The question of why Reddish Army outright lost frontier battle in Byelorussia, the Ukraine (although just in the defense KOVO it was not quite so sure) and the Baltic long occupied the minds and military historians, and people interested in the history of the USSR and Russia. In the circumstances referred to as the principal:
1. An advantage of the general capabilities of the invading army of the group of Russian troops in the western military area (becomes overwhelming on areas of major strokes);
2. Red Army met the beginning of the war in neotmobilizovannom and nedorazvernutom form;
3. The achievement of tactical surprise the enemy attack;
4. Very bad disposition of troops in the western military area;
5. Reorganization and modernization of the Red Army.
All of this is correct. But apart from these circumstances repeatedly examined from different angles and with varying degrees of detail, there are a number of circumstances that often fall out of the discussion of the circumstances of the defeat of the Red Army in June-July 1941. Let's try to analyze them, for they are in fact played a huge role in a disastrous start majestically Russian war for our people. And you pochetaemye readers decide for themselves how important were these premises.
Typically, when evaluating the forces of Germany and the Soviet Union the other day war first turn their attention to their size, the number of connections and the real security of the main types of weapons and equipment. But purely quantitative comparison, divorced from the characteristics of high-quality troops, does not give an impartial picture of the balance of forces and leads to wrong conclusions. Especially since usually associated units and their staffing levels, sometimes "forget" about the fact that the German troops were already long been mobilized and deployed, and our — went to war from a position of peace.
But the gaps in understanding problems of the pre-war Red Army give rise to various theories stunned. But this article is not for amateurs youth games in conspiracy theories in a manner Rezun-Suvorov and his last-born, it is an attempt to look and find out if everything was perfectly in the Red Army the other day of the Great War.
Development of military technology and methods of warfare in the middle of the twentieth century led to a sharp increase in the literacy requirements of the armed forces of any state. In this case, it concerned a professional member and reservist supplies. Especially important was the skill appeal with appliances. Germany by the end of the nineteenth century became the first country in the world with the general literacy of the population. In this case, the Bismarck was quite right in saying that a war with France won the regular Prussian schoolmaster, not guns Krupp. In the Soviet Union, according to the Census 1937, there were almost 30 million (!) Illiterate people aged over 15, or 18.5% of the total population. In 1939, only 7.7% of the population of the USSR had 7 education classes and more, and higher education was only 0.7%. In men aged 16 — 59 years, these characteristics were markedly higher — respectively 15% and 1.7%, but were still unacceptably low.
According to the German at the end of 1939 exclusively in Germany there were 1,416,000 passenger cars, and this is without taking into account the associated fleet of Austria, the Sudetenland, and Poland, in other words, within the boundaries of 1937. And on June 1, 1941, the USSR had a total of about 120,000 cars. Accordingly, based on the number of people in Germany by 1000 people had 30 times more cars than in the USSR. In addition, in Germany, in private property was more than half a million bikes.
Two-thirds of the Soviet population lived up to the Second World War in rural areas, and the level of education and skills appeal with the technique recruits from villages in the vast quantity of cases was disappointingly low. In most of his own before joining the army, they never got even great, but some of it had never even heard of! So read about the experience of driving a bike or a car does not have to.
So Makar, at first, only at the expense of more competent and prepared at the technical level fighter Wehrmacht had a significant advantage over the Red Army. Russian control perfectly understood these difficulties before the war were organized educational program courses, and a fighter par with the military trivial matter taught to read and write. By the way, this part of the Red Army was conditioned extraordinary popularity among young people, who not only did not seek to "hang" from the army, but yearned to serve! And the officers, well, just to the Red Army, were treated with great respect.
Notwithstanding Huge efforts to eliminate illiteracy soldiers of the Red Army, to an average literacy rate in the German army was still very far away. German an advantage and grow at the expense of the highest discipline, personal and obmyslennoy apprenticeship training system, originating in the "army of professionals" — the Reichswehr.
Compounded by the fact that the Red Army as a first class junior officers were absent. In other armies, they were called non-commissioned officers or NCOs (not an exception and the Russian royal army). They Bilkov like the "backbone" of the army, more disciplined, sustainable and combat-ready part of it. In the Red Army, they do not differ from ordinary soldier nor the formation of their own, nor the training nor the experience. Accounted for the exercise of their functions to lure officers. That's why in the management of Russian infantry division before the war was three times more officers than in the German infantry division, the latter had 16% more personnel on staff.
