The results of three years of military reform.

The magazine "National Defense number 12", December 2011. 

Serdyukov's reform — Makarova.
Much has been done, now the main thing — to re-equip the Russian army on the new weapons and military equipment.

 

In our country, love to celebrate the date and sum up the (interim and final). In this habit, there is nothing wrong, but the third anniversary of the start of a radical military reform of the Armed Forces of Russia passed almost unnoticed in the media. No, materials related to the course of reform, of course, there were, the benefit of the military department constantly generates informational reasons, but an attempt to sum up the achievements and failures of the last three years is by no means superfluous. Especially given the importance of transformation for the Army: the general view of most of the leading Russian military experts at the beginning of the reform the Russian Armed Forces in a state of clinical death if not, then close to it: further delay in reforming their threatened critical implications for the security of the country. Thus, the reform of 2008 was the reason for the existence of the Russian army as a living and evolving organism.
Ilya Kramnik 

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

First we need to deal with the question — whose reform, and who is its author? Russia was going through a lot of military reforms, the most significant in the last three centuries it was named by its authors — Peter, Potemkin, Milyutinskaya, Frunze reform, etc. Today's reform by inertia Serdyukov called reform, linking the changes with the personality of the current defense minister, but this definition is incomplete. Speaking on the restructuring of Defense, a new approach to military spending, the humanization of military service, for the withdrawal of non-core functions to outsource the army, it is reasonable to attribute these initiatives led by the military establishment, but the change in the structure of the Armed Forces as those associated with the names of other people . It is now the acting chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Nikolai Makarov and his predecessor Yury Baluyevsky.

The name Baluevskii bind many ideas implemented later, and above all — the idea of establishing of strategic commands (OSK), bringing together disparate groups of forces in a particular area, with the exception of the strategic nuclear forces. Today it is a USC "West" (with headquarters in St. Petersburg), "East" (HQ in Khabarovsk), "Center" (Yekaterinburg) and the "South" (Rostov-on-Don). In accordance with the structure of the USC changed the structure of the military districts — four of them left, and system management districts and USC have been combined. In obedience USC was given all the general purpose forces in the territories, including parts of the Air Force / Air Defense and the Navy.

The essence of USC — in the creation of a unified system of command and control in conditions of peace and war, to avoid a loss of time to deploy and re-formatting system of command and control in the event of the outbreak of hostilities. This system has already existed in the Soviet Union — in the 1970-1980's. The Soviet Union formed a somewhat similar command structures for the management of foreign troops in the theater of military operations (TVD). After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, these structures have ceased to exist, and control of troops on the territory of the Russian Federation carried out through a system of military districts, laid back, Dmitry Miliutin, head of the Ministry of War in 1861-1881 gg.

Yuri Baluyevsky, however, failed to "push" the proposal, in addition, it was half-hearted: General Baluyevskiy offered along with the creation of USC to keep the existing structure of the military districts and fleets.

Makarova predecessor in office CHODs is also the initiator of the transfer to the Army brigade structure, but in the end the proposal was implemented in a different form. According to Baluyevsky, the army had to be composed and brigades and divisions, which would have been used at various theaters. But in the end adopted a brigade structure. Gangs have become a sort of "building blocks" from which the commanders in theater groups can form a desired shape under the intermediary — operational command, played by the army headquarters. At the same division level were eliminated.

Finally, referring to the authorship of the current reform, we can confidently say that its "military" section — a merit acting chief of staff. With that, of course, the head of the General Staff and its active use developments predecessors, namely CHODs acting in tandem with the current defense minister were those tandem, which was able to penetrate through the idea of reform is extremely conservative military structure and to defend it in front of the country's leadership. Therefore, it is correct to call it "reform Serdyukov-Makarov".

THE CONDITIONS

The current military reform takes place on a very difficult background. The need to reform the military say, probably, all the political forces in the country, but everyone understands it differently.

The economic aspect of the issue with the critics boils down to two main areas: "sawing", ie the misuse of funds, which is systemic in nature, and accusations of non-productive spending. In the latter case, the army blamed for the fact that it requires too much investments, which could be spent "to something more sensible" (from pensioners to help support education). The following are tips "on clothes stretching legs" and quite serious steps to harmonize the requirements of military development with the economic possibilities of the country.

