The Battle of Stalingrad Military Intelligence

The defeat of Moscow led Hitler first in 1942 to find new approaches to strategic planning of the war against the Soviet Union. The purpose of the coming of the summer of German troops on the Eastern Front in 1942 was set out in a hidden directive German parent command number 41, approved by Hitler, April 5, 1942 German troops, pointed to the directive, were to "… recapture the initiative and impose their will on the enemy . " The main secret of Hitler's directive was the direction of head hitting German troops. In 1942, the main attack was planned strike on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front, with "to kill enemy west of the Don River, then to seize the oil fields in the Caucasus and go through the passes of the Caucasus Mountains." That is the new Hitler's strategic decision — to deprive reddish Army food and industrial base, and cut off the supply of petroleum products. In Berlin the operation to capture the southern regions of the USSR received the code title "Blau".

In general, the implementation of this stunning military plan was to drastically reduce the military and economic power of the USSR and structurally weaken the resistance of the forces of the Red Army.

Plan of Operation "Blau" complement the strategic plan for the coming of the Caucasus, which took its code name — "Operation Edelweiss".

During the implementation of the operation "Blau" the German High Command also planned to take possession of Stalingrad and cut the transfer of military and other goods along the Volga. To make the preconditions for the successful implementation of such a plan, it was supposed to clear of Russian troops Crimea, Kerch Peninsula and take possession of Sevastopol.

Hitler hoped that in 1942 Germany will be drawn into the war against the USSR, Japan and Turkey, which will contribute to the final defeat of Russian troops.

"The Red Chapel" made harder work of military intelligence

In preparation for Operation "Blau" Hitler gave the order to activate the command of the German counter-espionage detection and destruction Russian spies operating in Germany and in the territories of the countries occupied by German troops. To this end, the German intelligence services have developed the operation "Red Orchestra". She had to be carried out immediately in Germany, Belgium, Bulgaria, Italy, France, Switzerland and Sweden. The purpose of the operation — the identification and destruction of Russian intelligence agent network. That is why the title of the code and the German counter-intelligence operation was accordingly — "The Red Chapel".

In the process of active German counter-intelligence activities have been identified and arrested by Russian military spies Leopold Trepper, Anatoly Gurevich, Konstantin Efremov, Alexander Makarov, Johann Wenzel, Arnold Schnee and others. In Berlin, was arrested managing agent group Russian military intelligence Ilse Stebe, including the center under the name of "Alta". During the arrests, which were carried out by the Gestapo in Berlin, were seized assistants "Alta" Baron Rudolf von Shelia, who worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany and relayed J. Stebe valuable intelligence information, military-political nature, journalist Carl Helfrik, its closest ally, and other agents of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army (SA GSH CA).

As a result of intensive activities conducted the German intelligence service, were also identified and arrested by agents of "Sergeant" and "The Corsican", who collaborated with external intelligence service's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD).

Russian intelligence network intelligence, German intelligence services in 1942 dealt a severe blow. In general, the German secret service managed to arrest about 100 people working for Soviet intelligence. After a closed military court 46 persons of them were sentenced to the death penalty, and others — to long prison terms. By the death penalty, was sentenced to the guillotine and Ilse Stebe ("Alta"), one of the more valuable sources of Russian military intelligence. Ilse Stebe during interrogation and even tortured by the Gestapo did not give their own assistants.

Unable to withstand the force action by the Gestapo executioners, some scouts under duress agreed to conduct quizzes with the Centre. The purpose of quizzes — to send to Moscow misinformation information on the plans of German military command, as a deliberate attempt to split the affairs of the USSR with the Allies, the weakening of their interaction the other day coming of the German forces on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front.

Active in the German counter-espionage in 1942 did much harder work zabugornyh residencies Russian military intelligence. Difficult working conditions, in what turned out to scouts had an impact on the quantity and quality of extracted information about the enemy. Admission to the Center of the materials that were needed for a proper understanding of the strategic situation on the Soviet-German front, declined. At the same time, the Centre has sharply increased the demand for military and military-political information of strategic nature. The General Staff of the Red Army was developing its strategic plans of war against Germany, and unless intelligence to do it was unreal.

In the difficult situation and the political control of the Soviet Union, which does not fully take into account the information about the enemy, who were caught by military intelligence. Supreme Commander IV Stalin January 10, 1942 directive signed a letter addressed to Russian generals, led puzzles in which the troops of the Red Army. In the letter, namely, stated: "… After the Red Army managed to quite weary German troops, she ran across the offensive and drove west Nazi invaders. Our task … is not to give the Germans a break and drive them to the west without stopping, forcing them to expend their reserves before spring … and to ensure that such Makar, complete defeat of Nazi troops in 1942 … ".

