All my working life in peace time (from 1953 to 1990) was associated with a Russian tank development. At this time, we (in the Warsaw contract) and our potential enemies (NATO countries) tanks occupied one of the main places in the arms of both military blocs.
As a consequence of the development of tank development in the world has progressed rapidly, almost like during the war. Naturally, in this arms race, each side had its own merits, and the miscalculations and blunders.
The book "Tanks (strategy, technology, the economy)," * given some analysis of the state of affairs in the Russian post-war tank. This very concise analysis has permitted to conclude that the Russian tank building were two severe shortcomings.
First — the neglect of the economy.
2nd — underestimation of the human factor in the system "man — the gun."
The book shows some specific examples to support these conclusions. But over time I have collected materials that allow us to consider some issues of tank building and quantitatively and with high sides. In life, all of these materials were scattered. They were in different articles, reports, reports of both Russian and zabugornyh. Not enough of the sources of the materials were quite different, but they also got to see me in a different time (from time to time at intervals of a couple of years). So, without further insidiously, and I kept my notes from 1967.
Many of the materials found in these records have not lost their relevance in our days are. In the end, the idea was born to try to classify the data and publish them in the form of a monograph as a reference as "food for thought".
With all of this should be to draw attention to the fact that for the last 25 — 30 years of science and technology have evolved particularly active, and the people in their physical and mental characteristics from the standpoint of the ability of its activities in the criteria of the tank configurations fundamentally not endured.
True, the Russian Federation should make a slip. As a result of "perestroika" physical and moral-psychological level of training a contingent of possible future tankers dropped sharply. Fell and the level of general education (there are cases when the freshmen in institutions of higher education do not know the multiplication tables). In this regard, the Russian tank design optimization issues bonds in the system "man — Wednesday — machines" extraordinary sharpness.
1. Slightly GENERAL ISSUES
In order to avoid misunderstandings, make a reservation immediately that fighting properties of the tank and combat effectiveness of the tank — they are different concepts.
Fighting properties — it is the technical properties of weapons systems and tank control, security systems, the properties of its engine, chassis and boxes, which are provided on the condition that the crew of the tank has a perfectly working techniques with these systems, all systems are correctly and fully maintained and in good condition.
Combat effectiveness — is an overarching concept that characterizes the ability of the tank combat tasks. First, this includes tank itself with its combat characteristics, the crew of the tank to the extent that its military and technical training (including coherence crew). And this concept certainly includes system maintenance and logistics, including their effectiveness with the professionalism of their personnel.
Now we take as a theorem: if we have several models of tanks with similar fighting traits, then potentially the greatest combat effectiveness of the model is designed to provide maximum comfort for the crew to work in combat criteria.
Wrote near the word "tank" and "comfort" and could not help thinking. The reader will, for sure, such a phrase grin. But let's not jump to conclusions, let's see, they wrote in 1988, the engineers of ID Kudrin, BM Borisov and M. Tikhonov in the industry journal kelly ye 8. Their paper entitled "The Impact of habitability on the combat effectiveness of VGM." Here are excerpts from this work:
"… Improving the human response time of 0.1 seconds (which is checked only by a narrow physiological study) leads to an increased probability of the tragedy of drivers by 10%. Such a situation may arise, for example, by increasing the concentration of carbon monoxide in the air 0 , 1 mg / l (upper limit of normal) or with air temperature 28 … 30 'C, ie, in a rather mundane and more than that, the usual criteria of the driver.
…Firing all types BMP guns 60 seconds after sealing in the criteria may 50% condom poisoning personnel.
…The air temperature inside the tank is not correct in the summer when the outside air temperature above + 19'S the winter — at temperatures below — 20's. With all this the highest temperature in the crew compartment compounded over-humidity reaches 72 … 100%.
…Special conditions tankers lead to an increase in the level of respiratory diseases, injuries, diseases of the skin and eyes, to jade and cystitis, to diseases of the cardiovascular system to frostbite. This affects the combat effectiveness of weapons. Namely, the potential ability of artillery under-utilized up to 40% of individual types of air defense missile systems to complex criteria battle — 20 … 30 tanks — 30 … 50%.
…To have a significant impact on the design of the systems' man — Wednesday — machine ", to use quantitative methods of forecasting performance of the crew in the course of combat equipment operation.
…We are talking about the design of the operator's activity as an integrated system with the following development of technical means, not the classic adaptation of humans and machines to each other … "
Here is another excerpt from a different job. In 1989, DS Ibragimov released documentary novel "Confrontation". In it, he reports to follow:
"… Twice Hero of the Russian Union Colonel General Vasily armored forces Arkhipov, who spent two wars in the tank, in his memoirs," Time to tank attacks "highlights the dependence of success on the battlefield training tank crews …
Here's what he wrote:
"12 — 16 hours a rumbling tank, in the heat and stuffiness, where the air is saturated with the powder gas and combustible vapors consistency, tire and the strongest.
At one point, our doctors have had experience — 40 tankers alternately weighed before and after a 12-hour battle. It turned out that the tank commander during this period lost an average of 2.4 kg, the gunners — at 2.2 pounds, gunner — by 1.8 kg. And most of the driver (by 2.8 kg) and charging (by 3.1 kg).