The latter is especially strange because the tasks of the Armed Forces — in principle, not an economic category. Quite the contrary. If the Armed Forces of the task of protecting the independence of the country, the money should be allocated based on the amount required for the solution of this problem. If the requirements for the country's armed forces are limited to setting a guard of honor for visiting dignitaries, the money should be allocated only to this. But then it must be borne in mind that the potential enemy completely obliged to respect our plight with the money and wait until we get rich. Moreover, it is not too heavy.

Yet the economic aspect completely discounted did not. Constantly preparing for the "war of the future", an army major nation in time of peace turns into an all-devouring Moloch, pulling money out of the pockets of citizens. Therefore, the question of funding or, more correctly, that the allocated funds were spent efficiently, is acute. However, society should be prepared to spend and to understand that the amount spent went to work and not thrown away on the wind.

About GIST

Besides the already discussed the issue of establishing USC, military reform includes a number of other important aspects. Let us consider them in order.

INCREASE ALERT AND MOBILITY ARMED FORCES

Under the combat readiness of the army is to be understood the presence of such of its structure, in which the advance immediately after receiving the order can complete unit, ready for independent combat missions, not typed with the world on a string "fragments" of larger units and formations, which derive from the locations of the simply impossible. In such a situation, our army fell in the course of the two Chechen wars, and during the last war in August 2008, and this despite the fact that in themselves fighting in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia were considered military leadership as highly probable and is ready for them for a number of years.

It is with the establishment of such units — brigades, and, consequently, the transfer of the army on the structure of the battalion, brigade, started all the visible part of the reform.

In the course of the restructuring of armed forces was one more important step: The Army has refused cadre units and formations, previously formed the basis of the Army. Intended to mobilize in the event of a possible large-scale war, these units and practically not subject to reform: about some major changes in the structure that performs the main functions of stockpiled equipment, is uncertain. It was even harder to talk about their rearmament.

  • On one of the objects of the Space Forces
  • On one of the objects of the Space Forces

 The move has generated a lot of criticism. In general, they can be traced to the following points:

1. Adopted by the state teams (4 battalions and units gain) is not optimal, in fact the team is a former motorized infantry (tank) regiment with reinforcement units and needs to increase the number of battalions to 6, to be able to conduct independent operations. In addition, the diverse nature art, inherited from the Soviet Union, the unification obessmyslivaet States and impedes the creation of a standardized database storage.

This objection may be partly to recognize the wealthy, but shortcomings orgshtatnoy structures should be addressed in the future reforms will be processed and when passed a new state teams. At the same time the problem will be solved and diverse nature of technology. Today in Russia are being developed promising universal platforms: light and medium wheeled, medium and heavy tracked. Successful completion of the development and launch of a series of machines will eventually unify the armed brigades.

2. Liquidation division level was premature. Divisions persist in leading the armies of NATO, especially in the U.S.. Division headquarters used to coordinate teams in large-scale operations (3-4 teams per division). In Russian the same conditions when the teams close on the army headquarters, will have to control at the same time last 8-10 teams that make it hard to control and co-ordination.

This is perhaps the most serious argument against the brigade structure, the complexity of the management of large-scale exercises were observed at 2009-2010,., But the conclusions and further measures to optimize the system has not yet been announced.

3. The heterogeneity of the environment in which the Russian army has to act, excludes the use of teams of unified state. They should be optimized depending on the particular situation.

On the one hand, the Russian army really have to operate in a diverse, greatly differing conditions, on the other — military organization maintains sufficient flexibility and capacity to adapt depending on the situation. For the theaters of war with radically different from the standard conditions are created, and special types of brigades. Today, it is already established mountain brigades and created the Arctic. In other cases, the standard of organizational and staff structure completely allows you to fight any opponent, reinforcing brigade if necessary additional parts.

REDUCTION OF THE ARMY AND ITS ACQUISITION

This question was the most painful in the whole reform. Reducing the size of the army to a million people — a fait accompli. The principle of its acquisition but provokes heated debate.

Most definitely have to say that Russia today can not afford any conscript army — to staff the sun sufficient number of recruits will soon not be enough people in mind the demographic collapse of the 1990s. Nor completely contract. Such a force is not available to us today is not only and not so much because it is "expensive", but also because the threat of a possible large-scale impact on the land to Russia has not been canceled. The only acceptable solution to our situation — it's a mixed staffing.

