Were fully adequate, and judgment on the economy's dependence on global oil prices — in general, there is no exclusivity was not. Another thing that a pessimistic look at these prices was not entirely true: the colossal issue of the European Union in December-February 11-12 years (one trillion euros!) And the tensions in the Middle East have led to the fact that these prices were much higher than expected by most professionals.
Important place in last year's forecast took description of the contradictions faced by the Minister of Finance Kudrin — and as a bureaucrat, and as the head of the liberal "party" in the Russian elite. And now we know that these differences led to his resignation, although its influence on economical solutions for the government is still very large.
Quite correctly been described major economic difficulties of, in view of the fact that the transition inflationary scenario in deflation in the global economy and has not held that, in general, it was predictable. May also be noted that the Central Bank is uniformly moving away from its own hard line — namely, just before writing the real forecast significantly softened the requirements for collateral, under which banks are granted funds. But this process has only just begun.
Fully been properly considered in the forecast and prepyadstviya Russian officials, some of whom we have already apparent in the form of a monitored during the election campaign and immediately after it. Now, these difficulties lead to the beginning of serious configurations in the "elite" and, most likely, these changes will only last and grow. At the same time, the brakes must be separated on the results of campaigns, which have not been described projection. In general, I can not call this shortcoming of the forecast, as the vicissitudes of the campaign herald a matter in general was not feasible.
First, as a result of increase of economic difficulties deteriorated position of "United Russia". Its outcome could hardly have lasted up to an absolute majority of seats in the State Duma, and this process was accompanied by a significant increase in dissent, including — mass demonstrations. With all of this it seems to me that their premise was not so much demand for "clean elections" as the desire of the middle class to pay attention to the event, that the economic situation has seriously deteriorated, and for most of this group, it became clear that their well-being at risk . This applies particularly to small and medium-sized businesses, for which the growth rates of natural monopolies, the pressure of imports (in the criteria for accession to the WTO) and the corrupt "tax" becomes critical.
We note with all this, that the samples of the liberal wing of the Russian elite "ride" this movement, no effect was given — the middle class wanted to debate with the government, rather than confrontation to her. And to realize that (at the time) presidential candidate Vladimir Putin, is well seen by his campaign rhetoric of articles on the main dilemmas of Russian reality. With the development of the protest movement, they became more and more national-patriotic, virtually disappeared from their liberal component. Another thing is that she has returned to his speech immediately after the elections.
Very fundamental point was the very Putin's return to the presidency. The fact is that until mid-2011, the Russian "elite" world view prevailed that the crisis in the country was completed, and hence, no extraordinary measures should not be adopted. With all this space, let us say, the Speaker of the State Duma, Putin provided a comfortable and peaceful existence without much worry. But he took to illumine itself is quite complicated to go back to the first position in the government.
Here it should be noted that the first two of your own term, Putin was (and, in principle, he felt himself so) have formed a hired manager in 90 years Russian "elite". Let me remind you that the quotes I've been put in connection with the fact that this "elite" does not tie their future and that of their own children with our state and in this sense, is for the Russian Federation, faster, the equivalent of a colonial administration. Specifically for this reason he used to describe his own work splashy image of "a slave in the galleys": Putin's personal qualities are not very consistent with that mode of operation that is required of the president, he clearly prefers a more free way of life. In addition, in contrast to, say, Medvedev, Putin is not a fan of power, for it being on the highest position does not have an independent value.
In such a situation, I can see only one version of the best explanations of Putin's return: the realization that the crisis is still inevitable. The fact that its consequences will inevitably beckon to a sharp reduction in the entire Russian "elite", including a reduction in the number of wealthy people (the reduction of the "pie" that separates the Russian elite, I wrote in the forecast for the previous year, about the rich — not once open a discussion on worldcrisis.ru). And this process will be governed by the most "elite" very, very concerning. A means the coming Putin and his team had to make a decision — either they will be engaged in cutting "on live", or someone will cut them. In this sense, the reasoning of the forecast for 2011 were adequate, just in the sense that it is quite clear and understandable outlined the general trends of the year.
