In one of the metropolitan newspapers in August of the year today posted an article General Director of JSC "VNIITransmash", Doctor of Technical Sciences, corresponding member of the RARAN Victor Stepanov, "All heresy armor rating." The paper maker has been criticized for a South American magazine "Military Ordans", which is jointly combat parameters underestimates the position of Russian tanks
T-90 and T-90AS compared with zabugornom M1A2 (USA), "Leopard 2A6" (Germany), "Leclerc" (France) and others. With all of this creator believes that the methodology for assessing the ratings tank South American magazine did not use, and presenting the results was commissioned by developer.
The main conclusion of the article Victor Stepanov is that the upgraded T-90AM in the absence of new ammunition in armor-piercing projectiles, batch creation of which is not disbursed exceeds the M1A2 SEP tank on military-technical level (WTU).
Leaving aside the "Military Ordans" comparable properties 2-pairs of tanks (T-90A, the M1A2) and (T-90AM, the M1A2 SEP), which are used to confirm the creator advantages of our armored vehicles.
When we want to pass off as a REAL
Viktor Stepanov method uses a 40-year-old, in which the full record of military-technical level (KVTU) is determined by multiplying the characteristics of firepower (Co), protection (CP), mobility (KP) and operational capabilities (CE), in other words KVTU = KOhKZhKPhKE .
To evaluate the characteristics of combat tanks in Germany, the U.S., Russia is technique. But perfectly clear that any initial data in any technique is incorporated, then the corresponding answer and get it. From this perspective, we compare the results of assessments KVTU GABTU former chief Colonel General Vladislav Polonsky ("Review of the Armed Forces», № 6, 2007), and Victor Stepanov (Table 1).
The results of Vladislav Polonsky, relating to 2007, higher than the results of Victor Stepanov, relating to 2012. The difference in the submission of the results of 5 years. During this period, the military-technical level with Stepanova compared with estimates Polonsky fell to the T-90 in the half, and for the M1A2 — almost half. Why so much sprawl exhibited the assessment by the chief of the WTU GABTU and CEO of "VNIITransmash?" It is hard to imagine that these estimates are overstated Polonsky. But it is also hard to believe that their Stepanov underestimated in favor of their own confirmation. That's really undeniable truth — which are using the initial data, these results and get it. With all of this indicates that the size of the input and output disk imaging to calculate the overarching characteristics of the main battle tank parameters and WTU is more than 5000 names. According to the views Stepanova, it assigns the evaluation of objectivity with which we can not agree. Objectivity depends first on the reliability of the initial data.
Alarming rates exhibited in the article zabugornyh tanks in comparison with our T-90 (Table 2). With all this Stepanov argues that in terms of price-quality T-90A is two to three times better zabugornyh M1A2, M1A2 SEP, «Leopard 2A6" and others.
Taking into account the price-performance ratio, it is not clear why foreign money more of the same Russian. Here our quality or worse, or we do not know how to trade. As a result, the use of initial data that do not meet the existing realities Stepanov concludes with an evaluation of our results presentation and American tanks (Table 3).
Try to trace as Victor Stepanov, manipulating figures K0, short, KP, KE, "proved" an advantage over zabugornom Russian tanks.
OGNEV infirmities of the T-90A and T-90AM
For a nice presentation of firepower and protection of tanks (T-90A, the M1A2) and (T-90AM, the M1A2 SEP) compare the properties of the BPS included in these ammunition armored vehicles, with their frontal armor protection protection. Ammunition T-90A, T-90AM may consist out of old Russian BTS (Table 4), since no others.
Together, Viktor Stepanov acknowledges that ammunition zabugornyh tanks are overvalued BPS power in comparison with Russian BPS (Table 5).
Armor protection (Table 6) frontal protection M1A2 SEP tank is 700 mm, and for the cumulative ammunition — 800 mm. This means that a direct protection of the tank will not make its way to the BTS 350 armor penetration mm/60 deg., And the cumulative means of destruction (COP) — with armor penetration of 400 mm/60 degrees.
Firepower article Stepanov presented in Table 3. Next creator, not bothering to analyze the effectiveness of certain traits of tank ammunition ammunition also features the vulnerability of armored vehicles, said: "In general, the firepower of the T-90A M1A2 exceed 10%."
