History has repeatedly taught that the more advanced countries for their own benefit at times resorted to force to reshape the world. Now certain circles in China and the Land of the Rising Sun raves annexation of Russian and CIS "lost territories", and in the U.S. there are people dreaming of the dismemberment of the Russian Federation and the reduction of its spaces to the size of the Moscow principality, to provide for an open access to the use of resources of the Russian Federation. How not to recall here on one candidate for president of the United States, which in 2011 advocated the elimination of the Russian Federation for American civilization achievements required for her current location.
Can Our homeland rely on their own strength general purpose (non-nuclear forces) to protect its territory and interests? Do a little comparison. NATO forces in permanent Army infantry, motorized infantry, mechanized and armored brigades in four or five times as much as in China — three times more than that of the Russian Federation. On the relation between air force, navy, precision instruments and in total we have states of East and West do not have to read. Thus, the guarantee of integrity of our country, the independence and security of our country is a nuclear weapon.
IN THE FIRST CIRCLE
Implementation of plans for a nuclear war will keep the U.S. military ammunition about 5000 nuclear warheads (YABZ), and in France, England and China nuclear ammunition 200-300 YABZ each country. To the south of Russia, in Asia, there are all the other nuclear countries of the world, asking for a high quality and quantity of the nuclear arms build-up (at first near, then the middle and later a long range) — Israel, India, North Korea, Pakistan. With the end of the creation of the Shia in Iran's nuclear bomb around Russia practically closes the arc of the nuclear states.
Paradoxically, that the reduction of nuclear weapons to the lowest levels of the possibility of its implementation will increase because of the lower total level of the damage.
The meaning of nuclear deterrence in the current time is in the 2-position. Demonstrate a possible enemy in force, the capacity and the ability to apply in advance of unacceptable harm. Convince potential enemy in his own will and determination to apply on it as needed nuclear weapon: first openly as limited or selective strikes, and then massed in the form of counter-force ("disarming" and "decapitated") and kontrtsennostnyh ("a devastating retaliation" for towns) strategic nuclear strikes.
Depending on the scope of action possible opponent defending side can cause him a small, proportional to either the largest unacceptable for him harm. But there is harm not only to the Warring States, and for the whole population. Since 1945, 10 countries are committed to the implementation explosions more than 2,400 nuclear explosive devices with total capacity of over 510 megatonnes (Mt), and produced more than 100 thousand YABZ (excluding re-used after the upgrade) with a total capacity of more than 50 thousand MT.
Since the early 80-ies of the last century, scientists study the effects of nuclear war at the same time undermining the mass YABZ on the flora and fauna of the planet and clarify that the maximum total power used by the parties immediately of nuclear weapons, beyond which comes disastrous for the population of the earth "nuclear winter." The military and political control of a number of states has to be taken into account confirmation of scientists and leading countries began a sharp reduction in supplies guns and review the characteristics of unacceptable harm and the desired number and capacity YABZ in their own ammunition.
At the end of the war were a cool experts who believed that one thousand delivered to the objects will defeat YABZ is enough to have been subjected to a nuclear attack superpower able to partly recover and reach the level of a third world country in 30 years after the war. There would be superfluous to mention that have been subjected to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the town in 30-35 years to heal their wounds and to increment its population. Curious change of positions of some analysts on the adequacy YABZ for 2-major powers of the world. In the 90 years in the U.S., it was suggested that the case of equality of strategic YABZ the United States and Russia could agree on a contractual basis of the fact that our homeland, given its proximity to the nuclear nations of Asia, had more than the United States, non-strategic YABZ.
In a brand new century, the pendulum of 1st latter provision has swung to the other, why not have the same number YABZ the United States and the Russian Federation (for example, in 3000 YABZ each country), but with the advantage of the U.S. in strategic YABZ (in 2000 U.S. that the Russian Federation 1000) and with advantage to the Russian Federation in non-strategic YABZ (in the Russian Federation in 2000, the U.S. 1000). If the 50-60s of the last century in the United States want YABZ about 160 thousand, in 2011 there began to consider the possibility of reducing the number YABZ (without specifying their purpose) stages until 1000-1100, 700-800, 300-400. As you know, the RF control previously proposed ceiling in strategic nuclear weapons in 1000-1500 YABZ. At the moment the ceiling "operationally deployed strategic" (GRA) YABZ not exceed the number of 2,100 units in the U.S., so do we. These are YABZ in strategic nuclear forces (SNF): a) on intercontinental ballistic missiles land-based (IDB) in silos (silos) and road-mobile missile systems (PGRK), as they were previously and ICBM combat railway missile complexes (BZHRK), b) on the nuclear missile submarines (SSBN) with intercontinental range missiles (SLBMs), and c) at airbases Distant aircraft for languid bombers (TB) with their cruise missiles (ALCM) and bombs (AB). This trio ("Triad"), land, naval and air forces in the strategic nuclear forces in the near future may become a couple or foursome strategic horses.