Chasing German troops without a break to the west Reddish Army in the spring of 1942 could not yet. Moreover, the enemy was still very strong.

In the summer of 1942, the Supreme Command (SHAPE) and the General Staff of the Red Army made an error in the assessment of plans and the German High Command. Stavka meant that Hitler was the main effort of their own re-send troops to seize the Russian capital. This view is taken by IV Stalin. Hitler had other plans.

Perfectly clear that although strategic decisions which preceded the hard work of exploration, which has produced the information necessary to assess the situation and make decisions. That still left in the spring of 1942? What information about the plans of the German command first in 1942 were able to obtain residency Russian military intelligence? How this information was taken into account by the Supreme Commander in Chief and members of the Supreme Command?

Reliable information about the plans of the German High Command were mined

Despite the vigorous exercise of German counterintelligence, conducted as part of "The Red Chapel", and the loss of Russian military intelligence of its own intelligence network, the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army managed to keep the principal sources of disk imaging in the capitals of some European countries. In the spring of 1942, the residency of the Head Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army (GRU SC) continued to operate in Geneva, London, Rome, Sofia and Stockholm. Activities of their rights of residents Sandor Rado ("Dora"), Ivan Sklyarov ("Brion"), Nicholas Nikitushev ("Akaste") and other scouts. In England and Italy
also operated illegal residency "Dubois", "Sonia" and "Phoenix" also had agents able to extract valuable information of military and military-political nature.

These particulars are archival documents, reflect the true plans of the German command in the summer campaign of 1942 The principal feature of the reports of military intelligence in this period was the fact that they obtained information about certain activities of German commanders on the eastern front before the signing of the Hitler directive number 41, in other words, at the stage of forming a strategic plan for the German command.

The first report of where Hitler was planning to spend the summer coming on the eastern front, the Center has received 3 March 1942 Scout Major AF Sizov ("Edward"), said from London that Germany plans to "start coming in the direction of the Caucasus." Sizov report contradicted what waited IV Stalin and the Supreme Command. In Moscow, preparing to repel the coming of the new German forces on the Soviet capital.

The Battle of Stalingrad Military Intelligence

Major-General Alexander F. Sizov, Russian military attache at the Allied governments in London during the stateliness Russian War, when the Battle of Stalingrad — Major

The reliability of intelligence information is checked by different methods. One of them — a comparison of the data produced by different sources. Combining such information obtained in London, Geneva and Berlin, we can draw conclusions about their authenticity. Following this rule, the Centre could not see that the report of Major AF Sizov confirmed information received by the SC from the GRU resident Russian military intelligence Sandor Rado in force in Switzerland.

March 12th Sandor Rado reported to the Centre that the main forces of the Germans will be targeted against the southern wing of the Eastern Front with the objective to achieve the turn of the Volga River and the Caucasus, to cut off the reddish Army and the central part of the population of of oil and grain areas. Comparing reports Sh Rado and AF Sizov, the Center prepared a special message "on Germany's plans for 1942," which was directed members of the Supreme Command and the General Staff. In Special report indicated that in 1942 Germany will make coming in the direction of the Caucasus.

In the spring of 1942, illegal residency Russian military intelligence, which was run by Sandor Rado, was active surveillance. To cooperate valuable agents were involved, which were connected to the headquarters of the Wehrmacht, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other government institutions in Germany. These sources were considered at the Centre under the names of "Long", "Louise", "Lucy", "Olga", "CC" and "Taylor." The station "Dora" had three independent radio stations were operating in different towns: Bern, Geneva and Lausanne. This allowed us to successfully mask the airing of radio operators, which deprived the enemy counter-intelligence capabilities of DF and the establishment of places of dislocation. Despite the efforts of the German counter-intelligence, which have gained success in Belgium, France and Germany itself, residency "Dora" continued its successful work for the extraction of intelligence information. On average, radio operators Sandor Rado times a day passed in the center of 3 to 5 radio messages. The Center reports Rado received the highest evaluation and were used for preparing reports to the political management of the high command of the Soviet Union and the Red Army.

In the summer of 1942, a resident of S. Rado sent to Moscow information on a wide range of military and military-political problems. He reported to the Center of the volumes of the German war industry of aircraft, tanks, artillery, military units on the movements of the enemy on the southern sector of the front, in the middle of the top military relations governing the German armed forces.