Once created reports that in 2003 has been adopted T-90AM with the upgraded gun 2A46M4 (5) and the new BPS oversized power. He goes on to warn: "However, the creation of a batch of these BPS not mastered. As can be seen, while continuing to work to improve the guns 2A46M4 (5) and 2AV2 and ammunition modernized T-90AM will exceed the "Leopard 2A6" and the M1A2 SEP firepower. "
Usually enacting the modernized tank must be accompanied by test firing ammunition belonging to the ammunition. But since 2003, no established mass creation of new overestimated the power of the BTS. But since 2003, nine years. For this reason, the ammunition of the T-90AM is not BPS and cumulative means capable of breaking through the front zone of protection of the tank M1A2 SEP, failure of which may be achieved by means of Russian ammunition of old times at the expense of getting into the weakened area or in the front side.
In ammunition Russian tanks with a rocket shot ZUBK20 9M119M that adopted in 1989. ATGM 9M119M intended to defeat the M1 and M1A1 tanks filled with hanging DMZ. Broneprobivaemost tandem warhead missile systems 9M119M is 350 mm/60 degrees. The tandem warhead of the missile does not penetrate the frontal protection M1A2 tanks and M1A2 SEP. The defeat of the armored vehicles can be achieved by getting in front of protection zones of weakness in either side. Apart from this, the rocket 9M119M bad overcomes the dynamic protection zabugornyh tanks ("HBO» № 47, 2006; № 12, 2010, № 4, 2011; № 34, 2011). Fans rocket 9M119M preach that the use of guided weapons mounted on Russian tanks, much to increment (up to 5 km), the maximum distance defeats the purpose. But the staff of BT Research Center 3 CRI Defense mark ("HBO», № 12, 2012): "The deterrent effectiveness of the implementation will be managed instruments that in real combat capability of sight at ranges exceeding 2500 meters, is very low." Curious how Stepanov took into account in its own methodology situation where ammunition in the T-90AM no ammunition, firmly hitting the M1A2 SEP by firing on the forehead? It also remains a mystery evaluation of the increase maximum range (5 km) defeats the purpose of a missile 9M119M for which the possibility of the line of sight at a distance of more than 2500 m very unimportant.
Laying in the assessment of military-technical level of initial data for the new BPS not available in the ammunition of the T-90AM, the creator of using such reception "proved" an advantage over Russian armored vehicles was in service with the M1A2 SEP.
Conclusions of the article firepower does not correspond to reality, as the Russian anti-tank ammunition T-90A, T-90AM, consisting of obsolete munitions are not able to firmly hit the M1A2, M1A2 SEP, «Leopard 2A6" the shelling of front, more sheltered areas. Unfortunately, the method of estimating the WTU masks the real state of firepower and protection of Russian tanks. If the creator presented the results of computer simulation of the effectiveness of the defeat of the M1A2 tank by firing in frontal protection zone at a distance of 2 km, the probability of hitting purchased on an aspect of the "loss of fire or door" opened a lot of state firepower of our tanks. In this case, the possibility of defeat M1A2 tank ammunition 3BM48 "Lead" is 0.10.
Creating an inclusive TANKS WITHOUT PROTECTION METHODOLOGIES
At present, the development of anti-tank weapons zabugornyh far outstrips the ability of the assembly consisting of Russian tanks in service, the protection of which has exhausted the ability of constructive improvement. Now the tank can no longer defend themselves without the help of others because of the sharp increase in the destructive power of modern weapons. These criteria require additional protection of armored brigades, providing camouflage from radar satellite intelligence that does not allow the application of electronic beats with microwave radio emissions for the scrapping of the electronics mounted on tanks, also counteract the various means of destruction. In other words, modern defense armored brigade should consist of collective and personal protection. With all of this collective defense should provide all-encompassing opposition to anti-tank weapons of the enemy with an army air defense missiles and artillery, aviation, and electronic warfare.
The methodology Stepanova collective component of tank protection is absent. And without its account should expect significant losses of our tanks. In the method of "protection" is presented outdated wording does not change accordingly fighting. Here is its content: "Immunity — the ability to maintain combat readiness in the tank combat missions under the influence of causes affecting ordinary guns, mines and weapons of mass destruction on the crew and equipment. Protection of personal qualities are invulnerable when slug firing, mine resistance and protection against weapons of mass destruction. " In this formulation, there is not even a hint of the need to ensure the collective security of Russian armored vehicles. Maybe Stepanov blamed for collective security to another agency. But of "VNIITransmash" knows better than anyone vulnerabilities of Russian armored vehicles and can formulate a good tactical and technical requirements for the collective security of a tank brigade in the criteria of proximity wars.
