The consequences of the tragedy at the base of storing spent nuclear fuel in the Murmansk region, 20 occurred eight years ago, is not eliminated so far. Facts are forgotten. The liquidators are killed. Until radioactive "garbage" in an amount equivalent to 50 tiers, the hands of the majestic nuclear power up to now have not reached
Non-military man abbreviation BTB is not anything goes. The military, meanwhile, know: send someone to serve in CMB — techno shore base — it's like that … to send three bukovkoy. And not because these objects were created in the beginning in the boonies, and since these places — the bad: from the early 60-ies of the last century on such databases stored supplies freshest and spent nuclear fuel from nuclear submarines. On their own warehoused watery and solid radioactive waste (LRW and SRW).
Andreeva placed 5 kilometers from Zaozerska. Where this is the lip — you can have a look at Wikipedia and Google Map. I can only say that even divers got there just a boat with its own database or on the road, the overlapped multiple checkpoints Fri
About CTB-569 at Andreeva always walked infamous. Submariners alkashovkoy called it: there were exiled unreliable — written off for drunkenness, unbalanced, "the party line", had a row with the boss … Place it had been forgotten not only by God, and all kinds of bosses.
Because life on the 569-th in the middle of the 80 proceeded under its own laws and customs.
On some of its features I told those who had to serve there. In the "history" of the sailor came from Lithuania: he drove moonshine, which provides the entire fleet. (They say, by the way, that was not the 1st option poisoning.) Another craftsman refiner German anti-tank mines (which in those combat areas after the war many left) and sold the explosives Murmansk bandits. Another "special", a descendant of an experienced convict, right in the boiler room arranged clandestine dental office, where randolevoy tape ("Gypsy Gold") made teeth — from the patients was not lights.
I myself am on the CMB in Andreeva Bay did not happen, but perfectly imagine for yourself and base, and its former inhabitants. Since at exactly the same BTB Pacific Fleet, in Sysoev Bay in the Primorsky Territory and Krasheninnikov bay on the Kamchatka Peninsula, visited more than once. I remember the sailors and officers, do not part with dosimeters, sad state of the objects and the special difficulties of "bad places." Death statistics no one ever did it: in the cards doses often underestimated characteristics were recorded, and the cards themselves at the hands of any officers or sailors were not given.
Judging by the official reports of the departmental professionals (and others were not allowed there), on similar bases everything was always under control. Only occasionally trickled rumors about some "trouble." About the middle of the harsh tragedies of 80 not out of the question — in the sense of references to them, especially in the Russian media. About them to this day not many people know. And the next — those who know less. Since the facts are forgotten, the liquidators are killed.
CTB-569 so far on your own site with all its contents strshnym and, unfortunately, many of the problems of almost thirty years of exposure.
Lieutenant Commander of supplies Anatoly Safonov, who I met in Obninsk, was one of the managers aftermath of the tragedy that occurred on the CMB in the Andreeva Bay in 1982. He served there as the commander of the group from 1983 to 1990 year, at a time of major rehabilitation work.
"On the convex Naval eye"
— Storage Room 5 — says he — put into operation in 1962. It was designed for storing wet method (in the pools) 550 canisters of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). But it soon became clear that such capacity is not enough. Because in 1973, made an addition to the building of an additional 2,000 covers. Stroybatovtsy worked.
When Safonov first saw this annex, frightened. The enormous building with no windows, electrical equipment in disrepair, a leaky roof. In almost all places — a whopping contamination levels of beta-particles. Since he was responsible for the receipt, storage and shipment of spent nuclear fuel at the chemical plant "Mayak" specifically from this store, the building is investigated specifically. And I found that in 20 years of operation, there were things here are fantastic on their own negligence. Cases were being ripped off and fell to the bottom of the pool. How many of them there were in fact — no one knew. The account was carried through the stump deck. At times they get out of the pool and taken to the "Lighthouse". Piled on each other containers of highly radioactive material bolshennymi threatened trouble, right before the spontaneous chain reaction — a nuclear explosion, but the "little".