The Battle of Stalingrad Military Intelligence

Sandor Rado, managing residency "Dora" in Switzerland

Only valuable information about the enemy and the operational plans of the German command was producing agent "Lucy." Under this pseudonym acted Teuton Rudolf Roessler. A journalist by profession, a member of the First World War, Ressler after the Nazis came to power, left Germany and is based in Switzerland. While living in Geneva, he maintained contacts with influential persons in Berlin, maintained contact with them and get valuable information of military and military-political nature. This information Ressler in the years 1939-1944. passed the Swiss intelligence "Bureau of X". In the first half of 1942, particularly at a time when Hitler was preparing for newcomer general offensive on the eastern front, Ressler met with anti-fascist Christian Schneider, maintains close business with Rachel Dyubendorfer, is a member of the intelligence team Sandor Rado. During the first meeting with Rachel Ressler Dyubendorfer realized that Ressler has only valuable information about the war plans of the German command. This information has to pass Ressler and Dyubendorfer Schneider, who reported on their Sandor Rado. Particularly from Ressler received the first information about what Hitler was planning to change the plan of the war against the Soviet Union and wants to go into a decisive Coming on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front, grab the Rostov region, Krasnodar and Stavropol regions, as the Crimea and the Caucasus.

Resident GRU SV in London, Major AF Sizov, acting under the cover of Russian military attache at the Allied governments, March 3, 1942 also said the Centre that the German command in the direction of preparing the coming of the Caucasus, where "… the main force in the direction expected of Stalingrad and the secondary — Rostov by Don and, in addition, through the Crimea to Maikop. "

In March and April 1942, the words "southern flank" and "Caucasus" in the reports of military intelligence officers met quite often. Information received from the scouts, the Center painstakingly analyzed, checked and then as a special message sent to the members of the Supreme Command and Chief of the General Staff. Some of these reports directed to the High Commander.

On the control of military intelligence zabugornyh residency in spring 1942 there were reports of German foreign policy efforts of management, aimed at drawing in the war against the Soviet land of the rising sun and Turkey. Such information received from the scouts center AF Sizov, IA Sklyarov and NI Nikitusheva.

First, in March 1942, for example, a resident GRU spacecraft in Turkey has extracted a copy of the reports of the Bulgarian military attaché in Ankara, which was sent to Sofia. It was reported that the new coming of the German troops on the Eastern Front, "… will not have a temper instantly, and will be carried out slowly to the merits of success. Turks fear that the Russian Navy will try to escape through the Bosporus. Against this will be followed up:

1. How will the coming of the Germanic, the Turks will regroup and concentrate them in the Caucasus and the Black Sea.

2. From this moment begins the orientation of Turkey's policy towards
Germany. "

Next Bulgarian military attaché reported to the management of their own: "… The Turks do not wait for pressure, that they were in a struggle either to the one side or the other until July or August. By this time, they think that Hitler will be victorious, and they openly go over to the German … ".

It is a resident military intelligence report received by the Center March 5, 1942, at the direction of the chief GRU spacecraft was oriented members of the Supreme Command and the Municipal Defence Committee (GKO). The Turkish government has to wait. Beda Red Army in fighting the summer 1942 campaign could provoke Turkey's military action against the USSR.

March 15 source military intelligence in London, including the Center under the operational pseudonym "Dolly," said the head of GRU spacecraft about the content of conversations minister of foreign affairs of Germany J. Ribbentrop Pact with the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, General H. Oshima, which were held on 18, 22 and 23 February 1942 In these talks, Ribbentrop told the Japanese ambassador that the German command to "… in 1942 the principal value will play a southern sector of the Eastern Front. Specifically, it will start coming, and the battle will unfold to the north. "

So Makar, in March-April 1942, residents of the Russian military intelligence extracted and sent to the Centre to confirm that the coming of the new general of the German troops on the eastern front is taken in the direction of Stalingrad and the Caucasus, and that the German administration is trying hard to involve in the war against the Soviet Union Japan and Turkey.

Generalizing all of the information received from zabugornyh residencies, GRU command the spacecraft in a special message number 137474 sent to T-bills March 18, 1942, said that the center of mass of the coming of the vernal Germans will be transferred to the southern sector of the front (Rostov-on-Don — Maikop — Baku). The conclusions of the special reports stated: "Germany is preparing for a decisive offensive on the Eastern Front, which will unfold first in the southern sector and spread to the north in the next."

How to react top political posts in the administration of the USSR military intelligence?

In 1-x, in accordance with the instructions of IV Stalin after the defeat of the Germans in the Battle of Moscow considered the question of transferring troops of the Red Army's offensive. The ability of the General Staff of the Red Army troops were assessed more timid. Chief of the General Staff of the BM Shaposhnikov, evaluating the results of the counter-offensive of the Russian troops after the defeat of the Germans in the Battle of Moscow, believed that in 1942 the whole front of the Red Army troops were not "… to drive them to the west without stopping," and move on to the strategic defensive.

IV Stalin and GK Zhukov agreed to move to the strategic defensive, but suggested that a more offensive operations. In the end, a compromise was worked out — as the head of the form of action of the Red Army in the summer of 1942, we adopted a strategic defense, supplemented, in accordance with the advice of IV Stalin's personal offensives.

