Baltic special: the first hours of the war

Baltic particular: the first hours of the war

In late May 1941 IF Kuznetsov reported to the Chief of General Staff of the Red Army on completion of the formation of anti-tank brigades and WEC neighborhood. With all of this commander of the district bitterly noted that completing the airborne units made of the personnel, which has not passed even a primary education, and part of the personnel and units were recruited "from the indigenous peoples of the republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus, ill or have general non-Russian language. Body parts are equipped with a broad substitution of specialties. " Anti-gang neighborhood because of this were nedoukomlektovany, and half of the personnel are not trained in the specialty. In addition …

In August 1940, the Soviet Union entered the three Baltic countries: Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Leaving aside the problems of this article is actually entering the data of the USSR and the Russian authorities following policies in these countries, we note only that in the areas of these States in the same year, was created by the Baltic Special Military District (PribOVO), precisely August 17, 1940 he was named specifically so, and was still held July 11, 1940, of the troops which entered the national army and Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia.

Initially, in command of the district joined Colonel-General AD Loktionov, but by the end of 1940, it became clear that Alexander Dmitrievich not fully sovladevaet with the assigned capacity to command the district. At the meeting of the steering of the Red Army 23 — December 31, 1940 commander of the district has not arrived, citing illness, was also absent and a member of the Military Council of the neighborhood housing commissioner IZ Susaykov. But PribOVO Chief of Staff Lieutenant General PS Maples has shown an enviable activity at the meeting. After the end of such a landmark event PribOVO commander and member of the Military Council of the neighborhood were relieved of their own posts. District Commander was appointed Lieutenant General FI Kuznetsov (the rank of colonel received in February 1941) and a member of the Military Council — Commissioner PA cabinet Dibrov. Chief of Staff of the neighborhood has retained its position.

Upon arrival in county FI Kuznetsov inspected the troops entrusted to him, the situation was dire, his predecessor actually did not do anything to increase the combat effectiveness of a neighborhood. Instead of the modern equipment of state borders and combat training of troops engaged for the most part arrangement of military camps, storage facilities for equipment and other chores. Especially bad things were with the construction of fortified areas on the latest state border strip. At the request of the District Commander of the central regions of the USSR in the spring of 1941 came to a huge number of battalions of the system, so only in the defense of the 11th Army were involved in 30 "foreign" field engineering and engineering battalion.
To cover the 300-kilometer stretch of the Soviet-German border, surrounded should have been deployed 7 shooting, 4 armored and motorized divisions 2. The defense of the coast of the Baltic Sea was assigned to the Baltic Fleet and subordinate part of the coastal defense, in addition to the same effect from the neighborhood of troops allocated two infantry divisions.

Total payroll number of troops PribOVO on June 22, 1941 amounted to 325,559 persons. The composition of a neighborhood comprised 19 infantry divisions, 4 armored and two motorized infantry divisions, 5 mixed air divisions (see "War and the size of the Armed Forces of the USSR during the stateliness Russian war" Statistical Bulletin number 1 Defense of the Russian Federation in 1994). In structure of the covering army of state borders were 11 shooting, 4 armored and motorized divisions 2. The structure of these compounds were 183,500 persons of staff, 1,475 tanks in the 2-neighborhood mechanized corps (3-m and 12-m MC), 1271 and 1478 cannon mortars, anti-tank guns 1632, 119 anti-aircraft guns, and 1,270 combat aircraft ( June 21, regularly 530 fighter and attack aircraft and 343 bombers).

Correlation of forces on 22 June 1941 in the defense PribOVO was a frustrating experience for the Russian side. Against the forces of the enemy concentrated neighborhood two (!) Tank groups of 4 — 3rd and 4th, 1062, and 635 tanks, respectively [1]. The structure of the advancing enemy troops in the Baltic region were 21 infantry division, 7 tank, 6 motorized divisions and one motorized brigade. Total 562015 (18 th army — 184,249 people; 16 Army — 225,481 people; 4th Panzer Group — 152 285.) Personnel of the 1697 tanks, 3045 guns, 4,140 mortars, 2,556 anti-tank guns. In the interests of this group were more than 1,000 aircraft (1st fleet — 412 aircraft and 8 Air Corps 2nd fleet — 560 aircraft).