Under these conditions, the uncertainty inherent in military reform in this respect, is perhaps the main reason for the fair and rigorous criticism. From 2008 to 2011. military department consistently passed through several stages. First, there is increasing the share of contract and reduced contingent of conscripts. This was followed by reduction of the number of contract formally informed financial difficulties due to the economic crisis. Finally, in 2011 it was again announced that it relies on the professional soldiers who should form the basis of the army.

 

  • The most important objective of the reform was the creation of a new structure of the Russian Armed Forces, which would make the army more mobile and manageable.
  • The most important objective of the reform was the creation of a new structure of the Russian Armed Forces, which would make the army more mobile and manageable.

 These throwing "moved to the right" and the creation of such an important time for the combat capability of the sun and store it as a living organism institution as staff NCO corps. Initially, it was announced that staff sergeants and petty officers in the future will replace the warrant officers, and the meaning the outlook is pretty close. However, the result was that at the level of allowance that the proposed staff sergeants, dial the desired number of people is almost impossible, and besides — they have no place to teach, issue of the hastily created sergeant schools until recently remained extremely low. As a result, non-commissioned officers and warrant officers remained in their places. Who on the staff sergeant spoke again, and I think, with the increase of salaries and increasing capacity sergeant schools, this problem finally begin to be addressed.

You can not say that it "will be resolved" to such and such a year — simply because, like any other social institution, a career NCO corps calls for the establishment of a minimum generation is better than two. Genuine reform results in this part of the current thirty-see, is celebrating its 50th anniversary. Of course, if that does not happen to any of the next fracture.

One of the most important and the most difficult problems to be solved during the current military reform was to reduce the size of the officer corps. Approach has also had to adjust to the change process. Initially, it was announced on the reduction of the number of officers from 335 to 150 thousand people. Then, in 2010, the MoD decided that the Armed Forces should remain 220,000 officers. The formal explanation for this change was the creation of Air and Space Defense as a separate entity, but, according to some experts, this is only part of the truth, while the main reason is that the 150000th officer corps was eventually found to be inadequate for the Armed Forces .

The release of a large mass of officers exacerbated another chronic problem — lack of housing. Every officer who has served more than 10 years and was fired not by denigrating the grounds has the right to housing in the chosen place of residence, and this right was one of the main objectives of Anatoly Serdyukov, who has got a long tail of nearly 170,000 in need of housing military families.

"Absorption" stage began in 2008-2009. By the end of 2010, the housing needs about 120,000 people, and for the first nine months of 2011 decreased by almost half of all — up to 63,800 people.

The process can not be considered unprob
lematic — in some cases, local authorities and the Ministry of Transport of late with the expansion of the road network, making available the road after the construction of new districts are beginning to suffer from traffic jams in some areas lagging social infrastructure. However, in any case, the situation today is radically different from what it was in the early 2000s. and even three years ago.

  • Voronezh air base on "Baltimore" came the first of 10 new bombers Su-34.
  • Voronezh air base on "Baltimore" came the first of 10 new bombers Su-34.

RESTRUCTURING OF MILITARY EDUCATION

The new structure of the army requires a review of approaches to managing it, which is impossible without a change in the training command personnel. Self-sufficiency of the new formations, their suitability to the solution of combat missions in sparse combat formations and maneuvering combat commanders require special training at all levels. It should be a preparation not only theoretical, but also practice-stroevika, once trained to apply their theoretical knowledge. This training is no longer possible under the old system of military education, more aimed at the acquisition of theoretical knowledge.

The solution was found in the consolidation of the military schools and giving them the opportunity to conduct year-round practical training of future officers, and that will intensify such training. Instead of the former military schools appear large centers with a strong educational base that can prepare future officers, both theoretically and practically, and at the same time. Such a center can not be built for a military university, the personnel of which is in respect of marching is one battalion (200-500 people). So our perspective — several large military training centers that train officers of all disciplines and branches.

Such restructuring will decide, and another problem: the officers of the Armed Forces of the new image should from the outset be ready to manage heterogeneous forces. With this new Army Field Manual, which should be adopted in the near future, just provide space for the commanders of initiative and discretion within the task, excluding taken before planning the senior commanders in two or three steps down. Training requirements for officers with increasing speed.

