Prospects for the U.S. nuclear triad — Part I

Prospects for the U.S. nuclear triad - Part I
Value it can be given to aircraft components
Misha Tsurkov
Andrew Shushko
Analysis of the last 10 years the development of the U.S. nuclear triad, which is now part of the reformed U.S. strategic offensive forces, allows to conclude a significant strengthening in the near term, the role of its air component — strategic bombers (SBA).

This is supported by the actual elimination of nuclear weapons of heavy bombers out of control procedures Contract START-3, as the planned reduction in the number forthcoming U.S. «operationally deployed nuclear warheads» on its own intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

Currently, only the air component of the triad developed qualitatively new nuclear ordnance — air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) and the next generation of smart bombs with precision-guided. Nuclear weapons land and sea component triads only modernized. However, according to statements made by senior U.S. military will be equipped with new ALCM without exception strategic bombers — carriers of nuclear weapons: available as the B-2A and B-52H and promising RL-B (LRS-B — Long Range Strike-Bomber).

I should add that in the end almost two decades of strategic offensive arms reduction Russia and the U.S. land and sea components of the nuclear triad of the United States is largely lost their own potential counterforce against Russian strategic nuclear forces, having in its composition grouping mobile ground missile systems. This event, apparently not satisfied with the South American military and political control (CDF) which continues to claim in a new century on the unquestioning global leadership of their own country.

Guaranteed new threats

Until the end of the last century South American nuclear triad, the structure of which was formed at the height of cool war, was the base of strategic offensive forces (SNA), United States.

At the turn of the century military and political control of the United States has concluded that the existing SNA unable to provide guaranteed new threats of national security of the country with which the Americans may face in the twenty-first century.

The result of this was the decision of President George W. Bush to begin in 2001 to create wonderfully modern strategic triad of the United States, including the components of offensive and defensive forces, military-industrial infrastructure. All three components must be combined designated agent unified command and control, intelligence, communications and operational planning.

By decision of the CDF U.S. nuclear triad existed then, maintaining its structure (ICBMs, SLBMs, and SBA), was included in the latest offensive forces component of the strategic triad, except where it also includes non-nuclear strike forces started to apply strategic strikes and ordinary means of at the strategic level of information operations.

It should be noted that since the Bush administration with South American CDF characteristic pragmatism he seeks to reincarnate its nuclear forces in flexible power tool to provide not only strategic deterrence, and achieving the United States and its allies goals if you can not hold back the enemy.

This is evidenced as proclaimed under George W. Bush strategy of preventive action, and not so long ago, Congress directed the newcomer U.S. nuclear doctrine prepared by the Obama administration.

Based on the continuity of Washington’s policy on the use of nuclear weapons (NW), we can expect that the use of U.S. nuclear forces in the criteria, when you can not hold back the enemy, will be implemented regardless of the prevailing situation in the framework of 2-major options: preventive and retaliatory counter (response). With all of this scale and order of introduction of nuclear weapons in their implementation directly determine the quantitative and qualitative parameters of the nuclear forces, also serving at the time of their implementation strategy.

Quantitative composition of the U.S. strategic nuclear forces

Start creating the latest strategic triad, CDF U.S. was forced to act first in the framework of quantitative and qualitative restrictions Contract START-1 (on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms between the USSR and the USA), and then the Contract on Strategic Offensive Reductions (on Strategic Offensive Reductions between Russia and the U.S.).

START-1 contract was signed in 1991 and operated until December 5, 2009. In accordance with it Russian Alliance and the United States shall reduce and limit its ICBMs, SLBMs, languid bombers (TB) and their warheads so Makarov, that seven years after the entry into force of the contract total amount of these components do not exceed 1,600 deployed delivery vehicles and 6,000 nuclear warheads (YABZ) on them.

By December 5, 2001, after seven years stipulated in the contract, its parties fulfill their obligations: Our homeland as a successor to the USSR was on this date in 1136 and 5518 YABZ carriers, United States — in 1238 and 5949 YABZ carriers.

Note that all the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) of the parties under the Contract START-1 were carried out only by their destruction or conversion. Unfortunately, a similar practice in the coming of the US-Russian agreement on strategic arms reductions has been excluded. In the end, it gave the U.S. an opportunity to save for today’s days are revertible impressive potential, which is used extensively in their own interests.

