Eve of War: fatal errors

As before, do not abate debate on the issue of why the military was likely an enormous tragedy that happened to our country June 22, 1941 and brought untold suffering to our people.

It would seem that Russian control before the war done everything possible, and even impracticable to prepare the country and people to cruel tests. Was created by a powerful real base, released 10 of thousands of tanks, aircraft, artillery and other military equipment. Reddish Army, despite an unsuccessful war with Finland (although it was conducted in the winter of complex criteria and completed a breakthrough massive concrete fortifications Finns) aggressively trained to wage war in the criteria, it is very close to the fighting. Russian intelligence seemed to "report to the precise" and all the secrets of Hitler appeared on the table of Stalin.

So what's all the same premise that Hitler's armies were able to just break through the Soviet defenses and be at the walls of Moscow? Is it true for all the fatal flaws lay down the blame on one person's — Stalin?

Miscalculation MILITARY

Quantitative and almost all high-quality and characteristics of the work done in the Soviet Union, especially in the production of military equipment, were cyclopean. If by the end of the 1920s Russian armed forces is only just 89 tanks and 1394 planes (and that in the main foreign models), by June 1941, they have totaled almost 19 thousand Russian tanks, among them high and T- 34, and more than 16 thousand combat aircraft (see table).

The failure is that the Russian political and military leadership could not ordered to make appropriate means of armed struggle, and reddish Army was unprepared for a major war. Imposed on the question: what did the prerequisites?

Of course, that, at first — it's set in the 1930s, Stalin's regime of personal power so that no one, even the most unimportant question of military construction dared military agency without his sanction.

Specifically, the Stalin regime guilty of that just the other day the war Russian forces were almost decapitated. By the way, Hitler, when deciding on the specific preparation for an attack on the Soviet Union, in particular the timing of anger, appropriated to this fact of prime importance. In January 1941, at a meeting with representatives of the Wehrmacht, he said: "For the defeat of the Russian Federation the issue of time is very important. Although the Russian army is a giant clay without the head, it is difficult to predict future developments. Because our homeland should in any case be broken, then do it better at the moment when the Russian army does not have the leaders … ".

The other day, June 22, 1941 Park Russian armored vehicles in the main standards were outdated weapons

Repression generated from commanders horror, fear of responsibility, and hence lack of initiative, which could not but affect the level of management and operation of the command personnel. This did not go out of sight of the German intelligence service. For example, "information about the enemy in the East" — the next bulletin of June 12, 1941 stated: "The characteristic features of Russian: clumsiness, template, indecision and fear of responsibility … The commanders of all links to recent times still are not suitable for the experienced management of large modern compounds. They are unable and unlikely to be able to produce large offensive operation of the war, rapidly engage in a suitable environment, and to act without the help of others in the overall operation. "

In connection with repression, and because of the constant adjustments priemuschestvenno military construction plans political control of the country in 1940-1941. military commanders had to make decisions on the expansion of the training command personnel immediately with the start of the arrangements associated with an increase in size of the armed forces, including officers. On the one hand, led to a shortage of commanders tremendously. On the other hand, command posts were people with a missing experience.

In the process started in 1940, the reorganization of the armed forces were committed fatal mistakes that had literally tragic consequences. There have been the formation of a huge number of new units to unreasonably huge number of major types of military equipment. Creates a paradoxical situation: the presence of almost 19 thousand tanks in the Red Army were able to equip them for only one hundred percent of the 29 mechanized corps.

In 1940, the Russian military command refused to air armies, subjecting the bulk of combat aircraft (84.2% of all aircraft) command combined arms formations (fronts and armies). This has led to decentralized use of air, contrary to the general trend of the development of this highly maneuverable long-range means of armed struggle. In the Wehrmacht, on the contrary, the entire aviation organization was reduced to a few large strategic formation (in the form of air fleets), she did not obey the general military command, but only led the interaction with the ground forces.