The ratio in the defense PribOVO was 3:1 on staff in favor of the enemy, the tanks 1:1, 2.4:1 for artillery guns in favor of the enemy, by mortars 2.8:1 in favor of the Wehrmacht, the anti-tank guns by 1 6:1, at the zenith 3-1 in favor of the enemy, and only Russian troops on the aircraft had the advantage of 1:1.2. And this is without taking into account the number of personnel of the third Trp, and parts of the 9th Field Army Aviation "Center" also advancing in the defense PribOVO.

Assignment of Army Group "North" in the directive number 21 ("Barbarossa") sounded, followed by:
"… Kill existing in the Baltic enemy forces and capture the ports on the Baltic Sea, including the Leningrad and Kronstadt, to deprive the Russian navy of its bases.


In accordance with this task, Army Group "North" breaks through the enemy's front, the main blow in the direction of Dvinsk, as can be faster moving his strong right wing, sending the forward moving troops for forcing p. Western Dvina River, in an area north-east of Opochki to prevent the retreat of Russian combat-ready forces from the Baltic to the east and to the prerequisites for a successful upcoming promotion to Leningrad.

The 4th Panzer Group, together with the 16th and 18th armies breaks through the enemy front between the lake and the road Vishtitisskim Tilsit — Vilnius, moving to the area Dvinska Dvina and to the south and gain a foothold on the east bank of the Dvina.


The 16th Army in collaboration with the 4th Panzer Group breaks through the front of the opposing enemy, dealing a major blow to both sides of the road Ebenrode — Kaunas, the rapid advance of his own strong right flank of Panzer Corps is in their ability to economize the faster the northern district. Western Dvina at Dvinsk and south of it.


18th Army breaks through the front of the opposing enemy and main strike along the road Tilsit — Riga and east, rapidly boost their main forces p. Western Dvina at Plyavinasa and south, cuts are south-west of Riga of the enemy and destroy them. In the upcoming she rapidly moving in the direction of Pskov, Islands, prevents the withdrawal of Russian troops in the area south of Lake Peipus … "

Based on data from Russian intelligence about the transfer of East Prussia 4th Panzer Group Wehrmacht (Trp), FI Kuznetsov started constantly put before the People's Commissar of Defense issue of strengthening the anti-tank defenses neighborhood. Assertiveness gave positive results: April 20, 1941 Military Council PribOVO was obtained directive of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense of the form
ation to June 1, 1941 in the neighborhood of the 9th and 10th of anti-artillery brigades (brain reserve command) in Siauliai and Kaunas, respectively . In addition envisaged formation in Dvinsk (Daugavpils) 5th Airborne Corps (WEC).

In late May 1941 IF Kuznetsov reported to the Chief of General Staff of the Red Army on completion of the formation of anti-tank brigades and WEC neighborhood. With all of this commander of the district bitterly noted that completing the airborne units made of the personnel, which has not passed even a primary education, and part of the personnel and units were recruited "from the indigenous peoples of the republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus, ill or have general non-Russian language. Body parts are equipped with a broad substitution of specialties. " Anti-gang neighborhood because of this were nedoukomlektovany, and half of the personnel are not trained in the specialty. In addition, the commander of the district emphasized that "the great officers of the shortage in the brigades can not be covered from the resources of the county."
Finally, the complaint Fedor Isidorovich led to the visit of the next Commission to test the combat readiness of troops — that is to say, instead of real help command PribOVO — but for the sake of fairness it should be noted that the trained professionals, commanders and educated recruits take polls was simply nowhere.

In modern Russian historiography, there is a typical "sacred cow" Behold they say, the Odessa Military Area Command led against the orders of the control of the Red Army forces in the embattled neighborhood, and all, and the "Wehrmacht did not pass." But it turns out not only OdVO engaged in "amateur". Not so long ago in historical research documents show that the commander PribOVO evaluated the possibility of starting a "big war" is very, very high. In this case, the enemy forces involved against OdVO PribOVO and even associate fun.
First, in June 1941 as a result of the commission the Commissariat of Defense was made a special order of the District Commander for the number 0052. Specifically it said the subsequent:
"Checking the readiness of the surrounding area revealed that some commanders still do not pay tribute to criminal attention to ensuring operational readiness and can not control their units and parts." [2]

