Violate any Russian INF Treaty? («The National Interest», U.S.)

Violate any Russian INF Treaty? (
Our homeland violate any contract on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces? According to the illustrated disk imaging, the Obama administration believes that violates, and high number of Republicans lawmakers require decisive action. «We believe that it is necessary not to allow Russian leaders believe that they have benefited from the violation of this or at least some other contract,» — wrote the chairman of the Armed Services Committee in the House of Representatives, a Republican from California Buck McKeon (Buck McKeon), chairman of the committee on foreign affairs Rep. Ed Royce (Ed Royce), also a Republican from California, and the head of the House Committee on Intelligence from Michigan Republican Mike Rogers (Mike Rogers).

Such statements make it very difficult situation. They probably will further exacerbate Russian-American affairs, which already dropped to a very low point, prospects weaken further reductions of nuclear weapons and could hamper efforts to enlist the support of President Obama’s own congress in Iranian politics and reach the main achievements in the field of arms control.
Allegations of violations of the dual. First concerns the newest intercontinental ballistic missile «yars» (RS-26) (MS-26 is the name «Frontier», the designation «Yarsa» — RS-24 — approx. Trans.), Which, apparently, no longer run times on distance is less than the upper limit on the INF Treaty (this contract puts a ban on all South American and Russian / Russian launch missiles with a range of 500 to 5500 km). Although these tests may cause fear, they are not in violation. RS-26 is any hesitation, is a strategic missile (its range exceeds 5,500 km), and in existing treaties no provisions prohibiting conduct tests at a distance less than the maximum. Flight tests missiles, of course, carried out in order to assess its ability to overcome the enemy’s defense, but because the Russian use for launching the Sary-Shagan, specializing in defense matters. Second assertion, which became clear only recently, concerns an unidentified land-based cruise missile.
South American government, according to available disk imaging, not once confronted the Russian question on these tests, but they replied that it is not the problem and the subsequent responses from abandoned. January 17, 2014 The United States’ NATO allies about their own concerns. But the official dealer of the State Department explained that the matter until analyzed, and in the category of violations of the act makes no Russian.
Subject compliance with the contract of INF covers three distinct but closely interrelated nuance. One of them is of a technical nature: the essence of the allegations of violations, the properties of the respective missiles, also the problem of checks. The second refers to the arms control and strategic dilemmas — to how the provisions of the contract of INF fit (or not fit) into the Russian national security policy. Third terms of policy, raising questions about why allegations of violations continue to emerge in the public debate, creating the potential consequences for U.S. foreign policy.

Technical nuances temper concerns
Technical issues — is a daunting maze of engineering, military and legal details. As noted above, tests Russian SS-26 is not a breach of contract are in existing treaties on arms control is no ban on testing at a reduced range. Absence of the lower limit for flight tests of strategic weapons — this legacy approaches cool times of war. In those days, the parties were worried about priemuschestvenno greatest abilities weapons systems, whether distance or number of warheads mounted on the launch vehicle. There are techno reason unrealistic to prevent bad starts, which can be attributed to violations if it is found a small distance for flight testing.
Situation with allegations of trials of new land-based cruise missiles, medium-range missiles (INF contract prohibits land-based missiles with ranges of 500 to 5500 km) to analyze more complex, since no specific information on this subject were not disclosed. Ballistic missiles, which are often used in the same propulsion, and that of cosmic rockets fly the steep line of motion, due to rising fuel and falling due to gravity. Cruise missiles are also manageable, and they spend on fuel during the flight, like aircraft torpedoes. One of the candidates for the role of suspicious cruise missile can be rocket R-500 is designed for the complex «Iskander», which was constructed under the first ballistic missile.

«Iskander» had to change the operational-tactical missile complex «Oka» (SS-23 by NATO systematization), which eliminated under the contract of INF. Decision on liquidation «Oka» caused outrage among Russian generals who claimed that her range of less than 500 km (450-470 miles), and that the Russian president Mikhail Gorbachev went to a severe U.S. concessions without their support. The «Iskander» is the same range as that of the «Oka», in other words least 500 km, and it does not violate the contract of INF. Yet, there are severe suspicion that this range as needed can be increased. According to the report of the State Institute of Defence of Finland, on the line of motion good range ballistic version of «Iskander» can have a range of 600 and even 700 km. It is believed that a cruise missile R-500, which was tested for 360 km, may have a radius of flight «in a couple of times more.» If, as many believe, the P-500 is a modified version of naval cruise missiles «surface-to-surface», «Garnet» (SS-N-21 by NATO systematization), then theoretically range she really can be more.