Many errors in military construction in the Soviet Union emerged from the war the other day extra commitment to the experience of fighting the Red Army in local conflicts (Spain, Russian troops march into the western regions of Ukraine, and Belarus), and the inability of inexperienced, poorly prepared in respect of Professor, besides lacking independence of military control impartially evaluate the experience of a major war, which led the Wehrmacht in Europe in September 1939

Naikrupneyshy miscalculation Russian military-political management has committed to a ratio of means of warfare. Back in 1928, when planning the construction of the first five years of military value was given to the creation of the main instruments of war — artillery, tanks and warplanes. The reason for this was the conclusion: in order to conduct successful operations, the Red Army for the intended theater of operations needed, highly mobile and well-armed units (motorized infantry machine gun parts, reinforced large armored units, armed with fast-moving tanks and motorized artillery, cavalry large part, but certainly reinforced armor (armored cars, fast-moving tanks), and firepower, and large airborne units). In principle, the decision was correct. But at some stage the creation of these funds take such exaggerated proportions that the Soviet Union not only caught up with his main enemy capabilities, and greatly overshadowed them. Namely, it was established the creation of a huge number of so-called "motorway tanks" that have developed their own resources to back to 1938 Their condition, according to the professionals, "It was horrible." For the most part they just lay on the territory of military units with defective engines, box, etc., and most of it was also disarmed. Parts were missing and repairs are carried out only by dismantling some tanks to restore others.

The soldiers of the Red Army on exercises for combat training

There were also mistakes in the procedure of restructuring of the armed forces. First, it was carried out in the armed forces in the border military districts, with virtually enveloped them completely. As a result, a significant part of the able-bodied, well-staffed and well-coordinated compounds was disbanded when the war began.

Due to miscalculations in determining the necessary and probable number of compounds as errors in the
organizational structure of troops and other reasons most of the planned activities was incomplete, which is very negative impact on the level of combat readiness of the armed forces as a whole, but especially armored forces, air force, airborne troops, anti-tank artillery and troops RGC fortified areas. It is not entirely equipped, they have low mobility, training and teamwork.

During 1939-1940. to join the Soviet Union was relocated to new areas the bulk of Russian troops, which is located in the west. This adversely affected the combat readiness and effectiveness of those units and that June 22, 1941 had to come to grips with the German aggressor. The fact that the redeployment plans violated the mobilization and strategic deployment of Russian troops in the West in the event of war, and the development of new plans to finish absolutely failed. The troops and staffs were not able to master them sufficiently.

According to Marshal SS Biryuzova, Chief of the General Staff of the BM Shaposhnikov suggested KE Voroshilov and IV Stalin quit the main body of troops east of an old border, which has been built well fortified defensive lines, and the New Territories have only mobile troops, coupled with strong engineering parts of the barrier. According to the views of Shaposhnikov, in the case of attack by an aggressor, they will keep fighting acts of restraining line to line, this can buy time for mobilization and creation of groups of forces on the main strip an old border. But Stalin, who believed that not a single inch of land of their own should not be given to the enemy and destroy it should be on his own country, rejected the proposal. He ordered the main body of troops to concentrate in just connected areas, ie in particular close to the border with Germany.

Introduced to new areas troops had deployed on unequipped theaters. What was the result seen in the air. The available airports in the New Territories is only half met the needs of the Air Force of the western military districts, because 40% based on the two regiments on the same airfield, ie more than 120 aircraft each, at a rate of two to three airfields in the regiment. Sad consequences are well known: the criteria surprise attack Wehrmacht unlimited Russian aircraft with the first raid was destroyed on the ground.

Russian General Staff was shackled need all of their solutions fundamentally agree with IV Stalin

The event that during the war with Finland, the Red Army had to dig deep long-term defense, and on the borders of a number of European countries, too, have been built massive long-term capacity, would be a great basis for the control of Russian decision to build a long-term defensive lines along the western border of the newest. This is costly and sought multiple forces and resources and time. Neither one nor the second nor the third control in the Soviet Union was not there. When the war was carried out about a quarter of the planned works.

Heading at the time the Red Army Corps of Engineers, AF Fucking recalled after the war that he and Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, BM Shaposhnikov, which has been entrusted to manage the construction of the defensive at the border, at first offered no concrete build and light field fortifications. This would allow faster as you can to make the conditions for sustainable management of defense and later evenly build more massive concrete structures. But the plan has been cut off. Finally, by June 1941, the planned work was far from over: a plan to build fortifications failed by only 25%.

