In the near future the web write a lot about what I'm doing apologetics Putin. Someone wrote about this is evident in the accusatory tone, someone thinks that it simply stated a fact. The objectives are pursued with all this variety, but generally speaking, it looks somewhat funny. Because if I did indeed work for Putin, the more they say about it, the more I can do for themselves to seek wage. And if not — then why read about it? But in reality, the creators of similar statements show their utter incompetence in political issues, namely the lack of understanding of what is still the head of a large country, namely, the president of Russia.
All the arguments made under such schemes are based on a kind of logic that looks something like this. Putin comes in a certain uniform "team" that makes all the dirty tricks in the country (alternatively destroys the system of education, juvenile justice enters, realizes the country to the West, introduces corruption, does not carry the "democratic" reforms, limits "democracy" to add the missing to taste) . Since he like everything.
The creators of these arguments do not take into account two fundamentally incident. The first is that politics — the art of the probable. And so, the behavior of the policy, 80 percent is determined by external circumstances. There are obviously people who are above events, but in the 1-x, they are generally too little, in-2, a priori, to consider the kind of person someone a bit naive and, in the end, they very rarely break on the highest positions of power. So here, incident, in which Putin acted first 2000's, at the end of the second term of his own and is now fundamentally different. And so — Putin as a politician (and he has shown that he is something in politics precisely aware of), can not be different in different periods of his stay at the head of the country.
Second — that politics is the art of compromise build. Between different political forces. And the more talented politician, the better he builds these compromises, how much more impressive look to an outsider observer as managing a single cohesive team. Since I am a little bit for yourself imagine some characters that are in Putin's entourage, I can imagine for themselves as they can not stand each other, and how difficult it can be to build them is not that meaningful, but just not very brutal interaction.
If you look at the overall development of the situation, from the standpoint of Putin, it looks something like this: in the first step in its own first term as president, he was just ordinary hired manager, who hired elite some solutions for certain problems. He was very limited in the political decision-making, although he was able to spend some. This period is likely to be considered ended after the "Khodorkovsky case".
We note a very important thing. All the modern corrupt regime and even strengthen the "siloviki" Putin was already granted. We built this corrupt regime both major political force 90, "family" and "liberals" and the two were its beneficiaries. Politically, by the mid-90s, especially after the elimination of the "group-Soskovets Korzhakov", these two forces are personified in the figures of Berezovsky and Chubais, but on closer inspection was shown a much more mixed picture.
Specifically home group started to increase the role of security forces (Nikolaev, Kovalev, Bordyuzha, appeared for a long time to Putin), specifically it has included top security officials in the number of beneficiaries of privatization schemes. And no right to change anything, Putin was not long enough. And when they get there — here and there at the end of his first term, the economic situation has improved rapidly due to the increase in oil prices. And Putin, who was not far-powerful (and it is at the moment not all-powerful, and even remotely resembles Stalin's late 40's) was not going to ruin what moves and evolves, for the sake of the merits of disputed goals.
It is also necessary to consider that by the time when Putin came to power, there was already a complete monopoly on the liberal description of the world ("family" and "security forces" did not have its own pattern and used the "liberal"), which, moreover, maintained and the IMF and the World Bank, the European Union and the United States. But other liberals economic groups in Russia were indescribably very weak besides the fact that the fight 98-99 years have put on the losing team Maslyukova-Primakov (or were eliminated even earlier). And no ordinary politician will not change the operating system if it does not have a solid awareness of what (and who) will come to her replacement.
Putin in the 2000s such awareness was not, was not in his surroundings and people like that. And liberal (consolidated by that time with the "family group on the basis of the struggle with the" siloviki "), and" force "a group of new characters in Putin's entourage entered did not want (and the" admission to the body "- is a separate and very profitable business) and need not be such. All well and it was fine, and, in accordance with the liberal description of the world, no problems and could not be.
When Putin in 2008 was gone, he left behind him the opportunity to come back, but it is not going to interfere in the policies pursued by the two major political factions. He already had some power (but only in the framework of elite consensus, which would be destroyed at one time, as he would have something to fundamentally change it), but there was no conviction that this should be done. And, most importantly, still there was no other "team."
Had to go through in 2008, with the crisis, and then another couple of years, so it was clear that the output under an old model no longer exists. Yet it is unclear what will be the new girl, but as part of an old — no way out for sure. And in such a situation there are a number of possible options for the finals. First is the complete demolition of the entire system. The dangers here are so significant (especially in view of the crisis in the world, which has shown to all of our oligarchs that not only there is no guarantee of preservation of capital but, on the contrary, there is a full guarantee that they would not leave anything like lost "cover-up" by the rf), and guarantees so convincing that it is an option categorically does not suit anyone.
Option two: the gradual reduction of some inner elite consensus before the situation is not "ustakanetsya." In this variant, many believe, but reasonable people (which, of course, is Putin), most likely, this option is not considered. For all this they begin to certain acts that the other members of the elite scare. Note that the validity of this option is close to zero, since no close in time improvements obviously not expected.
The third option — the victory of one of the elite groups with the elimination of others, with no consensus. A analogue of the 30-ies in the USSR. Option probable, but not now, while the level of conflict within the elite have not gone so far, though, can be up to him and coming.
And it remains the fourth option — to elect consensus "dictator" and give him the opportunity to conduct tough reforms, tough in the sense that they can and will damage the system that w
as built in the late 90's — early 2000's. It is this option and was elected, and has appeared as a dictator Putin. But it is not by invitation of the elite, as it was in '99, and without the help of others. Specifically for this reason that he specifically wanted to win the election — as in another of its ability to change the political model in the country could be severely limited. Specifically, for this reason, he was given a "marsh process" (exact, true, he was sent as his initial enthusiasm was not against the government, and to the authorities — in order to explain to her that something must be changed), which, in general, not of success headed for.
And now Putin is the only person in the country, which has the ability to change something without the revolutionary process. I note that there is an opportunity — it does not mean either that he will or that he will succeed. But all the other options require the revolution. With all of this elite group are willing to endure some reform, but with one condition — they must not worsen the situation. And since it will actually worsen machine (because of the crisis), strategically rely on elite Putin can not (tactically — will, of course).
Appeal Fishing season the Academy can be viewed as an attempt to make the nomination and the liberal description of the world, and liberal economic management. Will it be so in reality — we will see the results change of control of the Central Bank. If instead Ignatieff will be appointed Ulyukayev Kudrin else what Zadornov, it means that Putin decided until the "no wake Down and Out." What happens after that — a topic for another discussion.
And in conclusion. A situation in which Putin acts, fundamentally changed. And impartially, and in person, in other words, in terms of his case to the Russian elites and business elites to it. And it asks of him as a politician, to react. I have tried to outline his abilities and chances — given the fact that most of the country, so far, at least, no one has a chance to make the necessary reforms without blood. If Putin refuses to — see what happens then. But I'm not sure that he himself likes to hunt and to act — and in this sense, the situation looks still very uncertain.