I do not consider characteristics such as reliability, range, accuracy, reaction time, speed of destruction, the ability to overcome air defense / missile defense and others. It is a question of the adequacy YABZ with the survivability of nuclear weapons. YABZ sufficiency — is a vague concept that varies depending on the time, the degree of danger, abilities and goals of the country. For example, in the U.S. Armed Forces in 1967, there were 31 thousand YABZ, but at the moment there are about five thousand adequacy implies redundancy YABZ as an unexpected blow attacker and defender retaliation YABZ in the vast majority of the attacked country will be destroyed or neutralized and this country will be obliged to rely only on the survivor, the smallest part of its nuclear stockpile stewardship, first on a guaranteed nuclear reserve. In the presence of 160 operationally deployed strategic (COP) YABZ England holds in the sea without annoying one invulnerable SSBN YABZ 40-48 with a capacity of about 5.4 Mt, in other words its nuclear guaranteed cash value is 25-30% YABZ. In France — with its ammunition at the GRA 280 YABZ — at sea SSBN is invulnerable 80-86 YABZ capacity of about 8.9 Mt (29-31%). United States in 2100 in the presence of COP YABZ keep the oceans once more invulnerable 6 SSBN 600 YABZ with capacity of more than 60 Mt, in other words have a guaranteed nuclear reserve 29-30% of the GRA YABZ.
In the past, the British were aiming for 58, the French — 60, and the Americans — at 200-250 Union Russian cities. No further at the end of the 70-ies of the last century, the South American president boasted that one South American SSBNs with SLBMs "Poseidon" could kill all large and medium-sized
town of the Soviet Union. In the Russian media is difficult to find reliable information about the adequacy of our current performance and guaranteed nuclear reserve (if any). If we turn to the past, it is very disappointing official data in 1998: from 6 thousand YABZ our strategic nuclear forces (SNF) is guaranteed to have gained the U.S. only 600 (10%).
Do we have at the moment guaranteed nuclear reserve, similar existing in the U.S. Navy, France and England? Judge for yourself. In 2001-2008, in fact, a similar number of subs in the U.S. and the Russian Federation South American SSBN performed 13 times more patrols than Russian. Patrolling our boats out of the continuous reincarnated as episodic. Our submarines, standing at the piers and transformed, in fact the case, the barge missile with a nuclear reactor, can not participate in a retaliatory strike by surprise nuclear attack the enemy, for the beginning of retaliation has already been destroyed. According to the information from 2011, in the sea combat stability of our subs are reduced to zero for the second day after the release of the bases. This means that when an unexpected enemy nuclear attack them immediately sink the ordinary weapon (a South American Secretary of the Navy in 1985 stated that our subs will be attacked "in the first 5 minutes after the start of the war").
Let me remind you: in 1987 in the United States thought that 20-60 hours after the start of a search operation in the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans, the Sea of Okhotsk to the position 95% of Russian SSBNs are on active service, and in 90 years Russia believed that it could be destroyed in the war with the introduction of the enemy only ordinary means of destruction about 30% of our strategic nuclear forces (of course, that the composition of these 30% were our SSBN). Do not proceed as in the past decade in a U.S. magazine addressed the question of winding up SSBN SF and PF in the bases of sea-based cruise missiles "Tomahawk" in the ordinary equipment. Has been reported that at least some of the submarines of the "Seawolf" gun with 45 such missiles to release four "Tomahawk" for each of the 11 who were at the piers SSBN SF. On land, the unexpected nuclear attack of the enemy, for our retaliation will remain only in the case of surviving ICBM silos (to be destroyed or neutralized by 93-95% in the ICBM silos) and are not detected by enemy reconnaissance PGRK TB and outside spaces of constant bases, in other words, it is unlikely 5-10% of the manpower and resources SRF and Distant aviation. As can be seen, at this point we do not invulnerable by no means constant and specific composition of carriers and vehicles equipped to defeat the object of the aggressor, even with the injury.
