Marine underwater weapon: challenges and abilities

Our fleet is now obliged to purchase expensive and obsolete torpedo

The indisputable mistake made in the USSR in the 50s, was the monopolization of development homing (CCH) torpedoes organizations without experience in the field of sonar technology. Due to the fact that the initial step is to copy the German sample, found an easy puzzle …

Errors have been very manifest beforehand

Meanwhile, specifically in the middle of the twentieth century, the time of "primitive" CLO abroad over. New requirements for marine underwater weapons were forced to find the freshest ideas. In the Russian Union has welcomed the competitiveness of the best creators of hydroacoustic equipment, to its creation involved organizations such as the Research Institute "Morphyspribor", Institute of Radio Engineering and Electronics and Acoustics Institute, Academy of Sciences of the USSR … How unfortunate it did not sound, development CCH in this country is concentrated in the Central Research Institute "Gidropribor" with the least experience and the introduction of developments outside organization. Blunders were made and when establishing scientific support of the Navy (28th Research Institute). Hardly committed developers in the 70-80s of the error would have missed the experts at the Research Centre of electronic equipment (SIC REV) of the Navy, it is very manifest beforehand they were …

In the 50's and 60's is adopting passive CLO (torpedoes SET-53, MGT-1, SAET-60M), which are almost all copies of the first German homing torpedoes "Tsaukening" (1943). Typically, one of these SPEs (torpedo SAET-60M) was in service with the Navy until our early 90's — a unique case for longevity rather sophisticated military power system, is indicative of our "well-being" in the development CCH torpedoes.

In 1961 he was adopted into service the first Russian active-passive PRS for torpedoes SET-40, and in 60 years of active-passive homing torpedoes and anti receive caliber 53 cm (AT-2, SET-65). First 70 years on the basis of developments 60s created unified for all torpedoes CLO "Sapphire". These systems were fully operational, in normal conditions provided reliable guidance on goal, but had a very low immunity against the GSPC and features significantly inferior to the U.S. Navy torpedoes CCH.

For torpedo promising third generation SET standards of requirements has been set CLO torpedoes Mk-48mod.1, capable in suitable hydrological criteria to detect a submarine at a distance of more than 2 km. Task "to catch up and overtake America" was solved by the end of the creation of the 70-ies strong low-frequency PRS "Waterfall", developed for the aircraft torpedo UMGT-1 and installed (in a massive form) in the USET-80 torpedo. Brand new system in the criteria of the Black Sea deep-water polygons provided in this TTZ radius response neuklonyayuschimsya on submarines. But tests in real criteria were devastating.

Head of the Operations Department torpedo guns of the 28th Central Scientific Research Institute of the Navy L. Bozin recalled: "The commander of submarines of the third generation of Admiral Tomko would send a boat on active duty with a weary sense of … Knowing that does not torpedo homing on a target in a combat exercises he had prepared the boat and target shooting, that it was impossible to miss. A torpedo still do not see the purpose … "And again:" And what about Naval Academy? Real contribution to the development of homing systems in the 70-80s, scientists Naval Institute is not brought. Wrote some Nira, reports, conclusions. And thanks for that. A look wherever demonstrated. And developers can show only what had: the results of the Black Sea. "

A similar situation is described in the memoirs of the Research Institute "Gidropribor" who participated in the design: "It was 1986. The Northern Fleet in 5 years practical shoots torpedoes USET-80. But the results of these submarines mode shooting guard started: maybe bad master mariners that torpedo or torpedo induced instability in the criteria of the shallow northern polygons.

After multiple tests on batisfernyh real goals were set: CCH torpedoes USET-80 criteria ranges of the North does not provide the required distance on the technical task response.

