Asks in the English-language Russian newspaper The Moscow Times political analyst Vladimir Frolov. We will acquaint you with the content of his article.
Over the Kremlin's decision to begin a campaign of extermination against the President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko is difficult to see a clear strategy. Moscow outraged opposition to Lukashenko establishment of the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, but the strategy, which aims to humiliate and weaken its Lukashenko regime — a road to nowhere.
Moscow faces a strong resistance to her plans Lukashenko's political and economic integration in the post-Soviet space. Lukashenko in turn sees these integration plans and the abolition of Russian economic subsidies direct threat to its authoritarian power, especially at a time when he is seeking his fourth term as president in the early 2011a.
It is clear that Moscow would have to Belarus without Lukashenka, but she did nothing to prepare the ground for a change in Minsk that Moscow could control. The opposition does not exist shapes that Moscow could support. All the opposition calling for the integration of Belarus into the European Union and unknown outside of Minsk and Brussels. Bet on the Premier Sergei Sidorsky without the consent of the Lukashenka would be doomed to failure.
Lukashenko's popularity rating — about 50%, the ratings of his opponents less than 10%. Thus Lukashenko is the clear favorite has chosen to be held next year.
Moscow tried to intimidate the Belarusian president of information attacks. The idea was to get him treated with more respect for the wishes of Moscow. But this tactic has its limits, and its implementation is difficult to turn back without losing face. In addition, it leaves the possibility Lukashenko retaliatory steps.
If you accuse a foreign leader in the organization of political assassinations, you better have proof. To make your words with deeds, you have to bring him to justice, as didand the United States with Saddam Hussein.
The least risky strategy would be to continue the economic pressure on Lukashenko ahead of the presidential election in Belarus, in conjunction with the offer him a solid package of guarantees and bonuses in the case of a peaceful departure.
Less viable option is the non-recognition of the election results in Belarus, and this requires a tight coordination with Washington and Brussels.
Just invective against Lukashenko is not a strategy.