If our subs will be made in the sea bastions, in other words, areas that will be covered tightly equilibrium air, surface and submarine forces of our Navy and become irresistible for anti-submarine forces (PLC) of the enemy, and even then we will have a guaranteed nuclear marine reserve.
Guaranteed nuclear RESERVE
How to approach the level of guaranteed nuclear reserve land? Important is the method of placing ICBMs. In the U.S., already thinking about a brand new (mobile) new method based ICBMs in China has long been developing a network of "cave" (underground tunnel and rock) hiding in Asia are taking steps to deploy solid-BR at the railway missile complexes.
Russia has eliminated its BZHRK with languid liquid ICBM, and now explore the possibility of restoring BZHRK, but with lighter solid-fuel ICBMs. Why Russia is not easy to recreate the solid-compact monoblock on an autonomous mobile ICBM launcher (remember the 15-ton ICBM "Courier"). The lowest part of such missiles in disguise vozimykh towed or self-propelled transport and launch container would always be in motion on dirt, highways and railways. Most of the missiles was a "vacation" from movements in located in populated Fri indoors (remember how Americans suffered with the discovery of Iraq's mobile ballistic missiles, which are hidden in the towns). Other missiles would be contained in secure shelters "cave" type. The creation of light on the move, rockets, as well as the expected shift from placing the U.S. ICBM silos (technically ready for launch Minutka 0.5-2) for placement of ICBMs for mobile launchers (in the technical readiness for start 15-20 minutes) would contribute to lowering the risk of accidental nuclear war, because the finger is not be on the trigger.
It is necessary to keep in mind about the hypersonic missiles global range planning, owning a wide ability to maneuver in the direction of flight and rounding insecure against air defense / missile defense areas.
In determining the adequacy of fundamental importance to a reasonable task rassredotachivaniya YABZ between species and types of media and means of delivery depending on the degree of vulnerability of a nuclear warhead. One YABZ enemy can kill or neutralize a long time in one single ICBM silos (1, 3, 6 or 10 YABZ) in one area of dispersal division PGRK — three ICBM (3 or 9 YABZ), one garrison regiment based PGRK — IDB nine (9 or 27 YABZ), based on the same airfield Distant Aviation — up to 30 TB (180 YABZ), one Fri-based submarines — to 4 SSBN (256 or more YABZ). You can not forget about the ordinary (non-nuclear precision) weapons. For example, an ordinary ammunition respective power can kill or neutralize a long time one subs (YABZ 64 or more), one or more MDB PGRK (1, 3, or more YABZ) one TB or more (6 or more YABZ). Of course, in the interest survivability of our strategic nuclear forces us to be more profitable as possible YABZ on the media or means of delivery, and keep out the bases of constant placement and movement as much as possible carriers and delivery vehicles.
Loading of the most heaviest in the world of sea rocket (starting weight of 90 t) P-39U to the mine underwater missile cruiser strategic focus "Typhoon".
Price of nuclear weapons is derived both from their desired sufficiency and enforced redundancy, and from the apparent extravagance in their maintenance and renewal. In 2011, the Russian Federation, there were six types of liquid and solid-fueled ICBMs (RS-20 and RS-18, RS-12M, RS-12M2, RS-24 ICBM and created "Vanguard"), 5 types of liquid and solid SLBM (RSM-50 , RSM-54, RSM-54M, RSM-56 SLBMs, and create a "liner"), four types of SSBN (projects 667BDR, 667BDRM, 941, 955). Comparable to the prudent and frugal Yankee who would rate more important than just a cost-effectiveness ratio. In the U.S., only one type of solid-propellant ICBMs ("Minuteman-3 '), a type of solid-fuel SLBM (" Trident-2 "), one type of SSBN (" Ohio "). In the United States, Britain, France and China have refused the creation of the BR intercontinental range to the watery fuel, and in the Russian Federation last work on the creation of both solid and liquid ICBMs and SLBMs. Nuclear weapons are very expensive to change the missiles and YABZ every 10-15 years. In the U.S. in TB-52H has served for 50 years (only lasts 70 years), the IDB "Minuteman-3" — 40 years (50 — 60) SLBM "Trident-2" — 20 years (40-50) class SSBNs " Ohio "- 30 years of age (above 45 years), for YABZ W76 SLBM — above 30 years of age (only last for 60 years). If our performance on similar types of nuclear weapons in the South American yield 1.5-2 times, it is necessary to adopt best practice, do not repeat the mistakes of our past.