The honor of the fleet remained at altitude and Research Institute "Gidropribor" It took two years to put a torpedo USET-80 PRS, including adapted to the conditions of the North. "

Or: "… entertained the successes of their … samonavedentsy, graduating own series of field tests torpedoes "Hummingbird" (article 294, caliber 324 mm, 1973) with CCH reproduced on Russian hardware components … This CCH — "Ceramics" — broke all records of longevity. In fact, there was not a torpedo, wherever the modernization as an anti-submarine SSN has not been established that CLOs. "

"USET 80K-caliber 534 mm, 1989 … brand new two-plane active-passive acoustic CLO "Ceramics".

So Makar, all 80 years with a real combat capability torpedoes USET-80 (PRS) in the Navy was a huge problem (despite the fact that an old CLOs were directed normal), which was solved only in 1989 by the installation "Playing in the Russian element base" CCH U.S. torpedoes … development of the 60s. (!) In this case, the history of this — the continuing mass production of the PRS — the developer does not cease to be proud of in the XXI century …

As they say, comments are superfluous!

Typically the fact that NGOs are developing the "Region" homing anti-aircraft missiles for APR-1, APR-2 is already in the 60s were much better and smarter than the main developer. CCH modern torpedoes UGST also works up NGO "Region". On the basis of knowledge on the APR in the Scientific and Production Association has developed antitorpeda complex "package", but more on that a bit lower.

SPEED AND RANGE

Against the background of problems identified by our undisputed success should be regarded as the development of anti-submarine missiles (PLR) for nuclear submarines.

There is a world view: because the enlightened West does not have them in service, then we do not need. But PLR — is a high-speed tool that provides defeat of enemy submarines in the shortest possible time and still great distances compared with torpedoes. The use of anti-submarine missiles in a situation where the enemy fired first, lets take the initiative in the battle and defeat. In this great role played by the rate of delivery of the warhead to the target. Award bureau "Innovator" is specifically in the implementation of this requirement, the more apparent in LHP 86r caliber 65 cm World that the range of the anti-missile (100 km) was not needed, semi-literate. Range — a consequence of this the highest speed, providing a significant increase in efficiency at the distances, a lot of the least-most in relation to the PLR 83r caliber 53 cm

Unfortunately, LHP 83r and 86r have some drawbacks — a consequence of a number of errors in the TTP for their development.

One of them was the above-water version of "Waterfall" — LHP 83rn. Start with submarine missile imposes on a number of additional requirements (and this weight, and tools) quite unnecessary for surface ships. Ammo our anti-submarine ships repeatedly conceded western Moreover, this trend with each of our project was growing, example is the TFR project 11540 with full ammunition load of the missing 6-missile torpedo launchers (RTPU) caliber 53 cm

What is the background of this situation? In-1's, in the isolation of our military science from the Navy. Here it is impossible not
to recall the widely publicized jet torpedo, "Squall". Yes, the 200 units in the series have received the product, but a number of restrictions made it almost useless weapon in the battle. The enthusiasm of foreign intelligence services to the topic was focused not on himself "Squall", and the large amount of bench castings underwater missiles carried with us, because ideology is developed in the United States and Germany, high-speed torpedo was fundamentally different — non-nuclear, with CCH, the highest speed and low range, for the introduction of aviation and as a warhead PLRK (in other words, close to what we had to ACR).

This gap has led to a number of developments that are applicable only to the "paper war". The fleet is often very ironic referring to another science news, just crushed tekuchkoj, ranging from increasing from year to year the amount of cardboard and finishing activities day plan of combat training, continuous "presenting an inspection" and "removal of comments."

Further reason — defects of training (first narrow specialization of officers), organizations and systems address the issues of the Navy. Officer gunsmith (antisubmarine) had usually feeble knowledge in acoustics, submarine detection systems, because the educational applets were designed to study the mechanical part of the pre-emptive.

In some cases, various assumptions are embedded in the very low quality of arithmetic tactical models designed for scientific support for the construction of ships and MPO.

