What Moscow is seeking information attack on Lukashenko, ribbons "The Godfather" and other hard speeches in Russian media? This element of the campaign dismissal of the Belarusian president from power, an attempt to make it more pliable and loyal, it's a personal revenge? Your answers to these questions offered by Russian political analysts interviewed by Yuri Drakakhrust.
Director General of the Agency of Political and Economic Communications Dmitry Orlov
I believe that the Kremlin and the Russian elite in general are interested in maksymalistskim version — to care for Lukashenko, Belarus managed to more loyal to Moscow leader, and most importantly — a more predictable, which would better understand what it means to play by the rules, and which would not require anything that is beyond the scope of intergovernmental agreements.
But in that game, which is now going on between Moscow and Minsk, Moscow, it is important just to besiege Lukashenko, to make him understand that there is a certain corridor decisions
corridor of energy policy, which he may carry. And it seems to me that this policy direction regarding successful. Customs Union of Belarus did not go for those tough decisions by the many Belarusian officials.
Drakakhrust: But this is an informational attack occurred just after Belarus signed an agreement on the Customs Union.
Eagles: I think so. that to the Lukashenko regime was adequate and in the negotiations, and generally in the relationship with Moscow, it should keep on our toes all the time, constantly demonstrate that Moscow has a different mechanism of pressure on Belarus. I do not think it is any special technology. In the Russian media have certain information and why not now, when relations between Belarus and Russia is not the most positive, to disclose this information?
Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Sergei Karaganov
The aim — undermine Lukashenko to make his or her psychological and political pressure. Another thing is that this reaction is a little late, it was necessary to do so, and 10, and 15, and 5 years ago. And with it all the time played. And he believed in his nyavrazlivasts. Probably for good reason. But it is perfectly survives.
Drakakhrust: So can he survive now?
Karaganov: I do not exclude it. that it will survive now. He showed that we should not underestimate his political skills and ability to survive. He has shown that he is an outstanding politician
despite all its quirks and children in the marshal's uniform.
Drakakhrust: Is there a clear plan for the Kremlin, the first step of which is this information attack?
Karaganov: I have not met in the Kremlin, but I have long said that it was necessary to do much more pressure before.
Drakakhrust: But it's the pressure to himself, so to speak, well kept, or to his successor a well-kept?
Karaganov: I think it is to he conducted himself well, or well-behaved to his successor.
National Strategy Institute Director Mikhail Remizov
Simply answer the question about the motives of the Russian side than on its purpose. The motives are more or less clear. The long-simmering irritation behavior Belarusian partners and the lead partner. In the power of his Russian establishment have not considered a reliable partner and negotiability. And the feelings are mutual.
Most likely after a meeting in Moscow on July 11, after which even the low-key Medvedev became afford statements on the verge of a foul, this irritation has reached a new level of quality, which led to an escalation of promotional wars. In fact, the gas war has been sustained in advocacy genre.
As for the goal, everything is more complicated. In my view, the only goal that can be achieved in politics such actions, a goal that could be of interest to Moscow — is to create a zone of vulnerability for Lukashenko in domestic politics.
It is clear that these tapes have a certain resonance within the country, they do Lukashenko's position on the political scene more vulnerable and hypothetically — a lighter partner in foreign affairs. But in fact, this vulnerability is not necessarily in the domestic policy is converted to a more accommodating toward Moscow. Is not the opposite.
Lukashenko — a man who has always stressed that it is not necessary to build relationships with the use of ultimatums and propaganda wars. The reaction is reversed.
So the creation of an area of vulnerability for Lukashenko obvious, but it does not turn into a tool to strengthen Moscow. Lukashenko will be worse, but the Kremlin does not get better. And it is not possible to perceive these conflicts as rational as a tough but rational political game.
It is often said that the purpose of this game can be almost overthrow Lukashenko, but I think it's totally unrealistic, as serious alternatives to the current president of the republic there, the whole system of government is built under the current head of state.
Experience shows that Moscow does not have the technology regime change in neighboring countries. This is a complicated matter. I would say that Washington's ability often exaggerated in terms of impact on the change of elites. In the case of these possibilities Moscow less.
Moscow can make a big impact on the recognition or non-recognition of the quality of elections, on the relationship with the new elite, but to change it at will, Moscow is. I do not believe that the recent change of government in Bishkek was staged in Moscow. Moscow's position factor was significant, but as one among others. So here — to put a rational purpose replacement for someone else Lukashenko Moscow simply can not, because there is no appropriate tools. Therefore, the logic remains rablennya mutual damage without a significant gain for themselves. And it looks more like the logic of communal strife, than the logic of big politics.
Senior Researcher, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences Dmitry Furman
No need to search for complex plans. It's not so much a plan as a reaction, the result of irritation against Lukashenko and his policies. The former Soviet Union is about what used to happen in the space of the Warsaw Pact. The threat of Soviet hegemony was ambivalent: it was from the people's democratic movements, as in Poland, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, but also from strong dictatorial regimes that precisely because of their dictatorial nature did not want to be vassals. So it was with Albania, and the most glaring example — Ceausescu.
We in the former Soviet Union to the Russian policy is threatened by popular movements in Ukraine
in the same Belarus, Georgia. But it is quite another threat — from countries with strong dictatorial regimes that do not want to dance to the tune of others. For example, the time of Niyazov's Turkmenistan, and now — is an analogue of socialist Albania. But Lukashenko — an analogue of Ceausescu.
This causes irritation and propaganda campaign against him — this is the result of irritation. I do not think we have any serious plans to overthrow it, the more that carry out these plans is incredibly difficult.
There is one more point. In Russia's internal political life appeared very light, but certain liberal tendencies associated with President Medvedev, but not only him. But Lukashenko — a perfect object for the influential circles of the intelligentsia and the bureaucracy without much risk empty out his liberal sentiments. So in due time in the USSR liberal part of the establishment liked to describe the horrors of the regime of Mao Zedong. Here this element is also present, but it is optional.