Because people fall asleep at the station at one time … . "
I think that is quite pronounced in order to understand why you need now, solving the problems of tank building, decide on the scientific and technical level and comfort issues in the tank, well and in other combat vehicles too
2. WHAT AND HOW WE litsezreem OF TANK
Usually in tank-rooted view that the main battle tank components: fire, protection and maneuver. Initially, in the armored schools from different countries were disputes, which give preference to: weapons, armor, or the motor. T-34 (tank M.I.Koshkina and Morozov) around the world has proved that all three components of naming in the tank equal.
But now I would introduce another component and set it on the first place — VISIBILITY.
Let's make out puzzles and disposition of the crew on the battlefield only for a single tank (in the platoon, company of the battalion it would be more difficult).
Let's clear the crew received a combat puzzle, very probable intelligence about the enemy and took up combat tasks.
Once on the battlefield, the crew:
in-1's — should our eyes behold a certain situation;
in-2, must assess the situation and decide on a certain fighting his own tank now;
in-3, using very own fighting properties of the tank, to use them in combat with the enemy;
in-4 — with my own eyes to make sure that the task is complete and only then run across to the next action fighting.
From the spoken easy to create, that if in a particular tank is not given sufficient attention to the issue of visibility, the word "fire, maneuver and protection" is losing its dominant value.
It is very characteristic of one of the findings of research "Editorial", made in the Institute of the Ministry of Defense in 1972.
— Results of tactical exercises demonstrate that the lack of timely receipt of the crew of the disk imaging purposes of the tanks incapacitated earlier than they have time to make at least one sighting shot. For the same reason, the flow of shots tank company in the coming rounds is 3.5. / Min, while the technical ability to allow the flow of shots intensity of 30 rds. / Min. "
By the conclusion of research can be added, and the fact of combat practice.
In October 1973, there was the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Arabs were armed only Russian tanks, Israelis — South American and English. In the process of fighting the Arabs suffered heavy losses in tanks and lost the war. On a hot pursuit to become familiar with the causes of what happened in December 1973 went to Egypt and Syria representatives HBTU generals LN Kartcev and PI Bazhenov. In Egypt was LN Kartcev. That's what, that is, states in its report:
"… 0 transience of fighting — Example: 25 nd Tank Brigade 15 October dealt a blow to the north to connect to the 2nd Army. Tank battalion of this brigade, which operated in the vanguard, fell at one point under the front and flank fire Israeli ATGM and was completely destroyed. ATGM plants were masked, so that out of the tanks they had not seen for the whole fight, tankers fired at random.
0á successful use of tanks in the defense — Example: Roth T-55 (11 tanks), 21 th Armored Division in repelling attacks, Israeli tanks on the 16 th Infantry Division, leading the flank of the advancing fire, killing 25 tanks M-60, having lost only two T-55. "
As we see, the results of research supported by the facts hundred percent of combat practice.
But this high-quality side visibility. How to evaluate the visibility quantitatively?
In 1972, the tankers at Kubinka conducted special studies to learn the conditions of View (observation) of the armored vehicles. My focus in this work, particularly lured one table. I will give it one hundred percent.
Due to the increase in the average speed of 25 km / h to 35 km / h in the same conditions at the time of processing of disk imaging, coming from the unit overlooks the space decreases by 1.4 times "
In this case, the distance of 1,500 meters is chosen as the base is not the case. In the 60's — 70's, this distance was good for opening fire. In those years, the tanks were still missing rangefinder device, tank artillery had not yet had the neatness, accuracy of fire fighting and armor penetration necessary to deal with the small-sized targets (such as "The Tank") at huge distances.
But in this table are fairly laid couplers visibility with the visual attributes of man.
That's what goes on this VI Kudrin in his article "The ergonomic principle of increasing the search features of the tank" (WBT dw 3, 1989).
"… In daylight the march with closed hatches detection tank hazardous purposes is reduced by 40 — 60% …
The man is an integrator and regulator performance characteristics of the tank. The human element is more vulnerable and less studied component of up to 30% failure rate appears ~ n the fault of the human factor … "
But technology was moving forward, and at the end of the 90s on the basis of mathematical modeling of electrical systems arise, allowing to slightly increase the search capabilities of the tank. But that's what this says VI Kudrin:
"… The shortcomings of mathematical models is the neglect of the identity of the operator.
…The application of mathematical methods has led to some increase in the efficiency of search capabilities due to "technical" level, and the search properties of the tank in a retrieval system, remains a "thing in itself".
The qualities of the human component of the system are: indiviaualno psychological disposition, character, motivation, emotion;
psychological: attention, memory, thinking;
visual: the exposure and dynamic (if rather short exposure) visual acuity, oculomotor activity, the capacity of the visual analyzer;
Professor: benefit, special techniques, knowledge of the enemy.
Oftaelmoergonomicheskih complex parameters is the trigger of the gunner, the base of which lie in the reception disk imaging, its processing and decision making.
At the output of the system are the speed and accuracy. opredelyayushie final battle "(emphasis added).
So can briefly define communication between impartiality and personal factors in the "visibility".
But let us return to our little table. It is taken as the base distance of 1.5 km, and the maximum — 4 km. While our tank sight multiplicity growth was 3.5 "and 8" and the angles of field 18 'and 9', respectively. With these properties could find the target at a range of 3.2 — 3.6 km from the place, and 2.2 — 2.4 km away from the course, but to find the purpose of "Tank ™ — at a range of 2.5 — 3 km from the place of and only 1.7 — 1.8 km from the move.