But the fact that Medvedev swiftly passed their position, and the entire "liberal" team, most likely, it was just the result of public sentiment, although at the time of the adoption of the respective decisions in September last year has not appeared so obvious. But in any case it is clear that the puzzles that must be solved Russian power in the coming years, it is very difficult — including as sharply increasing conflict of the "elite" and the society as actually inside the "elite", which confirms the basic idea of the forecast on the previous year.
We mention another event which in a certain sense, is the beginning of the forecast for the current year, although of the same points already passed. The fact that the government dramatically liberalized the political process in the country, which is likely to lead to the emergence of a 10-s of new parties. Since the past 10 years they were engaged in full directly opposite case, the question arises, what is produced.
In my opinion, this is due to the fact that the "cleaning" of the Russian unit of governance in the criteria of the crisis and the reduction of all the "elite" completely inevitable, must go on, in general, fairly typical scenario: a substantial reduction in an old machine is under increasing pressure "new forces",
in which the place of 10 "old" new officials come 2-3. With all of this "new force" can be grown in the apparatus itself — this way, for example, has applied Gorbachev, but he ruthlessly paid for it, as these new people do not consider themselves obliged to him. These forces can be grown specifically authority irrespective of an old device — so did many politicians, traditional example — Oprichnina Ivan the Terrible, or the Red Guards of Mao Tse-tung. There are lots of such examples in the history of other countries, in Europe, viz. But such requests in the way of our criteria is quite enormous amount of time to prepare the respective people, as there should be no more 10-s or hundreds, at least a 10-s of thousands. The relevant time was lost and Putin and Medvedev, and is — still requires some variant.
So could be a dramatic stimulation of political activity in the country. Roughly speaking, active people in all regions manifest themselves, and then with them (more precisely, with their minions) will be personally agree on the applicable criteria for the power of cooperation. With all of this some of them will sink "into oblivion", but on the first step of their pressure on the power (more precisely, on its lower and middle unit) will be heavily welcomed.
It is possible even that the power will go to the division of the party "United Russia" — or the method of its split, or through the creation of another party based on the "United People's Front" with the creation of the respective faction in the State Duma. The first option will claim of early elections, the second — can not do without them, but it deprives the "United Russia" an absolute majority. I think that the final decision on this will be taken no earlier than 2013, but there are likely options.
We mention one more fascinating nuance of 2011, which was passed over in the last forecast. We are talking about a split in the elite of the United States with respect to our country during the election campaign in the country. Obama continues to show to the smallest RF loyalty: his administration is fairly painless "swallow" the election of Putin as president of the country, although that Vice President Biden spoke out firmly against it. But the favorite of the Republican "primaries" Romney declared Russia an "enemy number one" of the U.S. that looked, frankly, quite suddenly (not to mention the fact that, most likely, it really is not complete correspondence). Such a confrontation in dealing with Russia portends a serious problem if Romney wins the election in November, but, in general, they show up as early as 2013, when he became president.
And here is the time to actually go to the forecast. First, the financial part of it. Numerous pre-election promises require at least partial compliance, which means that taxes — both obvious and implicit (eg, corruption) — will grow. In addition, the delay in the increase in gas prices, the first lead to a significant rise in its second half.
Here it is necessary to add that the agreement on accession to the WTO asks us to bring to the "world" level of energy prices. This is a requirement of the European Union, which, of course, does not take into account the difference in the climate, but it is very "into the stream," Russian energy companies. But — contrary to Putin's promise not to increase the 3-year utility tariffs. Most likely, this conflict will venture, as usual, in favor of energy companies that will do a better standard of living, and increase the cost of Russian producers on their zabugornyh rivals.
This problem is enhanced by the policy of the Central Bank, which is desperately refuses to provoke lending Russian producers, although it is possible that in this direction in the current year will be major shifts. Yet, the overall situation of Russian companies in comparison with their competitors will get worse.