Another prerequisite is the lack of a single body with the capacity and resources responsible for the future development of the Navy. The prospect of doing all of the Navy, and little by little — Marine Science Committee, Naval Academy, 1st Central Research Institute, The 24th Research Institute, the central control … In general — formally — only the Main Command of the Navy, which is a big load of current affairs.

This situation is not there now. Former commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral AP Mikhailovsky (see his book "The fleet commander") is described amazingly — in other words, no way. The fact that the task of development of the ships third generation of his commander in chief of the Navy poses particular, Arkady Petrovich says more than once, but he had never mentioned the acute problems faced fleet when it is executed (for example USET-80).

How to Do Them?

Apparently, it makes sense to analyze the experience of other countries with massive naval forces, first the United States. For example, carefully examine the division of the organizational structure of the Navy for administrative and operational, but this issue is beyond the scope of this article.

Saving on our surface ships torpedo tubes (SLT) caliber 53 cm — nothing else, as a vestige of the second world war. The whole world another fifty years ago defected to the TA for compact torpedoes with distance volley like torpedoes caliber 53 cm (without remote control).

About modern TA NK very well said the commander of the 1st of American destroyers, "I hope never to experience the horror of finding the submarine at a distance of their effective application."

Compact torpedo in the U.S. Navy are the instrument for ships and aircraft have long become "spare gun." PLO chief instrument of American ships — PLRK "Asrok VLA» lesion with a zone of 1.5 to 28 km (with the prospect of the forthcoming growth).

In the arsenal of the Russian Navy has a significant number of mines seaport, to expose that if anything, given the reduction of ship, we can not at the physical level. The structure of these mines comes torpedo MPT ("our Mk-46"). She and her South American ancestor, has tremendous potential and accordingly repaired by upgrading can last for many more years. "After playing" in the 90's an expensive toy — a compact torpedo with "superTTH» Mk-50, the Americans in the XXI century, back to the pragmatic development of 60 — Mk-46 with the latest CCH, which has become a modernized form of Mk-54.

For us, a similar solution to optimally. The appearance of our NC-caliber 324 mm (with the upgraded torpedo MPT) paves the way for an impartial antitorpede complex "package" (324 mm caliber), which now has to be the mainstay of protivotorpednoy circuit protection (PTZ) ship.

Now and Tomorrow

Adopting from the early 90-ies of the Navy of foreign countries new types of torpedoes (especially their CLOs) and detection systems (including those based on active illumination systems and network-centric multi-position) has further aggravated the situation with the Russian Navy MPO, its carriers (first underwater) is already at the conceptual level, fundamentally speaking against submarines and swing their weapon in the classical form.

It must be admitted that the nature of configurations in submarine warfare that took place over the past two decades have not fully grasped not only us, but also abroad. The development of an adequate conception of the development of IWT real only after painstaking research capabilities of new network-centric systems, test them in real-world criteria. Now we can speak only of determining the direction of development of subsea tools and immediate measures to resolve problems more acute MPO Navy.

It fundamentally changes the submarine war are:

— a significant increase in the guaranteed distances submarine detection with new search tools;

— increase noise immunity of the new sonar, very complicating their oppression, even the new EW.

The conclusion is that the current system of homing torpedoes, one can, for example, from the report of the conference UDT-2001 (9 years ago!).

Within 3 years of experts at BAE Systems and the Office of Defense DoD research conducted in England in relation to these works torpedo Spearflsh. The main areas of work include:

— wideband signal processing (in active and passive);

— the introduction of more complex shape of the envelope signal;

— hidden mode active location;

— Beamforming;

— systematization of using neural networks;

— improving the process of tracking.

In tests it was found that the introduction of a broad band (one octave) improves the efficiency of selection of the desired signal in noise due to the increased processing time. In active mode, it allows you to use the compression length of the signal, which reduces the impact of surface and bottom reverberation.

For the detection of targets with the light-emitting low-power used complicated shape of the envelope signal with a random filling and a broad band of frequencies. With all of this radiation is not to torpedo.