The order noted: bad knowledge of the commanders of military districts use their own parts, and in peacetime units are sent to work for 10's of kilometers unchanged dislocation places without guns and ammunition; ugly warning and alarm collection, unhurried advance in the areas of collection and large plugs troops on the roads due to the inability to control troops on the march, bad interaction of arms, bad-established command and control especially in the link division — regiment. Emphasized that "… the commanders did not know how to navigate the terrain, NIGHT MODE fornication [so in the document — V_P], not how to rule, runs across the battlefield instead of the messenger." [2]
In mandative part of this document states:
"1. The Commander of the 8th Army division commanders personally with you to teach at the … By 29 June every division commander must reach a decision on the ground that the army commander to approve ….
2. Corps commanders to hold the doctrine on the ground with each regimental commander to 24.6.
3. The commanders of divisions to the doctrine on the ground with each battalion commander — division to 28.6
4. Problem exercises — work out a solution for the senior commander in the locality occupied prepare for a stubborn defense. The main thing — to destroy the enemy tanks and infantry, to hide their troops from aircraft, tanks and artillery fire of the enemy.
5. wire fences begin to establish immediately, also make the installation of minefields and education rubble. " [2]

Next, commander of the district emphasized:
"The commanders of battalions, battalions, companies, batteries need to know exactly their position and secretive ways to approach them as soon as the busy position to direct more attention to the burying of all kinds of weapons and personnel deep into the ground." [2]

It was necessary to prepare in advance for two firing positions for each machine guns, mortars and guns — the main and reserve. It was recommended to direct more attention to the company of artillery fire in order to massage her fire in any direction where you can expect the occurrence of enemy tanks, why it was necessary to prepare in advance by fire and maneuver wheels.
Commander of the district emphasized devoted its attention to issues of governance. He sought from all commanders to ensure reliable operation in combat training at the expense of premature replacement team principal and Fri, from battalion to division and inclusive, and the main and spare lines. In addition commander listed all the ways in which the enemy will try to disrupt the operation. He bluntly warned:
"We must bear in mind that communication centers work poorly experienced people in the set which may be spies working for the enemy. For the first day or output division in the area of their actions on all nodes of the local band division — the body should be engaged communicators military units. It is necessary to firmly establish the identity signal the senior commander for junior and junior to senior. Give verbal orders is only entitled to a direct and specific boss. No verbal orders not to give up on the phone … Written orders should be written in a concise … "[2]

The order was placed a 40-minute time limit readiness lifting parts of all the armed forces on alert. Some lines of the pre-war order of the commander PribOVO were truly prophetic:
"We must firmly grasp that the errors in the actions of 1 person, especially when that person is a commander, can cost a large blood." [2]

And in the end:
"The order is one hundred percent aware command personnel to the division commander, inclusive. The army commander, the commander of the corps and division up schedule of compliance, which is absolutely to perform June 25, 1941. " [2]

Is it not very noticeable document? From it perfectly clear that, in contrast to the West especially military neighborhood, where usually wait "orders from above", Fedor decided Isidorovich measures to prepare for an invasion, but, unfortunately, all these activities are hopelessly late. I'll tell you that despite the incompleteness of measures to bring the troops in the embattled neighborhood and the worst of the possible correlation of forces on June 22, 1941, F.I.Kuznetsovu managed to prevent a complete rout of his forces in the neighborhood of the border battle.
This order was signed by the commander, a member of the Military Council and the Chief of Staff of the neighborhood, printed in 41 copies and distributed to recipients June 15, 1941. In other words, a week before the start of the Second World War!
But this is not the commander PribOVO braked! June 14 started relocation of four infantry divisions (SD) and the control of the 65th Rifle Corps (SC) in the border zone. Closer to the border were moved 4 corps artillery regiment and one howitzer regiment (GAP) RGC. All of these units and had to concentrate in designated areas to 23/06/41.