Besides that big business had other negative consequences: significant funds were diverted from such fundamental measures as the construction of roads and airfields, the creation of the necessary criteria for combat training. Moreover, the shortage of labor and the desire to save money on a large scale forced to lure the construction of combat troops, which had a negative impact on their readiness.

In contrast to the Wehrmacht, where the youngest soldiers in the army were conscripts illumine 1940, and recruits vernal call 1941 initially sent in the army reserve, the Red Army in the rank and file additional vernal draft (April-May) in 1941 were delivered directly into operation. The troops of the border military districts fighters first year of service was more than 2-thirds of the whole number of the rank and file, with almost half of them were designed in 1941

OPERATIVE strategic blunder

By the spring of 1940 as a result of joining the new territories of the USSR a significant part of the deployment of Russian troops changed. By this time the Russian armed forces have increased dramatically. The plan of action adopted in 1938-1939. Quite finished match the decor. Because the General Staff for the summer of 1940 have been developed base of the new plan. In October, the plan after some revision was approved by the political control of the country. In February 1941, after the end of the General Staff of the mobilization of the war are in the vicinity began to develop their own mobilization plans. Complete all the planning was planned in May. But due to the continuing right up to June 21, the formation of new compounds, and does not stop redeployment plan could not finish.

Plans for the first operations is constantly adjusted, but mostly they October 1940 remained constant.

It was believed that the Russian Union "must be prepared to fight on two fronts: in the west — against Germany, supported by Italy, Hungary, Romania and Finland, and in the east — against Japan." Also allowed for the performance of the fascist bloc and Turkey. The main battlefield confessed West, and the main enemy — Germany. In the months before the war, it was expected that together with the allies against the Soviet Union, it will deploy 230-240 divisions, more than 20.5 thousand guns, and about 11 thousand tanks and more than 11 thousand aircraft of all types. It was assumed that Japan will put the East 50-60 divisions, almost 9 thousand guns, more than one thousand tanks and three thousand planes.

All in all, Makar, according to the General Staff, possible opponents could counter the Russian Union of 280-300 divisions, about 30 thousand guns, 12 thousand tanks and 14-15 thousand planes.

Initially, the chief of staff, BM Shaposhnikov implied that the main forces of the German army will be deployed for the coming of the north of the mouth of the river San. Because it offered the main forces of the Red Army to deploy north of Polessye to move to repel attack after coming aggressor.

However, this option has not been taken over by new management of the People's Commissariat of Defense. In September 1940, Tymoshenko and Meretskov, while agreeing that Germany is the main cause attack north of the Pripyat River, though felt that the main option for deploying Russian troops must become one, in which "the main force would be concentrated to the south of Brest-Litovsk . "

All military planning in the Soviet Union since the 1920s. based on the fact that the Army will Reddish military action in response to the strike of the aggressor. With all this her first acts of war and in the following operations were conceived only as offensive.

The thought of retaliation as ever remained in power and the other day the war. It was declared by political leaders in the public speeches. It was listed in the sealed sources and found a place in the training officers of strategic and operational level. Namely, held in January at the 1941 strategic military games with the leadership of the fronts and armies military action began with strikes west side, ie the enemy.

It was believed that the enemy starts their actions with the operation of invasion, why he was in the time of peace in the border zone will have a significant number of troops, tanks saturated. In accordance with this and the Russian military govern
ment recently held a war in the border regions of stronger forces. Stationed in their army was fully equipped with appliances, instrument and personnel. Also included are compounds rifle, usually one or two mechanized housing and one or two air divisions. By the beginning of the war 20 of 29 mechanized corps of the Red Army stationed in Western military surroundings.

Most of the Russian aviation aircraft stationed at airfields border military districts were destroyed in the first war Minutka

After the recognition of the first attack of the enemy and the end of the deployment of Russian troops in the West was supposed to start decisive coming to the final defeat of the aggressor. It must be stressed that the Russian military has long been considered the experts at the south-western strategic direction more profitable for offensive operations against Germany and its allies in Europe. It was believed that the application of the cerebral stroke from Belarus could lead to protracted battles and hardly promised to achieve decisive results in the war. That is why, in September 1940, Tymoshenko and Meretskov offered to make the main group of troops to the south of the Pripyat.