Contract SORT became the first US-Russian contract in arms reduction, the United States entered into after the beginning of creation of modern triad. He signed on 24 May 2002. In accordance with this document, the parties had to reduce and limit YABZ on deployed strategic delivery vehicles such makarom, that by 31 December 2012, the aggregate number does not exceed each of the parties 1700-2200.

This contract in the legal practice of the process constraints and strategic arms reductions for the first time introduced the term «operationally deployed nuclear warheads» (ORYABZ). These were attributed YABZ installed on operationally deployed strategic delivery vehicles (such as ballistic missiles and bombers) are also storage, guns airbases where deployed strategic bombers.

Another significant difference from the SOR Contract Contract START-1 was the fact that his hand began to determine the composition and structure of the remaining START own without help, guided only by the principles set forth in the preamble of «mutual security, cooperation, trust, openness and predictability.»

About performance criterion Contract SORT State Department reported in December 2009, stating that there have U.S. at that time ORYABZ 1968. This level, which was impossible to verify because of the lack of control procedures, according to the foreign press, was made by the American side, followed by this:

removed from service 50 MX ICBMs;
four SSBNs with SLBM «Trident-1» converted into submarines carrier conventional cruise missiles long range;
limit of the contract does not include all TB-1B, which, although carriers have been converted into more conventional weapons in 1997, but continued as before counted levels Contract START-1 as carriers of nuclear weapons;
reduced the number of warheads in the ICBM warheads «Minuteman-3» and SLBM «Trident-2»;
excluded from the category ORYABZ SLBM warheads placed on the 2-American SSBNs, which, according to U.S. officials constantly are in complete repair;
out of service nuclear triad further excluded 50 ICBMs «Minuteman-3» and a few hundred ALCM (according to the U.S. Air Force in 2006 from their 1142 were armed ALCM AGM-86B ALCM and ALCM 394 AGM-129A ACM, of which the then U.S. Secretary of Defense planned to retire all missiles ACM, and the number of missiles ALCM reduced to 528 units).

All excluded from service carriers with all this stockpiled, and their warheads to be cut into the so-called active arsenal. Last YABZ as readiness for use consists of operationally deployed, non-deployed active and inactive non-deployed nuclear warheads.

Active non-deployed YABZ contained in the «online storage» in readiness for installation on vehicles and as needed can be returned in the BM and TB. Inactive non-deployed warheads are YABZ exchange fund for each type of the event, if any is found lack of warheads.

On May 3, 2010 according to the official statement of the American administration active arsenal of the United States totaled YABZ 5113, of which it is estimated that approximately 2,500 warheads were on «operational storage.» It should be emphasized that in the above totals YABZ total accounted for both strategic and non-strategic nuclear warheads to the United States.


Qualitatively new content today the U.S. strategic triad, due to its inclusion in the offensive component of both nuclear and non-nuclear strike forces, to find reflected in the signed heads of the U.S. and Russia April 8, 2010 in Prague, START-3 (on measures to reduce and limit the forthcoming strategic offensive arms between Russia and the U.S.). The document came into force on 5 February 2011 and should remain in force for 10 years.

Contract START-3 sets for parties ceiling in 1550, for warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed TB. Note that unlike TB deployed deployed ICBMs and SLBMs count not only nuclear, and non-nuclear warheads, which automatically makes the object of the contract, any ballistic missile-carriers of non-nuclear warheads.

According to the contract the number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers U.S. and Russia should not exceed 700 units, and the total number of deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs, and deployed and non-TB — 800 units.

Just as in the case of the SOR Contract, either party without help determine the composition and structure of its own START. By 2018 th U.S. plan to have deployed 400 ICBM silos, 12 SSBN 240 SLBMs (number of missile tubes on each boat is scheduled to be reduced from 24 to 20 pieces) and 60 TB (16-2A and 44-52H) — total 700 units deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers languid.

To achieve the limit of 800 for deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers South American side plans contain 20 ICBM silos «Minuteman-3» without missiles, providing the ability to install in their ICBM silos and 30 absolutely dismantle. Traditionally, the number of non-deployed launchers will also include 40 missile silos on 2-SSBN «Ohio» which are registered in poslepohodovom repair.