In-2, the decision to hold a few offensive operations and strengthening the central portion of the front, where it was expected in the summer of 1942 new coming of German troops to Moscow, have been taken in accordance with the instructions of IV Stalin. These guidelines were built without intelligence information obtained by military spies.

First, the summer of 1942, the military spies produced new information that the plan also discovered the German command and specified the.

July 1, 1942 a military attache Colonel N. Nikitushev, acting in Stockholm, reported to the Center: "… Swedish headquarters believes that Ukraine has begun major German offensive. Germans plan — a breakthrough line of defense Kursk — Kharkov with the development of the coming of the Don to Stalingrad on the Volga. Then the establishment of a barrier in the north-east and the continuation of the coming of the fresh market forces in the south through the Rostov-on-Don in the Caucasus. "

Information obtained NI Nikitushevym, have also been reported to the members of the Supreme Command.

The Battle of Stalingrad Military Intelligence

Nikitushev Colonel Nikolai, a military attaché in Sweden during the Russian war stateliness

Reliable information about the enemy agents extracted S. Rado — "Long", "Louise", "Lucy" and others. This information was accurate and one hundred percent confirmed in the course of the ensuing summer of 1942, the coming of the German troops.

Supreme Command on the basis of information GRU spacecraft could make strategic decisions based on the planned strike by Hitler in the direction of the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. But at the Russian base decisions of the Supreme Command were put forecasts IV Stalin that the German command will cause major blow in the direction of Moscow. Delusion Stalin appeared on the basis of the available in the Stavka other information about the plans of the German command. While the headquarters of the German Army Group "Center" at the direction of the Wehrmacht Army Command has developed a disinformation operation under the code name "Kremlin". For the average performers, it looked like a real plan coming to Moscow. Provision was holding regroup and troop transport, relocation of headquarters and command Fri, crossing equipment supply to aqua-bottlenecking. Headquarters of the 3rd Panzer Army was relocated from the left wing of the Army Group "Center" in the area Gjatsk. It is here army was to advance as planned operation "Kremlin". Increased capital's air reconnaissance of the defensive positions, the outskirts of Moscow, the area to the east of the Russian capital.

Plans Moscow and other large cities located in the strip coming of the "Center", on July 10 were sent directly to the headquarters of the regiment, which increased the possibility of leakage of information. All events disinformation German command is closely linked to the preparation and the embodiment of "Operation Blau." For example, in the band of the 2nd Panzer and 4th armies they had to achieve a climax on June 23, whereas, in the 3rd Armored and 9th Armies — June 28.

Acts of the German High Command were carried out with a certain degree of camouflage, which assigns them completely certain authenticity. Apparently, this information specifically Stalin seemed more credible. Such a conclusion is imposed because Stalin believed that the main attack in the summer campaign of 1942, German troops will strike in the direction of Russian capital. The result — the defense of Moscow has been strengthened, and the southern flank of the Soviet-German front — not a lot has been prepared to reflect the large German Advent. This error led to the emergence in 1942 a very difficult situation on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front.

Marshal of the Russian Union AM Vasilevsky wrote about it in his memoirs: "The evidence provided in the preparation of our intelligence head hit the south have not been taken into account. In the south-west has been allocated less power than the west. "

A similar assessment of the situation and gave Gen. SM Shtemenko, who believed that "… the summer of 1942, a plan of the enemy to seize the Caucasus, too, was discovered quite rapidly. Yes and now Russian command did not have the ability to provide
decisive actions to defeat the advancing enemy forces in the short term. "

These facts show that the authorities zabugornye GRU CA spring 1942 produced reliable data, reflecting the plans of the German command. But they were not taken into account Russian control. As a result, in June 1942 Supreme Command was required to take immediate action, which should contain the advent of the German troops and prevent their capture Stalingrad. Namely, on the southern flank of the urgent Stalingrad Front was formed. August 27, 1942, IV Stalin signed a decree about the purpose of GK Zhukov, the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense.

In this period of the war was fundamentally have accurate information about the plans to rule the country of the rising sun and Turkey, which could enter the war against the Soviet Union on the side of Germany.

Initially, the operation "Blau" was to begin on June 23, but due to the tightening of the fighting near Sevastopol, German troops fled at the coming June 28, broke the defense and broke through to Voronezh. After the big losses IV Stalin drew attention to the reports of military intelligence, in which it was reported that Japan is increasing efforts of their own troops in the Pacific and recently does not want to go to war against the Soviet Union. This information formed the basis of decisions the Supreme Command of the transfer in July 1942 to the Far East to the West 10-12 divisions in reserve SHAPE. During the second time during the Russian war majestically information obtained by military intelligence, formed the basis of the decision on the transfer of the Far Eastern connections to the Soviet-German front to strengthen the forces of the Red Army. Intelligence reports about plans Japanese command were in 1942 reliable, allowing Headquarters urgently to strengthen the southern flank of the Soviet-German front.

