Asymmetric response to Russia

Asymmetric response to Russia
So may be the development of tactical nuclear weapons and super-low power

Significant changes in the look on the conduct of hostilities and their role in the missile and artillery (RAV) occurred at the end of XX — beginning of XXI century with the formation of the concept of network-centric warfare. Immediately identify and backlog of in this area of ​​the world level. Own eyes on the state of the Russian RAV and priorities of its development scientists are intensively working on this topic within the Russian Academy of Missile and Artillery Sciences (RARAN).

Missile and artillery armament is a very limited view of weapons of modern armies. In over 600 years of development went RAV evolutionary method: increased range, power was increased ammunition grew accuracy of their delivery to the target rate and artillery systems. At the same time the main principles for the implementation of this armament remained constant for centuries, practically extensive — massing of fire, his focus on the important purposes verbovanie to perform fire missions batteries, battalions, regiments, brigades, whether classical or receiver more modern rocket artillery.

Known songs «of hundreds of thousands of batteries …» naturally artistic exaggeration, but perhaps only in the order. So, in a traditional book on the history of artillery, published in 1953 under the general editorship of Misha Chistyakov, shows the number of artillery at Borodino (about 1200 units) in all countries — participants of the First World War (25,000), and the storming of Berlin coaxed (more than 41,000). With all this yearly creation guns and mortars of all calibers in the USSR reached 120,000 units.

The rapid postwar development of missile brought its own changes in the eyes of the role of PAB in the fighting, but in all the leading states of missiles at least some kind of home, with a huge range, first considered as carriers of nuclear weapons (with the exceptions of anti-aircraft missile systems and anti-ship missiles) .

So referred to as the fifth revolution in military affairs analyst Vladimir Slipchenko and Kapitanets associated with the emergence in 1945 of nuclear weapons. Followed after the second world war race nuclear arms between the United States and the Soviet Union led to the creation of the Russian strategic nuclear deterrence forces (SNF) and the establishment of approximate parity between the countries. Update triad of strategic nuclear forces and maintaining the combat readiness of the strategic nuclear missile shield to this day remains a major task applets State Armaments (GPV-2020).

Contactless War

Significant changes in the forms and methods of implementing the RAV occurred at the end of XX century with the development of concepts of conducting air-ground operations, construction of reconnaissance-strike (reconnaissance-fire) complexes. The main requirements for the aggregation of artillery began with reconnaissance and automatic control, speed expand / collapse in firing positions, planning and preparation for the management of fire, the possibility of effective implementation of precision-guided munitions (VTB). Since that time there has been a lag Russian RAV and the world level. If the first generation of these munitions with semi-active guidance systems zabugornye not inferior counterparts, the Russian VTB with autonomous guidance systems significantly inferior to them as inferior and automatic control system (ACS) troops and weapon, namely ACS Missile Forces and Artillery (PB and A).

Configuration to look at the conduct of modern warfare (go to the wars of the sixth generation) and their role in PB and A occurred at the turn of the XXI century with the formation and implementation in practice of the concept of network-centric warfare and the establishment of NATO hegemony of the U.S. Army. The best part of the alliance, including the United States, do not upgrade languid artillery systems: self-propelled howitzer tank chassis, tracked multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) and missiles land forces (NE), languid flamethrower system, etc. At the same time intensively modernized precision instrument (WTO), armored combat vehicles of various types, highly mobile artillery system wheelbases, means artillery reconnaissance, communications and automatic control.
War is often called the sixth-generation contactless, with all this, it is assumed that unlike contactless nuclear war fifth generation (such wars in the XX century there was no possibility of their appearance in the XXI century is negligible) they are conducted or will be conducted a precision instrument non-nuclear warheads. As an example of such contact war usually lead NATO campaign in Yugoslavia (1999), but it solved a limited number of tasks and not aimed at any destruction of enemy forces, nor control over its territory. More revealing are the military action the U.S. and coalition forces in the Persian Gulf from 1991 to 2003.