For reference, on the tanks of NATO scopes have variable frequency rate from 8 "to 16" and the corners of the field of view of 10 'to 3' direction. But it must be understood that as the multiplicity of light transmission is compounded.
Speaking of the table, pay attention to the last column, shows the extent to which the configuration of atmospheric transparency depending on the thickness of the air layer. In this case, it can be considered as a purely physical settlement figure. But in the life of the transparency of the atmosphere — the value of the variable, and in the main it is dependent on weather conditions. I remember when we held in the autumn-winter period the factory and municipal tests of the T-54B with stabilizer "Cyclone", the distance to fire on the move was for TTT 1500 — 1000 m, there was not the 1st option, so we postponed or transferred to another shooting day because of weather conditions. But when on the T-64 set guided weapons "Cobra" with the greatest firing range of 4000 m and a customer claimed in the first year of mass production to inspect 100% of full-scale tanks firing at the highest range, it was found that it is collected by the tanks for months (there were cases — up to 2 months) were idle at the site in anticipation of visibility 4 km to meteorological conditions (late autumn, winter, early spring).
There is much to ponder.
As proof of all uttered give details of the magazine "Armee of Defence" (1989, May — June) of the French tank Leclerc. The magazine reports that 65% of the price of the tank falls on electronics. With all this much to see that the panoramic sight of the tank is more expensive main motor (14.3% and 11.2%, respectively), the gunner's sight — more basic equipment (5.6% and 4.1%), computing device, the fire control system — no expensive equipment tower (1.9% and 1.2% respectively).
The figures suggest that from a technical standpoint, the issues of visibility in the tank are becoming a larger proportion.
3. Either ROCKET GUN
Simple, fast and categorically decided the issue in his time, Nikita Khrushchev: "Artillery — this cave technique. Give a rocket!" It has been in effect 40 years from the time when the verdict was handed down. Missiles firmly entered the life of the armed forces, but as long as it does not change the artillery could not. With all of this, I believe that the question "Do the rocket in the tank?" — A Russian tank manufacturing fundamentally unresolved to this day. First, the 80s, when the rapid development of compact defense systems of NATO states in tank thoroughly and comprehensively open a discussion question: what should be the range of the tank weapons of the future? In order not to repeat the essence of this discussion, I will give a few extracts from journals since then.
Here's what he wrote magazine "International Defence Review", 1972, v 5, № 1.
"During the second world war tank battle range fluctuated between 800 and 1500 s and most of the tank battles took place at ranges of 600 to 1,200 meters but there were a few instances when the German war machine ™ Tiger-I" and "Tiger-II" opened fire on the enemy tanks at a distance of 3000 m, and were usually hit with the third shot.
According to British sources, the average combat range of tanks during the war in Kashmir in 1965 was 600 — 1200 meters, the South American General Marshall leads the average range in the Sinai Campaign in 1967, equal to 900 — 1100 m in some cases, for example in the battle for the Golan Heights, the Israelis fired from tanks, "Centurion" type shells HESH (high-explosive with a flattening of the head) with a range of 3000 m and disabling enemy tanks in the worst case, with the third shot after capture target in the plug.
As a result of research areas Central European zone established that most of the targets will be in the range up to 2000 m (50% of all purposes — at distances up to 1000 m 30% — between 1000 and 2000 m, and 20% — up to 2000 m).
The study area in the northern part of West Germany, undertaken by the command of NATO forces, led to the conclusion that the conduct of the fire will be on the following ranges: 1000 — 3000 m — for most purposes, 3000 — 4000 m — 8% of the targets, 4000 — 5000m — 4% of the targets and the above 5,000 — 5% of the targets.
On this basis, the British and South American tank experts concluded: range of 3000 m can be regarded as the greatest military firing range of the tank and it should be considered as the basis of requirements for a future tank gun (they mentioned tayuke to increase the firing range of up to 4000 m).
By estimates of the Yankees, the tank that shoots first, has the ability to defeat enemy tanks by 80% higher. "
In the journal "International Defence Review", 1973, v 6, № 6, we find in the article "A new generation of tanks," follow-up assessments of both the tank and the tank weapons systems.
"Generally tanks have never been immune to the enemy guns, but they are less vulnerable and more than mobile than many other military assets …
Studies conducted in the European Theater of Operations (HPT), showed that the frequency of detection and recognition of targets in the vast distances is relatively low, and on small distances, on the contrary, more superior. As a result, the cumulative chance of detection and recognition of targets is almost the same as for the guns with an improved fire control, and for the missiles. If we consider the effectiveness of guns from the standpoint of the probability of hitting, there is not enough choice between forms with 2 tank weapons.
In any case, the possibility of getting — it's not the only aspect on which to judge the effectiveness of weapons systems. The tank should be destroyed in a short time, in order to reduce the length of time the enemy retaliation.
…range at which the slaughter of ATGM is less than the defeat of the gun exceeds the range at which the possibility of defeat ATGM is higher than that of the gun. This fact, coupled with the configuration of the probability of detection and identification of targets regardless of the distance leads to the conclusion that the average gun superior ATGM in the European theater of operations, and many lrugih (emphasis added).