At the same time, the management of the People's Commissariat of Defense, of course, understood the point of view of Stalin. Russian manager, determining the possible direction of the head hitting the enemy in the West, believed that Germany will seek to capture the first economically developed areas — the Ukraine and the Caucasus. Therefore, in October 1940, he ordered the military to proceed from the fact that the brunt of the German troops from the area of Lublin inflict on Kiev.

So Makar, the achievement of the strategic objectives of the next planned offensive actions to ensure, first troops south-west direction, which was to deploy more than half of all the divisions of the intended fronts in the west. While in this area to be concentrated 120 divisions in the north-west and west — only 76.

The main efforts were concentrated in the fronts of the armies of the first tier, priemuschestvenno to include most of their mobile connections to ensure a strong initial attack against the enemy.

Because of the strategic plan and the deployment plan of the first operations were designed to complete mobilization of the army, they are closely linked to the mobilization plan, the latest version of which was adopted in February 1941, this plan did not provide for the formation of the war in the new compounds. In the main proceeded from the fact that even in times of peace will be created for the desired number of reference compounds. This simplifies the process of mobilization, it reduced the time and contributed more than the highest degree of combat readiness of troops mobilized.

At the same time, a significant part of the human resources needed to come from the depths of the country. It sought a significant amount of traffic and mezhokruzhnyh verbovaniya a huge number of the vehicle, which was not enough. After the withdrawal of the national economy is very acceptable number of tractors and automobiles saturation of their army still amounted to, respectively, only 70 and 81%. Mobilization deployment of troops was not provided and a number of other real assets.

Another discrepancy was the fact that because of the shortcomings of storage space in the vicinity of the western military half of their supplies of ammunition stored in the area of the internal military districts, with all this, the third part — at a distance of 500-700 km from the border. From 40 to 90% of fuel supplies western military districts were stored in the warehouses of the Metropolitan, Orel and Kharkov military districts, also on civilians oil depots in the hinterland.

So Makar, the scarcity of mobilization of resources in new areas of deployment of troops in the western border military districts, the limited ability ton of cash and Communications complicated mobilization and increased its time.

Timely deployment of troops to the creation of the specified groups, their systematic mobilization were put in direct dependence on the organization of a reliable backup. Tasks were assigned to cover cross-border military neighborhood.

According to the plans received any army for the defense of the strip width from 80 to 160 km or more. In the first echelon of the army had to act Infantry Division. Army Reserve base Mechanized Corps was created for a counterattack against the enemy broke through the defense in depth.

Front line of defense for most sites took place in a particular proximity to the border and coincided with a front line of defense of fortified areas. For the second echelon battalion regiments, not to mention the smaller units of the second-tier division, the positions are not created in advance.

The plans were designed to cover up the presence of threat period. Part, intended specifically for the defense of the border, were stationed in the 10-50 km away. To occupy their assigned areas required from 3 to 9 and more than hours of the announcement of excitement. So Makarov, it appeared that the surprise attack of the enemy, specifically deployed to the border, the timely exit Russian troops on its borders is not out of the question.

Who had a plan was designed to cover the ability of the political and military control in time reveal the intentions of the aggressor and take early action to deploy troops, but he did not divined the procedure troops in case of an unexpected invasion. By the way, he is not being followed and the last strategic war games in January 1941 Although the "Western" attacked first "Eastern" action started practicing with the transition in the coming either from a counterattack on the areas where the "Western" managed to invade the countryside " Oriental ". Typically, neither the one nor the other parties have not worked through issues of mobilization, concentration and deployment that were considered really is more complicated, especially in the criteria, when the enemy attacked first.

So Makarov, Russian war plan was based on the idea of retaliation subject only to the armed forces, which was planned to do in the future, and did not take into account the reality of the situation. Of its component parts have been conflicting together, making it mystical.

Unlike the armies of Germany and its allies, who at the time of the attack on the Soviet Union were in a state of full combat readiness group of Russian troops in the west was not deployed and ready for military action.