Despite the strict warning Commissar of Defense with regard to written documents to bring the forces in the border counties in the state of over-readiness, in the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation remained a telephone PribOVO Military Council, dated June 13, directed the commander of the 48th CD (a copy of Army Commander 8)
"1. 48th Infantry Division to withdraw and place to park in the woods of south and north Nemakshchay. Similarly, areas for the benches and find otrekognostsirovat for 14 and 15 June.
2. Print out all of the division and bring all supplies, calc
ulated on the first tier of mobilization.
3. In winter quarters to throw a small number of people needed for the mobilization of the 2nd tier division and okaraulivaniya warehouses with property left for the 2nd tier of the mobilization.
4. To act on the night of 16 to 17 June and move to a new area only night marches. Focusing division one hundred percent complete by 23 June.
5. Days are placed on halts, carefully concealing parts and carts in the woods.
6. The transition plan division in a new area and a request to the appropriate vehicle to provide me with a 1.00 June 16, 1941.
7. [Appended by hand — auth.] Increased attention spent on full alert division. " [3]

After a day or two, June 15 military council neighborhood sent a coded telegram chief AU (Ordnance Department) neighborhood. This document was ordered to "withdraw from the Riga camp and transported to a place of winter stations" for the finale on June 23 both corps artillery regiment (AP). By June 26 the 402nd Howitzer Artillery Regiment high power (HAP BM) to withdraw and place in timber station Uzhpelkyay. At the end of the order appended by hand, "Transportation spend a night. Loading — before the coming of darkness. Unload at dawn. " [4]
June 16, FI Kuznetsov sends in troops directive on the procedure for notification of troops neighborhood in the event of enemy of the state border:
"The commanders of divisions, received a message from the commanders of the border crossing border guards, their own intelligence units or from the air warning stations and checking his report to the commander of the neighborhood or the Chief of Staff of the neighborhood first, and then the commander of the corps or army commander, taking the right measures to repel" .

In those days of the commander PribOVO bombs Commissar of Defence and Chief of General Staff constant reports about the concentration of German troops at the Russian border, but Moscow stubbornly silent.
Finally on June 18 Moscow permits under the guise of the exercise, removal of the first tier of staff PribOVO (250 generals and officers), which is by 12.00 on June 20 took prepared in advance command post in the forest, 18 km north-east of Panevezys. Second echelon headquarters was placed on June 21.
On the same day PribOVO commander Colonel General Fyodor Kuznetsov Isidorovich gives the order number 00229, in which the purpose of rapid alerting the neighborhood troops were ordered to the final day or June 18 to withdraw army compound in a cover band of the state border, also lead to full combat readiness of all antiaircraft defense and communication on the terrain neighborhood — and perform a number of other activities likely to repel aggression of the enemy. But here was followed by "flick" of Moscow. Bringing in full combat readiness of air defense to June 21, 1941 was canceled Chief of General Staff of the Red Army GK Zhukov: "without the approval of the People's Commissar you were given orders by the introduction of air defense in action number 2 position, which means — in the Baltic States to blackout, and this harm the industry. Such acts can be carried out only with the permission of the government. Your order is different rumors and irritates the public. Demand to immediately cancel illegally gives orders and provide an explanation for the encryption of the People's Commissar of the report. " How unfortunate it did not sound, an explanation Kuznetsova has yet been found.
Despite this, the commander PribOVO continues to bring the troops in the embattled neighborhood. June 18 neighborhood headquarters gave orders to subordinate troops following content:
"For the purpose of rapid alerting theater [even ah so — auth.] Neighborhood of order:

Commander of the 8th and 11th armies;


a) proceed to the workpiece materials at hand (rafts, barges, etc.) for the device Vilia river crossings, Nevyazha, Dubysa. Items crossings installed with the Operations Section of staff neighborhood.
30th and 4th pontoon shelves to subordinate the military council of the 11th Army. Shelves have fully prepared to build bridges across the River Neman. Near the exercise to verify the condition of these bridges pickup shelves, achieving small deadlines;


e) The commander of the 8th and 11th armies — to destroy the more demanding lane bridges: state border and the rear line of Vilnius, Kaunas, p. Neman prorekognostsirovat these bridges, find for each of them the number of explosives, demolition teams and in nearby Fri focus all of their funds for demolition. Plan for the destruction of bridges approve the Military Council of the army. Deadline for the 21/06/41 "[5]

June 19 Kuznetsov sent to all army commanders neighborhood directive of 4 Fri:
"1. Operate the equipment of the defense. The impact on the preparation of positions on the main strip of ur work on which to strengthen.
2. Under the assumption that graduate work. But to assume the position taken by the troops only in the event of enemy of the state border.
3. To ensure frisky classes of positions as the assumption, and in the main defensive zone appropriate parts must be completely on the alert.
4. In the area of the back of their own positions to check the reliability and speed of communications with the border pieces. " [6]