The difference in the rate of fire also questions the common way to assess the relative effectiveness of guns and ATGM, which is based on the probability of hitting a single shot. Be sure that you can make two or three shots from a gun for the time it takes for the 1st shot ATGM. Since
the price of the second-generation guided missile (with automatic command control system. — JK) is about 20 times more than the price shell tank gun, it will have an impact on the cost-effectiveness of gun systems (emphasis added). "
I tried to bring the main reasons NATO military professionals when evaluating artillery and missile tank. In this connection, for sure, it must be said, as such analysis was conducted from us. I remember in 1962 as a representative VNIITransmash, under consideration of the technical project "Object 287" (tank missile development KB LCZ). Consideration was happening in GBTU into sections NTS. After leading designer graduated own report, questions started. Raised a hand of Colonel Grau. He was given the floor.
— I have a question to the speaker. Effective missile artillery shell at a range of 3 — 4 km. There is evidence that in Central Europe, where NATO forces are concentrated and SVD, terrain at a range of 3 — 4 km can find a total of 5 — 6% of the targets. We considered whether the application of such mass expensive and hard tools like a tank, so to perform limited tasks?
— I rented this question! — A cry rang out from the audience. — And you, Colonel, leave the hall!
Everyone turned to this team replica. She filed a colonel-general, who seems to have already entered the hall at the time of the report. As it turns out, Colonel-General was represented at the General Staff of the NTS. His team-designation has been made mandatory. After that, open a discussion section on technical issues only.
Apart from this, other cases discussing "gun or rocket" in the practice of the Russian tank development in either the Russian press, I do not know.
In the end, on the main battle tanks of NATO weapons remained cannon, here it was the missile cannon. At the theoretical level, at first glance, our tanks from the standpoint of strategy become more effective: "if you want, shoot out of a cannon artillery shells, you want — a rocket."
From this we can agree only on a theoretical level. Arguing, we consider only the combat characteristics of guns and forget about the concept of "combat effectiveness." I have already referred to the VI Kudrin (WBT, 1989, № 3). Considering issues of ergonomics, he rightly says: "Man is the integrator TTX tank and regulator. "Let's try to understand what actually is it in our particular case.
In TTX guided weapons is recorded that at a distance of 4000 m missile hits the target with a 98 — 99%. How to inspect it? At the firing position set experienced tank. At a distance of 4000 m from the tank set a target so that it was excellent (one hundred percent) vision to the terrain did not create obstacles to the missile, and in the right weather to shoot missiles. While the rocket overcomes the distance to the target, the shooter is the operator with the remote control keeps for several seconds reticle control device on the target.
At the theoretical level, in those few seconds the operator can smoke a cigar and drinking coffee. In any case, if a specialist, he can only worry for high-quality performance obligations. If the first or second missile hit the target, its task is complete.
Now imagine for themselves a real combat situation. On the experience of combat tanks and aircraft in the war in the Middle East in October 1973, "Military Technology and Economy" (Organizer 2), number 9, 1974 reported: "During the last war in the Middle East, there has been a broad and massive use tanks, in which both sides suffered heavy losses, from infantry anti-tank weapon — 50% in tank battles — 30% of the aircraft and anti-tank mines — 20%. Most of the tanks were amazed anti-tank gun at a distance of 2.5 — 3 km ….. "In this situation, our shooter operator together with its missile tank itself is converted into goal number 1 for all anti-tank weapons of the enemy. As pointed out by combat experience in Almost all of these criteria varies.
-The experience of the second world war showed that the value of the probability of getting in a fight goes down very much in comparison with the probability of getting acquired in time of peace at the landfill. For the 88-mm gun PAK 43 with dimensions of 2.5 x 2 m target and the distance of 1500 m from getting in peacetime was 77%, and in time of war — only 33%. "
As we see, in action, "hothouse" the possibility of hitting the target decreases by half.
Spoken of above can make a definite conclusion: "The standards should not be associated only weapon in combat features. Need to learn how to identify their combat effectiveness and based on it to make the final choice."
And now a look at this problem of the other. The political leaders of NATO countries openly declared that the arms race, which they unleashed in the "cool war" — is not a "target" of the war, and "means." With the arms race posed little problem to bleed the economy of the socialist camp. In this situation, evaluation of new types of weapons should be a basic principle of "cost — effectiveness", because the main battlefront in the "cool war" has moved from the area of combat operations in the field of economics.
What we got from the standpoint of the economy, by developing, by adopting and launching a series of missile-gun tank? On the fourth year of normal production gun tank T-64A was worth 194 thousand rubles, rocket and gun tank T-64 was worth 318 thousand rubles. The price of the tank increased by 114 thousand rubles, or by 60%, and its combat effectiveness in comparison with conventional enemy tank increased by 3 — 4%. With all this we still do not consider that the 10's time compared with artillery shot increased the price of rocket firing. As a result, navodchikovoperatorov taught rockets fired from a tank with electrical simulators, and in order to save the shot missiles naturnyi combat missile on average accounted for 1 in 10 of the trainees. " But it is also necessary to take into account when we evaluate the combat effectiveness.
The issues raised in this section, have extraordinary relevance. As experience shows, in tank weapons systems and control systems are developed more lively, and these systems greatly affect the combat effectiveness of the tank. And though they say, "cool war" ended, but the economic uncertainty in Russia puts economic component in evaluating the combat effectiveness of design innovations with even greater urgency than in years "cool war".
Now the dictionary defines the word "crew" as a command, the personnel of the tank. During the war, German stateliness Russian tanks T-III, T-IV, T-V, T and T-VI-VIB ("royal tiger") all had a crew of 5 people. The position of the Germans in this matter was clear. The Russian tank building, there was no clarity. Medium Tank T-34-76 had a crew of 4 people. Since January 1944 is released the T-34-85, the crew was increased to 5 people.
