In the person of the commander WSMD like a drop of water reflected all the standard reddish army in 1941. He was the commander, who promptly moved to the supreme position due to thin out the army repression. But the version that he did not have sufficient training, which is easy to explain and all served in the coming reason for his execution, is not true. By assigning only him responsible for what happened in June 1941, so we assert that the other person in his place would improve the situation. As if the situation in which the West front succumbed to the blows of the Germans, did not even ask the evidence. Some especially savvy experts at saying that it was enough to put the existing tanks T-34 and KV in an ambush, as later did the general Katukov near Moscow and German tanks would burn before Baranovichy. But such people are completely baffled ask the question "where they organize an ambush?". Apparently, Pavlov had to know the precise routes coming of German troops. But he did not know, and when vyznat — it was too late.
Before the judge Pavlova need to put yourself in their shoes and consider actions, taking into account the data that was in his possession. In itself, accommodation Bialystok projection has meant an operation on the environment and, of course, knew Pavlov. All of it was the fact that a similar operation could be carried out by various methods, which presented difficulties and defending and advancing. The primary, and for those for the other was a matter of determining the point of convergence of the advancing armored spearheads. From the Germans were expecting a similar operation, but a small depth, with an attempt in the area of education boiler Volokovysk, Baranovichi.
Historical events, as often happens, the pushing forward of chance. Something similar happened in 1941 in Brest. Having learned from bitter experience in 1939, while Gudarian already tried to take over more of the Polish Brest fortress in the campaign in 1941 he planned a double workaround. Figuratively speaking, the high-spirited Heinz "blew on the water", replaced in order to throw his tank group along the highway in Brest, he drove it in tanks for rugged terrain to the south and north of Brest. Take the castle and attack the city had infantry. And so began the morning on June 22 for "health", Gudarian graduated "for the peace." The Germans captured a lot of bridges, but many of them are applicable for the infantry and light vehicles, not tanks. All day June 22 izderzhala tank group to fight with the terrain, trying to get out on the highway. By the evening of June 22, many still have not crossed the Bug. Sprouted on the same highway section 3 and 4 armored divisions 49 Motorized Corps Germans at the end of day or stumble upon scorched bridge over Mukhovets in Bulkovo. Gudarian was annoyed by such a beginning, but this is the delay it has played a major role in the unfolding drama of the Western Front.
By the end of the day or Pavlov and his staff engaged in assessment of events and tried to create countermeasures. Pavlov did not know all that we know now, he was driven data exploration. What did he beheld? First razveddonesenie from 14:00 to report that the enemy is making every effort to capture Grodno, the second of 16:15 talk about the fact that the main efforts of enemy aircraft observed in the area of Grodno, Lida. Evening final 22 hours of the intelligence contained the following data. With the dawn of the Soviet border fled German units of up to 30-32 infantry divisions, 4.5 tank, up to 2 motorized, 40 artillery regiments, 4-5 regiments, one landing division. And this is where the scouts were wrong not much working against neighborhood forces were determined approximately correctly emphasized that the actions in the area of border crossing your neighbor on the right tank group, whose strength was estimated at 4 armored and motorized divisions.
But a very different picture was on rassredotachivaniyu these troops. Thus alleged that at Grodno come 2 tank and two motorized divisions, in fact there was only one infantry. But gun to other areas remained 2-3 tank connection. Another armored division intelligence "found" in the southern fase Bialystok ledge, and there were no tanks, infantry only reinforced ACS "Shturmgeshyuts." At Brest remained 1-2 armored division, it was a fatal miscalculation, the underestimation of the enemy on the left flank.
This was done completely and specific preconditions, air reconnaissance of the front was weakened suffered tremendous losses for the day. You could even take into account the aspect such as the depth of penetrations of enemy units and the introduction of the battle tanks. Specifically on the direction of Grodno, this situation was observed. In the district of Brest Gudarina introduced his tanks into battle by roundabout ways and in Minsk, they have not yet beheld. Later, as luck would come directive number 3 of the General Staff, which ordered together with the North-Western Front strike back at the flank Suvalkovskoy group of Germans. It is fully docked with the fact that Pavlov beheld the enemy in Grodno — represented the main danger. So the largest and most battle-worthy mechanized division of the front (6 Mechanized Corps) was thrown into the battle of Grodno, where it was forced to ram a strong defense of anti-infantry divisions of the Wehrmacht. But the left wing commander did not leave without attention to this area were entered into combat infantry, 47 Rifle Corps in the 55, 121 and 155 infantry divisions.
The saddest thing is that to understand the situation in front of the headquarters of failed and 23 numbers are still evaluating operating on the left flank force the Germans as insignificant. Meanwhile, the Panzer Group 2 June 23 Part 4 of the army crushed Korobkova. And for a day of its advanced armored units advanced to 130 km, reaching the river izluki Shchara. Specifically, there was a meeting 55 Infantry Division and armored divisions Germans. Fighting in izluke Shchara continued throughout the next day on June 24. Stubborn fighting division detained on the day of the German tank rink, in one of those fights had died and the division commander, Colonel Ivanyuk.
But the important thing was not the case. In the battle that took place in the morning of early June 24, 155 Infantry Division reconnaissance battalion scattered motorized detachment of Germans. In one of the two cars are maps were found, one of them was deposited with the decor. This card was immediately targeted the headquarters of the front, where the bombshell, as if scales fell from the eyes of the commander. By applied to her situation was clear that against his left flank are 3 German tank corps, one of them in the 2nd tier.
Next played their say the time factor. The map was captured around 4:00 am on June 24, took some time to send it to the front headquarters, as luck would have it that specifically June 24 was relocated from Minsk to Hog, the time has been lost here. But even so, the first decision based on the data contained on the map, it was decided at 15:20 on June 25, it took about one and a half days. Maybe commander izderzhal them on reinsurance, the data needed to test, at least, now it was clear where he was.
General Pavlov was not bound by any orders of the "fight to the death" did not ask for a bet, waiting for her decision at 4 day battle he gives troops the order to retreat. In case of success the Front's troops could avoid the inevitable defeat. 6 Mechanized Corps was turning 180 degrees to strike at the elephant, he had to become the vanguard and the main disruptive force retreating troops. But in giving this order, Pavlov eased the pressure on the flank of the Germans in Grodno. Prior to joining the German armored spearheads near Minsk had a little more than 2 days.