No need to assume pochetaemy reader, that FI Kuznetsov was the only PribOVO man who believed imminent attack German troops fact resolved. Clever commanders, and in particular those whose units were stationed near the border specifically understood that it was a matter of days — a maximum of one or two weeks. For example, the encryption remained commander of the 125th Rifle Division of the 11th SC 8th Army from June 19, 1941. Major General PP Bogaychuk writes commander of the district:

"According to the agents' data and defectors near Tilsit concentrated to 7 divisions of German troops.

On our side of the defensive measures of temper that guarantee against attack mechanized units not taken, and the Germans rather let one tank battalion, as held garrison can stay caught flat-footed. Internal outfit and patrols can only warn of, but not provide. The band assumed without garrisons of troops Germans will not hold, and border guards are on time field troops and to warn. The band assumed the division is close to the state border than to the parts of the division, and with preparatory activities for the calculation of the time will be captured by the Germans earlier withdrawal of our troops there.

Reporting on the present situation on the border, I ask:
1. To give guidance on what activities the moment I can put into practice to ensure the sudden invasion motomehchastey Germans, or give me the right to itself to create a plan of action, but the division of funds for this little ….
4. Allow me to withdraw for a period of not to assume two battalions in the directive neighborhood number 00211, and four. "

Very exciting reaction to the memo, Major-General Bogaychuka higher authorities. Commander PribOVO put her subsequent resolution: "live ammunition on hand not to give, but to prepare their extradition. For completion of the work assumption put forward three battalions. More support. Forces and resources you have. Securely manage, safely and skillfully use all. Not to worry, but to be truly in full combat readiness. "

Quite a different reaction, bordering on hysteria, caused another initiative commander 125th diabetes in Moscow. Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army GK Zhukov immediately send to the address of the Military Council later PribOVO coded telegram read:
"To tell the division commander Bogaychuku give cipher PERSONAL explanation People's Commissar of Defense, on what basis he made the evacuation of families of officers of the division. People's Commissioner considers it an act of cowardice that contribute to the spread of panic a
mong the population and the findings provocative, very unnecessary for us. " [7]

But the most decisive step was the commander PribOVO withdrawal of troops of the 8th Army in the neighborhood areas in the plan cover the state border. Unfortunately, this order was given orally. But, this is confirmed by the surviving documents of the compounds of the 8th Army. So, in the battle of staff available to the same 125 th of DM 16.30 19 June 1941 (g Tauroggen) indicated that "in the performance of an oral order of the commander of the 11th Infantry Corps 125th Infantry Division was now 6/19/41 and turns is a limit on the defensive front …. Defense readiness to 4.00 g 06/20/41, fire system to 06/19/41 21.00, the conclusion to the main parts of the defensive zone to start immediately, and make extended order to complete the 18.00 6/19/41 city …. DotA immediately ready to accept and take their garrisons with suitable weapons … "
This martial order was fulfilled. Already on June 20, Major General Bogaychuk report to the headquarters of the neighborhood: "The division came to the area to assume. I ask directions, can I give means of chemical protection NC on hand. "
But under pressure from Moscow, the commander PribOVO begin to overcome doubts — as if he's doing when the capital of him saying one thing and sees it in a completely different environment. All the same, by telephone message restless Bogaychuka he writes instructed the Chief of Staff neighborhood "is checked to advance no one got into the assumptions. Create a reason for provocation can not be. " And the chief of staff furiously wires in the 125th CD, "What is it? You understand that the assumption is forbidden to occupy? Urgently find out. " Major General Bogaychuka can only regret — it is hard to imagine how he felt the day June 22, 1941 …

Despite all the doubts Kuznetsov withdrawing troops of the 8th Army in the areas under the plan covering the state border. Yet, there is a firm sense that the command PribOVO led a kind of "double game." On the one hand it is obvious the county was preparing to repel the aggression of the enemy, on the other hand — carefully concealed it from his own superior command, and inhibited the initiative "from below." It should be noted this paradoxical situation. But let us give tribute to Colonel-General FI Kuznetsov, he made more than the same commander WSMD, though confined to half-measures.