Languid KV tanks had a crew 5 people, and in 1943 began producing tanks IP, the crew was reduced to 4 people. Despite the fact that fundamentally multifunctional differences in the obligations of the members of the crew and another tank was no.
Try to trace and evaluate the evolution of views on the crew of the tank directly on the example of Russian medium tank T-34, T-54 and T-64. In fact it was the main Russian Army tanks.
T-34-76. The crew of four people: a tank commander — he's gunner, a driver, loader, gunner. Of the four members of the crew had the third twin functions: commander, gunner, a driver and a gunner. Cooperating these functions as a specialty person could, but to do them in full on the person and on the mental level, and physically could not. But if a driver could stop a tank and to address the physical damage (if it was in his power) if the gunner at the request of its own commander could end up shooting at the manpower of the gun (while the infantry had not yet had its own anti-tank guns) and start working on the radio, the tank commander, finding the enemy tank or anti-tank gun, had to immediately open artillery fire, achieving defeats the purpose. At the time of the duel he found himself without a tank commander, because at that time the commander of a 100% converted to a gunner. Excellent even if it was a line of tanks. And if it was a tank platoon, company or battalion commander turned out that without a battle, all the unit. Oh, so it is said about it in the order of Stalin number 325 of October 16, 1942:
"… Company commanders and battalion, moving ahead of combat orders, do not have the ability to watch the tanks and control the battle of their own units and converted to ordinary tank commanders, and parts, not having control, lose orientation and wander around the battlefield, carrying a useless loss … " At the time of our loss in the tanks is not measured in tens, not a hundred, but tyschami. As we see, this issue came to the commander in chief of the Red Army is not the case.
T-34-85. The crew of five people: a tank commander, driver, gunner, loader, gunner. In this embodiment, the situation has changed fundamentally with the commander in the best possible way. In this embodiment, the T-34 participated in the victorious, ending with step majestically Russian war.
T-54. Adopted in 1946. The crew of four people: a tank commander — he's radio operator, a driver, gunner, loader — he's the anti-aircraft machine gun shooter. In this embodiment, the situation with the commander at first glance seems normal. But that's only until such time as we do not understand: what is the time to fight for the radio unit commander.
Here's what he wrote in 1980, E. Morozov in his article "The problem of reducing the size of the crew of the main tank" (WBT, № 6)
"… In the modern tank about the same piece of management as to gallakticheskom ship (more than 200). From them 40% of the commander because he can not successfully manage and your tank, and a division once. Total disk imaging battalion commander for the day 420 posts out of them 33% higher, 22% of employees and 44% of the interacting entities. exchange of information can take up to 8 hours (2 — 5 minutes per session), or 50% at the 15-hour working days are. "
To this we must add that in addition to working on the radio for it was still necessary to look, it was still necessary to maintain.
Hardly worth it in this case, the shift to the shoulders of the commander to the same concern for the maintenance of radio communications. Certainly, this reduced the combat effectiveness of the tank.
T-64. Adopted in 1966. The crew of three people: a tank commander, radio operator, he's the anti-aircraft machine gun shooter, a driver, gunner — in the next he's operator ATGM. The design of the mechanism used in the tank loader guns (MOH), which makes loading of the gun as artillery and missile shots. But if the power of the work was done now charging mechanism, the controls on this mechanism and its technical service went on pnechi gunner.
With such heavy staff structure of the crew talk about the growth of the combat effectiveness of the T-64, although it had been fighting properties, according to Russian professionals (and the military in particular), the most highest in the world tank manufacturing. And impartially can agree with it (in the fighting properties, we consider only the quantitative but not high quality of the crew).
All of the above applies to the spoken tank and its crew in action. But much of the time the tank is out of the battlefield, where it is temporarily transformed into a fighting machine that you want to clean, lubricate, refuel, replenish its ammunition, restore the chassis (replacing worn or warped road wheels and caterpillar tracks), flush the clogged air cleaners, clean and lubricate weapons. Here the verge of specialization between tank crews cleared and they are transformed into a "crew car combat ™. Here for that to change track or tracks to clean 125-mm gun, need at least 3 people. This is at the physical level is very languid and dirty (in the literal sense of the words) work.
E. Morozov, thinking about how to reduce the crew of the tank up to 2 people, spent time keeping the T-64 (crew of 3 people) and got the following data:
So, 9 hours of continuous physical layer volume work, after which you need to give people the opportunity to wash a little, take food, take a break and relax for further combat operations.
Then I can blame that I am very much attention to maintenance issues. It may be said that during the war the crew of the T-34 was not easy, but he's performed his obligations and the T-34 had the highest combat effectiveness. It may be said that the post-war Russian tanks dramatically increased fighting properties due to: the introduction of the stabilization of arms, introducing rangefinders, the introduction of the Ministry of Health and, in the end, due to the introduction of missile weapons.
As for all that we have changed the terms of the rights in the fight? We have forgotten that "Man is the integrator and regulator performance characteristics of the tank."
That's what this report says about SRI-2 "0 results of the research" Deduction "(18 February 1972):
"- If the load on the operator to take gunner-T unit 34, the T-55 and T-62 is increased by 60%, T 64 by 70%, in IT 1 270%."
