Afghan vector for many years in a row remains the main security threats in Central Asia. These dangers stem from both the socio-economic and political problems of Afghanistan itself, and because of "geopolitical game," in which its members to Afghanistan and based on its territory the rebels are assigned a very special place and role.
The risks and challenges associated with the Afghan vector can be (quite arbitrarily) divided into three groups. The real dangers and challenges, in other words those with which the system of regional and national security are facing in current time. Alleged dangers and challenges, in other words those that may occur in the event of the failure of the strategy of the Western coalition, the configuration of its strategy of counterinsurgency, and its rapid withdrawal from Afghanistan. Third group is related to the discussing intensively at the present time the problem of the role of the SCO in a settlement in Afghanistan.
The first group includes the following dangers and challenges.
First, the preservation of Afghanistan as the main base of terrorists, including the number of people who are linked to terrorist and extremist organizations having their own to destabilize the situation in Central Asia, the overthrow of existing political regimes and the establishment in its borders of the Islamic Caliphate.
The political instability of Afghanistan and the lack of control over a large part of its territory by the central government — it's the base that allows you to use the terrain of the country to prepare though small, but really pose a real threat to the political regimes of Central Asian groups. We are talking about such groups as the "Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan", "Akramiya", "Tablighi Jamaat", "Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party," "Jamaat Mujahideen Central Asia, "Etc. In other words, those who have a home of their own origin countries of Central Asia.
Since the fight with these groups within the terrain of Afghanistan and the countries of the region do not have a home of our ability, they can only impose that the external activity of these groups will be to suppress the national security forces of Afghanistan and even while being in this country subdivision ISAF.
The only thing that we can — strengthening the borders around the perimeter of Afghanistan and strengthening the CSTO RRF as the only structure to ensure collective security in the region.
Second, the preservation of Afghanistan as the main base for the production of raw opium, also a major supplier of heroin and other drugs on the world market transiting through Central Asia.
The main problem for us — the introduction of the territories of the region for the transit of Afghan drugs, the emergence of criminal gangs associated with this transit and rapid increase in the number of drug addicts in the states of the region.
Expect that this problem is "resolve" itself, naive.
In 1-x, by some estimates, the cultivation of opium poppy yields up to 40% of Afghanistan's GDP, and it involved the creation of more than 3.5 million Afghans (or nearly 15% of the population).
Moreover, according to the international committee on drug control at the end of 2009, total supplies of opium in Afghanistan and adjacent countries amounted to about 12 thousand tons. That number was enough to please the global illicit demand for opiates for 2-a-half years.
In-2, the border with Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan is actually transparent and do not represent an obstacle for drug smuggling.
B-3, in the 1990s and early 2000s, was created by a network of international finance, manufacturing, transportation and sale of narcotics. Supply of drugs from Afghanistan to Europe immediately implemented across multiple channels. Eliminate the whole network at once will not work.
But the main obstacle to effective counter this danger is that, most likely, involved in drug trafficking as the forces of the coalition forces, as well as a significant part of the elite in the United States, Europe, Iran, Pakistan, Russia and the countries of Central Asia. If it was different, then the overlap of supply routes to Afghanistan are not produced on its territory precursors rather would only political will.
Third, the likely collapse of the government of Hamid Karzai and the return to power of the movement "Taliban", entailing the inevitable emergence of a new round of civilian war in Afghanistan and the threat of destabilization in Central Asia.
Engage in dialogue with the movement "Taliban" as due to limited foreign policy skills, and for the reason that in this dialogue the countries of Central Asia and Russia will not allow the U.S. and NATO, we can not. The only thing that we can — to strengthen the security zone along the borders with Afghanistan on a collective basis in the framework of the CSTO and, perhaps, the SCO.
With all of this, as already mentioned, the main problem lies not in the unlikely anger movement "Taliban" in Central Asia, and in the completely real revitalization of ethnic terrorist organizations in the North Afghanistan, having close contact with the terrorist underground in Central Asia (Especially in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan) and in Russia.
Fourth, the upcoming escalation of the situation in Pakistan, the collapse of the ruling coalition and the prospect of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists.
Judging from the development of the situation in Pakistan, it's — the coming prospect. The ruling coalition has actually broken up, and the only force that still keeps Pakistan from total collapse, it is the army.
But at the moment there is a real coming of the position of the army and security services in order to lower their style and positive role in society. Thus, there is helpless against the government, the growth of radicalization and the number of perpetrators of terrorist acts.
In the end, the inevitable and quite fast and the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan ISAF units (even if they decide to throw out there unchanging bases).
This means that the only force that really holds back the pressure of Islamism in Central Asia, leaving the region and leaves the secular political regimes of one-on-one with the growing influence of Islam constructive.
Caring U.S. and Western coalition forces in Afghanistan to require that the countries of the region and the Russian Federation without the help of others solve all the problems associated with Afghanistan, the bulk of which is likely the emergence of the newest wave of Islamic radicalism throughout the region and the resumption of activities of Islamists in Central Asia.
The second group of threats and challenges are not so yavna.
The first and most terrifying challenge of military geostrategic, under the pretext of fighting terrorism, the United States and NATO have done for 10 years in Afghanistan impact foothold, allowing as needed ve
ry quickly deploy the most powerful forces in the southern borders of the CIS.
Judging by the way the war is being waged in Afghanistan, imposed a conclusion that the main goal of the U.S. and NATO is to make the terrain of Afghanistan and Pakistan, a springboard for the next penetration and establish their own impact on the entire Central Asian region and the blocking of the Russian Federation and China. Practically speaking, it focuses specifically on the strategy of "Greater Central Asia", designed for separation of the Central Asian states of the CIS, the CSTO and the SCO.
