers have a lot of fodder for their own horses, especially because steppe horses do not actually get better with grain) and on the heavy work.
After taking the bulk of torzhka Tatar army concentrated on the upper Volga in Tver. Then they moved to the first half of March 1238 a broad front to the south in the steppe. The left wing, commanded by Kadan and storms passed through the forest watershed Klyaz'ma and the Volga, then went to the upper reaches of the Moskva River and on it went down to the Oka River. In a straight line is about 400 km, with the average rate of movement of nomads fast — about 15-20 days to go for them. So, apparently, in the first half of April, this part of the Tatar army out in the desert. Infy about what the impact melting of snow and ice on the rivers on the movement of this order, we do not have (only Hypation Chronicle reports that the steppe moved very rapidly). What this unit is engaged in the subsequent month after the release of the steppe is also no information, it is clear only that in May Kadan and the Storm came to the rescue of Batu, got stuck at that time under the Kozelsk.
Small Tatar troops, perhaps, according to V. Kargaly and RP Hrapachevsky, remained on the middle Volga, looting and burning Russian village. As they came out in the spring of 1238 in the desert — is not clear.
The greater part of the Tatar army under the command of Batu and Burundi instead of the shortest path to the steppe, which were troops from Kaduna and Storm, has chosen a very zamudrenny route:
On the trail of Batu more clear — from torzhka he moved along the Volga and Vazuza (a tributary of the Volga) to the rivers of the Dnieper, and from there through the Smolensk land to the town of Chernigov Vshchizh lying on the bank of the Desna, writes Hrapachevsky. Making a hook on the upper reaches of the Volga in the west and north-west, the Mongols turned south and crossing the watershed, went to the steppe. Perhaps some teams were in the center, through the Portage-Lamsky (Forests). Approximately, the left edge of Batu was during this time of the order of 700-800 km, other units of the least sensitive. By April 1, the Mongols have gained Serensk and Kozel'sk (Kozeleska chronicle, to be precise) — April 3-4 (according to another disk imaging — is March 25). On average, it gives us another 35-40 km a day march.
Under Kozelsk, which already could start drifting ice on Zhizdra and melting snow in its flood plain, Batu stuck almost 2 months (more precisely, at 7 weeks — 49 days — until May 23-25, maybe later, if we start counting from the April 3, by Rashid al-Din — 8 weeks). Why Mongols took necessarily precipitate pathetic, even by Russian standards, medieval, town, is not completely clear. For example, the towns adjacent to it Krom, sleep, Mtsensk, Domagosch, Devyagorsk, Dedoslavl, Kursk, nomads have not even touched.
On this topic historians argue to this day, any sane argument is not given. The funniest version offered folk historian of the "Eurasian-wing" LN Gumilev, suggested that the Mongols took revenge grandson Chernigov Prince Mstislav, who ruled in Kozelsk, for the murder of ambassadors on the river Kalka in 1223. Fun that the murder was involved as ambassadors of Smolensk Prince Mstislav of old. But the Mongols did not touch the Smolensk …
Logically, Batu was necessary to quickly go in the desert, as the spring thaw and starvation threatened him with a complete loss of, at least, "transport" — in other words, the horses.
The question of what did get better horses and the Mongols, precipitating Kozel'sk almost two months (with standard kamnemetnye cars), none of the historians puzzled. After all, ordinary hard to believe that a town with a population of a few hundred people have a tremendous army of Mongols, estimated tens of thousands of soldiers who could not take 7 weeks …
In the end, under the Mongols lost Kozelsk to 4,000 people, and only the arrival of troops from Kaduna and Storm in May 1238 was rescued from the steppes of the position — the same town was taken and destroyed. For the sake of humor is to say that the last Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in honor of winning the population Kozel'sk before the Russian settlement awarded the title of "City of Military Glory." The failure was the same in the fact that archaeologists for almost 15 years of searching and could not find concrete evidence of the existence of the destroyed Batu Kozel'sk. On what passion about it raged in the scientific and bureaucratic public Kozel'sk, can be read here.
If we sum estimates in the first and very rough approximation, it turns out that 1 December 1237 on April 3, 1238 (the beginning of the siege of Kozel'sk) conventional Tatar horse went from an average of 1,700 to 2,800 km. In terms of 120 days average daily gives a transition in the range of 15 to 23 km with a little. Being known intervals, when the Mongols do not move (the siege and the like, and it is about 45 days in totality), the scope of their average daily march of the real odds of 23 to
38 km per day.
Simply put, it means more than a rich load of horses. The question of how many of them survived after such transitions in a rather menacing weather criteria and simple lack of feed, Russian historians even discussions are. As well as the question of actually Tatar losses.
For example, RP Hrapachevsky generally believes that the West has always hike the Mongols in 1235-1242's their loss amounted to only about 15% of their initial size, while the historian VB Koshcheev figured to 50 thousand sanitary losses during the campaign in North-Eastern Russia. In general, all of these losses — both in humans and horses, excellent Mongols quickly made up for by the … themselves as conquered peoples. Since the summer of 1238 the army of Batu continued war against the Kipchak steppes, and in Europe in the 1241 general invaded usvoy not what army — so Thomas Split reports that there was a tremendous amount of … Russian, Kipchaks, Bulgars, etc. peoples. How many among them were themselves "Mongols", not really clear.