In the end, the pre-war years in the Red Army has developed paradoxical situation: despite the huge number of commanders (in June 1941 — 659 thousand people.), Reddish Army constantly felt great shortage of commanders regarding the state. For example, in 1939 on the 1st commander of our army had 6 privates in the Wehrmacht — 29 in the British Army — 15, in French — 22, and in Japan — 19.
In 1929, 81.6% of the students accepted into military schools, came back only to the original form of class 2-4. In the infantry school, this percentage was even higher — 90.8%. Over time, the situation began to improve, but very slowly. In 1933, the fraction of students with the initial formation decreased to 68.5%, but the armored schools she remained as before 85%.
And this is explained not only the low average level of education in the USSR, which, though slowly, but thanks to the alternate state program there continued to rise. Negative role played by the practice of providing benefits for admission "by birth." Little more than social status (and therefore — and the level of education) were the parents, the more readily take on the Red Army officer training their offspring. As a result, semi-literate students had to learn the simplest things (reading, writing, addition, subtraction, etc.), spending on this is the time that a German student specifically squandered on military affairs.
The troops of the situation was no better. Recently the start of the Second World War only 7.1% of officers and officers of the Red Army could
brag higher military education, the average was at 55.9%, accelerated courses — at 24.6% and the remaining 12.4% did not receive any general military education. In the "Act for the admission of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR" Comrade Tymoshenko from Comrade. Voroshilov said:
"The quality of the command staff is low, especially in the chain of company-platoon, in which up to 68% have only Short-term 6-month training course of second lieutenant."
A consisted of 915,951 registered commanders of the army and navy of supplies 89.9% of the respondents had only had a Short-term courses or had no military education in general. Even in the middle of 1076 Russian generals and admirals of higher military education received only 566. With all of this, their average age was 43 years old, and is a huge and practical experience they had. Especially sad the case in aviation, where the generals of 117, only 14 had a higher military education. None of the air corps and divisional commanders it had not.
First bell rang during the "Winter War": Reddish mighty army came across in the course of the Soviet-Finnish war of a sudden the stubborn resistance of the Finnish army, which can not be considered strong, neither in quantity nor on the equipment, nor the level of training. It was like a bucket of cold water. Immediately swam significant deficiencies in the training of personnel of our army. Scourge of the pre-war average of the Red Army remained discipline, constant personnel detachments of military training for economic and operational work, frequent regrouping of forces over long distances, from time to time in the untrained and furnished areas of deployment, weak educational facilities and inexperienced officers. Flourished simplicity and formalism of training, and even obvious fraud (as it says "fraud") during the inspections, exercises and live firing. But the worst thing that all of this has already flooded out in the criteria which began the second World War, when the Wehrmacht at the sight of the whole world, including the administration of the USSR, crushed even more powerful enemies than the Finns. Against the background of these victories, the results of the Finnish campaign, frankly, looked very pale.
It seems that specifically as a result of the Soviet-Finnish War, there have been tremendous configuration of the People's Commissariat of Defense. May 14, 1940 the new Commissar Timoshenko issued an order number 120 "On combat and political training of troops in the summer 1940 academic year." This order was said is true about the shortcomings identified in the Red Army:
"The experience of the war in the Korel-Finnish theater naikrupneyshie revealed flaws in the combat training and education of the army.
Military discipline does not stand tribute to the height …
Preparing commanders did not answer the requirements of modern combat.
Commanders commanded their units are not held firmly in the hands of subordinates, lost in the mass of men.
The authority of commanders in the middle and junior level is low. The demands of commanders low. Commanders sometimes tolerated the criminal violations of discipline, to wrangling subordinates, and from time to time and to the right of non-fulfillment of orders.
More than a weak link is the company commanders, platoon leaders and departments that do not have, generally, the right training, commanding abilities and career experiences. "
Tymoshenko was well aware that a major war is around the corner, and stressed: "Education troops closer to the conditions of combat reality." The order number 30, "On the military and political training of troops for 1941 training year"Dated January 21, 1941, this formulation becomes very tough:" Teach the troops just what is needed in the war, and just because it is done in the war. " But the time for such training is not enough. Learn the basics of military wisdom of our army had been under bombardment, during the most severe struggle with a strong, experienced and fierce opponent who did not forgive nor the smallest mistakes and angrily chastised for each of them.
The presence of combat experience is an important component of combat effectiveness. Unfortunately, the only method of its acquisition, accumulation and retention is a specific role in the fighting. No one, even the most wide-ranging and close to the combat situation will not change the doctrine of a real war.