Ultimately, based on the total number of TB — carriers of nuclear weapons in 96 units, the number of non-deployed nuclear bombers — 36 aircraft (4-2A and 32-52H). So Makar, the total number of deployed and non-American launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers should reach 796 units.

START-3 contract in respect of the detailed rules for counting TB YABZ introduced, according to which for one bomber is counted only one nuclear warhead, while on the implementation of this rule, according to media reports, particularly the South American side insisted. One American professionals admitted that it was made in the negotiations specifically to reduce «attractiveness» as a matter of U.S. TB rate.

Note that the South American side so nearly brought nuclear weapons of its own TB first ALCM, under quantitative control. Now the United States, being armed with any number of nuclear ALCM, may not represent the latest control procedures for Contract START-3, and «report» in the latter, for example, only 60 nuclear bombs.

Retaliatory capability of the Russian Federation

One of the principal features of the ongoing 1991 process control and reduce U.S. and Russian strategic offensive arms is to reduce the ability of the application of the United States disarming strike on SNF Russia. Its appearance and the future development was made possible thanks to the presence in the Russian Federation and maintain combat ready countless groups owning the highest survivability mobile ground missile systems (PGRK), necessary part of which is constantly on the routes alerting.

The existence of the said laws within the present structure of the START U.S. and Russia have sent a few years ago such a noble special attention in the field of strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Dvorkin.

First, in 2010 they were made calculations, which in the event of the American side hypothetically disarming strike on SNF RF 800 ICBM and SLBM warheads more than 600 of them should be spent on settlement silos RVSN, and the remaining 200 warheads will hit at best, about 10 percent Russian PGRK.

Perhaps the latter figure was obtained by Dvorkin, who admits that the attacking side, now has no ability to control movement in Russian PGRK their position areas in real time (PMB) will be obliged to strike at all possible places without exception alerting these complexes.

If we accept the above estimates for the base, then at the present moment the total number of warheads to be used exclusively in disarming phase of massive nuclear strike (MRYAU) in Russian strategic nuclear forces must be more than 2600 BG, which exceeds the stated U.S. in 2009 by ORYABZ almost 30 percent.

Here we must not forget that in the indicated number of warheads and ORYABZ includes U.S. SBA, which examines the impact to the application is not involved. Besides the United States are required to have an additional reserve of several hundred ORYABZ likely to parry unfriendly actions of China, which in the criteria conflict between the U.S. and Russia may try to use the prevailing situation to achieve their strategic objectives.

Hence it can be a trivial conclusion that the criteria established in peacetime levels and structure ORYABZ SNA recent U.S. do not possess the possibility of applying for an unexpected MRYAU Russian strategic nuclear forces. Of course, that this provision will remain valid in the period specific hazard anger until the full involvement of the U.S. revertible own potential.

It is interesting to note that a similar conclusion has now come, and the South American side, fixing in your own modern nuclear strategy thesis of «a substantial decrease in the probability of unexpected disarming a nuclear attack.»

Offensive doctrine of nuclear deterrence

Taken CDF U.S. after the war cool course at the sole global leadership has repeatedly demonstrated that the United States does not accept the presence of countries now conducting independent of their policies. Even more so when these policies are based (or begin to rely) on its nuclear capability.

A similar attitude can be traced to the U.S. though how States: as old participants of the «nuclear club» (Our Fatherland, China) and the countries only trying to join it (Iran, North Korea). This is clearly confirmed by the latest U.S. nuclear doctrine, which replaced enacted Barack Obama just two years back the South American nuclear strategy, the main provisions of which are set out in the «Review of U.S. Nuclear Policy» (NPR-2010).

Designed by the Obama administration doctrinal document entitled «Report on the strategy for the use of nuclear weapons by the United States of America» ​​shows exactly what’s new nuclear doctrine is a doctrine of offensive nuclear deterrence: none of the holders of nuclear weapons today is immune from «counterforce» U.S. actions.

With all of this conduct would be in most cases nuclear, and they will determine the start of the U.S. at its own discretion.

Like this post? Please share to your friends: