After that, the services of the army authorities resorted three more times, but not from the perspective of domestic political opposition forces — a 2-Chechen campaigns and during the military conflict with Georgia in 2008. She rescued them again, although the Chechen campaign were given to her very hard in moral terms.
At this point, in the days of the 20th anniversary of the so-called. "Putsch", there was an occasion to reflect on the likely role of the army in the future. Will it ever more influence policy? The question is not idle when we consider the role of the army in vernal "color revolutions" in the Middle East. Is it necessary to take into account the factor of today's Russian military authorities in their actions, or you can ignore it? To answer this question tried Dr. international institutions' research problems of the world in Oslo Pavel Baev, in an interview BFM.ru.
According to the views of the analyst, Russian army is not what it was in 1991 and even in 1993. Endless reduce the confusion, not rich funding, neglect of the authorities to the officer corps and two years with excessive military reform (after 2008), along with causing widespread criticism and dissatisfaction with the actions of the Minister of Defense Serdyukov did the trick. Among the officers reign apathy and unwillingness to take responsibility for the fate of the country, which was not even 20 years ago. Maybe this state specifically the Army and was a major objective that was set before Prof. furniture maker, appointing him to command the defense. But the men — not furniture. This is only a parable about Oorfene Deuce they were made of wood, sprinkled with magic powder, it draws on the body's uniform — ready, go ahead.
"In the Soviet army had a very different profile, she felt quite differently, especially the officer corps, — Says the expert. — It was more the belief that military force — this is important. The USSR was at first a military superpower, the idea was the basis of all state power and handed the officer corps, which had a very strong sense of responsibility for the fate of power. "
But even then, in recent years the Russian government, the collective psyche of the "invincible and legendary," as it was called in the songs, has received the first significant injury. "The Soviet army, particularly the Army, has been seriously injured, in-1's, the experience of the war in Afghanistan. In-2, at the time of the destruction became apparent coup Warsaw Pact, the need for withdrawal, deposit, as it seemed then, best line of defense ", — said Baev.
For officers formed a feeling that the country is losing and there is a tragedy. It seemed to them that the act is more certain, politics reigns utter confusion, the management has lost the idea of how to keep the situation under control. "Troops ready for what will have to take responsibility for themselves, was very high," — said the expert.
But this willingness now no trace. What after all has changed? "Fundamentally changed very nearly all — says Baev — especially the very feeling of the army. In August 1991, for the army, it was not about how to respond to something, and that, that act in the most active manner. Currently army unable to take any responsibility for the political development of the country. I do not think that in the officer corps are sentiments that the army has something to say or offer.
Very demoralized army reforms that continue to illumine 2008. Officers exhausted different cleaning and dicing. Various promises in terms of weapons that the climate does not change. "
In addition, special or not, but at Moscow remained a sufficient number of troops that the army could again play the role assigned to it in 1991. There was not the same number of divisions, or hundreds of tanks, which are then moved to the capital. The population of Moscow has increased by an order, and the number of combat-ready units in the same order declined.
But, perhaps, increased loyalty to the army to power? After remaining in the service of the officers tangible added salary, give the apartment, announced new plans to rearm, fully named an impressive amount that are going on this izderzhat. "Not at all — is responsible Baev. — Loyalty Management in the sense of confidence and a willingness to defend it, perhaps, at a record low level. There were periods, especially after the defeat in the first Chechen war, when the feeling that the army threw, it was very strong. At the moment, there is the same. The reforms carried out in such a disregard for the views of the military, all manifestations of discontent in the officer corps so uprooted, the entire top of the officer corps prof so hardened broom swept out what to expect from the army can not be certain loyalty. "
Remains whether this background, the Minister of Defense Serdyukov after the 2012 election, or we can assume that he fulfilled his puzzle, leading the army to a state in which it resides at the moment?
"It's hard to say — is responsible Baev. — The reforms were initiated and unwound in the same environment, designed completely different. They were designed in 2007, when it seemed that in front of us — smooth sailing. The reforms started not only after the war with Georgia, and with the beginning of a very deep crisis. From the perspective of ordinary human logic, the worse the moment it was hard to pick up. In my view, the situation is ripe in order to declare him a scapegoat, and even before this election is likely to clean out of sight, to bring down a wave of discontent. " Only in this makarom can be restored loyalty of the army. This is particularly necessary in real time with an eye on Egypt and Syria. It may be a situation in which the army will be the last support for the regime.
In this perspective, it is useful to look at how the modern army refers to President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin. The expert believes that Putin became Prime Minister, shrewdly distanced himself from the military problems by focusing only on issues of weapons. For this reason, it is not focused much discontent military. And the fact that the Minister Serdyukov announced it was he, not everyone remembers.
Medvedev same as the commander in chief could not, though he tried at first to put forward to the first plan Serdyukov. But later he had to intervene himself. It bears the burden of responsibility for making final decisions. One time he liked to appear before the lens in a jacket with a badge in chief, but it did not do him special political dividends, and made only one of the focuses of military discontent, on whose votes he is now unlikely to rely.
But even with the support of the army, the expert said, if she was not the president would have done a real political confrontation with the prime minister. "Dmitry Anatolyevich weak to go on harsh confrontation — says Baev. — He is trying to position itself as an interesting candidate. It requires political will, determination, character, and for h
im, I do not notice thereof. "
If a politician in his own right conclusions, neither a member of the duo is also not necessary to count on the active support of private army, if such a need arises suddenly. While the overall situation seems far from it.