Will deteriorate and the standard of living of the Russian population — both qualitatively and in kind. Strengthening of administrative pressure, demonstrative refusal of state to perform their duties to the people, strengthening of corrupt activity, the liberal reforms (for example, the introduction of juvenile technologies that deplete the classic family values, the reform of medicine, depriving people of the ability of free healing, etc.) will increase alienation of people from the country and society from the elite.
Additionally, it will increase the fall in real living standards. Refer here to the statistics is difficult, since in-1's, it is obvious in the low part of the description of the properties of the real structure and the scale of people's income, in-2, reduction of inflation, of course, but the scale for different population groups, and quite unknown in the end, in-3, sociology does not give clear answer to the question of how bad people evaluate the deterioration of the social environment.
As an example, the parents of those kids in Moscow, who walk in the kindergartens. Appropriate management of City Hall signed exclusive contract (which bears obvious signs of corruption) with some manufacturer's "Food", in which a kindergarten kids in the order of mandatory fed "food", containing an enormous amount of additives is obviously harmful for them. Certificates for this "food" part just rigged, mass in children show signs of allergies, they shall be removed from this "food", etc., but all attempts to change something were bad. So here is the scale of the stimulus large enough Muscovites to the State sociology until measured.
In general, the policy of power quite naturally follows from the nature of the Russian "elite", which was described in the last forecast: modern, our "elite", which, of course, are all bureaucrats, fundamentally renounces responsibility to society. One idea on the return of such liability (for example, breach of contract on child nutrition at the request of perturbed parents) is causing officials to moral indignation. Moreover, it is possible that they will avenge their more stubborn "offenders" — for example, by including them in the list of "problem families" (which has already drawn up), which means a dramatic increase in the likelihood of forcible weaning babies from their parents in the juvenile technologies.
Some might say that I am superfluous to dramatize the situation and that these stories certainly do not belong to the one-year forecast, but here I do not agree, because they illustrate the important point, which began to manifest itself openly in the past year, and this will be one of the important reasons of public relations: the company does not want to endure more "elite" that ignores their interests, what is more, it is ready to go for a direct conflict. And the "elite" continues to fully ignore the interests of society, I would said, is to ignore starting to get demonstrative features.
And this is where it makes sense to remember the rallies end of last year, or, if you will, "marsh process." I've read that the activity of the people in the struggle against the "illegitimacy" of the elections will fall and in this sense the power can not be afraid of anything. Since the external force, the impact of which should not be underestimated, pushing our society specifically in this area with their factor is also fundamentally limited — liberal values of Russian society is very exciting and very concerning.
Moreover, the Russian "elite", and society (with its filing), considered liberal ideas as an excuse for failure of the "elite" of social responsibility. I'm not sure that the founders of the liberal philosophy mean particularly an interpretation of his own thoughts, but for Russia it is already the established fact. With all the consequences. And so the liberal ideas
of society are not supported intensively — as I wrote initially forecast. But such controversy on the issue of liberal thought just makes more pain point with respect to the "elite" and the society — which, of course, does not increase the stability of Russian political life. Moreover, this conflict will inevitably intensify in the current year.
I have already mentioned that Putin first time came to the presidency with a mandate from the "elite" (and he took himself specifically so that would be on the subject of any company intended). I will not repeat here what he wrote in the previous forecast, but it is a puzzle completed, and at the end of the second period had its own casting for the candidacy of his successor. Very basically here to realize that this casting, contrary to what has been said in public, was only for the "elite" and she naturally chose the liberal way.
The election campaign's 2011-12 showed that the worldview of the "elite" have not changed, in fact, she was supported by a generalized West. But with all this attitude of society has become even more anti-liberal — although many in the "middle" class, who came to the meetings, did not understand it. In any case, based on the foregoing, it is necessary to think that at least some public demand for power, whether it is the desire of honest elections, the requirement to comply with the laws, corruption, etc., is perceived by our "elite" as a violation of the "liberal" principles. This means that as the continuation of the liberal reforms of the anti-liberal (patriotic, or even nationalistic)-minded people will be more and more.
