The tragedy of 1941 is around the corner

Most later broke out in 2014, the global crisis, which has, in fact, did not start.

Exactly one month left until June 22, when it will be 70 years of Nazi Germany's treacherous attack on our country.

Mediavoyna about this already in full swing. And again, the main issue will be to identify those responsible for the disaster of summer 1941. Indicative here is the article of the first rank of captain retired Valery Kalinin in the "Independent Military Review" for May 13 with the telling title "Exploration and the Kremlin recently majestically Russian. Exploration provided compelling evidence. "

Creator, of course, points out the inadequacy of Tipo "Kremlin" in the clear, as clocks, Russian intelligence, "the military-political leadership of the country has received from the Russian intelligence accurate and timely information about what Germany is preparing for an attack, the date and time, the strategic building and the size of the strike groups. This allowed the intelligence information correctly assess the emerging military-strategic situation and make appropriate findings as the political management of the country and the management of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff. "

But angry creator, despite the fact that all the intelligence was made, and in excess, the "military-political control of the Soviet Union" (listed on Stalin, Beria, Molotov) could not use the intelligence and right up to June 22, "not believing" in Germany's attack, made the tragic mistake,

That is, the idea of a retired Comdr can be expressed in almost the same easy-going manner as that of the notorious Mlechina as saying on day at the "Echo of Moscow" almost followed: "The fact that Hitler was going to poruha Russian Alliance, knew only two people : It Molotov and Stalin. All other beheld that this thing goes … ".

In general, nothing new in similar allegations there. All of this — a rehash of recognizable fantasy Nikita Khrushchev in his sad eminent "report" at the XX Congress of the CPSU, where Khrushchev in his own creative analysis of the situation in 1941, indicating that there was no surprise in the attack Hitler June 22, 1941 and could not be, because as "as soon as Hitler came to power in Germany, he immediately put the puzzle in front of him to defeat communism. This was read as the Nazis directly, without hiding their plans. " That is, according to Khrushchev, Stalin was not only a valiant exploration did not listen, and even Hitler himself as much as 8 years to focus not notice!

But specifically, the lack of any novelty in Article Valery Kalinin, and even in so pochetaemom "Independent Military Review", just ask and wonder: why again played all this nonsense?

Of course, in order to solve two problems.

In 1-x, kick once again a dead lion — IV Stalin, and with it — all the management of the country and the Soviet Union.

In-2, once again rear its departmental corporation (now — the exploration well and the army) at the expense of political control, respectively, the order of play down the latter.

In fact, there is no longer any hesitation that Russian intelligence is not able to identify the strategic plan and the cerebral potential enemy, it turns out systematically disoriented top management of the country. It should be exhaustively document from the head of the pre-war months — Report of the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army Lieutenant General Golikov in NKO, SNK of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) "The statements [orgmeropriyatiya] and options for fighting the German Army against the USSR" of March 20, 1941

At the end of the policy brief was concluded from the 2-pt, in which confidently stated the impossibility of the German attack on the Soviet Union until the "Hitler's victory over England or after the conclusion of her noble peace for Germany."

As you know, June 22, 1941, when Hitler attacked USSR, he was not a victory over England, no peace with it. That is, according to Russian intelligence, Hitler could not start a war with the Soviet Union on June 22, and did so, of course, by mistake, without being aware of the report Golikov. Moreover, the main military spy on behalf of the General Staff Intelligence in that report directly sought from the political control of the country regarded as disinformation "rumors and documents that speak of the inevitability of war in the spring of this year against the Soviet Union."

These two Fri:

"Conclusion:

1. Based on all the above expressions and probable courses of action in the spring of this year, I think that more than likely for the start of operations against the USSR will be a time after the victory over England or after the conclusion of her notable for Germany in the world.

2. Rumors and documents that speak of the inevitability of war in the spring of this year against the Soviet Union, should be considered as disinformation emanating from the British, and even, perhaps, the German intelligence service. "

Of course, the spring in the text of the report is taken Golikova rather arbitrary, like the projection "on the block", but, without a hesitation, had in mind, and at least the first few months of the summer. According to another exploration would have to distinguish that from the beginning of the summer statement about the dependence of action in Germany against the Soviet Union from making peace with Germany, Britain is no longer valid. But — do not write. So Makar, to name a similar "information", as it does now Kalinin, "accurate and timely" is not just wrong, but for now, 70 years after the events — an outright lie.

Contrary to the assertions of bravura Kalinin submitted exploration findings are not only not allowed to "properly assess the emerging military-strategic situation and make appropriate findings as the political management of the country and the management of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff," but, just opposite, being led away to the management of the country's disastrous linked since the attack on the Soviet Union with the German victory over England or the merits of the world with it. That is, the management of the country's proposed expected outcome of confrontation between Germany and England, to which the spring and summer of that year was a disaster is still far away.

