Organized May 3, 2012 by the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation International Conference on "Missile Defense: Cooperation or Confrontation?" Was to some extent a historical event in the strategic dialogue leading military world. For the first time in a large forum with the role of the press in detail open a discussion complex and delicate nuances of communication of strategic offensive and defensive weapons, with the assistance of computer models and technical data.
The new trends of openness initiated by the Russian Ministry of Defense, of course, will have a positive effect, even if the last time the sides fail to reach agreement on controversial topics.
The main contradiction of the Russian Federation and NATO, which reflected the said conference are that there will be programmed global missile defense system the United States and its regional component — NATO's European missile defense to be able to intercept Russian strategic ballistic missiles or not. In other words — whether the U.S. missile defense / NATO to undermine Russian nuclear deterrent?
As expected, the official South American panelists argued: it will not, and Russian justify that will be the end of the decade in the third and fourth phases of the deployment of European missile defense. With all of this in the main differences were limited to highly technical questions: What is the maximum speed of future U.S. missile interceptors of the SM-3 Block 2B (more or less than 5 km / sec), after how many seconds after the end of the last booster stage ICBM launch the interceptor can be another hand, whether the interceptor is able to shoot down a missile in the boost phase line of motion (or "vdogon"), as this will affect the necessities of life for its maneuverability at speed interceptor missiles?
Without denigrating the importance of these issues, it must be emphasized that not enough attention was paid to the wider and seems more principled strategic themes.
Inconsistencies American band
From the West virtually unanswered some key questions. Even if we accept the evaluation of several professionals that in 10-15 years, Iran can make missiles of intercontinental class and all the more medium-range missiles (which block the Eurasian continent to Spain, Norway and Krasnoyarsk), which is the best method to counter this danger? U.S. is not just officially announced that would not allow Iran acquiring nuclear weapons (meaning, apparently, also Israel's determination not to allow this). If so, you should create a major European missile defense system to protect against missile equipment in the ordinary? Because such missiles because of the low accuracy fail to inflict enormous harm and to deal with them would be quite the newest high-offensive systems in the U.S. and other non-nuclear powers, which can be applied as a pre-emptive strike, and in retaliation (for the type of transaction in Iraq, Yugoslavia and Afghanistan).
It is symptomatic that Iran has never opposed the European missile defense NATO, even though the main object is to officially act of this system. European missile defense program from Tehran sees as a sign of eagerness NATO insurance against Iran acquiring nuclear and missile capabilities. This is completely satisfied with the Iranian administration, much less that the missile defense system has become a major bone of contention between the U.S. and Russia. Their unity of the Iranian dilemma at the UN Security Council — the biggest threat to the nuclear lobby in Tehran.
Another topic on which the United States does not give clear answer: how to influence global and regional perspectives on missile defense programm upcoming proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology in the world. While official Washington's position is that the missile defense system constrains these processes, no actual evidence of such an effect in relation to the programs when Iran, North Korea and other likely candidates for the missile and nuclear clubs do not exist. The last years have shown that only the unity of the majestic powers on the dilemmas of the spread and development cooperation can be an effective defense deterrent of this kind.
In the end, a huge fear of Moscow is the event that the United States leave the answer to the question: will shut down or significantly revised programm European missile defense, if it will stop programs from Iran by peaceful or military? Such obligation Washington does not, it does not provide certainty as to the subsequent plans for European missile defense build-up after the fourth step of the adaptive plan. From all this develops memory: line U.S. has a "double bottom" and is associated with bolshennymi nedogovorkami that creates suspicion and exaggerated threat assessment on the part of Russia.