In poor condition of the personal protection of our armored vehicles. To give the appearance of a positive assessment of our tanks with regard to the presence of complex optical-electronic suppression (EIA) and the active protection (AZ) compared with zabugornom standards Viktor Stepanov uses the definition underestimates the equipment of tanks M1A2, M1A2 SEP complexes EIA and AZ (Table 7).
It has long been clear that the equipment zabugornyh tanks complexes AZ is a priority to increase their security in the criteria for the introduction of a non-contact high-precision long-range anti-tank warfare weapons. But the creation of the reader another view Stepanov uses the term "possible", referring to the presence of the tank M1A2 SEP complexes AZ, EIA. It is assumed that the assessments measure of security M1A2 SEP is without complexes AZ and environmental impact assessment. On this occasion, more than 10 years to reverse the Colonel-General Sergei Maev, at the time — GABTU chief, wrote in the journal ("Weapon. Policy. Conversion». № 3, 2001), which increase survivability of U.S. tanks is modernized by the installation of an AZ . Immediately clear that in Germany conducted for R & D in the tank "Leopard 2A6" AZ complex, which should provide protection against anti-tank, and homing homing warhead artillery and air weapons, ceasing their operation on the approach to the range of 20-150 m, and in the upper hemisphere — 25-250 m With all this it is clear that the complex environmental impact assessment "blind-1", mounted on tanks T-90A and T-90AM is overcome zabugornom ATGM with thermal or radar homing (missiles "Javelin", "Hellfire "" Brimstone "," spike "," Nag "etc.). In other words, the set of "blind" predutverzhdaet getting into the armored car just an old second-generation anti-tank, the control circuit which is used tracer that is placed in the rear of the rocket. In turn, the complex AZ of the "Arena" with all its positive properties are not able to fight with BPS and percussion cores.
Vorachivayas to estimates Victor Stepanov, it must be emphasized that its terminology is expressed in the statement "there", "No", "possible", "work", hides the real property and the security of our zabugornyh tanks.
Coupled with the fact installed on tanks T-90 reactive armor (ERA) "Contact-V» firmly overcome BPS 829A2 and DM43 thanks to a pointed design of their head without the initiation of detonation in the EDZ. This was proved by the fruits of experimental research conducted in NIIstali in the late 80's, but for some reason left without attention. Then the chief engineer Peter Palastrov upgraded Russian BPS 3BM22 by setting it in the head of the "pin" (sketch 1a), whose diameter was 13.8 mm. It was assumed that with the assistance of the post with a 15-mm metal plate integrated RS will create fragmentation weak stream, unable to detonate explosives in the EDZ. Shooting this projectile has confirmed the said assumption — the detonation of explosives in the EDZ is not accomplished.
Research began in the main led the testing of integrated CLE "Contact-V» by BPS 3BM22 "Hairpin", the head of which is shown in Figure 1b. With the assistance of the BTS 15 mm plate after crushing ballistic tip (1) is punching plate-localizer damper (2) which increases in diameter from 24 to 39 mm. These dimensions and guide the creation of a massive fragmentation flow to initiate detonation in the EDZ. The creation of a massive fragmentation also facilitates the flow of material 15-mm plates — steel armor of the highest hardness, which has inflated fragile.
What conclusion follows from this? Adopted in 1985, the integrated RS "Contact-V» is not applicable to the protection of zabugornyh BPS with ostrogolovye warheads. With the assistance of such warheads appears a low-power stream fragmentation, which eventually forms a hammer-free zones of explosives in the EDZ, which is one of the main reasons for the lack of detonation. So Makar, CLE "Contact-V» can only work against Russian BPS 2BM22 "Hairpin".
More exciting results of the experiment (sketch 2), conducted in late 1985 by Peter Palastrova. Integrated ERA in these experiments consisted of 4 EDZ. A powerful stream of fragmentation of 15-mm plates, formed by the collision with BPS 3BM22, initiated detonation in EDZ (1), which is passed on to all of the following (2-4) thanks to their mutual contact. Acceleration 15-mm plates occurred by impact plates EDZ and expanding detonation products. Exposure to 15 mm plate on a side surface of its BTS was the prerequisite for the formation of bounce in the armor plate with the funnel 50 mm deep. These are the results obtained by the detonation of 1 kg of explosives and weight 15-mm plate 7.6 kg. Experiments Palastrova give an idea about the features of the excitation of detonation in the EDZ and the impact on energy abilities DZ at BPS.
In integrated DZ "Contact-V» under a 15 mm plate (size 500h260 mm) are four sections, each of which two stacked EDZ 4C22. Section separated from each other by iron walls for the non-transfer of detonation. Comparing the structure of DZ "Contact-V» with the criteria of experience, we can note its lowest efficiency, which is determined by the detonation of only 2-EDZ.