And in the same report:
"- Increased number of operations and their complexity increase the amount of bounce arms tank crew through the fault (in a T-55 — 32% in T-62 — 64%). At the same time, technological reliability T-62 is higher than T 55: for technical failures of T-62 — 35% of the T-55 — 68%.
Part tanks reduces the reliability of their efficiency by 16%. "
You can give other examples of how in the pursuit of the highest traits of the Russian military tank building, due to gross neglect of human factor was reduced once the combat effectiveness of tanks.
I will give another example, which, in my opinion, is for armored forces fundamentally important. This
time the order is stately Russian war. It's small, I'll give him one hundred percent.
about the purpose of commanding officers to middle and languid tanks
Number 0400 October 9, 1941
To increase the combat effectiveness of tank troops, the best of their combat use in collaboration with other branches of the military to appoint:
1. As commander of medium tanks * second lieutenants and lieutenants.
2. The positions of platoon commanders medium tanks * lieutenants.
3. The positions of commanders KV tanks — captains — the majors.
4. In post komandnrov mouth medium tanks * — captains.
5. The positions of battalion commanders languid and medium tanks * — majors, lieutenant colonels.
Chief of monetary control of the Red Army to make the appropriate configuration in the salaries of the content.
* Word-of medium tanks, entered I. Stapinym reddish pencil instead of "T-34".
The People's Commissar of Defense
This order — an example of how the bloodiest war taught our High Command realize the significance of the human factor in armored vehicles and human value in increasing the combat effectiveness of the tank.
But the war was over, and began to forget its lessons. The new post-war tanks were becoming more and more difficult technically. Thus, in the mass production of 1 January 1946 labor-T-34 was 3203 standard hour, the labor-T-55 (on January 1, 1968) was 5723 standard-hour, labor-T-62 (January 1, 1968 .) was 5855 labor hours and labor-T-64 (on January 1, 1968) was 22564 standard hour. With all of this in comparison with the T-34 crew of the T-55 and T-62 was lower by 1 person (4 people instead of 5 for the T-34) and, in particular, had a negative impact on the combat effectiveness of these tanks, as commander of a tank discharge of the officer was transferred again into the category of sergeant. At the T-64 crew was reduced to 3 people in general, and with all this in tank units was abolished post zampoteha company and the vacant place in the staffing introduced the position of political officer. In the end, the future commander of the combat training tank was held for six months in training units flush with the rest of the crew. 0 consequences of such decisions tankers VNIITransmash in 1988 in its own report on the research "Study the main directions of development of armored vehicles to the TCB" (code "content-3") wrote:
"… On the one hand, the constant updating technology and high-quality short-lived life of massive contingents of personnel, on the other hand, greatly complicate the tasks of combat training.
The features of the process of preparing a fighter and junior officers is that within six months of yesterday's schoolchildren are often poor knowledge Russian language in the training units required to prepare soldiers have modern instrument.
At the conclusion of psychologists, the level of organization and technological equipment of the educational process in the training units … with ~ considerably behind the level of difficulty of the objects. To summarize the results of the survey of graduates of the training center, they are prepared for the operation of the facilities in the best case, by 30 — 40% (my italics), ready only to the most superficial of its operation, without detailed knowledge of its systems and facilities. "
The data confirm the research conducted:
"… That the combat effectiveness of the tank can vary by an order regardless of the level of training and fitness crew."
And in conclusion:
"Given the low rates of resource and ammunition due to their highest price, the number of hours crews on combat-capable machines with 2 years of service, so not a lot that is not provided by the formation and consolidation of sustainable combat abilities work, and realizayiya fighting properties machines crew average does not exceed 60% "(emphasis added).
Summarizing everything said, you can make the following conclusions:
1. The crew advisable to have a 4-man: a tank commander (aka platoon or company or battalion), gunner, a driver and loader.
2. The design of the tank's advisable to have a loading mechanism. With all of this in the function of the loader must enter management and service loading mechanism, the work on the radio and the firing of anti-aircraft machine gun.
3. The commander of a tank officer should be the average of the military-technical education.
4. The level of military and technical training of the crew must ensure the implementation of more than 90% of combat machine properties in the criteria, it is very close to a combat situation.
The latter requirement can be a lot more to implement the transition to a professional army. With conscripts embody paragraph 4 will be a lot more difficult and, more importantly, after demobilization, in civilian life, people quickly lose its special abilities and knowledge of tanker and, as in the case of mobilization will be expertly not suitable for effective use in a modern tank.
Fundamentally related issues with the crew of the tank, require radical solutions.
Send to fight a modern complex machine, knowing in advance that her crew has appropriate knowledge and abilities of its management — means consciously condemn to death and technology, and people.
5. Driver and TANK
As the crew of the tank there is one person that is associated with the machine (tank), and on the physical level, and organically. That's the last form of communication we never actually stop to think, and it has a very severe importance for such cars as the tank. I have not thought about it and I though he had a driving license and the bike had some practice in driving T-34 and T-54. My attention was drawn to the subject case. If memory serves, it happened in 1970. One day I got a call from the Academy of BTV and was invited to come to them and look kinotrenazher driver, developed by a group of professionals and young officers Adjunct Academy. What I saw outshone all of my expectations. In the tremendous box on a concrete foundation, leaving at 4 meters deep into the earth, has mounted a full-size model of the iron bow of the tank. Inside the layout was one hundred percent of production parts and components installed workplace of the driver's T-54. The horizontal layout mounted on a massive 2-hinged and can swing in a vertical plane around the center of mass of the simulated calculation of the tank. Swing produced using massive hydraulic cylinders. Behind the layout was built with a special film projector platform. Was placed in front of the movie screen. On one side of the layout was accordingly equipped cabin instructor, on the other — cases with control equipment. Communication between the learner and the instructor was carried out using a tank intercom. Was carried eyeliner power supply. Overall Shield is a complex construction and engineering construction.