I'm not under any circumstances do not wish, as do the Kalinin and darkness the other "historians" and "analysts", belittle such managers as Golikov, and exploration in general. All of our discussions and reflections made in the knowledge of the situation that happened on June 22 and in the first months of the war — that is, the presence of the fundamental factors that have been completely stripped and Golikov, and management of the USSR. Clever, possessing knowledge, just as they had to make decisions in a situation of great uncertainty and focused on acts of misinformation on the part of both Germany and (in particular) in the UK.

And the kids understand that the same Great Britain was anxious to see Stalin started the war against Germany or gave Germany an excuse to attack the Soviet Union. The funnier now refer to the telegram Churchill, who, they say, also warned Stalin of the impending attack Hitler. And it's not even the fact that to get from Churchill such "information" meant a de facto working to ensure that Churchill just skillfully pits, and Churchill himself, without any hesitation, "subjectively" provided "un
ique information" on only 90% in order to catch Stalin and the hardest to configure Russian control against Hitler.

And then — the main point. Do not handle the situation with England and attacked the Soviet Union, Hitler made completely adventurous, and therefore the most difficult to move prophecy. Hitler had a situation last time and resource constraint, in fact, there was no other way out. And along with that, he had severe grounds, that due to the technology blitzkrieg, "lightning war", and with the superbly strong army virtually impossible to solve this puzzle.

Do not attack the Soviet Union, Hitler could not, and the attack on the Soviet Union was tantamount to suicide. And it is time to recognize that in this regard and Russian intelligence, and Stalin did not expect self-destructive solutions Hitler.

The most important thing in the end is that the tragedy of 1941, as paradoxically, is one of the most faithful of the greatest characteristics, an unprecedented feat of Russian people and its government.

Going on an adventure, Hitler and his pan-European, in fact, a military machine had around in a mad frenzy of their own and with the outstanding organization of the Soviet Union grind. But country withstand the impact of unprecedented strength sverhkontsentrirovannoy crazed enemy bomber. Moreover, as soon as possible in the most difficult criteria for two years had been created completely new girl reddish army that after Stalingrad was of strongest army in the world.

That's why in front of us — not just the war, and not just a second global war, Lofty and the war with the majestic victory.

What still concerns Tipo intelligent exploration and silly sounding political governance, all this has long been studied, pereizucheno. As he wrote 15 years ago, yet the historian Misha Meltyuhov, "the Soviet intelligence failed to disclose a strategic plan for the German command. Information about the directions coming Wehrmacht were very controversial and far not always correspond to reality … Moreover, Russian intelligence had no clear information about the likely disposition of fighting against the Soviet Union. " High quality and with a good syllable analysis of this question is in the books and Alexei Isaev Igor Pyhalova.

And it's obviously not in the, so in retaliation so careless writers, as Kalinin, Mlechin & Co., starting incriminating the Soviet intelligence and reconnaissance. But to enter into the mind of the patriots of military intelligence and army have long to go. Just as it's time to hand over to the trash recently hosted the 45th anniversary of the Victory in the "work" of the article of the "long-term" head of the Head Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff, General of the Army Pyotr Ivashutin, with a program entitled "Exploration report to the right …".

What were nevertheless real preconditions defeats at the beginning of the war Lofty?

In 1-x, the German army was at that time the most powerful impartially, and in terms of technology — simply outstanding army, besides representing the combined power of all of Europe.

In-2, the attack is always stronger than in the first step gives a phenomenal dignity. But the Kremlin and the country needed a strategic plan to poruha over completely to a trivial anger against the Soviet Union became the basis for all subsequent political and diplomatic action, including the formation and the most anti-Hitler coalition.

In this respect, strikes, like last quarter of a century the main military scout the country, Army General Ivashutin inadequate, when in that his article in "labor" states: "The country's leadership is essentially ignored the intelligence of the impending danger of Soviet security because they did not meet the then firmly established political attitudes and personal assessment of Stalin and his entourage. "

What in fact was the intelligence we already know, and just bad luck that management countries should not be ignored. What's all the same for the "political attitudes" that we have before us — the argument is not the head of the military spy late Soviet Union, and the boy toddlers who are not in a position to assess where he sits on the potty — in which institution and which country.

Equally shocking are inadequate reasoning and Marshal Vasilevsky, even after two 10-ka years after the war and did not understand that in the pre-let of the week in 1941 at least some provocations and erosion of German anger at least some of the USSR manager just did not have the right as a charge geopolitics — the more so if this control was excellent geopolitics.