So Makarov, Viktor Stepanov in the estimates do not apply damaging property deeds zabugornyh anti-tank weapons, which are firmly hit the tanks T-90A and T-90AM, which led to an overestimation of protection of our armored vehicles.
Integrated RS our tanks "Contact-V» is overcome: the probability of 0.8-0.9 zabugornom modern short-range anti-tank with a tandem warhead — "Eriks", mid-range — "Javelin", "Dragon 2", "Milan-2T ", long range -" Hellfire "," Brimstone "and others; zabugornom grenade shot with a tandem warhead; zabugornom BPS M829A1, M829A2, M829A3, DM43, DM53, having a pointed head portion, which allows to overcome the DMZ without detonation. In other words, our integrated RS can fight only with old ammunition, having a shaped charge, or with Russian BPS.
It must be emphasized that the installation of a tandem DZ "Relic" to "roof" of the T-90AM does not save it from destruction aircraft missile systems PARS 3LR (FRG), which has armor of the main charge tandem warhead 1,200 mm and the ability to attack armored vehicles from above with an angle close to 90 meetings grad. ("HBO» № 32, 2012).
Information for consideration
The above was confirmed by the failure characteristics estimations of combat options "firepower" and "protection" of the T-90A, T-90AM, M1A2, M1A2 SEP. Coupled with estimates of the same parameter "mobility" can agree with the creator of the article. But about the occurrence of "operational opportunities" there are a lot of comments, of which we mention the more important. So, Viktor Stepanov acknowledges that the U.S. and NATO countries System Support (MOT) is different number of performers and the quality of service from our similar system. Their quality of service is ensured swift technical specialists recruited under contract. Because, as acknowledged by the creator, the current system then in tank units, NATO ensures the highest operational performance capabilities of their tanks in comparison with ours.
Modern tanks are difficult technical complex, requiring the highest level of training of the crew, which we did not meet the level of difficulty of modern tanks. For three months in the training center is unrealistic to teach soldiers of good work in fighting criteria. Because maintenance of armored vehicles lasts untrained crews.
In the end, with reference to our armored vehicles presented the following results: 4 of the main characteristics of the military is only one parameter (CP) corresponds to reality, the other three (K0, BB, EC) unreasonably high, and for zabugornyh — understated. For this reason, the T-90AM by the method of WTU "surpassed" M1A2 SEP.
Creator of the initial data used to justify the K0, KZ, KE, cause huge doubts. Thus, the rate of R0 is not proven highly effective BPS shooting referred to in 9 years no ammunition in the T-90AM. Also there is no barrier, protecting the front of the tank simulator M1A2 SEP, which is due to any tests "fire power" can not be recognized at the municipal level, with the adoption of a new BPS. So as being in service with our BPS significantly inferior zabugornom swatches to armor penetration, then they can not elect analog zabugornogo ammunition for target practice for the protection of the T-90AM.
Technique of "VNIITransmash" WTU assessment does not account for non-contact nature of war. Thus, it remains unattended radio-electronic hit, incapacitating AZ, CICS, communications equipment, in what many zabugornoy electronics. Such a blow significantly reduce the combat effectiveness of our tanks. It is not paid attention to the collective defense. It has long been time to deal with what ammunition can beat AZ, DZ, and that takes an army air defense.
I would like to wish of "VNIITransmash 'success in solving the burning problems of combat options to increase Russian armored vehicles.
|Table 1 Comparison of estimates for KVTU|
|Price and Russian tanks zabugornyh Table 2|
|Tanks||M1A2||M1A2 SEP||"Leopard 2A6"||"Leclerc-2"||-90|
|Cost ($ million)||5.1-5.6||7.5||6.5||8.5||2.5|
|Evaluation parameters of combat tanks and WTU Russia and the U.S. Table 3|
|BPS included in ammunition Russian tanks Table 4|
|The index of the projectile||3BM22||3BM32||3BM42||3BM48|
|Year of adopting||1976||1985||1986||1991|
|Armor penetration, mm/60 degrees.||170||250||220||300|
|BPS ammunition American tanks Table 5|
|The index of the projectile||Year of adopting||Initial velocity, m / s||Armor penetration, mm / 60 °.|
|The presence of complexes of OEP, AZ on tanks, according to Victor Stepanov Table 7|
|CES||No||Likely||There is||There is|
|Table 6 Frontal armor protection protection|
|Tank||Armor protection for the BPS, mm||Armor protection for the COP mm|