Currently, the United States and its allies are close to, to change the strategic balance of power by building strategic nuclear weapons and not even through the deployment of anti-missile systems, reducing the effectiveness of retaliation (although it pays great attention to the fronts), and the application of stealth, massive, frisky preemptive strike precision instrument by means of Russian strategic nuclear forces. This is a very expensive undertaking, requiring coordinated action by all branches of the armed forces, orbital constellation of global engagement management systems, intelligence, electronic warfare, etc. Well, the price is actually high-precision weapons is very high (the cost of a cruise missile of the «Tomahawk» — more than a million bucks and promising hypersonic missiles can achieve 10s million).

Priority lines

Sad experience of the USSR tried to spare no means to properly respond to the strategic defense initiative of U.S. President Ronald Reagan, who began the construction of aircraft carriers, similar to South American, try to maintain quantitative balance of nuclear missile weapons with the world, indicates the futility of such ways. Decent asymmetric response to these and other challenges to the 80s of the last century has not been found.

Now, in our opinion, this asymmetrical response may be the development of tactical nuclear weapons and PB A low and ultra-low power. Modern technologies allow to create it in the main caliber artillery weapons, promising multi-purpose high-precision missile systems and MLRS rockets, with all this is actually one hundred percent rule out the possibility of its use by terrorists, even in the case of contact with such ammunition in their hands. When making decisions about the development of a fundamentally tactical nuclear weapons need to correctly declare that it can be applied only to the outer reflection of anger and only on its own terrain. Naturally, such a decision would cause sharp criticism from neighbors Russian Federation, states ‘nuclear club’, accusations of lowering the threshold of nuclear war, etc.

The answer can only be one — this measure compulsory. Even full implementation of SAP 2020 and permanent reform of the Armed Forces (AF) Code does not provide them with the opportunity to wage war with the sixth generation how something harsh opponent. Figuratively speaking, the Russian Armed Forces abilities 2020 enough to host multiple counterterrorism operations immediately. Perhaps for «peace enforcement» of the boundary of the country with an army of 20 thousand people.

But it will be obvious enough to combat technologically equal, but numerically far superior enemy (Army of China — more than 2.3 million people, with the mobilization reserves — more than 30 million), or with the opposite side, approximately equal in size, but significantly superior technologically (Army United States — a bit less 1.5 million people, the European NATO countries — a little more than 1.5 million military personnel).

Military-political and financial situation compels Russia to solve conflicting dual puzzle — to provide nuclear deterrence, in other words be within wars fifth generation, and immediately prepare for the coming wars, wars of the sixth generation.

The aforementioned Vladimir Slipchenko very impressively demonstrated that the presence of the SNF did not warn of any war in the second half of XX century, did not help the U.S. win in Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, but the conclusions made from these facts, we want to offer little to correct .

Not be absolutely renounce nuclear weapons and all efforts directed to the development of precision tools, network technology, information systems and other components of confrontation sixth generation wars. Emphasis in nuclear deterrence purposefully move to create a more cheapest kind, even in low vulnerability criteria that the war itself last generation of tactical nuclear weapons, which can serve as a means not only regional, and strategic deterrence aggressor, because it was hard to imagine that without a ground operation may be goals anger against Russia.

Certainly, for all that you need the most active way to develop all the technologies, types of weapons, military and special equipment (AMSE), relating to preparations for wars of the sixth generation to take appropriate organizational and administrative decisions. Complexity of the implementation of a wide range of activities for the Armed Forces, and nearly on the scale of the Russian military-industrial complex (MIC) and the Russian economy as a whole makes it difficult to transfer all of the military structure of the country to the new, network-centric design principles, implementation and development of AMSE.

At the same time in the field of missile and artillery are prerequisites to the creation of high-performance, adaptive intelligence and percussion (reconnaissance-fire) units (modules) that can operate in both existing (inflexible, rigidly connected with disabilities by providing intelligence and information) systems control (for example a uniform system of tactical level), and the promising network-centric systems.