Today, however, talk about the positive results of the restructuring of military education is too early: the first officers, fully trained "in a new way," we get no earlier than 2016-2017 years. But to join the chorus of mourners at the ruined Soviet military education system also does not make sense. The main complaints about the current reform of military education boil down to the fact that during the formation of new training centers were disbanded and lost developed over decades and destroyed teams organized system of officer training. On the one hand it is certainly the case. On the other — should face the truth and admit that by the end of 2008 in Russia there were no military academy that would meet modern requirements. Outdated material base, archaic curricula, lack of connection between theory and practice — all this led to the fact that school leavers had a long and carefully re-training in parts, often on a "Now forget everything you were taught, and do as I do" .

In fact, the school at this point retained only one, albeit a very important function: they turned yesterday's schoolboy in the military, an officer, a man capable of quickly and without unnecessary reflections to make decisions in a critical situation, to give orders and execute orders received from above. But in practice, this is usually enough for a few months of training, the sergeant on the course of military school still require a more serious outcome. Investigation and was the reform, designed to simultaneously solve the problems of logistics training process, the creation of new educational programs and optimizing the number of students under the current needs of the Armed Forces.

"Reformatting" and humanization MILITARY SERVICE

Problem solving, which stated above, logically leads to the restructuring of the nature of service as soldiers and officers.

Changing the structure of the armed forces has led to the unification of places of permanent deployment of heterogeneous parts into a kind of "bush" — let's call them bases. Such consolidation should reduce the cost of maintenance of military units, will develop the infrastructure of military camps as it is done in the ordinary village. This will ensure that military personnel — from private to general — everything you need in everyday life, making military service does not look like a permanent set up a camp, in which there were many generations of Russian military. Unsubscribe from the presence of small military towns, such as parts, servicing radar early warning system is not possible, but the other part of the plan to bring in the military base, the number of no more than several dozen. The Army this process is still at the very beginning and will take several years. On the other hand, in the Air Force, such a transition is almost complete: aviation reduced in several major air bases, has a network of airfields from which the execution of combat missions. In this new structure the Air Force, of which the composition of the "left" many shelves that existed in recent years purely nominal, also significantly increased their control and provided an opportunity for a systematic and massive rearmament.

Here it is pertinent to recall the troops and say that the consolidation of bases can improve the conditions of service, making it more attractive and increasing the motivation for the proper performance of their duties. With all conscripts bit easier — for the intensification of training is enough to create the conditions in which the soldiers will be free of duties not directly related to the service and combat training. But military personnel should be provided not only the conditions of life, do not resemble the barracks of the past, but also the conditions for healthy living. This mobility, learning out of service, cultural recreation. It is necessary to take into account the presence of his family, and hence the demand for institutions, it is not peculiar to the military units — from theaters and restaurants to schools, kindergartens and homes creativity. And such is the task of large military camps, large databases can not be solved.

These changes are in the mainstream of the humanization of military service, which is recognized as one of the most successful achievements of military reform. First of all, it concerns the compulsory military service. Terms of obligatory service in the last three years have changed dramatically: in addition to reducing the term and changed content. First, in the past has left the classic "hazing" as being played back with every call to the format of hazing on a "senior-junior". In the army, there are still problems with hazing based on physical superiority in combination with insufficient moral principles of individual soldiers on the Karelian community, but conditions for them are in civilian life, same old "hazing" in the army no longer exists.

Changed the principle of responding to the complaints of soldiers. If the earlier cases of bullying and its consequences have tried to hide, but now such concealment can do prevent its commander more than the mere fact of hazing in the subdivision. The soldiers received the right to use a mobile phone, and often the internet (sometimes with the same number), have become much more to inform relatives about how they live and serve.

As noted above, the soldiers stopped (not yet in all parts o
f this process is completed) to use for non-core military functions: cleaning, cooking in place of permanent deployment, construction, repair and finishing, and so on. This change closely associated with the transfer of non-core military functions to outsourcing, among other things, provided an opportunity for a much more intensive combat training than before.

Finally, to ease the conditions of service of soldiers are now trying to encourage closer to their place of permanent residence. Not always feasible — for example, to ensure the Arctic or the Far East among local recruits impossible, but the general principle is the place to be.

  • Most functions provide in the Armed Forces will now perform civilian personnel.
  • Most functions provide in the Armed Forces will now perform civilian personnel.