The Age of the "heavy" triad with bolshennymi SSBN, languid ICBMs and bombers languid century gives way to the "light" of the triad with low to medium SSBN, light and medium ICBM and medium bombers. In the development of carrying nuclear weapons and delivery systems in the world YABZ holds zeal to reduce the size and mass
media (SSBNs and bombers) and fewer YABZ on carriers of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles YABZ.
Back in 1992, the Americans put forward a proposal to build a small displacement of the PLA 5 or 8 tons with 4 or eight large silos with the possibility of placing them in the same number of long-range SLBMs, or three to four times more ballistic or cruise missiles lowest range . As part of this idea since 2012 in the United States studied the possibility of equipping a multi-purpose submarines of the "Virginia" crotch-range ballistic missiles with non-nuclear equipment using established to the newest SSBN new silos for SLBMs. British to 2029 want to have a third-generation SSBN smallest size and with eight silos SLBM for current and new type. The Chinese are intending to build SSBNs with 16 or 20 silos for SLBM SSBN build 12 silos. Americans in 2021 to begin construction of the third-generation SSBN, which will not be on the 24 silos, and only 16 or 20. It seems ripe realization that age megalomania nuclear combat units was over due to a reduction of nuclear ammunition and inevitable increase in the vulnerability of such ships in the future. And in Russia, according to media reports, the number of silos on new SSBN increasing from 12 to 16 and even 20. But our new SSBN should not be cruisers, water-carriers with an underwater displacement of 10's of thousands of tons, and low-noise submarines displacement to a maximum of 10 tonnes and a maximum of 10 light missiles. Relatively small size of these subs would facilitate their placement in rock shelters and in harbors and bays of dispersal.
Eagerness to have instead of languid bomber average observed in the United States. Distant Russian aviation only medium bomber (SB), is not capable of acting on the hard to reach for her goals in the United States, and the objects in the zone of Eurasia (in other words, to do the function of previously destroyed us BRSD "Pioneer").
Miniaturization obviously will affect the IDB. By the end of the war the Americans cool and we went to the flight tests of mobile single-warhead ICBMs weight of about 15 tons ("Midgetman" and "Courier", respectively). Taking into account the technological U.S. an advantage, you can not hesitate, in the case of the continued existence of the nuclear triad, they come back to us faster use of backlogs in compact mobile single-warhead ICBMs. Fascinating, by the way, and other incidents. Americans have reduced the number YABZ on each ICBM "Minuteman-3" from 3 to 1 st, RF crosses to be placed in new ICBM silos is not one YABZ, and with 3. Of course, the Americans increase the vitality of its own nuclear stockpile stewardship in the terrestrial component, and we reduce, even if you do not take into account an advantage of almost double the number of U.S. ICBM silos.
In the last 20-25 years in the U.S. Navy, France and England can be seen a tendency to a decrease of ammunition YABZ on each SSBN and reduce the average number of YABZ one SLBMs with six or eight to four or five (when mounted on a rocket from 1 to 6 or Eight YABZ). In the Navy of the Russian Federation there is a different picture. According to the media reports, instead of 4 YABZ on the RSM-54 SLBMs on a rocket, "Blue," will be 10, and a rocket "Liner" — 12 YABZ much (of course, to the detriment of YABZ power, range or SLBM warheads breeding system). Hardly appropriate to have on each vulnerable to PLC U.S. Russian SSBN three to five or more percent of the country's nuclear stockpile stewardship strategic nuclear forces. In the Russian Federation — have a tendency to each SSBN (PLC vulnerable to actions by the United States and invulnerable action PLC China) about 100 or more YABZ in China — the intention to have on each SSBN (vulnerable from the actions of the U.S. LST) until at 12 YABZ. Experienced and thrifty Chinese, valuing each YABZ survivability for a retaliatory strike by surprise, for 40 years set on each missile (IRBM, ICBM or SLBM) only one YABZ.
The establishment and maintenance of nuclear weapons in the United States spent 8.7 trillion. dollars (in 2010 prices). How much is spent in the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation, we hardly know. In 2011, it was reported that only purchase 80-100 new American bombers would cost the country $ 50 billion. dollars in the same year in the United States believed that the establishment and existence for 50 years, 12 third-generation SSBN (design, construction, weapons, maintenance, repair, upgrade, recycle, support infrastructure) will cost 347 billion. U.S. Given the cost of about 20% of that amount to actually build it turns out that the average cost of construction of each of the American SSBN approximately 6-7 billion. U.S. And Russia in 2011 sought a monopoly contractor for the construction of a modern SSBN 347 billion. rub.