Questions to the position of the Russian Federation
All fairness it should be noted that the reports of the official representatives of the Russian spared few problems. In 1-x, the demonstration of computer models to intercept ICBMs RF missile defense system the United States has been reduced to a "duel" situations, when one or two rockets on different parts of the trajectory shot down one or two interceptor missiles. With all of this has been discussed, that does not take into account complex decoys (PCB ABM), which are available on Russian ICBMs and SLBMs, and continue to improve. Meanwhile, the specific PCB missile with multiple warheads multiply personal guidance (MIRV) were at one time factor, destroyed the hopes of creating a robust missile defense area majestic powers and propelled them to the conclusion of the Contract on the limitation defense in 1972. This factor has not lost value, and for the foreseeable future. According to the distinguished military and civilian professionals (for example academician Yuri Solomonov and General Viktor Esin) already present IRT PRO are designed to break an order of magnitude more effective missile defense, if planned by 2020 the U.S. / NATO.
Even if we imagine for ourselves a very effective missile defense system based interceptor missiles SM-3 Block 2B and sea-based, which by 2020 could intercept Russian ICBMs in the boost section of the line movement to breeding and PCB missile warheads, it would apply only to the most Western Strategic Missile bases in the European part of Russia. And all the MDBs are posted east and east of the Urals, could still be out of reach of NATO, as their active ends of the line of traffic on the inland areas of territory of Russia.
Another fundamental question is, what kind of nuclear capability sufficient to provide a measured mutual deterrence based on mutual "assured destruction" blowback (or, as it says in the latest Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation in 2010, "Application of the damage in all circumstances"). According to estimates of aggregate and zabugornyh-independent Russian research centers (including SIPRI, English Institute of Strategic research), the total destructive power of nuclear forces the United States is 25,000, and of — 45,000 units in the "Hiroshima equivalent" (in other words, in the amount of conventional bombs, equal in destructive force that swept from the face of the earth of Hiroshim
a and Nagasaki in August 1945).
It is clear that the two powers keep secret their calculations as to what part of their strategic nuclear forces at the decisive moment may not be ready to launch what will be struck the first blow of the enemy, which fails after launch, which can be intercepted by the missile defense system on the other hand, and in After all, how much will reach their goals. But given the enormous destructive power of the initial strategic forces of both sides, of course, that the "margin of safety" deterrence is truly enormous. Even one percent of that power (250-450 "Hiroshimas") in the real world would be guaranteed to destroy the greatest modern government or alliance of countries. Because "dueling" model intercept ICBM missile defense system is very vaguely relate to the overall strategic picture.
Obviously, this domain of national security in the face of deterrence should be handled carefully, including the negotiations on the reduction and limitation of it, because the nuclear capability has not only the military, and political dimension. And panic assessment of possible degradation of this potential under the influence of the U.S. missile defense system entirely unjustified.
Defense and stability
Third theme, which is quite "left out of the frame" at the conference — is a defensive weapon of, which, according to current plans, by 2020, will be an important part of the overall strategic picture, along with the U.S. missile defense / NATO. Directly refers to the program there Aerospace Defense (ASD), which is the value of weapons programs from State to 2020 (GPV-2020). In 2011, on the basis of Gallakticheskih troops had formed a new branch — EKO. In the LG-2020 for example program allocated about 20 percent of the funds — about 4 trillion rubles (about 130 billion U.S. dollars). In addition to the modernization of existing and creation of new parts of the missile warning (EWS) planned bulk purchase of anti-aircraft missile systems S-400 "Triumph" and C-500 "Hero", the modernization of the Metropolitan missile defense system (A-135), and most importantly — the creation of integrated information management system ASD.
The current phenomenon is that the United States stubbornly deny their own anti-Russian missile defense, but our home is seriously afraid of her. A Russian aerospace defense very transparently designed to protect the United States and NATO, but there is not yet tested on this occasion no concern. Not only the military doctrine of the Russian Federation from 2010, and the Ministry of Defence Materials prepared for that conference, postulate that the task of ASD is a "reflection of the anger in the aerospace, air and missile defense critical facilities of the municipal and military control, the main objects of the Armed Forces , economy and infrastructure. "
Specialists consider that the air-space attack (SVKN) include aerodynamic vehicles (aircraft and cruise missiles), ballistic missiles, and future combined means of delivery tools (rocket-planning part-orbit system). It is clear that in the foreseeable future, by such means, in this case in totality, will have only the United States. Because readiness to repel the attacks of air and space attack on a theoretical level, too, can be regarded as a factor weakening the South American deterrent.
