The failed military reform and modernization of the Russian foreign policy (Wall Street Pit, USA)

The failed military reform and modernization of the Russian foreign policy ("Wall Street Pit", USA)First 2000s Our homeland began to implement a plan to transition from a legacy of mass conscription to a more modern system of recruitment based on the principle of voluntariness. In part, this was a concession to the harsh demographic dilemmas, because of which the staffing of the armed forces personnel in the old way was quite realistic. According to the steps the authorities also recognize the fact that the usual army on the basis of poorly adapted to appeal to today's conditions of warfare, which dominate modern technology. This was clearly demonstrated their own courage and successes of South American troops. Changes were also needed in connection with violation of the functioning of the organism Russian army, with its appeal that most notably manifested in such a sad phenomenon known as hazing.

At the moment, almost everyone recognizes that efforts in this direction have ended in failure. Acts of the Russian military in Georgia during the war were not far exemplary. Write in appropriate amounts contract could not ever, and those who are all the same type, was pursued the same objectives as the inductees: extensive vserasprostranennaya ruthlessness and criminality in army ranks.

But if our homeland justified the inability to create a viable armed forces on a voluntary basis, its demographic disadvantage is still here, and therefore maintain an army of conscripts in the right quantity is now virtually impossible. Moreover, the reforms started to address the problems of bullying, which are first expressed in the reduction of life to a year, only exacerbated these prepyadstviya.

In short, our home is not in a position to keep the army on the basis of the call, and immediately she can not make the army on a contract basis.

So do all the same? Of course, it is absolutely rejected the idea of picking on a voluntary basis. Such a principle is never used in the middle of popular military leaders committed to Russian concepts and dreams of the former Russian military glory. So, our homeland reduces number contract. Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov said this year: "We want to focus on the appeal." A fortnight back the head of the Head of organizational and mobilization department of the General Staff, Colonel General Vasily Smirnov said in the Committee on Defense and Security Council of the Federation, which will be introduced some measures (some of them denied Makarov) to increase the number of recruits. What is the most perceptible, he announced plans to increase recruitment age to 30 (!) Years. The military also reduce the number of delays from the army; number schools whose students may be exempted from military service, and introduce call for the part of the students during their training.

But all these calculations simply do not work. In the years of the Russian Federation to maintain the strength of the armed forces is useful 600,000 people. Reducing the number of young people means that to find her in such a quantity would be unrealistic. At first, it just really is not enough. Further, many will shy away from the service, others are very ill to serve (or suffer from alcohol or drug abuse). And those who are all the same will come to serve, not suitable for service on a physical level or intellectually.

What offers Smirnov, like an act of desperation. Medvedev is trying to give it some shine misleading, saying that there are difficulties with the call, but immediately promising to increase the service life of the recruits will not. 1 year is enough to teach quality spices, soldier or sergeant, he says. The last statement is ludicrous. But even if this were true, what good is that such experts and sergeants after years of service, leave the army?

Here it should be emphasized unavoidable contradiction between Medvedev's modernization advertised on the one hand, and the inability to go beyond the indiscriminate imitation of obsolete military system, on the other, especially if it turns out because of verbovaniya not willing to serve young people in the military service instead of mindless accumulation of valuable human capital . Occasionally in Russia and co-existed side by side so sharp contradiction stated eagerness to go beyond their own stories and enter into the modern world and a complete inability to turn away from the most obscurantist traditions of the past.

Certainly, Our homeland is facing a terrible problem. Its extensive territory asks big enough army, but a declining population makes it mystical. Add to this the desire to return some semblance of the empire, the obvious and overwhelming disparity between the objectives and the means to achieve them.

Maybe it specifically gives a clue nedavneshney leakage disk imaging on a single document Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which presents a friendly Russian foreign policy. (Certainly, the fact of leakage can be given different interpretations. Hopefully I'll have time to light the other provisions, but later I will give just one.) Least pugnacious foreign policy makes sense for someone who recognizes the low combat capability of the Russian army, and then that make it more recently will not work. Samples perpetuate the past, sending a group of voenkomatchikov on the hunt for 30-year-olds, only justify the absurdity of the situation, and lack of comparability of an old military model and raring to modernization. (Sending text messages to mobile phones with the announcement of the guys call them for military service is a ridiculous perversion of the idea of modernization — the introduction of modern means to preserve their obsolete systems.) This policy reflects the closer to the reality of trying to bring objectives with available resources .

But even if this interpretation is correct, the question of the significance of this paper is another matter entirely. In the end, this document is addressed to Medvedev, and it reflects Medvedev's thinking. Medvedev expresses special outlook and other matters, for example, denouncing Stalin. But the outlook is not decisive Medvedev. Not even clear whether it has any meaning in general. In reality, the world is fundamentally Putin. And he showed no particular interest in questions of modernization (to put it mildly), proudly defending Russian revanchism and anger. As can be seen, Russian puzzle in military matters, and its relationship with external policy more generally, it's just another act of the play, the outcome of which will come in 2012.

When betting, I'd bet on Putin (not out of love, of course, but really assessing the situation). Yes, and it will eventually not be able to overcome the force of will that the Soviets called impartial balance of forces. The internal contradictions (if you remember another Soviet phrase) Putin's policies are very significant. This means that it will be a Pyrrhic victory — both for him and for Russia.

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