How to report accurately EXPLORATION?

Getting now to intelligence data, have been reported in the first half of 1941, the Kremlin does recollection, as if the situation was as clear. It seems that Stalin could only give a directive to the Red Army for bringing it to full combat readiness to repel aggression. It is, but it did not, and, of course, is his fatal blunder which stimulated the tragedy in 1941

But in fact, the situation was even more difficult.

First you need to answer the following key question: could the Russian-based control disk imaging acquired, namely, from military intelligence to believe when, where and by what means Germany will strike on the Soviet Union?

On the question of "when?" Received quite clear answers: 15 or June 20, between 20 and 25 June, 21 or 22 June, in the end — June 22. At the same time, the timing is always relegated and were accompanied by different slip of the tongue. This, apparently, caused growing irritation Stalin. June 21 it was reported to the message that "according to reliable reports, the German attack on the Soviet Union is scheduled for June 22, 1941." On the form of reports, Stalin wrote: "This information is a British provocation. Find out who the creator of this provocation and
punish him. "

On the other hand, information about the date of June 22, although they were available for a very recently the war, though, could play a significant role in improving the readiness of the Red Army to repel the attack. But all attempts to take a position in advance of the border zone (presumably) aggressively suppressed above. Known, namely, telegrams GK Zhukov, the commander of the Military Council and KOVO to overturn an indication of the occupation and the assumption of the field urovskimi parts, because "such an action could provoke the Germans in armed conflict, and fraught with all sorts of consequences." Zhukov claimed to understand "who immediately gave the order is arbitrarily." Because, in the end, it turned out that when all the same, it was decided to nominate the troops on the plan cover, the time has not actually left. Army commanders WSMD June 22 exclusively at 2.25-2.35 received a directive instructing all of the lead in combat readiness, to take firing positions fortified areas in the state border, disperse on all aviation airfields, lead the embattled anti-aircraft defenses.

By including in the Baltic republics of the Soviet Union Russian Navy received upscale naval base

To the question "where?" Was received the wrong answer. Although the first of June of the Intelligence analysts have concluded that the need to pay greater attention to strengthening German forces in Poland, though, this conclusion was lost against the background of other communications intelligence, which again pointed to the danger from the south and south-west directions. This determined the incorrect conclusion that "the Germans is largely increased their right wing against the USSR, increasing its share in the overall structure of its eastern front against the Soviet Union." Immediately emphasized that "the German High Command, already having the time being necessary strength for future development in the Middle East and against Egypt … at the same time quite rapidly recovers its main grouping in the west … keeping in perspective the main embodiment of the operations against the British Isles."

The question "what forces?" We can say that as of June 1 was received more or less the right answer — 120-122 German divisions, including fourteen and thirteen motorized tank. But this conclusion was lost in the background of another conclusion is that almost the same number of divisions (122-126) was deployed against Great Britain.

In the undeniable merit of Russian intelligence to put what she was able to reveal the exact signs of readiness to attack Germany. The main was the fact that, as reported to the scouts, to June 15, the Germans had to complete all the activities for the strategic deployment against the Soviet Union, and it was possible to wait for the unexpected blow, is not preceded by any criteria, or ultimatum. In connection with this intelligence was able to identify the exact signs of readiness for an attack in Germany in recent years: transferring German aircraft, including bombers, carrying out inspections and rekognostsirovok large German generals; transfer shock troops with combat experience, focusing crossing equipment; zabroska well-armed German Agents equipped with walkie-talkies with instructions to go after a job in placing German troops already on the Russian countryside, leaving the families of German officers from the border area, etc.

Perfectly understandable distrust of Stalin to intelligence reports, some even attribute this lack of confidence "maniacal character." But you have to consider the fact that Stalin was under the influence of a number of other mutually contradictory and sometimes even mutually exclusive reasons for international policy.

Reasons for international policy

Political conditions for the Soviet Union in the spring and summer of 1941 evolved very unfavorable. While the conclusion of the contract of neutrality with Japan strengthened the position of the USSR in the Far East, but trials do better things with countries such as Finland, Romania, Bulgaria, or at least prevent their roles in a block of success fascist countries had not.