There have been other urgent solutions to strengthen the defense of Stalingrad, the formation of strategic reserves and operations planning, which have allowed to achieve a breakthrough in the battle of Stalingrad. But this change was achieved through extraordinary efforts and at the cost of huge losses.

Delivered tasks performed

During the Battle of Stalingrad defensive steps (July 17 — November 18, 1942) and in preparation for the counter-offensive of the Russian troops zabugornye residency, military intelligence to solve a wide range of tasks. Among them are:

  • obtaining information about the plans of the German command in the winter of 1942-1943.;
  • autopsy plans to use the German command of the armed forces of the Allies (Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Slovakia) on the Eastern front;
  • specification of the structure and concentration areas reserves the German army;
  • obtain information on the progress of mobilization in Germany and the relationship to her people;
  • obtaining information on the number of replacement troops on the ground in Germany, on how the transportation of troops and military supplies to the Russian front, their arms and organization;
  • obtaining information about the preparation of the German troops to conduct chemical warfare;
  • revealing a fundamental military and industrial targets in Germany on the ground for air raids and locations of the defense forces of the enemy.
  • GRU spacecraft was often reported to the Supreme Command of the German army casualties on the Eastern Front in manpower and materiel, as the results of bombing military facilities on the territory of Germany.

    To address these and other reconnaissance missions GRU command the spacecraft planned intensive use of the existing residency zabugornye military intelligence, also throw on the ground a few German reconnaissance and intelligence for individual intelligence organization in Berlin, Vienna, Hamburg, Cologne, Leipzig, Munich and other German towns. Responsible for these tasks were senior assistant chief of the German department of the GRU Military Engineer Grade 2 KB Leontiev, the staff of the Department Capt. MI Polyakov and Lieutenant V. Bochkarev. It was also planned to return the connection to residency GRU SV in Berlin, where the rules J. Stebe ("Alta"). Center did not know that the German counterintelligence conducting an operation "Red Orchestra" and has arrested a large part of scouts that were part of the military intelligence network of agents in Europe. Because Center planned to return to bond with spies J. Wenzel, C. Ephraim G. Robinson.

    In 1942, continued to operate the residency of military intelligence "Akaste", "Brion", "Dora", "wand", "Jaurès", "Zeus", "Nak", "Omega", "Sonia", "Edward" and others .

    Significant contribution to the defeat of German forces at Stalingrad brought residency strategic human intelligence "Dora" and her manager Sandor Rado. In January — October 1942, Rado has sent to the Centre 800 encrypted radio messages (about 1100 pages of text). During the period of the counter-offensive of the Russian troops during the Battle of Stalingrad (November 1942 — March 1943). Rado sent to the Center for about 750 radiographs. So Makar, in 1942 — the first quarter of 1943. S. Rado sent reports to the Centre in 1550.

    The main feature of residency, "Dora" was the taking proactive information about the enemy. The station "Dora" give timely responses to inquiries about the center rear defense lines Germans southwest of Stalingrad, the reserves in the rear of the Eastern Front, plans for the German command in connection with the coming of the Red Army at Stalingrad.

    During the Battle of Stalingrad intensively operated residency military intelligence "Brion" in London. The activities of this residency ruled Major General of Tank Troops IA Sklyarov. In 1942, Sklyarov sent reports to the Centre in 1344. In January and February 1943 to the Center of Sklyarov received 174 reports yet. So Makarov, in the 2nd period majestically Russian war only rezidenura "Brion" sent reports to the Centre in 1518. Most of the reports of Major-General IA Sklyarov were used command the spacecraft to GRU reports members of the Supreme Command.

    The Battle of Stalingrad Military Intelligence

    Major-General of Tank Forces Sklyarov Ivan A., Managing residency "Brion" in London

    During the Battle of Stalingrad employee residency "Brion," Lt. Col. IM Kozlov ("Bilton") controls the activity of a valuable source of "Dolly", served in the British military department. "Dolly" had access to intercepted and deciphered the radio messages of the German High Command and the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin and other hidden documents. Information "Dolly" were very valuable and constantly received the highest evaluation in the Center.

    During the 1942 "Dolly" each month passed Russian scout IM Kozlov from 20 to 28, the British decrypted German radio messages about Ribbentrop Pact negotiations with the Japanese, Hungarian and Romanian ambassadors indication of Staff German Army commanders on the Stalingrad front, orders Goering's command of the German Air Force, which supported the army of Paulus.

    Dispatches from the source of "Dolly" the chief of military intelligence is often reported to IV Stalin, GK Zhukov and AM Vasilevsky.

