U.S. preparing a nuclear attack on Russia

U.S. preparing a nuclear attack on Russia
Moscow remains the only competitor Washington owning nuclear capability commensurate with the South American
Misha Tsurkov
Andrew Shushkov

The U.S. nuclear triad will be given to the value of aircraft components. Such a conclusion can be made, including examining developed by the Obama administration on the strategy for the use of nuclear weapons by the United States. This document clearly identified that none of the holders of nuclear weapons now counterforce is immune from U.S. actions.

According to South American legislation the U.S. administration in the case of the introduction of the latest strategies for using nuclear weapons (NW) should impose a special report to Congress on the rationale for making configurations in nuclear strategy and their description. It also presented due to these changes adjustment policies of the country, promising plans for the development of nuclear forces, their probable candidates.

The necessity of such a document, according to its content, called a refinement of Washington’s nuclear strategy in the event of trouble deterrence will not work when the enemy keep. All other major provisions of U.S. policy in the field of nuclear weapons contained in the NPR-2010 («Nuclear Posture Review»), remained without changes:

prevention of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism;
preservation of strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels;
Strengthening regional deterrence and assurance of allies and partners in the reliability of the U.S. nuclear security guarantees;
reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy;
maintaining benign operation, protected from unauthorized access and the introduction of efficient arsenal of nuclear weapons.
In the new nuclear doctrine openly declared: «The United States must be prepared to the fact that intimidation will not reach the goal.» Immediately to the Ministry of Defense in the event of trouble containment prescribed to have improved implementation plans of nuclear weapons.

The central point of the special report, in our opinion, is a statement about the need for the United States and maintain a massive counterforce potential of providing implementation plans labeled «New Guidelines (doctrine) demand that the United States maintained a significant potential counterforce against potential adversaries.» The document also notes that Washington is no longer focused on «small containment strategy» and renounces «anti-value strategy.»

Brand new U.S. nuclear doctrine declares the introduction of nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances to defend the fundamental interests of the actual United States, its allies and partners. At the same time coming similar extraordinary events, judging by the absence of a special report, some explanations will be determined only by Washington in its sole discretion.

The notion of «counterforce potential» in the modern American doctrine is not specifically disclosed. But high-quality content of the South American counterforce potential directly determined by the structure created by the U.S. strategic triad, which allows it to accumulate in the potentials of offensive and defensive forces triad immediately.

Because considering spoken above we can expect that the basic form of involvement of the South American counterforce potential will not respond, and preventive offensive conduct: proclaiming the rejection of «anti-value strategy» is illogical to waste the available potential offensive forces to strike already empty launchers to shoot the enemy.

Despite the statement in a special report that Moscow and Washington are no longer adversaries, the United States is still prepared variants of nuclear actions against Russia. South American military and political control (CDF) as previously concerned that our homeland is the only competitor to the United States owning nuclear capability commensurate with the South American, being armed with a triad of strategic nuclear forces and strategic nuclear wielding bolshennymi forces.

Noting the significant decrease in the probability of unexpected disarming a nuclear attack, the U.S. CDF instructs the Ministry of Defence to explore further options for reducing the role of the retaliatory strike in U.S. nuclear planning, while maintaining all of this opportunity to launch a retaliatory strike in case the respective solutions. Although object retaliatory strike here in an obvious form is not specified, it’s clear that they can only be Russian Federation — the only government potentially owning the possibility of applying a disarming strike on the United States.

Not counting Russia under the latest U.S. nuclear strategy are to maintain strategic stability with China. There is no doubt that specifically for the «neutralization» of data of 2-Washington must preserve its nuclear triad, and it came in handy a significant counterforce capability.

Subsection doctrine of «nuclear deterrence and strategic stability,» the U.S. Open, Russia and China have warned that maintaining (nuclear) triad and abilities «dozagruzhat» nukes guarantees (Yankees), which in the case of at least some potential crisis in the future no opponent will not be able to conclude that benefit from a blow to the United States or its allies and partners will never outweigh the loss of the enemy from the U.S. response.

Beginning with the Contract on Strategic Offensive Reductions («MIC», № 36, 2012) Washington arms reduction priemuschestvenno conducted by removing nuclear warheads (YABZ) with carriers and their transfer to the operational reserve to form meaningful revertible potential. In the modern doctrine explains how the U.S. wants to use VLOOKUP in the last case of technical problems with YABZ or their means of delivery.