The invasion of the Germans in Yugoslavia, April 6, 1941, at which the Soviet Union has just signed a contract of friendship and non-aggression, was the final blow to Russian Balkan policy. Stalin became clear that a diplomatic confrontation with Germany lost, that from now ruling practically everywhere in Europe the 3rd Reich did not want to reckon with its eastern neighbor. There remained only one hope: to remove terms now imminent German anger.

Left much to be desired and the affairs of the USSR with the UK and the U.S.. The military defeats in the Middle East and the Balkans in the spring of 1941 led Britain to the brink of a "strategic failure". In such a situation, believed Stalin, Churchill's government would do everything in his power, if only to provoke a war of the Reich against the Soviet Union.

In addition, a number of the principal events that have strengthened these suspicions of Stalin. April 18, 1941 salting England in the USSR R. Cripps handed Russian Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the memorandum which stated that in case of prolongation of the war for a long period of certain circles in the UK can "smile at the thought" to end the war with the German Reich on the criteria. Then the Germans will open unlimited space for expansion to the east. Cripps did not rule out that a similar idea can find followers in the United States. This document clearly warned the Russian administration, which is likely such a turn of events, when the Soviet Union would be alone in front of the danger of the Nazi invasion.

Russian management perceived it as a hint at the possibility of a new anti-Soviet conspiracy "world imperialism" against the USSR. It should be noted that in the UK have been following, pleading for peace negotiations with Germany. Pro-German sentiments were especially characteristic for the so-called Cleveland clique led by the Duke of Hamilton.

Alertness Kremlin further increased when a subsequent day, April 19, Cripps handed a letter to Molotov British prime minister, has written on April 3 and addressed personally to Stalin. Churchill wrote that, according to the views of the British government, Germany is preparing to attack the Russian Alliance. "I have reliable information … — he continued — that when the Germans found Yugoslavia caught in his net, that is, after March 20, they began to throw over from Romania to southern Poland three of their own five armored divisions. As they learned of the Serbian revolution, this movement was canceled. Your Excellency will learn the importance of this simple fact. "

These two reports, coinciding in time, have already given a reason Stalin regarded the events as a provocation.

But then came the next event. 10 May closest ally of Hitler and his deputy Rudolf Hess in the party on an airplane Me-110 flew to the UK.

Apparently, the purpose of Hess's conclusion was "a compromise peace," to stop the depletion of the UK and Germany, and to prevent the final settlement of the British Empire. Hess believed that his arrival will give strength strong anticherchillskoy party and give a powerful impetus "to the fight for the conclusion of peace."

But Hess's proposals were unacceptable for the very first Churchill and therefore would not be accepted. At the same time, the British government is not any official statements made and kept a mysterious silence.

Silence of the official London about Hess gave Stalin extra food for thought. Exploration is not a time to report to him about the desire of the ruling circles of London to get closer to Germany and immediately push i
t with the Soviet Union, to carry the danger of the British Empire. In June, the British did not once transferred to the Russian ambassador in London, Maisky information about preparing for the Germans attacked the Soviet Union. But it's all in the Kremlin definitely regarded as eagerness to involve Russian Alliance of Great Britain into the war with the Third Reich. Stalin sincerely believed that the government wants to Churchill, that the Soviet Union began to deploy military groups in the border areas and those instigated the attack on Germany Russian Alliance.

Certainly, a great role played by the German High Command event simulation war against the manufacturers of the United Kingdom. On the other hand, the German soldiers intensively built fortifications along the Russian border — it fixed the Russian border military intelligence, but it was part of a disinformation activities of German command. But the most important thing is that the Russian administration introduced misleading — this is information about the ultimatum, which, allegedly, the German administration was going to bring the Soviet Union before the attack. Essentially the idea ultimatum USSR never open a discussion surrounded by Hitler as the real intention of the German, and was only part of the disinformation activities. Unfortunately, she came to Moscow from sources including external intelligence ("Sergeant", "Corsican"), used to give information harsh. The same misinformation has come from the famous double agent O.Berlingsa ("Lyceum student"). Still, the idea of "ultimatum" very well fit into the concept of Stalin — Molotov talks about the ability of the method (referred to Molotov their "big game") take the danger of attack in the summer of 1941

In general, the Russian intelligence managed to find time attack. But Stalin, for fear of provoking Hitler is not allowed to carry out all the necessary operational and strategic measures, although the management of People's Commissariat of Defense asked him about it for a few days before the start of the war. Apart from this, Russian control was a prisoner of the Germans narrow disinformation game. As a result, when the necessary orders have been given all the same, do not have time to bring the troops on full alert and organize resistance to the German invasion.

