Meanwhile, the very experience of the Revolution of 1917 shows that the analysis of the political situation based only on the direct historical analogies, rarely happens crisp. Who is not only associated Kerensky, for some, it was the Russian Danton, for others — Louis Blanc. Some ecstatic supporters called him "the Russian soul Gracchus with Garibaldi." Kerensky even associated with Napoleon — one is offended, others inspired, as many want a militant leader and savior who will overcome the anarchy. And provided the necessary analogy with the "Time of Troubles" — supporters of Kerensky called it a Pozharsky, the Minin and enemies of the head of the Provisional Government called him Falsdmitry. And all these analogies did not work.
It is unlikely that the modern Russian Federation reminds the Russian empire eve of the revolution. A set of problems and the scale was different. Obviously, the governor and his government's reforms are lagging, but hardly any sensible politician would envy the position of the last Russian tsar. No matter what reform, even the obmyslennaya, created new challenges provoked crises in various fields.
Was it possible to integrate with the reforms to the empire of the Poles or Finns? Tough as centralization and Russification undermined base of the empire, which was created on the basis of agreements with local elites, written and unwritten agreements.
Was it possible to solve the problem of land by the Stolypin reforms? In some regions, farmers were willing to accept it, others felt that the only way to solve all economic problems is the "dark redistribution." It was the deepest conviction 10 s of millions of people.
You can recall and other weak points of the empire, if you want to find some simple analogy. But it is important to mention another feature that is inherent in our forefathers and us feeling the need for change is not accompanied by a productive search for a national consensus on a set of priority reforms. There are no recognized principles and political lobbying reform. The cultural diversity of a large country made it difficult and complicates the formulation of general rules of the political game. You could even say that today's Russians discover the least ability to political self-organization than their forefathers who lived the early twentieth century.
And yet segodnyaschy political the situation is fundamentally different from the events of a century ago.
100 years ago the inhabitants of, pursued a wide variety of political views, relaxed attitude to political violence, "the way of thought to trigger" was for them even shorter.
The power is usually used as a military police force as a universal solution to all problems — economic, educational, law enforcement. Not a bad police is not cheap, and the funds in the Empire, fighting for the status of the majestic power, hell is not enough. Police government did not have the appropriate number of police officers. But the introduction of police to people prepared for war, led to the fact that different social and political conflicts escalated into small civilian war. Such experience played a role in the preparation of large state of war.
With other hand, many members of the opposition considered the revolution a universal means of solving all social, political, governmental problems. Faith in the future revolution confirmed the unusually developed political culture of the revolutionary underground. Created by decades of rituals and symbols brought a culture of uncompromising protest movement. Under the impact of this culture were the most different layers, it is simply used to design a wide variety of requirements. Though what the conflict was malehankih revolution.
Programming of the Russian Federation on the confrontation intensified significantly during the First World War. In the criteria superior war, made a lot of innocent people fierce warriors, the violence seemed a natural method of resolving political issues. But it is difficult to implement a common army as a police force, which eventually led to the revolution.
Fortunately, in today's political socialization RF conditions are quite different. Clearly, the experience of regional wars and bloody ethnic conflicts can not have an impact on the political consciousness of Russians. But the experience does not necessarily lead to violence — on the contrary, it is often used as an argument to prevent all sorts of conflicts (sometimes pulls and refusal to change, if they carry the risk of confrontation).
And yet the modern analysts resorted resorted to compare the current situation with the events of 1917 — despite the fundamentally opposed 2-eras.
In 1-x, the myth of stateliness October, was a fundamental myth of the USSR. People brought up in the Russian Union simply could not know anything about the revolution. This knowledge is stored luggage and up to the present time, sometimes only change signs assessment. Because similar to the year 1917 and played almost automatically by ordinary people and politicians, and the media.
In-2, in the minds of plainclothes war remains irresistible injury. And so far, many identify with the "snow-white" or "reddish", although sometimes not know much about the real stories of fratricidal conflict.
B-3, the general consciousness of pleasure, "explains" the story of the revolution by various komplotov if contemporaries believed in the "komplot Empress", the first twenty-first century social historians, focusing on the overall detektivizirovannoe consciousness komplotah talk about the Masons and the machinations of foreign intelligence as the main factors of the revolution. Belief in the power of intelligence connects voedinyzhdy weird way, and former dissident and veteran intelligence. This chekist-dissident discourse is greatly influenced by the current policy. Its appearance is understandable, its effects unpredictable.
In this situation, it is necessary rationalization of the greatest historical consciousness.