Accordingly, in Russia will grow and anti-Western sentiments, so if West intensively supports both times our liberals. Why does he do it — a separate issue, the answer is obviously lies beyond the actual forecast. Most likely, the point is a complex combination of stories, and how relations between Russia and the West, and the West itself and the choice of the "lesser evil", but in any case, then you can simply state the fact. Such a situation makes 2012 a fundamentally based on fundamental beliefs of deciding what course the country will elect themselves.
We note, incidentally, that our only geopolitical success of recent years — the creation of the Customs Union, and one economic space — linked to the activities in-1's, not a liberal politician Sergei Glazyev, and in-2, achieved in the framework of the liberal right back the course. Reply liberals, by the way, not forced himself to expect — they abruptly forced entry into the WTO (perhaps due to additional concessions on the part of the Russian Federation), were also able to dismiss Glazev from his post. Which again reads that liberal Course focuses impartially against the interests of Russia.
At the theoretical level, Putin can expect some more time, as the deteriorating economic situation of the people is not a tragic character. It is already clear that the U.S. monetary authorities under any criteria will not allow the deflationary scenario as it was in the fall of 2008, and therefore Makar, the main danger for us is imported inflation, which by its magnitude exceeds the positive effect of higher oil prices. Made worse by the fact that the film is for everyone, including people, and positive — mostly for the very narrow part of the elite.
But the issue in the United States will not begin until May-June so Makar, inflationary wave will most premature, at the end of the year, which means that from the standpoint of a one-year forecast, this scenario is not particularly enthusiastic. In view of accumulated reserves, which means that although the deterioration of the economic situation of the people will go on (this is especially true for those who make a small and medium business), no rapid decisions are not sure.
But in terms of the strategic choices on how to develop the country's decision must be made fairly quickly. If Putin decides to pursue liberal "reforms", it is quite rapidly cause a sharp rise in dissent, and they are increasingly begin to take aggressive nationalistic and patriotic character. Prerequisites last I talked to him before, and why it happens rapidly to explain.
I'm already in a previous forecasts explained that one of the main objectives of Putin during his first presidency, was the introduction of the "rules of the game" inside the "elite" that would guarantee a solution intra problems without appealing to the public. So how exactly was the last one of the main reasons for acute problems of the 90s. This task was solved, but only through the use of constantly growing "pie", who shared the "elite."
Who is this "cake" is not only not growing, and shrinking — and for completely impartial reasons that change is unrealistic. Moreover, it will shrink and the size of the "elite" — and not on the interest, and at times, the premise of this phenomenon once open a discussion on a website worldcrisis.ru. In addition, a major issue was the emigration, as more or less adequate people have realized that to maintain their wealth in a foreign country in the event of rupture of relations with Russia will be very, very problematic.
This means that the part of the "elite", which will be dedicated to the disappearance (or even one that just considering that it is designed for this purpose) will vigorously appeal to the public. Just no one else to — the "elite" in this case, the "losers" will not help. In this case, adjust the company, this part of the "elite" will be against Putin. And if he will continue the path of liberal reform, this anti-Putin "komplot" (which, incidentally, is already there, I wrote about this in his own texts on the campaign) inside the "elite" will find its audience rapidly inside the country, while it is at all of this will be constantly growing. And outside help (as it was Yeltsin), Putin will not be exact.
I repeat, campaign rhetoric Fishing season clearly shown that this my problem, he understands perfectly. And specifically for this reason it was so important to get not just a solid result in the election, and passed up the whole of society. Roughly speaking, it can not again get a "mandate" to rule on the "elite": and as part of it can not go against the West, which has been intensively against Putin, and since he has to deal with its reduction. And even if he will sit warehouse hands, natural economic processes will this "elite" to cut — and will povinet Putin, too, if he was the final court of appeal.
This means that if Putin does not want to become an outspoken dictator, supported by only a handful of close (and he did not exactly want to), then he could only get a mandate from the public. And on this particular he was engaged in the campaign and more than that, completely succeeded. In this sense, he can not worry about the deterioration of relations with the "elite" — if the mandate of the society is not so much.