Yet a radical increase in emphasis on defensive systems in addition to offensive potential — is in principle quite true turning Russian military policy and military development. Another thing is that certain organizational and technical solutions and the plans seem to be very controversial. Drawback is the fact that the system and programm ASD are not integrated into the overall concept of the Russian security and strategic stability. At a meeting with military and political professionals in Sarov at the end of March 2011 the then presidential candidate Vladimir Putin singled out: "… We need such a harsh basic justification of all that we are planning. It should be a certain philosophy of our work … "
While this work is not carried out by the competent authorities, which may be an explanation of the controversial qualities of ASD. Namely, there is no official statements about how ASD fit into the model of strategic stability, which, according to the views of Moscow, will face South American programm defense. From time to time that the destabilizing nature EUROPRO United States based on the fact that it is in contrast to the Russian deployed outside their local area, close to the borders of Russia.
In the politico-psychological terms, this, of course, plays a huge role. But in the strategic context of such an approach is very superficial. Fundamentally not where deployed missile defense, and what are its technical ability to intercept missiles and other states as it affects the geography of her home. A number of professionals in Russia and abroad, for example, believe that the deployment of future improved interceptors of the SM-3 is not in Romania, Poland and on ships in European seas, and on the location U.S. and Canada, as on ships from U.S. coasts could be more excellent ground cover in North America. By the way, at the conference of the Defense Ministry official dealer showed him as a threat to stability first model intercept ICBMs launched from Siberia South American interceptor missiles such as GBI (GBI), stationed in Alaska and California. However, by 2020, there will be a few 10 s (at the moment — 30 units), the model also does not take into account Russian IRT PRO and exceed the amount delivered by our missile warheads.
The strategic rationale for the latest defensive and offensive concepts of stability, which reads Vladimir Putin in Sarov, yet to be created, and this can be due to a number of proposals put forward. But that's a topic for another article.
What Americans keep back?
The usual concept of strategic stability, formulated 45 years ago, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, then, is that because of the situation dispassionately safety of both parties provided their mutual ability to cause unacceptable harm to each other in a retaliatory strike, even assuming the first strike the enemy. The missile defense system in the context of this concept is destabilizing. On the basis of this philosophy in 1972, the Company concluded the Soviet-American ABM Contract and Interim Agreement SALT-1, initiating the process of forty mutual reduction and limitation of strategic arms.
But nothing lasts forever, time passes, the situation is changing and being changed for the right consciousness. In the last decade, the U.S. is a huge, then the least zeal evenly reconsidering the concept of McNamara. In 1-x, with the end of the cool war and geopolitical bipolarity spread of nuclear missile weapons led to a new approach to missile defense as a stabilizer system from a polycentric world nuclear missile. Ability to provide security in a world based on the classic Soviet-American model of mutual nuclear deterrence is being oscillation. This is justified as a political and ideological nature of the new countries — holders of nuclear weapons (and probable non-state defendants) and their drawbacks of military and technical abilities in strategic relationship together and with majestic powers.
In-2, leaving in the past global confrontation closer to zero the political possibility of armed conflict between the U.S. (NATO) and Russia. Therefore assumed that the requirements for military and strategic characteristics of stability in their relations can be substantially mitigated, including aspects of "unacceptable damage" and "liberalization" approach to valid military-technical features of missile defense systems.
The Obama administration has significantly moderated missile interest predecessors Republicans. But the overall thrust of the strategic review of the role of missile defense is preserved and put it in the p
aper on nuclear policy from 2010. There, that is, it is said that deterrence will be amplified by "investment in missile defense, means of combating weapons of mass destruction and other conventional military capabilities."