June 22, at 0 hours 25 minutes chief of staff PribOVO PS Maple sends a report to the General Staff of the Red Army (copies of the Red Army Intelligence Chief, Chiefs of Staff 8 th, 11 th and 27 th Army, the Chief of Staff WSMD). In his report, he reports that lasts concentration of German troops in Eastern Prussia. Also part of the Wehrmacht are displayed to the Soviet-German border. The construction of pontoon bridges across the river Neman in a number of areas. Protecting the border with the German side of the field assigned to the Wehrmacht. In Klaipėda proposed a civilian population to evacuate inland from the border of 20 kilometers. In Suvalkinskom county residents evicted by 5 km from the border. June 16, 1941 in Suwalki was produced records of horses that need to be taken into the army on June 20. [8]
1.30 In a telegram of the General Staff of the Red Army, and at 2.15 it was duplicated by the Military Council neighborhood in the 8th and 11th armies.
Day of June 22, 1941 the German troops of Army Group "North" after the massive bombing and artillery training (held at 5.30 am Moscow time), run to the offensive.
The outbreak of hostilities in the defense PribOVO for engineering battalions involved in the border line of defense equipment, was one hundred percent of a sudden. These battalions were not even small arms. Because, remembers the chief engineer troops of the 1st Army colonel Firsov, "they were scattered, and immediately lost all military company, turned to the crowd of people fleeing from death, who could … They randomly accompanied the army compound just before her departure to the limit p. Western Dvina and only strengthened the nascent panic. " [9]
In the first hours of the invasion headquarters PribOVO tried in vain to organize control of subordinate forces. Wired bandwidth connections were partly destroyed by the German air force, but mostly cut by saboteurs and local residents, the number of agents of the German intelligence service. Because the first battle report PribOVO chief of staff of the General Staff of the Red Army, sent at 10.00 am on 22 June, it was the general character. It said in the beginning of the coming of the enemy, and to join with him in the battle of the individual compounds neighborhood.
Meanwhile, the position from the beginning was the hardest fights. By 12.00 was surrounded by one of the regiments of the 10th SD in Cooley's what led this division to retreat to the limit of the river Minya. Parts of the 125th diabetes were languishing fighting half-encircled in Tauroggen. 33rd CD came under concentrated attack on the 28th and the 2nd Army Corps and the Germans retreated to the east. Also, under the pressure of the enemy retreated to the east 128th and 188th diabetes. Communication with the headquarters of the neighborhood and the neighbors were not, every commander of acting in its sole discretion.
After 2.5 hours, 14.30 headquarters of the North-Western Front (so now was called PribOVO) to the General Staff of the Red Army was oriented new military report. Again, it sounds just platitudes. The same loss of his report referred to in the middle of aviation neighborhood, recognized "significant."
Ended the first day of the war, but the communication staff of the North-Western Front with the troops did not come. But the delegates began to arrive due to the planes, cars and bikes.
News was disappointing.
Chief of Staff of the Front realized that wriggle vague wording has not come out.

At 22.00 the General Staff of the Red Army was oriented operational summary of Staff of the North-Western Front (SPF), namely, to what was said: "The front of the defense of the 8th Army broke through on the direction Krytinga tanks and motorcycle parts opponent. The compounds of the 11th Army under the pressure of the enemy retreat. Communication with the individual compounds lost. " [10] Immediately it should be emphasized that the summary of STP staff was more real and honest of all the summaries of all the fronts admitted to the General Staff of the Red Army during the day or June 22, 1941.