With the severe problems facing developers and shield in cinetechnics. Then sync with the image of species tank tracks have been recorded accurately and geometrically her profile, and still do almost everything that was not in the ordinary movie.
I will not go into details, I will mention just but simulating the actual physical activities on the working bodies, which took advantage of the driver, the work sheet was accompanied by simulating real-world noise occurring in the criteria of the tank.
What he saw prompted a feeling of profound respect for the spice, smogshim make such a shield, and testified to the harsh real abilities of the Academy of BTV in a while. Tankers have something to be proud of. Did not cause vibrations that such a board would be able to do better lozvolit superbly trained driver-mechanics and dramatically reduce fu
el tanks in the service life of combat training park. It was necessary to take positive measures to organize work on the boards in the industry. While in charge of armored vehicles in the Defense Ministry was deputy. Minister Joseph Y. Kotin.
I called him. Kotin not have a lot to explain, he realized and accepted to perform at a glance, without requiring any official instructions. The ministry issued an order in which the plant was instructed to do Muromsky bureau for tank simulators and manufacturing facilities for the production of such simulators. Which was then performed.
But the main reason why I thought the whole story came out after I graduated acquainted with a shield. I was approached by one of the participants of the demonstration board, introduced himself as an associate academy and subsequent said. They (the creators of the shield) came to the conclusion that, apart from the fact that the shield is a simulator for the development of certain abilities in humans control the machine, it is also a device that allows a quantitative study the organic links that arise between man and machine in the course of their work together. To shield the control system were connected devices that are up to a little bit of a second measure allowed the emergence of an alarming video on the silver screen, the reaction time on her person and the response time of the respective devices. On the basis of these data have been developed and tested standards for the evaluation of their performance in the simulator with the estimates on a 5-point scale. With Cuban women invited a group of young fighter that took place there a course on mechanics, drivers, and tested them on the board. The works allowed those who were rated "5", "4" and "3". Losers to work on the shield is not allowed, because some of them got there a severe spinal injury. 0osle lessons on the shield fighter returned to Kubinka, where they continued their studies on the real tank combat training park. Upon graduation, all men without exception, showed poor results on the board (evaluation "3"), at the end of study, despite all the training, evaluation of the above three driving could not get.
Even before this disk imaging adjunct I realized how great significance and fitness of a person's experience for the proper and competent driving. But now I think about the fact that with increasing weight of the tank and the growth of its dynamic accuracy and speed of the act mehanikavoditelya receive special significance.
The current tanks holding weighing more than 50 tons and reach speeds of over 70 km / h, require the person performing management operations such machine is almost a matter of seconds shred. But not everyone is able to do, which was confirmed by the experience of the Academy of BTV.
Well, in life we're looking at that one person, if he sees falling sandwich, catch it on the fly, and another stir only when the sandwich is already on the floor.
Now, when I hear reports of tragedies on the road and pass the car "BMV" collided with a car "Ford," because the driver can not cope with the control, supervision, I understand that the person who undertook to operate the machine "BMV", was the nature of the high-speed response, which did not meet the dynamic characteristics of the machine "BMV", such a person could not give the right to operate such specific machine.
Apparently, its proper certification was time to enter and for candidates to be selected in the driver of the tank.
In principle, the tankers have long been required to pay their attention to the performance of the tank depending on the condition of the driver. For example, in 1975 the magazine kelly, № 2 in the article "The impact of the time of hand-motor reaction of the driver to control the quality of the tank" wrote:
"… T-64A two-night march in winter criteria, as a result of fatigue idle time-motor response increased by the end of the first day by 38% by the end of the second — by 64% (0.87 s, 1.13 and 1, 44 seconds respectively). With this riding distance at 30 km / h (8.3m / s) — 30 m, 35 km / h (9.7m / s) — 50 m, 40 km / h (11 1 m / sec) — 75 m and 50 km / h (13.8 m / sec) — 150 m ";
In the same journal in 1975 VBT, № 4 GI Golovachyov in "0 simulation of the movement of tank columns" the following data:
"… As experience shows, the acceleration of the movement of single tanks does not increase rates of the convoys."
And let's schedule:
And more. In the journal of TSWV, № 2 1978 FP Shpak in the article "The impact of" slow — crackdown "on the mobility of VGM in the march," cites data that the growth of the power density from 10 to 20 hp / ton Vav increases by 80% from 20 to 30 ps / m — increases by 10 — 12%.
It is easy to create, that in all these cases, purely technical, at first glance, the characteristics directly depend on "downtime visual-motor response" (writes WBT, № 2 1975) of man. And if we wish to increase even further the importance of these features, we need deeper and more serious study of human abilities and try to put it to good use.
Unfortunately, up to this day or our military specialists, tanks and tank builders talk about the dynamic ability of the machine only from the standpoint of technology, or showing ignorance in matters of the tank depending on the dynamics of human performance, or inexcusable neglect in a human factor in general.