Wasilewski reasoning about the need for "forced mobilization" and even then looked complete nonsense: "After Nazi Germany, especially the last month, in fact, openly producing military production at our borders, more precisely, this was the very time when the forced mobilization should conduct and the translation of the border districts are on full alert, company hard and defense-in-depth. IV Stalin, to render a tremendous impact on the foreign and domestic policies of the party and the government, apparently, failed to catch the true turning point of this … The fact that Stalin could not fit to take such decisions, it is a serious political miscalculation. "

Again the same, similar umnichanyami is a desire to shield the failures of the General Staff and obey military intelligence.

B-3, the Germans really developed and organized a new type of war, when they simply did not give the same "legal" Textbook 10-14 days for mobilization and deployment of troops.

In-4 — the main thing. We were all in the vast majority were not prepared for the deadly war, as were poorly prepared and extremely careless.

In a situation of collision with excellent mobilized, shelled and attacked the plan of strongest in the world of the German army reddish army inevitably had to be the victim.

One of the best writers of the "pro war" Nekrasov in the novel in 1946, "In the Trenches of Stalingrad" gave perhaps the most clear-cut answer to the question why we were not ready.

Here is a dialogue with the company commander Lieutenant Farber Kerzhentsev:

"- Have you ever really thought about the past of their lives?
— Well?
— Does it seem to you that we are to a certain extent were strausovsky lifestyle?
— Strausovsky?
— If there are parallels, perhaps, it will be the most successful. We have almost no head poking out from under the wing.
— Decode.
— I'm talking about the war. We and war. Below us, I mean myself, you, the people in general, not specifically related to the war in time of peace. In short — you knew there would be a war?
— Perhaps he knew.
— Probably not, but knew. Moreover — know what to do will be to participate.

It is a couple of deep drags and exhales noisily.

— Before the war you were the commander of supplies. Is that right? MAS-34 … Graduate Training Corps, or what-nibudt like that … Once a week, you had a military day. You missed it all carefully. Summer — camp drill. Right, Left, Circle, quick march. The commanders sought precise turns, joyful songs. At the tactical exercises, hidden in the bushes, you slept, smoked, looked at the clock, how much is left before lunch. I guess I'm not much mistaken.

— Popravde, not much.

— This is where the dog and buried … On the other we all rely. Stood during the May Day parade on the sidewalk, hands in pants, and looked at the passing tanks on airplanes, soldiers marching on to the ranks of … Oh, how cool, ah, what power! That's all what we then thought of. After all, is not it? And the fact that we used to have to walk, and not on the pavement, and the dusty road, with a bag over his shoulder, that our lives will depend on — well,
not hundreds, but at least 10 people-s … Have we thought about it then? .. And who in all this povinet? Who povinet? Uncle — as stated in my foreman? No, not Uncle … I myself povinet. I just was not interested in the war to engage in military affairs … ".

But the most important thing — and that many of the military, good living at that time, engaged in military affairs was not interested.

The best analysis of the war prof was given to our best captain Konstantin Rokossovsky in his memoir, "Soldier's duty." Here is a small piece of the first chapters:

"In a way [of the staff of the Kiev Military Area] involuntarily began to think about what really happened that we suffered a heavy defeat in the initial period of the war.

Somewhere … in depth, on real calculations of the General Staff, must have time to turn around our main strength. They were to meet in an organized enemy and inflict opponent. Why does this not work? .. What's the plan developed and submitted to the Government of our General Staff? Well, there was at all? ..

Well, let's say, the General Staff did not have time to draw up a realistic plan for starting the war in the event of an attack of Nazi Germany. What did then explain such criminal carelessness, tolerated the command of the neighborhood (near the border)? .. The troops of the [Kiev] neighborhood from the first day or the war were not prepared to meet the enemy … ".

Yes, why go too far? Suffice it to recall the five-day war to protect South Ossetia in August 2008. There was all the same, only an order of magnitude worse.

And, discussing the disaster 70 years ago, we have long time to grow up and sober up after all of the Khrushchev-tuning chatter. Learn the right lessons and draw adequate conclusions for us today.

If the company commander then called Farber prewar lifestyle "strausovskim", for our present carelessness and even this estimate would have looked undeserved compliment.

Summary war now goes to the geo-economics. Most later in 2014 volcanic erupt global crisis, which has, in fact, did not start. No later than the spring of 2013 will be very lowered the price of oil and gas — namely, as one of the ways to pull the blast crisis. Even without more than likely in the period 2013-2015,. real war we crushed and mangled in the geo-economic terms.

And tell me which of our top officials and "ordinary" people preparing for the future "sudden" cataclysm? And what will be the result of our neotmobilizovannosti? ..

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