Military-technical cooperation between Russia and China, another 10 years ago was a pivotal part of the profits of all Russian export of arms and military equipment, today this volume can not brag any of the available supply. At the same time, as a result of this partnership, China has made over the past 20 years, technological leap, comparable only with the progress in the 50's. In the late 80's Chinese army was equipped with either direct copies of Russian special technologies developed in the 40-50's, or equipment and weapons, made on the basis of Russian systems with insignificant changes. At the same time, the Chinese continued to comprehend and copy the Russian military creation and later, after the actual termination of relations between States with 2 to the beginning of the 60s. The necessary examples of modern equipment and weapons they received the district of ways, through the countries of the Third World, to buy a tool of Moscow.
China in the process of military-technical cooperation with Russia, as well as 40 years ago, was the most pragmatic: the provision of the main branches of modern special technologies at the expense of imports from the Russian Federation, copying examples of equipment, systems and devices to their batch creation in China, the establishment of its School of Military design by the tight fit of cooperation with the Russian educational and research institutions in the required profile.
This is the logic of all weapons traced contacts in China and Russia for the past 20 years. And in the actions of the Russian side a systematic approach to cooperation is not visible. He certainly was in the 50s when, passing Beijing fully modern equipment, the Soviet Union established its own ally limited access to a fundamentally new technologies. These constraints, together with its domestic shocks of the 1960s were a major cause a sharp decrease in the rate of formation of the military industry in China after the cessation of Russian aid. At this point, after a few decades, China has rapidly making up for lost time.
In particular, the difficult situation in China has developed in the aviation industry. In the early 90's Air Force of People's Liberation Army of China have been armed in the main equipment of the 1st and 2nd generation. These were the fighters shown in the Chinese Air Force under the names of the J-1, as well as the J-6, analogs Russian MiG-17 and MiG-19. They formed the basis of China's tactical aircraft, and serial create J-6 in China was interrupted only in the early 1980s, more than 20 years later than in the USSR. In the production of the PLA Air Force at that time remained aircraft J-7 — a copy of the MiG-21. Also, they were exported. At present, the best Chinese fighter — J-8 — is a clear copy of the design solutions Mig-21. Besides the fact that the Chinese Air Force were equipped with outdated equipment, they had virtually no combat skill use at both the strategic and tactical level, also experienced difficulties due to a very nasty staff training, a weak infrastructure and poor property management. Neither the Korean War, nor in the fighting in the conflict with Vietnam in 1979, the Air Force did not take an energetic role.
The decision of the puzzles China plans to build on the two main applets. The first was the purchase in Russia languid Su-27 with the upcoming establishment of its production license. 2nd — in the manufacture of lightweight fighter J-10 on the basis of acquired at the end of the 80s of the Israeli Lavi. This task, in general, also could not be solved without China's help.
Prior to 1995, China has bought two lots RF Su-27. During the period from 1992 to 1996 year from RF There were 36 single-seat fighters Sou-27SK and Su-12 twin 27UBK. In late 1996, a contract was signed for the development of the PRC licensed production of the Su-27, including creation 200 combat aircraft at a factory in Shenyang. In the Chinese Air Force aircraft was given the designation J-11. Mastering the licensed production of Chinese designers and illegal copying of other similar aircraft have allowed China to the end of the first decade of the 20th century, the first breakthrough in the field of aircraft building — start serial production of J-11 without the introduction of Russian equipment.
In general, to the 2 nd half of the 90-ies of the main Su-27, predugotovlennye, first, to gain air superiority, is not satisfied with the Air Force China, given the fact that they needed a multi-purpose aircraft to combat both goals in the air and on the ground. In August 1999, followed by the end of the contract to supply 40 Su-30MKK, which, unlike the Su-27SK could use the new missiles while "air-to-air" also carry fire from the guns of various types of "air-to-ground." Another contract for the supply of 43 such cars was signed in 2001. Now the Su-30 are the basis of combat power of the Air Force PLA.
Along with supplies from Russia Su-30 and J-11 production, China has continued to develop his personal promise machines, three of which — the average fighter J-10 on the basis of the Israeli Lavi lightweight FC-1 made on the basis of the technological platform MiG-21, and has long remained hidden, fighter fifth-generation J-20. According to the statement of Chinese designers, they made J-20 is a unique and unparalleled in the world has. But, despite this statement, you can be sure that the home base is copied, but it's unclear at what the aircraft and which country.
Copying foreign technology, China has managed, in the end, make your world-class defense industry, as independent engineering school. Suspend the process of
growth of the military-technical and scientific potential of China is virtually impossible, meaning the world's countries should take this into consideration and use in their own interests. In much of this applies to Russia, which, despite its own large military-technical potential, there is much to learn from the Far Eastern neighbors.