It is necessary to emphasize that this is not some promising developments, it is already a fact, with production in the torpedo, which is confirmed to the press service of the command of the U.S. Navy submarine force from 14 December 2006: "The first Mk 48 mod.7 put the fleet on December 7, 2006 is loaded on the SSN-752 "Pasadena" at Pearl Harbor. "

The possibility of effective opposition to such requests first antitorped torpedoes. In modern conditions receive special role antisubmarine missiles, much less that in this matter we are superior to all. For languid torpedoes only principle is the possibility of storm surface targets at ranges over 25-35 km mnogotorpednymi volleys with telecontrol.

Perhaps, given the identified problems, it makes sense to buy a torpedo abroad, as once in the XIX century, or in the 30-ies of XX? But once, shame as it did not sound, has not come out because the most important in the dash are now its CLO management system and methods. And these questions are leading developers locked aggressively directly to the development of special schemes assured destruction software torpedoes, so that the enemy could not get it back, even in fragments.
UK MoD is considering the probable acquisition of a U.S. Navy Mk 48 torpedoes heaviest ADCAP as finished upgrading your candidacy being on submarines armed with wire-guided torpedoes heaviest Spearfish. This decision was very important after the Defence Industrial Policy Ministry of Defense announced in December 2005 that in the future Britain would be willing to purchase a torpedo abroad, provided that it retains control over their tactical software and device CLO (Janes Navy International, 2006, p. 111, № 5, p. 5).

It turns out that there is no belief that even the closest U.S. ally — England gained full access to the "software" …

Abroad, it is possible and necessary to purchase a number of devices for our MPO, but homing system and the control system must be Russian. This work also has a huge export prospects. Needed for the development of modern scientific potential of CCH we have.

Now MPS is one of the main means of attack and defense of naval forces general purpose (ICOS), and only plays an important role in ensuring the combat strength of the naval strategic nuclear forces (SSBNs). A significant advantages in the criteria of probable enemies in the theater of military operations and air superiority modern mine warfare (using dalnohodnyh samotransportiruyuschihsya and UWB min) can be a massive deterrent, but the latter deserves a separate discussion.

To repeat, despite the acute difficulties with the development and creation of the modern MPO, there are now sufficient scientific and production potential for the development and production of subsea tools that meets the current requirements.

To do this:

1. The introduction of the R & D — the steps of modularity. The result even in the crotch step of development should be eligible for practical use.

2. Analysis of all the productive capacity of our engineering services for the greatest performance characteristics and low cost of MPO.

3. The extensive use of civilian technologies.

4. Very important questions of military-technical cooperation of both exports and imports in the development MPO Navy. Competent questioning MTC operates so as to issues of HRT.

5. Role in the utilization of MPO developers — to use the reserve previously made underwater weapons for the release of promising models, as is done in the same USA.

6. Proofreading regulations for the development of weapons and military equipment to the new approaches and time requirements to reduce time and price research and development.

7. Disclaimer of TA caliber 53 cm on surface ships, the transition to 324 mm caliber with a modernized torpedo MAT and antitorpedoy "Package".

8. Strongly need the common equipment submarine antitorpedoy complex "package." Option to submit a Project 877 submarines for export.

8. Further development of a submarine torpedo tube hose specifications, upgrade torpedoes languishing under the hose reel hose specifications for the development of the fleet.

9. Subject to the limitations in resources and providing ammunition purposefully Navy submarines to be armed with two types of torpedoes languid: a modern standard — UGST and modernized (with the substitution of batteries, DDR and installing the hose remote control) USET-80 torpedo.

10. In modern conditions LHP becomes the primary ASW weapon for surface ships and submarine.

11. Begin development of a particularly compact MPO (caliber least 324 mm). The development of PRS allows for even higher efficiency compact warhead small torpedoes, it helps to significantly lower the price.

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