JUNE: Tomorrow Was the War

In June, it became quite clear that we should expect the German attack in recent times, to be produced at one time, and most likely without the nomination of any preparatory requirements. It was necessary to take counter-measures, and they were accepted. Measures were taken to reduce the time alerting cover parts allocated to support the Border. Apart from this, in the neighborhood of the border lasted transfer of additional compounds: the 16th Army — in KOVO, 22nd Army — in WSMD. However, the strategic mistake was that these measures were too late. By June 22, could come only part of thrown out of energy and resources. From the Baikal region and Primorye from April 26 to June 22, managed to send only about half of the planned capabilities: 5 divisions (2 infantry, 2 tank, 1 motorized), 2 vdbr, 2 Dep. Regiment. With all this going again gain ground in the south-west: KOVO concentrated in 23 divisions, WSMD — 9. This was due to an incorrect assessment of the direction of the head hitting the Germans.

Immediately as before troops categorically forbidden to take up positions in the border zone. Almost fully combat ready at the time of the attack were only guards who were on duty in the emergency mode. But there were not very many, and their fierce resistance was swiftly crushed.

As acknowledged by GK Zhukov, Russian armed forces could not "own weakness" first war reflect massed German forces and prevent them from profound breakthrough. At the same time, if I could find the direction of head impact and the grouping of German troops, the latter would have to face even stronger resistance in the breakout Russian defense. Unfortunately, according to documents being available intelligence information is not allowed to do that. A decisive role was also played by preconceived operational command of Russian strategic thinking and point of view of Stalin, that the main blow should expect to Ukraine.

Almost exclusively on the fifth day of the war Russian command came to the final conclusion that the main attack was applied to the Germans on the west, not the south-west. Zhukov wrote in his memoirs, "… I had in the first days of the war as 19th Army, a number of units and formations of the 16th Army, previously concentrated in the Ukraine and fit back in the near future, flip on the western direction and enable the move to fight as part of the Western Front. This event, of course, affected the course of defensive action on the Western Front. " With all of this, according to Zhukov, "rail transport our troops in a number of circumstances is intermittent. The arriving troops often be the case without full concentration, which negatively affected the political and moral state of the parts and their combat stability. "

So Makar, evaluating the activities of military and political control of the war the Soviet Union the other day, it must be emphasized that it has committed a number of mistakes that had tragic consequences.

First, it is a miscalculation in determining the direction of head hitting the Wehrmacht. In-2, delaying the timing of bringing troops in full combat readiness. In the end, the planning was a mystic, and held the other day of the event — too late. Already in the course of the war revealed a another miscalculation: not foreseen actions of troops in case of deep strategic breakthrough of the enemy, and the defense did not plan on a strategic scale. A miscalculation in choosing the defensive line at the western borders in almost all secured a surprise attack on the enemy troops first operational echelon, which in most cases were stationed at a significantly greater distance from the planned milestones for the defense than the opponent.

In taking measures to increase the combat readiness of troops, military and political control of the Soviet Union, fearing to provoke Hitler did not head: time has not led to full combat readiness intended for the reflection of the first attack of the enemy covering forces, who were in a state-stocked. Manic fear of provoking Hitler played a bad joke with Stalin. As shown by the subsequent actions (Hitler's speech on June 22), the Nazi administration still has accused USSR that Russian forces "treacherous" storming of the Wehrmacht and the last was "forced" to strike back.

Mistakes made in operational planning (determining the direction of the head hitting the opponent, creating a group of troops, especially the second strategic echelon, etc.) had to urgently fix already in the process of fighting.

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