RESTRUCTURING OF DEFENSE

For a long time, the Ministry of Defence for the Army remained the main command authority, a traditional couple, "the commander, chief of staff" to play up to the top, where the commander in chief became minister and chief staff officer — CHODs. However, in the course of reform in this structure has changed dramatically. In fact, within the Ministry of Defense have two separate areas, or "trunk" as they are called with a light hand, Vladimir Popovkin.

"Military" trunk Defense, headed by the General Staff and is only concerned exclusively with the combat training of the Armed Forces and command and control. All economic issues, logistical problems, financial, housing, health and other services, including here and the organization of procurement of arms and military equipment, placed under the "civil" Barrel Defense and divided between the relevant line departments. This, according to experts, has reduced corruption in the procurement of arms and military equipment, as well as to increase the transparency of cash management of Defense as a whole. In addition, military leaders managed to free the masses from the solution of economic problems, which are often at virtually no time to properly guide the troops and their training.

"Ograzhdanivanie" Defense also was not without incident, but by the third year of reforming the system is finally beginning to show consistent results. In any case, the commanders who were dissatisfied with the fact that they took the issues of logistics, getting smaller — with the normal organization of this format was much more convenient than before.

Farewell to the Main Command

Today we can definitely say that their traditional roles main commands of the Armed Forces have lost. Administrative functions were taken away from them with the creation of the USC, the functions transferred to the order of weapons to civilian departments of Defense. In fact, with the Main Command of the Ground Forces, Air Force and Navy today preserved only functions of the organization of combat training of the Armed Forces of the species. This reduction in power could not generate a lot of rumors about the future of the Main Command — right down to their conversion into common departments of Defense and a sharp reduction in the number of military personnel. It is not known what path will eventually be selected, but this prediction is unlikely to be true. At least, for the Command of the Air Force and the Navy is managing portions of the nuclear triad, under their jurisdiction, but also — by forces beyond the control of areas of responsibility USC, for example, the campaigns / missions in remote areas. More likely, in this regard in the transformation of the Main Command of the General Staff.

The only main commands that preserves the integrity of its functions (except, again, the order of arms) is the Main Command of the Strategic Missile Forces. This is due to the fact that the Strategic Missile Forces, unlike the other branches of service, have not changed during the creation of the USC, remaining as a whole. It must be said that the control system's strategic nuclear forces during the reform has not changed — over the past ten years it has proved very effective and flexible — able to vary according to the new conditions, without the need for a radical "break-up".

SUBTOTAL

Cover all the issues of reforming the Armed Forces in a single journal to become unthinkable for this required volume. At a minimum, a series of separate articles deserve changes in the defense procurement and analysis of the current state armaments program for 2011-2020., Is inextricably linked to the reform of Serdyukov-Makarov and actually received through this reform. However, on the basis of what has been said you can draw some conclusions.

  • Serving in the army should be reformed comfortable.
  • Serving in the army should be reformed comfortable.

Radicalism of today's military reform, often bordering on voluntarism, caused a huge array of problems that have accumulated in the Armed Forces of our country since the late Soviet times, when first we were talking about the need for change, and aggravated the crisis in the 1990s.

The success of the reforms is largely due to the personality of the main reformer — having nothing to do with the army before the tip, Anatoly Serdyukov was spared from the mass of non-formal commitment that binds any high-ranking military, which facilitated his adoption of austerity measures.

For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union speech about the need to "meet today's challenges" have ceased to be hot air. The army really is reconstructed under a new format of engagement — primarily local conflicts low and medium intensity, while retaining some scope for doing "great war", and most importantly — Strategic nuclear forces as the most reliable guarantee of the absence of a major war.

For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union reform of the army is not reduced to the next reduction units and formations, and caused a fundamental restructuring of military structures to reflect the new understanding of their problems.

As a result, when the controversy of some of the used means of reforming itself reform is absolutely necessary. Over the past three years, all of the key objectives of the Reform, at least, begin to resolve. Some of these — for example, formal changes orgshtatnyh structures can pass quickly. Others — from the reorganization of the military education system to create a cadre NCO corps — will take years and years to come. The fruits of reform are already visible: a sharply increased the intensity of the combat training of the army began its rearmament. However, the final point of the «i» will arrange a war. For the U.S. examination, which showed that the direction chosen in the late 1960s. Robert McNamara, was the Gulf War in 1991 Where and how will take this exam Russian army — we can not predict. The future does not promise a quiet life, but God forbid that the exam was not premature. 

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