Under special programs prolongation actual cycles (LEP — Life Extension Program) for each component of the nuclear triad of the United States was scheduled to upgrade to two types YABZ: W78 and W87 — intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), W76 and W88 — ballistic missile submarine (SLBMs), W61 — for nuclear bombs, W80-1 — for cruise missiles, air (ALCM). Applets work on LEP characterized the highest degree of uncertainty, because the expected expiry dates — no earlier than 2030-2050 years.

Having a huge amount of supplies of non-deployed warheads, in case of technical failure in any type of South American YABZ spetsy want to run it inside the substitution component of the nuclear triad to another payload type (intra-leg hedge options). If the current in store YABZ does not provide a similar substitution, the scheduled «maneuver» warheads between components of the triad in another component of the triad is increasing YABZ on media to an appropriate level (inter-leg hedging).

In particular the implementation of the declared nuclear weapons zeal to minimize collateral damage to a civilian population and civilian objects, that can be achieved first by reducing the power and increase the accuracy YABZ firing of nuclear weapons. This area of ​​modernization of nuclear weapons is now fully meet existing and ALCM nuclear bombs, as evidenced by a number of ongoing work in the United States. Warhead ICBMs and SLBMs in the criteria of the moratorium on nuclear testing, the U.S. and Russia for this is not fully fit.

For example, based on the strategic (B61-7) and tactical (B61-3, -4, -10) U.S. nuclear bombs are developing promising controlled nuclear bombs (ASD) B61-12. Nuclear charger (Yazoo) The latest bomb is scheduled to make on the basis of Yazoo bombs B61-4, which has four values ​​switchable TNT: 0.3 / 1.5 / 10/45 kt. Immediately we can not exclude the ability to design for the latest bomb Yazoo with even the smallest capacity, using technological reserve, congestion in the United States in the development of ultra-low power nuclear warheads, so called mini-Newcomb.

In the rear instead of the B61-12 parachute system is planned to establish guidance assembly, widely used now in U.S. conventional type ASD JDAM, that will allow to provide differential mode acts of cosmic radio navigation system (KRNS) «Navstar» precision bombing (CWE) to 5 meters.

Start producing bombs B61-12 is planned in 2019.

Not seen major technical problems during such work (derating Yazoo and increased shooting accuracy) and in the process of creating promising nuclear ALCM, the development of which was launched in the U.S. in the past year programmke LRSO (LRSO — Long Range Standoff) to spoof ALCM and ALCM ACM.

Ultimately the U.S. can get a real counterforce tool provides a great solution to problems of both strategic and regional nuclear deterrence compared with the existing ICBMs and SLBMs.

To this should be added the positive side of the use of strategic bombers (SBA) with the ALCM is that the bombers may, rising into the air to disperse to ensure survivability, and if a decision on the abolition of combat tasks without the help of others to return to the base. CDF U.S. also considers it important that, unlike ICBMs and SLBMs, bombers can be demonstratively deployed in the region to send a signal to the enemy’s ability to strengthen deterrence and the proof obligations of the United States to its allies and partners to ensure their safety.

Naturally, SBA compared with ICBMs and SLBMs has comparable low efficiency of implementation, but the criteria for preventive action when the attacker chooses where and when to strike, low-speed vehicles and weapons are already relegated to the second plan.

In the end, in a special report to the U.S. again to continue offering Russian arms reduction sides. Now «one third of the level set in a new START Treaty.» These deals can not be treated differently, as an attempt to continue to practice the implementation of special bilateral South American approach to solving the problem of nuclear disarmament of the Russian Federation, which has already been written on the pages of the magazine «EKR» (№ 3, 2007, pp. 62-69).

On the one hand, the United States, focusing on their cash and technological abilities are intensively involved in development of new offensive and defensive weapons outside the START process limitations. Suffice it to recall the shock of long-range planning based on hypersonic aircraft, nuclear ALCM latest generation missile defense systems of marine and land-based.

On the other hand, taking into account the ability to create more counterforce potential U.S. through the conclusion of international agreements are profitable kind of «fit» quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation under real combat abilities own emerging potential.

Under Contract START-3 South American side reduces any of their strategic weapons that are for her ballast due to the inability of their actual implementation as part of the latest nuclear strategy on environmental judgments (South American ICBM and SLBM warheads have Yazoo capacity 0,1-0, 6 Mt). Immediately out of control output ALCM, which we believe can provide the Yankees with more efficient and applicable side effects (compared with ICBMs and SLBMs) ​​addressing the challenges now facing them in the criteria when it does not turn to keep the enemy.

To be continued.

Misha Tsurkov,
Head of SIC defense 4th CRI Russian Defense Ministry, Ph.D., Associate Professor
Andrew Shushkov,
Senior Researcher SIC defense 4th CRI Russian Defense Ministry

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