Shelled the fighters can do their tasks under enemy fire and shelled the commanders know exactly what to expect from their own fighter and what tasks to put their units, and most importantly — can swiftly make the right decisions. The fresher the combat experience and the conditions for getting closer to the order in which actions have to fight, how much more valuable it is.
Incidentally, there is a very ingrained myth of the "obsolete combat experience" and its harmfulness. The essence of it is that Tipo an old military leader, gained extensive practical experience so that longer able to accept new strategic and tactical decisions. This is not the case. Do not confuse the inertia of thinking with combat experience — it's a different order of things. Specifically inertia of thinking, stereotyped choice of solutions in advance recognizable variants leads to weakness in the criteria for new military realities. A combat experience — is quite another. This is a special ability to adapt to rapid changes in how ever, the ability to quickly and correctly make decisions, this is a profound awareness of the devices of the war and its devices. After all, despite the movement of progress, the basic laws of war do not actually undergo revolutionary configurations.
Many of the Russian commanders had time before the start of the Second World War to war, it was possible to do more in the civilian war that was of a very typical character. It acts battle for the most part conducted semi-guerrilla techniques and radically different from the large-scale battles of the vast standing armies, up to a maximum of saturated various military equipment. By the number of officers — veterans of the First World War — Wehrmacht was superior to the Red Army of times. This is logical, given how many officers of the Imperial Russian Army fought against the Bolsheviks and later was obliged to emigrate. First, it concerned the officers who had pre-war real education, in that they were superior to the head of their own far more numerous colleagues issue of wartime. A small part of the officers of the "old school" all the same remains, defected to the Bolsheviks, and was well accepted by the service in the Red Army. These officers were called "military experts". In the majority of their own, they were fired from there during numerous "purges" and the trials of the 1930s, many — shot as enemies of the people and only a few managed to survive this time and remain in the ranks.
If we look at the numbers, about a quarter of the royal officer corps have opted for a modern power: from 250 thousand "zolotopogonnikov" 75 thousand fled the service in the Red Army. However, they are often held very responsible positions. Thus, the division chief of staff of the Red Army during the war served as the mufti of about 600 former officers. In the interwar period, their turn "cleaned out", and in 1937-38. victims of repression were 38 survivors by the time the 63 former nachshtadivov. In the end of the 600 "military experts" who had combat experience as a division chief of staff, to the beginning of World War II serving in the army left at least 25 people. Such is the sad math. With all of this most of the "military experts" lost own posts not on age or health status, but on
ly because of the "wrong" form. The continuity of traditions of the Russian army was interrupted.
In Germany, the army and the continuity of tradition was saved.
Naturally, the Army had reddish and more than freshest combat experience. But he went to any comparison with combat experience of the Wehrmacht in the European wars. The scale battles on the CER, at Lake Khasan and hike in Poland was small. Only fights on the river. Halkin-Gol and the Finnish campaign was given the opportunity to "bombard" a certain number of Russian officers. But, frankly, experiences gained in Finland, was a very, very diverse. In 1-x, battles were fought in a very specific criteria Northwest theater, besides winter. In-2, the main character of combat challenges faced by our troops, very different from the one with which they had to face in 1941. Naturally, the "Winter War" made a great memory for Russian military administration, but the experience breakthrough fortified enemy defenses needed soon, only to end with a step of the Second World War, when our army entered the area of Germany with its pre-war fixed line fortifications. A huge number of the policies in the "Winter War" were not tested and it had to teach already under German attack. For example, the concept has remained completely untested implementation of large mechanized formations, and in fact specifically mechanized corps were the main striking power of the Red Army. In 1941, we paid dearly for it.
Even the experience that was gained Russian tank crews during conflicts 1939 — 1940 period was to a large extent lost. For example, all eight armored brigades that took part in the fighting with the Finns were disbanded and turned to the formation of the mechanized corps. So did the nine consolidated tank regiments, the same fate realized and 38 tank battalions of infantry divisions. In addition, the junior officers and rank and file Red Army veterans of the "Winter War" and Halkin-Gol, by June 1941 were demobilized, they have come to replace the recruits. Because even had time to do some fighting units and lost his own experience, proficiency and toughness. Well, it was not enough of them. So, the other day of the war in the western military districts were only 42 connection with combat experience Halkin-Gol or the Finnish War, in other words, less than 25%:
LVO — 10 divisions (46.5% of all troops neighborhood)
PribOVO — 4 (14.3%)
WSMD — 13 (28%)
KOVO — 12 (19.5%)
OdVO — 3 (20%).