    In 1942, GRU spacecraft was developed and targeted to high political management
    of the USSR and the commanders of the Red Army's Special 102 posts in Europe, 83 — to Asia, 25 -, and 12 in America — Africa. Due to the arrest of a number of residents of the Russian military intelligence German counterintelligence total specific messages to Europe in 1942 compared with 1941 decreased by 32 posts (in 1941 and Europe in RU GS SC 134 was prepared special reports).

    The other day and during the Battle of Stalingrad have gained significant success of radio intelligence GRU SV. During this period of time in her work identifies three main steps:

  • obtaining information about the enemy at the time of his arrival in the southern strategic direction (end of June — mid-July 1942);
  • conducting signals intelligence during the defensive battle Battle of Stalingrad (mid-July — the first half of November 1942);
  • conducting signals intelligence during the Russian counter-attack and defeat the enemy troops at Stalingrad (the second half of November 1942 — the beginning of February 1943.).

    During the retreat of Russian troops GRU radio reconnaissance spacecraft was in a difficult situation only because she had to work in a complex and rapidly changing battle conditions. Since the beginning of the transition of the German troops in the coming not been mined information on the development of the German command 3-striking forces of Nazi troops: 2nd Field and 4th Panzer Army — to strike at Voronezh direction, 6th Field Army, heavy tank formations — to strike at Stalingrad, 1st Armored and the 17th Field Army — to strike in the North Caucasus.

    According to expert assessment of the 1st of the leading professionals in the field of Russian radio reconnaissance party majestically Russian war Lieutenant-General PS Shmyreva, radio intelligence in this period of the war did not reveal the direction of the main impacts of the German troops and was not able to open the tribute as a reorganization of the enemy, which has affected the division of the Army Group "South" on two army groups "A" and "B". In the process of rapidly developing tank coming Germans frontage SIGINT radio system in the German army controlled the operational level is weak and the tactical (division — regiment) to exclude from the observation. It is no coincidence because of the ESM is not a word in the prepared staff of the Southwestern Front report on the situation at the front, which was presented to IV Stalin, July 9, 1942 Front Commander Marshal SK Russian Union Tymoshenko. The conclusions of the report stated: "… Of all the observed military intelligence, and according to aviation should be that the enemy all his tank and motorized infantry forces propels the south-east, chasing, of course, the purpose of holding limit overwhelm the defense 28 th and 38 th Army front and those threatened by withdrawal of their own groups in the deepest rear Southwestern and Southern Fronts. "

    Adversity in signals intelligence activities in the coming period of German troops at Stalingrad forced the department radio intelligence GRU take additional measures to radio observations of the interaction of the German headquarters. Front-line radiodiviziony began to be placed at a distance of 40-50 km from the band edge, which allowed to observe the divisional radio networks Germans. There have been other measures that allowed a significant degree of intelligence activities to do better front-line units and signals intelligence to organize a high-level analysis and synthesis of intelligence information received by them.

    By the beginning of the period of the Battle of Stalingrad defensive 394th and 561st radiodiviziony Stalingrad front is pretty much opened and began continuous monitoring radio Army Group "B" and a member of it the 6th Field and the 4th Panzer Army. By the beginning of the counter-offensive of the Russian troops penetrated Signals Intelligence group of German troops and their allies to the south, the Don and Stalingrad fronts. In the course of the counter-offensive radioprospecting fronts pretty much covered the status and activities of the enemy, opened training their counterattacks and transfer of reserves.

    The specific control signals intelligence in the battle of Stalingrad made the heads of departments signals intelligence staffs of fronts, NM Lazarev, IA Zeitlin also signals intelligence commanders KM Gudkov, IA Lobyshev, TF Lyakh, NA Matveev. Two radiodiviziona osnaz (394 th and 561 th) for the successful conduct of the enemy intelligence was awarded the Order of Red Banner.

    Employees deciphering military intelligence in 1942 uncovered the principle acts of German cipher machine "Enigma", and began to read encrypted with the help of German radio messages. In the GRU special mechanisms have been designed to accelerate the process of decryption. The decoded telegrams have allowed the enemy to establish a dislocation of more than 100 staffs of the German army, numbering 200 separate battalions and other units and units of the Wehrmacht. After opening the cipher Abwehr (German military intelligence and counterintelligence) the opportunity to receive information about the activities of hundreds of German agents in the rear areas of the Red Army. In general, the decryption service GRU opened in 1942 the main German and Japanese shifrsistemy combined arms, police and diplomatic ciphers, 75 ciphers of German intelligence, more than 220 keys to them, read by more than 50 thousand German coded telegram.