On the night of 22 to 23 June the headquarters of STP and failed to return a wired connection with any of the staff of the armies. Since June 23, it was decided to prepare command and control of the front of the spare node Communications (Dvinsk), where in the morning on June 24 was part of a unit sent to the 17th Regiment, a separate connection of the front. In the evening of the same day or the front staff was out of Ponevezhesa and in the morning on June 25 arrived in Dvinsk, which at that time were already approaching enemy troops.
But Dvinsk was naikrupneyshim railway hub, and subjected to constant bombardment of enemy aircraft. German planes practically "hung" over the city. In addition to the steel road and in the districts Dvinska worked countless groups of saboteurs. These criteria headquarters Front began to advance along the road of Dvinska at Rezekne. At the 44th kilometer of the road in the second half of the day or front headquarters finally managed to contact by radio with the 8th and 11th armies, and by telegraph — with Riga and Moscow.
So Makar, despite the measures taken by the command of the neighborhood, none of the compounds PribOVO failed to hold the enemy at the state border strip. Bolee of the first three days since the beginning of the war the troops of the first echelon defensive front led by the decisions of their own acts of their own commanders, not ha
ving control of the staff at the front and the general plan of warfare.
It is interesting to see how the acts were seen fighting the enemy. From the journal of hostilities GA "North" implies that this group of armies, taking the initial position of 3 hours 05 minutes (by Berlin time) June 22, 1941, the beginning of the coming and ran across the border in the area Vystitis — Baltic Sea. The resistance of Russian troops on the border specifically assessed as "negligible." It is emphasized that the enemy was caught by surprise, and all the bridges in the band coming GA "North" into the hands of the Germans intact.
Working through the gaps in the combat formations of the Russian troops in the evening on June 22 GA "North" broke through the line of border fortifications and the whole front has advanced to a depth of 20 km. In the area west of Siauliai German aircraft were destroyed and burned 150 to 200 Russian tanks and trucks.
Further in this journal says that "based on the testimony of prisoners of war and local residents also look for documents, you can assume that the enemy about 4 day or pulled back the big border forces, leaving only a small rear-guard cover. Where at the moment are his main strength — is unclear. Because you need for the ability to install faster contact with them on condition that before the release of the Western Dvina to tie them fight and kill them. " [11]
Coming June 23, German troops lasted virtually unopposed. There was a significant movement of the columns of Russian troops on the way to Kaunas, Daugavpils (Daugavpils) and on the way from Vilnius to the north-east. This gave reason to consider the German High Command that the enemy moves in the direction of the Western Dvina. 16th Field Army Wehrmacht his forward units, on the right wing made it to the district of Kaunas (18 km south-west). But by the end of the day or there is strong resistance to the enemy.
In records dated June 24, states that Russian troops at a number of sites have taken a counterattack, and in the evening in parts of the 18th Field Army was held considerable power counterpunch tanks. It also noted that the counter performed separately, held frontally, resulting in not achieving of success or achieve short of success, and the Russian tank units suffer huge losses. [11]
From the foregoing it can be concluded that the North-Western Front lost the battle frontier, but in spite of the fact that the coming of the German forces against the forces of the SMA has developed quite successfully and the highest rate, opponent failed on the Baltic area is one hundred percent defeat Russian troops and spend at least one operation to encircle our armies. Baltic Special Military county, most, by the way, weak from special districts of the USSR, was able to avoid the devilish developments on the Belarusian scenario. Despite this, the first of July of STP command in full force was removed from his post with the words "for the clumsy control of the troops."

1. Jentz TL 'Panzertruppen. The Complete Guide to the Creation and Combat Employment of Germany, s Tank Force. 1933-1942 ". Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publshing Ltd., 1996 | P. 2003 190-193, 206.
2. TsAMO RF, F. 344, Op. 5554, 19, cor. 11696 l. 12
3. TsAMO RF, F. 344. Op. 5554, 19. cor. 13073, sheets. 24-25
4. TsAMO RF f. 344, Op. 5554, 19, cor. 13073 l. 5
5. TsAMO RF f. 344, Op. 5554, 31 pp.. 12-13
6. TsAMO RF f. 344, Op. 5584, 1 ll. 23-24 |
7. IRA f. 48, Op. 3408, 14, l. 449
8. TsAMO RF f. 221, Op. 1394, 23, l. 76
9. TsAMO RF f. 15, Op. 977441, 2, cor. 23343, sheets. 65-67
10. TsAMO RF f. 221, Op. 1351, 57, 10593 k, ll. 3-4
11. TsAMO RF f. 500, Op. 12462, d 180, ll. 24-26 Foundation captured documents
12. "The Great Russian. The collection of documents. " In 25 volumes, edited by VA Zolotarev. Russian archives. "Terra" 1997-1998.
13. IB Moschansky, AV Isaev "triumphs and disasters stateliness of war." Veche 2010.
14. B. Müller-Gillebrandt "Land army Germany 1939-1945 "," Izografus "M. 2002
15. VA Rounov "1941. First blood "Yauza EKSMO M. 2009

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