By contrast, 82% of Wehrmacht divisions allocated to the operation "Barbarossa", had real combat experience bouts of the year 1939-1941.
The scale of the fighting, in which the Germans had a chance to participate, were even more important than the scale of local conflicts, in which participated Reddish Army. Based on the above, we can say that the Wehrmacht was utterly superior to the Red Army on the practical experience of modern war, highly maneuverable. Specifically such a war forced upon the Wehrmacht and our army from the beginning.
Repression in the Red Army
We have already touched on themes of repression, but would like the brakes on this subject in more detail. Prominent Russian theorists and practitioners of military affairs, who had the courage to defend their eyes, were declared enemies of the people and destroyed.
Not to be unfounded give a brief report of such number of Head of the officers of the Red Army's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR EA Shchadenko "Work for the year 1939" from May 5, 1940. According to these data, in 1937, just out of the army, except the Air Force and the Navy, was laid off 18,658 people, or 13.1% of the payroll of its command personnel. Of them on political grounds were laid off 11,104 people, and 4,474 were arrested. In 1938, the number of laid-off amounted to 16 362 people, or 9.2% of payroll commanders of the Red Army. Of these 7,718 people were fired for political reasons, and another 5,032 — were arrested. In 1939, there were only laid off 1,878 people, or 0.7% of the payroll commanders and arrested all 73 people. So Makar, for three years only ground forces lost 36,898 commanders of them on political grounds were laid off 19,106, and another 9,579 people were arrested. In other words, the direct loss of repression only in the Army were 28,685 people, the reasons for dismissal of another 4,048 people were drunkenness, moral corruption and theft. Another 4,165 people were removed from the list due to death, disability or illness.
There are proven for decades in all the armies of the world's theorem: the average properties of the platoon commander may be prepared in 3-5 years, the company commander — in 8-12 years, the battalion commander — in 15-17 years, the regimental commander — in 20-25 years. For the generals and marshals generally very exceptional conditions.
Repression of the 30s have touched all the officers of the Red Army. But the most terrible: they decapitated her. This is a very clear word — "beheaded". From the word "head". Number of repressed simply staggering:
60% of the marshals,
100% commanders of the 1st rank,
100% commanders of rank 2,
88% of corps commanders (and if you take into account that part of the newly appointed were also repressed — voobsche135%!)
83% of division commanders,
55% of the brigade commanders.
In the fleet was just as quiet nightmare:
100% of the fleet flagship of the 1st rank,
100% of the fleet flagship of rank 2,
100% flagships of rank 1,
100% flagships of the 2nd rank …
The situation with the command staff in the Red Army was devilish. In 1938, the shortage komnachsostava headed for 34%! Only the regular army needed 93 thousand commanders shortage reservists approaching the mark of 350 thousand people. These criteria had to return many laid-off for "politics" in the ranks of the army, for the years 1937-39. have been rehabilitated and restored in the army 11,178 people, 9,247 of them "politicians" are simply fired and another 1,457 people have already been arrested and their cases were investigating.
So Makar, transient loss of commanding the Army of the USSR for three civilians amounted to 17,981 persons, of them shot about 10 thousand people.
During the two years of the USSR Supreme irrevocably lost 738 generals who wore the title proper generals. A lot of it, or not much? For comparison: the years of the Second World War were killed and died for various reasons, 416 Russian generals and admirals. 79 of them died from the disease, 20 died in the tragedies and catastrophes, three had committed suicide, and 18 were shot. So Makar, purely military loss have become a prerequisite of a particular death 296 representatives of our generals. In addition, 77 prisoners were Russian generals, 23 of them were killed and died, but they have already been addressed in previous figures. As can be seen, the fighting irrevocable loss of the high command of the USSR amounted to 350 people. It turns out that only two years of repression of their "loss" was twice that in the four years the most horrible bloody meat grinder.
Appointed to the positions of the repressed those who came under his hand — the so called "proteges". In fact, as told at a meeting of the Military Council of 21 November 1937 Corps Commander NV Kuibyshev (Commander of the Transcaucasian Military Area) this resulted in the fact that with 3 divisions commanded the captains of his neighborhood, one of them previously commanded a battery. One division commanded by Major, the last before the military school teacher. Another division, commanded by Major, the last before the chief of the military and economic supply division. The question from the audience: "Where are the commanders?" Corps Commander replied
curtly: "All the other transferred to the Office of the NKVD without occupying certain positions." In modern parlance — just arrested. The very straightforward Corps Commander Nikolai V. Kuibyshev, lyapnuvshy IS, was arrested on February 2, 1938 and six months later shot.