    November 29, 1942 for government awards were presented to 14 officers decryption service GRU SV. Colonel FP Malyshev, Lieutenant Colonel AA Tyumenev and Captain AF Yatsenko were submitted for the award of the Order of the Red Banner, Major II Ukhanov, Military Engineer Grade 3 MS Odnorobov and AI Baranov, Captain Alexander Shmelev — to be awarded the Order of the Red Star. Have been awarded, and other experts at deciphering the military intelligence service.

    Decryption service GRU spacecraft was at the end of 1942 transferred to the NKVD, which was formed by a single cryptographic service.

    CA Defense Ministry. F. 23. Op. 7567. D. 1. Ll. 48-49. Specified distribution, "T. Stalin
    that Vasilevsky, that Antonov "

    A special message
    Head of the GRU
    General Staff of the Red Army
    VI Stalin.
    November 29, 1942

    Quite Secret
    Comrade. S T A L I N I

    Signals Intelligence Service and the decryption of the Red Army during the Russian war, have gained great success.
    Provided the decryption of signals intelligence service of the Red Army and the NKVD materials intercept open and encrypted telegrams enemy and neighboring states.

    Radio direction finding the German army were extracted valuable information about gangs, actions and intentions of the enemy, the Japanese army group opened in the Far East.

    Deciphering of the Head of the Intelligence Service of the Office of the Red Army opened the main German and Japanese shifrsistemy combined arms, police and diplomatic ciphers, 75 ciphers of German intelligence, above 220 keys to them, read above 50,000 alone German coded telegram.

    According to read a coded telegram is set dislocation than 100 staffs of the German army, numbering two hundred disclosed battalions and other fascist parts; extracted valuable information about the combat readiness of our partisans in occupied areas Germans.

    Extracted information on the activities of anti-Soviet groups, more than 100 German agents in th
    e Soviet Union and 500 of traitors that have fallen in the service of the German intelligence service.

    It was also established that the German agents obtain information about two hundred of our parts and connections of the relocation of factories of our industry. All these materials were reported on time and the High Command of the NKVD authorities for action.

    Scientific Group Office has identified the German telegrams ability to decrypt encrypted machine "Enigma" and went on to design devices that accelerate decoding.

    Transmitting signals intelligence and decryption services in the General Staff of the Red Army and the NKVD of the USSR, I beg your instructions to submit to the government awards the best officers and employees of the Office of third GLAVRU Red Army, who have done a great and valuable work in strengthening the country's defense.

    Appendix: List of officers and employees of the Office 3
    GLAVRU SC, submitted to the government awards.

    Head of the Head of the Intelligence
    Control of the Red Army

    Divisional Commissioner


    "____" In November 1942

    In 1942, the military intelligence and mistakes were made. On the one hand, the Supreme Command ignored information GRU spacecraft about the impending coming of the Germans in the south of the front, which led to the failure of Russian offensive operations in the Crimea and the Kharkov region. On the other hand, zabugornom Russian military intelligence agencies failed to produce documentaries that reveal the plans of the German command in the summer campaign of 1942

    In general, the forces zabugornoy and operational intelligence GRU spacecraft able to identify the structure of the German group and the intended disposition of its actions.

    July 15, 1942 Information Office of the GRU has prepared a report "Assessment of the enemy in front of the USSR", which was made in the subsequent conclusion: "Southern Army Group will endeavor to get out on the river. Don and after a series of operations will pursue our goal of decoupling the South-West Front of the Southern Front, under the cover p. Don enter into Stalingrad, turning to the upcoming challenge to the North Caucasus. "

    The coming of the German forces, which began on June 28, Russian troops forced to retreat to the Volga and carry languid loss. The intelligence department staffs Bryansk, South-Western and Southern Fronts were not able to organize an effective exploration and obtain information about the intentions of the German High Command. Scouts were not able to determine the composition of groups of enemy attack and the beginning of his coming.

    During busy changing situation reliable information about the enemy army intelligence officers hunted and reconnaissance aircraft pilots. Bravely and skillfully acted military scouts Lieutenant IM Pozniak, the captains
    AG Popov, NF Yaskov other.

    The Battle of Stalingrad Military Intelligence

    Military Pozniak spy Colonel Ivan, during the Battle of Stalingrad — Lt.

    Yet, the Supreme Command, made an error in the assessment of the strategic environment, expressed dissatisfaction with the activities of military intelligence, the other day, the Battle of Stalingrad. Head of Military Intelligence Maj. Gen. AP Panfilov, August 25, 1942 was removed from office and focuses on active duty as deputy commander of the 3rd Panzer Army. Maybe destiny Panfilov on the latest position was due to the fact that the Polish compound for the formation of the Soviet Union on the ground that he was in charge, refused to make war with the of the Red Army against the German troops. Then he became a hero of Panfilov Russian Union and GRU spacecraft temporarily headed by Military Commissar of the GRU Lieutenant General II Il'ichev, which was to take urgent measures to increase the effectiveness of all of the military intelligence. It was found that immediately directs the activities of the strategic, operational and tactical intelligence, officers of the Center is not always successful and brilliantly solve ongoing numerous operational tasks. It was necessary to study the experience of exploration in 1941-1942., And based on it to take new measures that were to improve the efficiency of all activities of the GRU of the General Staff of the Red Army.