If the question of P-500, the allegations of possible violations may indicate several options:

— The United States could detect one or several tests conducted at a range of more than 500 km;

— The United States could make a mistake in the measurements. Such measurements should be made public by technical means, but because they probably are not sufficiently accurate;

— South American measurements could be based on calculations of the trajectory good range and Russian data have been taken from real flight line movement, which includes two coordinate maneuvers to avoid detection and interception of missile defense systems (in this case the practical range may be less than 500 km, and the line good range of motion more).
In any of these cases, the excess in the range (above 500 km) is small, and no strategic differences it almost does not. If so, the dispute over the P-500 is completed as well as the end 10’s unresolved problems with the implementation of treaties, inevitable in the process of arms control and reduction. Essentially, the Russian Federation also have a claim to the United States on the implementation of agreements.
But there is the least possible power. For example, it would be the rocket tests «Garnet». Available information says that these sea-based cruise missiles were removed from submarines and is now stored on the shore. At the same time, the Russian military is often carried out tests of old Russian weapons systems in order to verify their compliance features. For various reasons, from time to time convenient missiles launched from land, if from an offshore platform. There is also a cooperative Russian-Indian project of creation of a cruise missile «BrahMos II», which is designed to start with a variety of platforms, including from the ground. But this project is still at an early realization of steel.

Our homeland or could experience the newest cruise missile with a range of land-based, far exceeding the limit of 500 km. Lacking even a simple disk imaging, for an extensive assessment of the implications of such a system for strategy and arms control regime will be hard. But that the State Department did not call this case a violation, but instead of this, said that it is a concern and requests additional assessments and consultations, indicates low probability of occurrence at the latest Russian long-range cruise missiles (up to 500 km) land-based. Meanwhile, the analysis of the behavior of the Russian Federation in the field of arms control and strategy shows that it is unlikely to go on cheating on the agreement for growth range missiles on some hundred miles.

Nuances of arms control: relation to the INF Treaty in Russia

Perfectly understandable that many influential figures of the number leading Russian elites oppose the contract of INF. In 2005, a close ally of Vladimir Putin, Sergei Ivanov, the then defense minister, spoke of a possible withdrawal of Russia from the contract of INF during talks with U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
Following the debate in Moscow led to the decision not to go out of the contract, but sometimes this question still comes to the surface. The main rationale is that the medium-range missiles make countries to the south of — China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel and others. We can say that the fate of the contract of INF in Russia hanging on a very narrow thread.
Someone says that the cold attitude of the Russian Federation to the INF treaty can explain attempt to circumvent or even break it. But most likely, right quite different: if Moscow decides that the contract of INF prevents it an important R & D programm, it is without hesitation come out of it.
Russian database security strategy is the creation of obstacles likely use high-precision non-nuclear weapons (eg, missiles «Tomahawk» from the Navy) the United States and NATO, as they did during the war in Kosovo and Iraq, as in other countries in the past 15 years . Russian military doctrine in 2000 provides for limited use of nuclear weapons against air bases and command centers in order to counter the perceived danger. But payment for introduction of nuclear weapons from the outset was considered a temporary measure, valid until such time as the country does not acquire modern means of non-nuclear deterrence. «Iskander» filled one such niche non-nuclear capacity (at the moment there is no evidence that our homeland is experiencing these missiles for use with nuclear warheads, although theoretically this could be), and in this sense, they play an important role, being aimed at a number of possible targets without the danger of a nuclear strike.
In the case of deployment of «Iskander» in the Kaliningrad region, located as an enclave between Poland and Lithuania, these missiles with a range of 500 km will be able to hit targets on virtually all areas of Poland and the Baltic countries, which is likely a base for NATO strikes. If the range of these missiles will grow to 100 or even 200 km structurally situation will not change.
As follows, it seems completely logical that if Our homeland has decided to deploy medium-range missiles of ground-based, it was aimed at a high-jump, say, for a system with a range of 1000-1500 km. Such missiles allowed Russia endanger not only a significant part of the euro theater of operations, and other countries to the south of Russia.
Output from the contract of INF is unlikely to be severe problem if the agreement will hinder the development of tools that management deems Russian principal for future development potential of non-nuclear deterrence. Output from the contract must support a large part of the elite. If Putin zaneset such a bill to Parliament, it will be adopted without debate, without encountering severe opposition.
U.S. withdrawal from the ABM contract in 2003 would be necessary pretext. Like the Bush administration, Moscow may declare that the INF Treaty is a relic of cool war, that its preservation harms national security (citing all this on applets’s missile carried southern neighbors of Russia), and that it intends to pursue nuclear medium-range weapon . Moreover, the state of Russian-American relations today is such that, according to the views of Russian control, cancellation of any contract of an old hardly aggravate it even more.