It must be emphasized that in the Armed Forces today is practically no clear concept of building a system RAV, the transition to the latest CB structure is very accentuated the problem of immediately creating the preconditions for its solution. Namely, there was certainty caliber cannon artillery, artillery groups composition units of the Land Forces, narrowed range of promising transport databases for RVs and A ST. Severe reduction issues require consideration facial features MLRS, anti-tank and anti-aircraft complexes NE, necessity and direction of future development of tactical missile systems, the creation of promising types of missile weapons, including tactical nuclear weapon, maintenance units and RV A NE in a single reconnaissance information space.

Together with the solution of conceptual problems RAV improvement, including the tactical nuclear deterrence, increased attention should be paid to the development of fundamentally new systems of such weapons, new systems throwing ammunition, creating them on other physical principles, the use of nano-and neural network technology in the construction of the RAV promising complexes and facilities reconnaissance and information support.

The concept of national security, military doctrine Russian Federation and other fundamental documents of our country has identified tasks in the defense of the country and formulated the main provisions of the military-technical policy. First, it agreed on the objectives, resources and expected outcomes of the development and improvement of weapons and military-industrial complex, military-technical cooperation to ensure the tasks of defense and security of the country at the required level. In these documents, it is declared that the Russian Armed Forces equipment must only be carried weapons, not inferior or superior to its characteristics zabugornye standards. So Makar, in the XXI century in our own homeland military-technical policy relies on rich technical and technological development of the country and the Armed Forces. The priorities regarded development or creating the next weapon systems:

precision (highbrow) fishing with giving him the opportunity of integration in interspecific reconnaissance-strike systems (complexes);
forces and means, the information counter;
basic information and control systems, embedded systems management tool and a complex of automation of management of strategic, operational and strategic, operational, tactical and tactical levels;
AMSE systems and complexes based on robotics technology and mental control processes;
systems and complexes of unconventional weapons;
Compact and ultra means of warfare based on miniaturization and nanotechnology, in particular for solving intelligence, counterintelligence, and command and control.

On the expanded board of the Ministry of Defense February 27, 2013 Russian President Vladimir Putin again confirmed these priority areas, highlighting the creation of combat robotics tasks, including unmanned aerial vehicles. The Head of State stressed that the «over the next 2 years to be created by the system of promising research and development in science and military technology» for all that you need to strictly follow the characteristics of weapons programs from the State until 2020.

Problematic issues

Implementation of the pillars of military-technical policy of, a real transition to implement the concept of doing so called network-centric warfare, the priority development of precision (highbrow) Eager tools require a wide range of problems: organizational, technological, industrial, military, political, and several others.

Development problems of Russian RAV and its production in the right quantities can be grouped into five main blocks.

Conceptual prepyadstviya — their decision reclaims verifying military doctrine and conduct research for the development of the overarching concepts of development in general and Sun RAV viz.

Prepyadstviya basic and applied science — there need to verify the list of basic and critical military technologies and important military scientific and technical problems of basic, exploratory and applied research, and the best coordination of Russian Academy of research, research organizations the Defense Ministry, research institutes and design industry.

Engineering design problem — to solve them should do better system for R & D in the Defense Ministry and logistical base institutes and design bureaus.

Production and technological prepyadstviya — this decision more languid block problems should be within the respective federal motivated programs, state of technological platforms, etc. in conjunction with SAP closely and defense contracts.

Organizational and legal challenges — include a wide range of issues related to the structure of the military organization of the country and DIC accessories rights, taxation, financing, training, foreign economic and other puzzles, the solution sought by improving legislation.

Without a solution to all these problems is impossible to create an effective military structure of the country, the reform of the Armed Forces and provide them with modern, much less promising weapons, including rocket-artillery.

Igor Artamonov, member RARAN, Ph.D.

Roman Rjabcev, RARAN Advisor, Ph.D.


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