Repression is not only caused the loss of sensitive personnel in the team, they are more severely affected the morale and discipline of personnel. In the Red Army began a real orgy of "exposures" senior officers junior in rank: denounce and ideological judgments for purely cynical (hoping to take over as head of his own). In turn, the senior commanders of the reduced demands on the slave is not irrational fear of their discontent. That in turn led to an even greater fall in the discipline. The serious consequences of the wave of repression was the reluctance of many Russian commanders of all ranks to take the initiative for fear of repressive consequences for her trouble. No one wanted to be accused of "sabotage" and "voluntarism", with all the ensuing consequences. Even easier and safer to do was stupid top-down orders, and passively wait for the new guidelines. It has played a cruel joke by our army, especially at the initial stage of WWII. I'm, well, no one else, can not say could at least slow coming Wehrmacht generals, destroyed by Stalin. But they were strong even though that is independent and not afraid to express their worldview. All the same I think that in any case it was possible to avoid the 10-s of thousands of victims of such loud and destruction suffered by Reddish Army in border skirmishes. At the end of the 30s, Stalin knew that the military chain of command is divided into supporters of Voroshilov and Tukhachevsky. To resolve the split in the military leadership, Stalin had to make a choice between personal loyalty of old times and fellow members of the "new military intelligentsia."
LEVEL TRAINING COMMAND STRUCTURE
In connection with the reorganization and the sharp rise of the Armed Forces of the USSR in connection with the pre-war 'cleansing' level of training of Russian tactical commanders, and in particular the level of operational training of the higher command of the Red Army fell sharply.
Frisky formation of new connections and large parts of the Red Army led to a massive advancement to senior command positions of commanders and staff officers whose career growth has been rapid, but often poorly justified as stated in the People's Commissariat of Defense directive number of 503138/op
01/25/1941 as follows:
"1. The experience of recent wars, campaigns, field trips and exercises showed low operational training senior commanders, military headquarters, army and front offices ….
The supreme command of … I do not have another way to pay tribute as accurate and complete assessment of the situation and making a decision in accordance with the plan of the High Command …
Army headquarters, army and front-line management … have only basic knowledge and superficial understanding of the disposition of modern military operations and front.
It is clear that at this level of operational training for senior commanders and staffs rely on a decisive success in the modern operation is impossible.
d) all of the Army …. offices by July 1, graduate study and testing of offensive military operations by November 1 — defensive operation. "
[TsAMO F.344 Op.5554 D.9 F. 1-9]
Bad things were, and the commanders of operational and strategic levels, which in large exercise has never acted in the role of students, but only — Governors. It first applies to the newly appointed commander of the military frontier neighborhoods, and that was to the summer of 1941 face-to-face encounter with one hundred percent of the Wehrmacht deployed.
KOVO (Kiev special military district) for 12 years headed the shot then I. Yakir. Then he commanded the district Timoshenko, Zhukov, and only in February 1941 — Colonel General MP Kirponos. Commanding during the Finnish campaign, the 70th SD, he received the title of Hero of the Russian Union of his division for the differences in the capture of Vyborg. Just a month after the end of the "Winter War", he commands the body, and six months later — the Leningrad Military District. And behind Misha Petrovic instructor courses Oranienbaum officer Infantry School, military, medical assistant school, medical assistant service company commander at the front of the First World War. In the Red Army was a battalion commander, chief of staff and commander of the regiment. In 1922 he graduated from the school of "ducats elders" in Kiev, then became its chief. In 1927 he graduated from the Military Academy of the Red Army to them. Frunze. He served as Chief of Staff, 51th SD, since 1934 and the chief commissar of the Kazan infantry school. Judging by the track record, Misha Petrovic, despite his undoubted personal courage, just did not have experience in managing such a large pool of troops as the military district (by the way, the most powerful in the Soviet Union!)
Kirponos can be compared with its counterparts. Field Marshal Karl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt was a lieutenant in 1893, in 1902 he entered the military academy, he served from 1907 to 1910 at the General Staff, he graduated from the First World War, Major, Chief of Staff to the post of the body (at the time Kirponos still commanded a battalion). In 1932, he received the rank of general of infantry and command of the 1st Army Group (more than half of the personnel of the Reichswehr). During the Polish campaign led by GA "South" in the 3 armies, apply the brunt. In the course of the war in the west commanded GA "A" consisting of 4 armies and tank group, which played a major role in the victory of the Wehrmacht.