So Makar, reasons that our homeland seriously violates the contract of INF seem weak. As noted above, the PC-26 tests are not in violation. In the worst case is the introduction of legal loopholes for their own advantage. History of cruise missile tests is uncertain, but the fact that the South American government did not want to call it a violation, says about his insecurities. In the history of US-Soviet and US-Russian arms control 10s were similar cases where the parties have expressed concern about the actions of each other. Almost always, these concerns did not find native resolution before the time, until losing their relevance.
Typically, these were technical issues discussed technical professionals behind closed doors. Why, then, did these general statements about the potential violation of the contract of INF? Likely prerequisites need to find not in essence the process of arms control, and in alliances and features of domestic policy.

Political nuances of the Russian-American affairs and U.S. domestic politics
More alternately stubborn questions about deploying «Iskander» asked the Baltic countries, namely Lithuania. Referring to these missiles, it states the need to preserve the South American nuclear gravity bombs in Europe, although many old members of the alliance in favor of their conclusion. Announcements about suspicious tests appeared after the January meeting of NATO.

And inside the U.S. Republican Party of the House Committee on Armed Services Committee wrote a letter, which indicates that «the ancient Great Party» saw in this an opportunity to slow down disk imaging comfortable administration initiatives in a number of areas, such as the forthcoming reduction in the South American and Russian nuclear weapons and the Iranian nuclear programm.
These announcements came soon after the entry into force of the perineum nuclear agreement with Iran, and President Obama has threatened to veto all samples Congress to impose new sanctions against Iran over its nuclear applets. Republicans on the committee for the Armed Forces said that the new agreement will allow Iran to impale the U.S., not with all this suffering from the harsh punitive sanctions, also argue that the administration acts against Russian substantiate their case.

Similarly, Republicans with no small skepticism react to Obama’s proposal to reduce from 2013 for another third of deployed strategic nuclear warheads the U.S. and Russia in the framework of the contract in 2010 START-3 — from 1550 to 1000. At first they were worried that Obama may try to execute these cuts bypassing the Senate, whose approval is of mandatory contracts.

How it paradoxically, there they found common ground with the Russian hardliners. Moscow shows obvious reluctance to engage cuts in addition to those provided START-3. Any actions that weaken the prospects of such reductions, went out and brought in support of the Russian government (of course, it will be publicly declare the negotiable). Moreover, if the initiative comes from the United States, it will be profitable to Moscow because the blame for the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament, it will be able to lay on the back side.
In addition, these leaks appeared just at the time when the Senate is considering candidacy Rose Gottemoeller. Gottemoeller, speaking as head of the South American diplomat in negotiations on START-3, here a couple of years Acting Deputy Secretary of State for arms control and international politics. It is expected to be appointed to this position on the same basis. But the price of its approval may be the dispute INF on criteria profitable new cuts opponents. Directly it means forcing the Russian Federation to the recognition of the breach of contract, with such makarom to plan the administration in the field of arms control were more impaired.

Nikolai Sokov — Senior Researcher of the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (Vienna Center for Disarmament and Nonproliferation).

Miles Pomper — Senior Researcher at the Monterey Institute of international research (Monterey Institute of International Studies), and past editor of Arms Control Today.

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