Available for a couple of years of promises about eight of our new SSBN in 2020 cause oscillation. In addition, there is the question of why eight, when you need very little 10, and saying in the business, 12 new SSBN? In England, where her four SSBNs at the dawn of the first generation of their activities were seen patrolling in the 3-SSBN 7% of the time in the 2-subs 73% and one SSBN 20% of the time, believed that it was necessary to have 5 subs the second generation for the simultaneous continuous and uniform lifetime patrol 2-subs (40%). If our SF and PF will be any squadron with 4 new SSBNs, the individual time intervals for each fleet may be on the patrol only one SSBN that is unsafe because of the ability of unexpected events this SSBN. If each fleet will be 5 subs, it will be on patrol for two, and in the worst case — one of the SSBN fleet.
In 2008, Americans, with 14 SSBNs conducted continuous patrols six SSBNs (43%). In 2011 year in the calculations of the third generation of their own subs in the U.S. Navy came to the conclusion that you need 12 new SSBNs to ensure continuous patrols in the calculation for the entire service life of five subs at once (ie 42%). In other words, if you want to be at sea on patrol in the 2-"bastions" constantly and without annoying four subs, then you need to have a fleet of 10 SSBNs, like 5 — 12 is required; dream of 6 — think of 14 SSBNs. Construction has just eight SSBNs new type means that the Arctic and Pacific oceans, we will have to continuously patrol (in each ocean) the least part of the time on a SSBN and most of the time on the two subs.
NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
In addition to the strategic nuclear forces, there are non-strategic nuclear forces (NSYAS), kitted delivery vehicles and carriers of nuclear weapons with a range of acts than 5,500 km. It may seem surprising, but in the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation from 2010 there is no mention either of NSYAS nor of non-strategic nuclear weapons (TNW), although the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces in 2011, said that "non-strategic nuclear weapon RF intended only for the purposes of deterrence , prevention and appropriate de-escalation of a large-scale aggression in the home address. " It is clear that TNW left in the United States and the Russian Federation for the Air Force and the Navy. TNW keep on airplanes or on ships NSYAS — troublesome, because it is stored in warehouses. The distinction between strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons in some kinds of cases are very conventional: the same can carry nuclear bombs plane as the SNF and NSYAS. Blurring the boundaries between the SNF and NSYAS led to the disappearance of NSYAS in England to a dramatic reduction of the United States and in France. Most likely we can expect that over time, instead of SNF and NSYAS will just nuclear forces. Until then, we shall need "non-strategic" YABZ, carriers and means of delivery.
The difference between retaliation and counter-strike an unexpected blow to the enemy is that prior to the retaliation we lose almost all our nuclear potential,
and in the retaliatory strike can apply more than half of it. If our military and political control will be unable to make a decision on retaliatory strike for 10-12 minutes before the explosion of the first missiles to our area, in this case, the right to give the order to our retaliatory strike should be delegated to the advance has all information and military authorities of the duty officer.
Let's sum up. From the perspective of the taxpayer, is required to take into account the likely after 2020, another reduction in nuclear stockpile stewardship strategic nuclear forces to the level of 1000 YABZ and do not spend money on those new strategic nuclear weapons, from which, perhaps, would have to renounce to the following agreement with the U.S. on START. It is necessary to take reasonable steps to extend the life of existing strategic nuclear weapons in order to start their new substitution in the 2025-2035 years immediately with the start of the expected re-SNF United States, Britain, France and China.
From the perspective of a wimp, really need to make available a guaranteed reserve of nuclear and make this method of separation YABZ and BR are very likely to include constantly moving platforms (on PGRK, BZHRK and if they are made strong bastions, small SSBN). It would be appropriate to focus on lowering the redundancy YABZ by increasing their survivability, for example, in the development of lung singly ICBMs on mobile launchers of various kinds.
One-seventh of the earth's surface occupied by our state provides enough space for the organization of the continuous movement of the placement of ICBMs and other parts of IDB is firmly protected shelters. This will allow them to do on the basis of a truly guaranteed nuclear power reserve. In this case, the SNF is unlikely to need to have a total number of over 1000 ammunition YABZ and the total capacity to 150 Mt. Guaranteed nuclear reserve with its modicum of more than 25% of the total nuclear stockpile stewardship strategic nuclear forces will hold the potential to cause us the aggressor in retaliation for his unexpected unacceptable harm to him.