Now the whole world has bypassed photo "flying" of the Russian T-90 tank. When I look at it, I could not help being imposed question:
-As more correct to say "a driver of the T-90" or "pilot-driver of the T-90"?
6. CARE Tanks
Send into battle tank with a crew that is able to use the combat characteristics of the machine by only 50%, or to send into battle qualified crew on the tank, which is at its technical condition can only provide 50% of pledged in his design of combat traits prototype criminal. Because in peacetime military service personnel training and technical service support combat readiness of combat vehicles should be designed so as to provide the highest readiness of both of them (in the war — even more so). Previously, we have beheld that service training tank crews in the Russian Army was poorly organized. The same can be said of the service logistics.
Here's reported that V. Novikov, V. Sokolov and A. Shumilov article ™ Normative and actual costs of operating AFV "(WBT, № 2, 1991)
"… According to the data acquired in the process of controlled military operation in parts of the number of military districts (Leningrad, Kiev, and others), the actual total annual costs for operation of the T-72A and T-80B, respectively, increased to 3 and 4 times in comparison with the costs for the operation of the T-55.
…actual average repair costs by 25 — 40% less, and the current — by 70 — 80% over the respective regulatory costs.
1) failure to implement fully the medium repairs (shortcomings in planning the supply of spare parts and maintenance materials), which leads to an incre
ase in the number of failures and the increase for this reason that the number of current repairs;
2) increasing fraction of failures in complex swatches with a complex structure (the T-64A odds. Difficulties of 0.79, while the T-80B — 0.86);
3) violation of the rules and modes of operation of the samples (the missing crew training and the complication of the design standard). "
YK Gusev, T. and A. Pikturno lounging in the article "Increasing the effectiveness of the maintenance of tanks" (WBT, № 2, 1988)
"Analysis of the range of failures series of tanks showed that 30 — 40% of them would be warned when the rational organization of THAT.
The equality of the components in the total losses in the regular service (ie, the duration of equality actually works ETO and time associated repair) comes to the T-80B through 100 km, T-64B — 200 km, and for the T-72B — 350 km. "
The latter conclusion is the enthusiasm for design assessment of the tank from the standpoint of operation. As we see, tagilchane overshadowed by this parameter is 3.5 times of Leningrad and Kharkov — 1.75 times.
It should also be noted that the NATO countries on maintaining the technical readiness of tanks paid much more attention. Typically, when considering the number of main battle tank logistical issues spices military service actually put on the first place.
That's what this magazine wrote, "Armor", № 4 for 1988 in the article "Some propositions concerning the reduction of the tank crew":
"The Western press is increasingly expressed opinion about the ability to reduce the tank crew. Prerequisite for this are the advances made in technology and in particular in the field of automatic charging device.
U.S., UK, France and West Germany in the current study the possibility of reducing the time a tank crew. Preliminary results of a comparison of the 4 crew and 3 persons led to the subsequent conclusions:
— The crew of 3 people with the introduction of additional equipment and to other accommodations crew inside can ensure the system within 72 hours of battle, and for all that the level of combat effectiveness of the tank is not significantly different from the level of combat effectiveness of the tank with a crew of 4 people.
— Apart from the automatic charging device will still need other equipment in order to assure the crew of 3 persons of the same opportunity to maintenance of the machine, which makes the tank crew of 4 people.
— During the operation of logistics services is not enough 3-man crew (emphasis added).
— Tanks with a crew of 3 people in general are more sensitive to the voltage of the fight, the least able to make up for the loss and have a huge load in the event of damage to the tank in relation to the tanks, where a crew of 4 people. This is especially felt during long operations.
A reduction in the tank crew must be considered in all qualities and in particular as a combat efficiency, saving human resources and save money. Preference otaaetsya judgment vozpeystviya sokrasheniya crew on his combat effectiveness. Lowering the combat effectiveness is not acceptable (emphasis added).
The decision to reduce the number of crew members is not an easy decision, and it should not be attributed specifically to the presence of the ability to use an automatic charger.
To reduce the number of crew members to perform improvements on the tank, which necessarily lead to dilemmas in maintenance, to ensure the security and logistical support. "
The Russian tank building maintenance issues were absolutely in the competence of the military, because in step development and the creation of new types of field of view of designers actually fell. In this regard, it seems appropriate for the development of TTT for the creation of new models to introduce a special section "Maintaining technical readiness" and the requirements of this section to begin to consider optional. Such a procedure would force both the customer and the developer in advance and work out a little deeper question, which is fundamentally important for the combat effectiveness of the tank.
The purpose of the true work — to draw attention to the tank and tank builders dilemmas that the Russian tank manufacturing usual number of minor, but in fact actually directly influenced the combat effectiveness of the tank.
The apparent prescription given in the paper materials can now affect the individual digital values, but not fundamentally affected by the problems of the essence.
This work — food for thought.
And more. I keep the book "Naval commander" — materials about the life and activities of the Union of Russian Navy Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov Gerasimovitch. In the book, put the expression NG Kuznetsov of manuscripts of works, phonebooks and books. I'll give it three expressions:
1. "Military people have no right to be caught off guard. Seems to be a sudden he looked no different twist or action can not be, that he caught by surprise, it is necessary to be prepared. At the highest willingness to suddenly lose power."
2. "The highest organization — the key to victory."
3. "I wrote the book, so that the conclusions were made."
In these words the essence and meaning of laid like this and all of my previous books.
March — September 2000