This is the same as some experts warn, and says that the main U.S. goal in the region is controlled by the formation of "impermanence arc" on the Eurasian continent, which they require to maintain their own status as a global superpower.
In-2, the planned transfer of Activism Western coalition troops to northern Afghanistan and the consequent activation of imminent action movement "Taliban" militant groups and other ethnic groups around the borders of the CIS.
This contains two possible call. In 1-x, the inevitability of retraction of the Russian Federation and the countries of Central Asia in the civilian war in Afghanistan, when it can be without the help of others, without the support of (or very limited support) from the Western coalition.
In-2, activation of an imminent terrorist groups pose a real threat to the political regimes of the region.
It is possible that the transfer activity of the U.S. and NATO in the north of Afghanistan due to the fact that the United States plans to expand the zone of "controlled conflict" by transferring it to the Ferghana valley.
B-3, the transformation of Afghanistan and Pakistan in a single zone of impermanence with the prospect of worsening Indo-Pakistani conflict is likely to use its nuclear weapons.
In this case, near the Central Asian region there hotbed of modern large-scale war with all its negative effects.
The introduction of this war of nuclear weapons will lead to environmental and humanitarian disaster in Central and South Asia.
In the end, in the case of the final defeat of the western coalition and its rapid withdrawal from Afghanistan will reincarnation of the movement "Taliban" of terrorist organizations in the national liberation movement, which serves the entire region of Central and South Asia, a model of how to perfectly resist foreign forces and overthrow existing political regimes.
This is — completely true perspective. Already, the authority of the movement "Taliban" is pretty high. However, so far only within the borders of Afghanistan and part of Pakistan. His victory in the criteria of the troop Western coalition only add to his credibility and the imminent rise to power after the departure of ISAF — give every reason to regard it as a national liberation movement.
As for the threats and challenges related to the role of the SCO in resolving the situation in Afghanistan. The very thought of for themselves the role of the SCO in Afghan affairs fascinating and under certain conditions fully realizable in practice. The question is, you need to give yourself a clear account of the fact that the SCO in Afghanistan are able to do and what is in the interests of maintaining a positive style of the organization should not do it better.
The SCO can.
In 1-x, funding social and infrastructure projects on the ground in Afghanistan. However, the development of a structure through which one could make a similar funding. While this structure is absent.
In-2, assist in the fight against drug trafficking in Afghanistan, including through the creation monitoring devices along the Afghan border. I must say at once, to take any measures to combat drug trafficking within Afghanistan itself, the SCO has no power. The second task, in principle, be solved, although here there are constraints.
First, to solve the problem of the creation of the narkobezopasnosti belt along the Afghan border without the role of Pakistan and Iran will not work. And without giving them the status of a full member of the SCO can be no question of full cooperation with them in this area.
Second, there is a difference in the assessment of the drug threat SCO member states. For some (Our Fatherland, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan), the problem of drug trafficking from Afghanistan, burning, for other priority other tasks. In any case, for the problem of Afghan drug trafficking in China is not yet a severe danger.
Third, I have already read about involvement in narkotranzit and it intrigued elites are on the perimeter Afghanistan countries.
B-3, the creation of a suitable foreign environment, it is blocking the export and import of drugs in Afghanistan precursors, sharply narrowing external financial support to the Afghan opposition and creating conditions that limit the export of the constructive thoughts of Islam.
It does not require coordination with the Afghan government, and most importantly, with the command of ISAF, but rather the political will of the SCO member states. With all of this strategy of the SCO in the Afghan settlement in its own economic component should be focused on the concentration of vkladyvatelnyh effort, based on the specific terms of the reconstruction of Afghanistan's economy, not the amounts allocated to investment, which is happening now.
The main purpose of the SCO member states should be the creation of a peaceful, free from drug production, a buffer zone along the borders of the member countries of the Organization.
The SCO can not and should not do.
In 1-x, or in any other capacity to get involved in solving military problems in Afghanistan. It is not appropriate for several reasons.
First, the Afghans consider any foreign military forces as occupiers, whose presence significantly violates the sovereignty of the country and leads to significant victims in the middle of the local population.
Second, our home has been a sad experience of introducing their own troops on the ground in Afghanistan, which has demonstrated intolerance to the Afghan foreign military presence here and impossible to realize all attempts to build in Afghanistan by force of modern society.
Third, the process of power component of the SCO is not yet over, and his ability to have been rather limited nature. As can be seen, do not entertain the illusion that the SCO could change NATO Afghanistan.
And the last. The involvement of the SCO in Afghan affairs at first need to discuss with the government of Hamid Karzai and the management of the U.S. and NATO, having developed one or the other scenario of this engagement.
In-2, trying to organize intra-Afghan talks under the auspices of the SCO. The practical solution to this problem is unlikely to be. Despite the definite change in the case of the Russian Federation to the current political governance of Afghanistan, the Taliban, for various reasons do not accept Russia and China, and will not go with them on a dialog. The role of intermediaries in the dialogue with the Taliban could play only two countries — Iran and Pakistan, which are currently members of the SCO are not.
But the main thing is not the point. Under the current criteria for the organization of the negotiation process with the favorites movement "Taliban" and even more so with the so-referred to as the "moderate Taliban" has no meaning. Hope for a positive outcome of the negotiations, the criteria when the Taliban stronger than the government and the international coalition — an unforgivable naivete.