    During the Battle of Stalingrad and, in particular, on the stage of her graduating from military intelligence to determine the composition and the approximate number of enemy troops were surrounded. In a special report, prepared by the Office of the General Staff of the military intelligence and Reported VI Stalin and AI Antonov, stated: "In the environment are part of the 4th and the 6th German Army under General Paulus armored forces, consisting of 11-th, 8 th, 51 th and 2-tank shells, a total of 22 divisions, their TR — 15, etc. — 3 ppm — 3 cd — 1. The whole is surrounded by a group: people — 75-80 thousand, field guns — 850 guns PTO — 600 tanks — 400. "

    The composition of groups has been opened quite accurate, but the number of enemy troops were surrounded by even more and was 250-300 thousand people.

    In general, the final step of the Battle of Stalingrad bodies zabugornoy and operational intelligence worked quite well, providing the Supreme Command and the commanders of the fronts of reliable information about the enemy.

    Intelligence department staffs of fronts, taking part in the Battle of Stalingrad, commanded by Colonel Alexander Kaminski, since October 1942 , the Major-General Alexander Horns (South-Western Front), Major-General IV Vinogradov (Stalingrad Front) Major General MA Kochetkov (Don front.)

    During the Battle of Stalingrad intensely acted in their own areas of responsibility of the intelligence departments of the South (Chief of Intelligence, Major General Sherstnev NV), North Caucasus (the chief of the intelligence colonel Kapalkin VM) and the Trans-Caucasus (Chief of Intelligence, Colonel Alexander Kaminsky ) military districts, and intelligence agencies the Black Sea Fleet (Chief of Intelligence, Major General DB Namgaladze) Azov (the chief of the intelligence captain Barkhotkin KA) and Caspian (Chief of Intelligence, Colonel NS Frumkin) fleets. They just provide commanders of fronts, taking measures to disrupt the operation "Edelweiss", in which the German High Command was planning to take over the Caucasus and its oil areas.

    The Battle of Stalingrad Military Intelligence

    Major-General Nikolai Sherstnev, Chief of Staff Intelligence Division of the Southern Front
    The Battle of Stalingrad Military Intelligence

    Major General Dmitry Namgaladze Bagratovich, Chief of Staff Intelligence Division's Black Sea Fleet

    At the end of 1942 due to the growing need for reliable intelligence information about the enemy, th
    e need for timely recording of a multi-faceted development of the situation in Europe, the Far East and Africa, and in order to impartial evaluation of the Anglo-American Supreme Command decided to increase foreign (strategic) human intelligence Commissariat of Defense.

    In October 1942, was another major reorganization of the military intelligence. October 25, 1942 People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR signed an order number 00232 on the reorganization GRU spacecraft, which foresaw the allocation of GRU of the General Staff and the subordination of strategic human intelligence Commissar of Defence. At GRU given responsibility for the company zabugornoy intelligence. As part of the GRU SC formed three controls: human intelligence overseas human intelligence on the German-occupied areas and information.

    In accordance with this order from the authority of the chief of the GRU military intelligence was withdrawn, all intelligence departments staffs of fronts and armies.

    To control the activities of military intelligence in the General Staff was created Office of reconnaissance, which were forbidden to conduct human intelligence. For this purpose, proposed to create task forces at the front, use a cover for their activities the ability of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan movement.

    But in practice, this reorganization of military intelligence noticeable improvements in its operations did not produce. The headquarters of the fronts due to the lack of subordinate human intelligence could not get proactive and reliable information about the enemy from sources operating in its operational depth. The command of the GRU spacecraft also failed to provide frisky bring to the staffs of fronts coming from sources of information in force in the territories captured by the enemy. These control deficiencies have a negative impact on the planning and organization of the fighting. So Makar, at the end of 1942, there is a need another reorganization of military intelligence.

    Overall, the 1942 Russian military exploration to complete its tasks, acquired a multi-faceted experience, unique in its content and bold solving complex problems, which depended on the course and an excellent final battle that raged between the Volga and the Don.

    The Battle of Stalingrad Military Intelligence is unique in that in this busy period of the war majestically Russian GRU officers spacecraft usually reported as a high political management of the USSR and the commanders of the Red Army, reliable information about the enemy, even though this information is often contradicted personal assessments of the Supreme Commander.

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