By the way, building on the CMB in Krasheninnikov Bay on Kamchatka and in Sysoev Bay in Primorye, which I visited, was built in the same years as the CMB in Andreeva Bay. And for the same "technology". I have the impression that in the minds of artists nuclear project and thoughts do not appear to be related to a single chain, "a secret meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU — drawing board scientist — building nuclear-powered ship — the construction of storage facilities — construction of apartments for divers and personnel infrastructure — utilization of PLA and RW" . The chain broke off after launching nuclear submarines (NPS). Then — in Russian, as it will.
APL designed and built naiumneyshie scientists and engineers in our country. Storage — not enough either completely uneducated stroybatovtsy. Submarine designers took into account all the little things in such a complex organism like a boat. In stores — cranes, shackles, pendants, bayonet locks on covers and much more, it worked anyhow.
And in February 1982. Attached pool of a sudden the waters were abated. Lowering saw the case: by ice on the wall of the structure. Highly radioactive liquid flowed into the Barents Sea. How it got there, no one knew exactly, as a device for measuring the water level was not. For this purpose, the sailor was used: every two hours, he was a terrible area with a longish stick with it and measured the water level in the pool. With all this power of gamma radiation in the X-ray spot is 15-20 / hour.
Noticing the leak, the pool was filled first … flour. Old method of sealing cracks naval chief of staff remembered BTB. Later, he also offered to run to the pool, where the radiation level reached 17,000 x-rays, the diver. But someone wisely advised not to do
Sacks of flour result, obviously, was not given. We decided some time just to watch the process. About, or as they say in the Navy, "by prominent naval eye", believed that in April of 1982, the total leakage reached 150 liters. day. Radiation measurements were recorded precisely: gamma background in the outer wall — 1.5 x-ray / h, gamma background in the basement vault — 1.5 roentgen / hour, the activity of soil — about 2×10 curies / liter.
In September the flow have gained 30-40 tons per day (in the same "bulging eyes"). There was a real danger of baring tops of the fuel assemblies. Water, who performed the role of bio-security is gone. This caused a sharp increase in gamma-ray background and has made a real danger to personnel.
Then set above the pool iron-lead-concrete floors. Fonilo all the same really, but allowed to work. Per shift worked at the facility sailors and officers were recruited to 200 millirem — a fifth of REM, at a rate of 5 rem per year.
Block destruction hirosimny
In autumn 1982 it was decided to express the removal of spent fuel from the pool of the left (to the right already spat — where water leaked all): where water is too early to leave. She refilled by a fire hose, stretched from the boiler room (the one where the son did convict teeth of randolya).
At the same time covers the SNF hastily deported on trains Chelyabinsk chemical plant "Mayak". Immediately accelerated pace began construction of the temporary storage of dry type — BSH (dry storage unit — he's at the naval terminology, an 'death hirosimny "). Under this deal adapted abandoned and unused capacity for aqueous radioactive waste (LRW). Why of unused? LRW has long since been drained from tankers in the newest area of the Earth.
SNF handled in iron pipes, arranged in a container, place between the pipes filled with concrete. Calculated: the capacity of a room 3a — 900 covers; numbers 2a and 2b — 1200 covers. 240 cells were used for burial of contaminated some clothes and rags, fonyaschih tools.
In Russia now 1,500 sites for temporary storage of radioactive waste, which has already accumulated about 550 million tons. Severe legal framework to regulate all matters relating to their non-hazardous storage, hitherto absent.
It was planned that in such a state of spent nuclear fuel will stay 3-4 years. Before the construction of a conventional store.
In this very state of the covers from the degrading spent nuclear fuel are already 28 years old.
By the way, the circumstances of this tragedy is set and was not. Stay Version: bad quality of the welds plating basins; shifts rocky soil, because of which cracked welds, sharp fluctuations in water temperature, which led to the creation of thermal stresses in welds, and in the end, the assumption that the left pool drip because of the distortions generated as a result of covering the right to protection of bio pool is not lightweight.