As commander WSMD, which at one time ran executed IP Uborevich with June 1940 took the Army General DG Pavlov. Dmitry G. in 1914, he volunteered for the front, was promoted to the senior non-commissioned officer in 1916, he was captured wounded. In the Red Army in 1919, the platoon commander, squadron assistant regimental commander. In 1920 he graduated from the Kostroma infantry courses in 1922 — Omsk Higher kavshkolu in 1931 — Academic Courses Military Technical Academy of the Red Army to them. Dzerzhinsky, from 1934 — mechanized brigade commander. Member of the fighting on the CER and in Spain, where he earned the rank of GSS. From August 1937 to work in ABTU Red Army in November of the same year became the head ABTU. During the campaign of the Finnish troops checked the STP. But with such baggage Spanish war hero was appointed Commander of the Western Military District special.
And confronted him Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, who became a lieutenant in 1898. In 1912, he graduated from the military academy, and with the beginning of the First World War — became chief of operations Infantry Corps in May 1915 and transferred to the headquarters of the 11th Army. He graduated from the war chief of operations of Army with the rank of major. In 1929 — Major General, commander of the 1st kav.divizii, in 1931 Stettin managing military neighborhood. Since 1935 he commanded the 3rd Army Group. In the war with Poland led GA "North" in the 2-armies. In France — the commander of the GA 'B', which included 2, 3 and later the Army and Panzer Group.
Commander PribOVO F. Kuznetsov. In 1916 he graduated from the school warrant. The platoon commander and later head of the team of scouts hiking. In the Red Army in 1918, the company commander, battalion and regiment later. In 1926 he graduated from the Military Academy of the Red Army to them. Frunze, and in 1930 — Rate of improvement
of the higher officers of the same with her. Since February 1933 the head of the Metropolitan, later — Tambov Infantry School. Since 1935, the department managed the overall strategy of the Military Academy. Frunze. Since 1937 senior teacher strategies Corps, and later head of the Department of Strategy at the same academy. As the Deputy Commander of BF in September 1939, participates in the "liberation" campaign in Western Belarus. From July 1940 — Chief of the General Staff Academy of the Red Army, in August, was appointed commander of North Caucasus Military District, and in December of the same year — the commander PribOVO. Of all the 3 teams, specifically Isidorovich Fedor had a good theoretical knowledge but practical experience in command and control it obviously lacking.
His opponent — Commander GA "North" William Joseph Franz von Leeb enrolled as a volunteer in the 4th Bavarian regiment in 1895, lieutenant in 1897. In 1900 he took part in the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion in China, after the military academy in 1909, he served in the General Staff, and later commanded the artbatareey. Since March 1915 — Chief of Staff of the 11th Bavarian PD. Graduated from the First World War, Major as Chief Logistics Group Army. In 1930 — a lieutenant general, commander of the 7th PD and immediately Bavarian commander of Military Region. In 1933, the commander of the 2nd Army Group. Since 1938, the commander of the 12th Army. He took part in the occupation of the Sudetenland. During the French campaign commanded GA "C".
The contrast in the level of training, qualifications, service and combat experience in opposing each other generals in my opinion is obvious. Useful for the school listed above German military leaders was their consistent progress up the career ladder. They completely failed to work hard in practice the art of planning military operations and command and control in the criteria of modern maneuver warfare against the enemy in running perfectly. Based on the results acquired in the fighting, the Germans have brought fundamental improvements in the structure of their own departments, units and formations in combat regulations and methods of training troops.
But our commanders, ascended to division commanders of the overnight leaders in the large masses of troops, apparently uncertain felt themselves to these highest positions. An example of their predecessors unlucky constantly hanging over them as Domoklov blade. They blindly did indicate Stalin and shy sample some of them to show independence in addressing increasing readiness of troops to attack the Germans were stopped by the "top".
This article is under no circumstances is not aimed at denigrating the Red Army. Just there is a perception that the pre-war army was reddish mighty and strong, everything in it was perfect: and a lot of tanks and planes, guns and rifles. But this is overshadowed serious prepyadstviya in pre-war Red Army, where the number, unfortunately, have not run across in quality. It took two and a half years of intense and bloody fighting of strongest army of the world, that our armed forces are such as we know them to victory in 1945!
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