The development of other (The New York Times, USA)

The development of other ("The New York Times", USA)Whatever you thought, "the development of the rest" is neither a new phenomenon nor unplanned.

When the United States after the end of the second World War were (perhaps) the most powerful nation in world history — with unparalleled modicum of global GDP, the factory building and military power — they set out to model the world on their own (if not flawless) and mean likeness: multilateral, not imperial government that serves the interests of the United States, as those who perceived the alignment of U.S. international system.

Deploying a cool war concealed the fact that the architects of the postwar world had vseobyatnom vision, and, from the Marshall Plan to end the war cool, kept the world order, promote global economic growth.

In fact (and this is often ignored) the U.S. is in a state of relative decline since 1945 — and this particular sought to Washington because the recovery have gained, first, the U.S. allies.

At the moment, the established order is challenged. But it is not the development of the "other", and in the development of the "other." Despite the periodic trade tension during the cool of the war, the country emerged on the world scene in the period from 1945 to 1995 did so under the astute management of the U.S., politically and economically, following the lead of States. Specifically, these countries are the real "other": the developed industrial democracies adopt and maintain a liberal international order.

Today's developing countries are fundamentally different from that group. And exactly this difference, and not the fact of "the other" makes tangible obstacles to the United States and declared their order.

What distinguishes the others? In 1-x — they are poor. For all characteristics, except for the economic, today's developing countries are more similar to their own developing peers than advanced countries after the second World War. GDP per capita in China is equivalent to one ninth of the USA, India — 30 one-fifth.

Because they are poor, they see coming development as a right and more concerned about economic growth than the responsible role in global processes — as it did in the West identical stages of development.

In-2, today's developing countries possess bolshennymi political differences than during the cool of the war. The post-war Germany and Japan quickly made presentable government and strong capitalist economy and has since experienced no severe crises. And China — authoritarian country with the capitalist way of life, our homeland, and Saudi Arabia — inert oil countries, India is a mixture of democratic liberalism and very carefully controlled market economy. Even Brazil, the most similar to the western model country in the middle of the new powers, supports a number of public companies and strongly defends its policy on industrii.Vkupe with political diversity arises political fickleness. Developing the "others" are intrinsically unstable. Riyadh is the Arab spillage with caution, and in Russia the rise of the protest movement. Management in India once a sclerotic and disorderly, and the party of "Indian State Congress" expects the non-permanent coalition partners to retain power. Case Bo Silayya (Bo Xilai) bared tension in the Communist Party of China. All of this contributes to isolation of developing countries, more concerned neuvvyazkami home than neuvvyazkami rest of the world.

In addition, developing the "other" countries simply do not recognize the legitimacy of the US-led world order, despite the fact that trying to achieve a greater power within this particular device. Countries "BRICS" immediately seek to achieve greater impact within the International Finance Facility and speak out against the IMF to play a more significant role in controlling the money systems in order to prevent future crises. China and India claim that should be included in at least some process on international climate change, but avoid responsibility for the future regime weather configurations.

This reluctance to accept the rules by which they are developed, it is contrasted with the behavior of Germany and the Land of the Rising Sun (for which the terror of the Soviet Union was a sufficient precondition to maintain the liberal world order) Cool times of war, and is a significant obstacle to the U.S. and soyuznikov.V eventually developing the "other" less experienced in international affairs — in diplomacy, in the preservation of peace, the rights and the norms of international governance.

Most States were insignificant participants in the world of cool times of war, and the units had any experience of the colonialists, because often were colonies — an underrated factor in the possibility of the West make a strong international system after the second World War. As soon as developing "other" out of the country on the international stage, their collective weight is unpredictable, uncontrollable and can be completely destructive will affect the overall system.

The growth of "other" and not "other" is a challenge for the United States. And the understanding of this feature is central to the U.S. attempt to find their way in today's world order.

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