Official announcement of the tragedy for the first time was taken in April 1993 in the report of the Government Commission on issues related to the disposal of radioactive waste in the sea, under the control of President Boris Yeltsin's adviser on ecology Alexei Yablokov.
I had to write about fires on Navy ships: there are emergency party rapidly, from seconds (for example, if there is a possibility of an explosion of ammunition), people are facing the "visible" danger. And the radiation is not visible. Well, the water is flowing and flowing. Really assess the degree of danger can only spec.
Safonov says that in this situation the management of all the BTB and the Northern Fleet was very scared. Meant the possibility of a nuclear explosion. Invited to consult the 1st of the greatest professionals in the field of nuclear safety. After a detailed investigation of the question on the spot, he said, almost followed: "Practically I am sure that a nuclear explosion in the process of stripping nuclear hazardous blockage will occur. But the possibility that in the course of work on this will begin the rubble of a spontaneous chain reaction (SCR), I did not rule. Later, a couple of times I beheld blue flashes. These were small nuclear explosions. "
All work for the unloading of the left basin produced by regular staff BTB and was completed in September 1987. The liquidators have learned over 1114 covers (ie, more than 7,800 SFA), even a large part — from the bottom of the pool.
Why is the work dragged on so long? Because of the constant failures of the old hoisting devices, electrical equipment frail and flabby cables that had to change, of strongest drop in water level (instead of the 6-position meters, for example, he plunged to 4). All this, knows Anatoly, inevitably led to an increase in the gamma-ray background in the workplace and, as a consequence, obtaining personnel unnecessarily high doses of overexposure.
By assumption, Safonov, in the Barents Sea has emerged not three thousand, as it was later officially announced, and up to 700 thousand tons of highly radioactive water.
We sit … in his malehankih apartment in Obninsk. Anatoly gave me a book written by him in collaboration with Captain 1st Rank Alexander Nikitin of these events — the edition is tiny. He points to pictures, and sometimes looks on the web site (http://andreeva.uuuq.com/), on the tragedy, which made the last submarine Ivan Kharlamov: whether there are new messages from fellow liquidators. From these posts, he learns that killed another sailor or officer. Died from diseases caused by overexposure.
— For me to this day remains a mystery — says Safonov — how beheld my crane operators and shift supervisors understand commands from a distance of from time to time over 40 meters, while in the cockpit of a crane at a height of about 20 meters. Once watched on TV competition auto crane, they began to move from 15 yards extended part of a matchbox. My boys Alexander Pronin and Konstantin Krylov the first time, the criteria of the highest radioactivity and bad visibility, got a cover — magazine with a diameter of 24.2 cm SNF — in a cell with a diameter of 25 cm at a distance of 43 meters. It is truly a magnificent result, worthy of inclusion in the Guinness Record Book.
Wings participated in the liquidation of the cascade (one after another) of radiation accidents. Two months after the dismissal, he was killed in store. Safonov vyznat about it from the electric letters to his friend Basil Kolesnychenko.
— Tribute to medical monitoring of the health of the people was not — continues Safonov. — Protective clothing is not enough. And equipment liquidators did not differ from odezhki prisoners padded jacket, canvas boots, boots or oak. So as not to chill the waist, belts ropes. Ill get better:
14 healthy young sailors after working on unsafe sites at three o'clock ate a bucket of potatoes and a few cans of sardines in tomato sauce. Ate in rubber gloves. In their own and slept. Body did not respond to decontamination. Worked at Andreeva Bay and seconded stroybatovtsy — two companies. They worked around the day. They were fed even worse than us. As an additional solder used scraps from our table, which was intended to pigs at the farm …
Sometimes, says Safonov, when lifting crane emergency cover cassette with spent fuel from it directly on the concrete strewed nuclear fuel. The "light" of this "garbage" to 17000 x-rays per hour. Sailors cleaned it with a shov
el and a broom. The work was done without the representatives of the Nuclear Safety Account (NSA), the Defense Ministry — their control was not. Certainly, it was a terrible game with human death.