The document emphasizes that "the missile defense system and any future ballistic missiles far the U.S. acts in the ordinary gear designed to counter new and emerging threats to regional order and are not focused on changing the strategic balance with Russia." But the United States seems to allow for the expansion and improvement of anti-missile systems on one or both sides to protect from third countries will gain a fairly reflect the potential impact of individual or group of strategic missiles of the Russian Federation and the United States. In the long term, they may consider expedient transformation of US-Russian strategic relationship of mutual deterrence in the direction of reducing the role of offensive nuclear weapons and missile defense and increase the role of non-nuclear weapon systems. It is clear that the United States for all that count on their merits in the development of advanced military technologies.
It is clear that the concept of McNamara reflected not desirable and impartially established and the inevitable situation where the safety of each of the states based on the ability of a few hours to kill the other power, and in addition the rest of the world. If the change of the political and technical nature can revise the model of relations, the forty years of experience has promoted negotiations to make it a consistent way. With all of this harmonization of the Russian Federation shall be guaranteed by strengthening rather than weakening its defense and security.
The current error by the U.S. is that instead of an open discussion of the prospects and options for negotiating with Russian partners, they strenuously scare Moscow danger of Iran and North Korea, and are confused about the problem of his own position. Logically, the Russian administration does not accept such reasoning, and this is one of the main reasons for the impasse in the dialogue on missile defense.
Is there a way out of the impasse?
The most authoritative Russian spices (including academician Yuri Solomonov, General Viktor Esin, Vladimir Dvorkin, Pavel Zolotarev) definitely revealed more segodnyaschy and predictable 10-15 years old South American missile defense system is unable to significantly impact the Russian nuclear deterrent.
At the same time, of course, that the European missile defense NATO planned without the participation of the Russian Federation and in spite of her objections is not a basis for cooperation in this area. A Russian aerospace defense, developed for the protection of "aerospace aggression" of the U.S. and NATO, will be combined with the overall bad (or dual) European missile defense system of — NATO.
Russia's role in European missile defense program there someone else — very artificial and unequal pre-formulation of the problem, which is almost everything is designed trouble negotiating. Our homeland should not stand in the position of the "poor relation", insisting on the admission to the South American missile defense system. Instead of the negotiations necessary to talk about the comparability of national aerospace defense of the Russian Federation with a phased applets NATO missile defense, assumptions, criteria and technical qualities such interfacing.
At a meeting in Sarov, Vladimir Putin said: "We have something that I think should push our colleagues and our partners to more constructive work than hitherto we see it … We very much hope that we, together with the our partners, aware of their responsibility and to our peoples and to the people of the earth in general, we are very kooperabelno work on processes deter a nuclear arms race … "
In the experience of forty years of strategic negotiations can be concluded: Moscow needs of success for the two components of the item. First — a real base in the form of real systems and weapons programs, without which it will not go to Washington harsh negotiations based only on the good intentions or nezapyatannoy theory of strategic stability. Second — in the presence of the Russian Federation at the base of a real need logical and unbiased strategic concept of strengthening the stability, the role and place it in the tools and systems, and the Russian-American agreements. On the other weapons on the one hand will cause retaliatory weapons other.
Make a real and marked mental framework to be in the process of implementation of the programs from ASD and modernization of strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation. In addition to the work of competent agencies and defense companies in principle part of the case study should be the expert community and the open exchange of views and assessments. They often do not coincide with the official line, and can cause the noble anger of individual commanders who not so long ago kerf to this topic and that it therefore seems normal and specific. But best of Russian position will undergo a very tough test for sturdiness inside our guild Prof. than her frail places will be opened and ripped at the seams zabugornom partners in the negotiations. Indeed, in this case the final agreement distorted in favor of the other party or as negotiations are at a dead end.
The forty-year history of the strategic dialogue that gave a lot of examples. It is time once and for all to reverse this trend in the interest of, global security and strategic stability.