Only setback is that if they continue liberal course of his work with the company to rapidly deteriorate — with help from the part of the "elite" that they will be targeted for demolition, or even just the one that counted on the "puddings and pies" in If used in power remained Medvedev. In other words, the continuation of liberal reforms inevitably "close" the mandate of the society and the only way to stay in power will just shift to rigidly dictatorial regime.
If Putin begins a gradual shift away from the liberal course, that he has a serious chance. His case to the public in this case will only grow stronger under the abbreviation "elite" and its partial substitution occurs a clear and understandable impartial aspect: the restoration of social responsibility. Roughly speaking, corruption, d
ereliction of presidential decisions, personal indiscretion officials, etc., in this case can not be interpreted as the tyranny of Putin or his "minions" ("bloody gebnya"), and specifically as a refusal to cooperate with the community. With automatic forfeiture of the right to receive additional benefits, such as exemption from criminal liability.
In other words, it just means changing the "rules of the game" in the elite, from those that were introduced in the late 80's, the first institutionalized and 2000s, the new. The process heavy, but, in general, not critical: it is different from the one he himself Putin held first-2000s, only that when he installed the new "rules of the game" inside the "elite" in secret from the public, and now — should do it together with the community in combating part of the "elite." Since its reincarnation in the elite normal that at the theoretical level of its own interests and is responsible. In general, until the Russian "elite" completely supports liberal reforms, and specifically because of their interpretation as the preservation of complete irresponsibility of its own to society.
Another thing that is changing the "rules of the game" asks the availability of power (more precisely, in the system of government) certain critical number of speakers of these new rules. As long as such there is virtually no 1st, they were cleaned in the 90's — early 2000's. Maybe you can enter them in the system of government at the expense of political liberalization, but with all this, there is also the problem over time.
Since new people can not enter alone (they are rapidly apprehend an old rule) and their management teams have not, then incorporate them into the control system can only be due to external factors. For example, the new parties are included in the State Duma, or overcome the regional elections. In this case, they are "entitled" to the proportional representation of their own supporters in the regional government (with all this, these same representatives do not have to be members of parties), which are now entirely represented by members of the "United Russia" and if it is a moral right to be supported at the level of the presidential power, and can be realized. But this process can take years, if not only accelerate — for example, through early elections to the State Duma.
In general, these arguments are already beyond the boundaries of a one-year forecast. And in fact, 2012 is the most important thing — the choice of scenario for the political course of the Russian Federation: the continuation of liberal reforms, or the beginning of their clotting. With all of this decision is, perhaps, have even accepted, but we know about it, maybe later. In any case, there are a number of "control points" on which it will be possible to draw any conclusions.
The first point — the composition of the new government and the presidential administration. If the rejection of the liberal policy in principle stipulates that in some places is to be formed respective headquarters. His absence, in general, the choice of nothing says appearance is almost a guarantee of general configuration of the course. Note that while the Liberals were not allowed anywhere near the occurrence of such anti-liberal formations in power.
The second point — the entry into the WTO. At the theoretical level, the vote in the State Duma for ratification of the respective agreements are not predetermined. And if it is not approved, it will be a very serious message — though, of course, in this case, we are waiting for an orgy in the liberal media (in other words, almost all the big newspapers and TV channels). One consolation: the people for the sake of the WTO on the street just does not come out.
The third point — the fall elections to local parliaments. If the authorities do not strictly limit new (and some of old times) parties, it is also quite a serious signal to changes in the general direction of the country. And here the situation is more specific: if the first two points, and Putin may miss having in mind that "still have time", here he has no choice — if he is not going to continue liberal course, it should liberalize the political process (as if may sound surprising is a "contradiction" in the same sentence.) In general, I have already explained that in our country the word "liberal" society and the "elite" means very, very different.
As seen from above, forecast for 2012 year came very much probability, in part because of the political right. But it's not my fault — because it fundamentally is dependent on the choice of Putin's policy of the country, which not yet manufactured, or, at least, is not indicated. But what about the year 2012 exactly — is the fact that Putin will have to take a decision in this particular year, expect more than just unreal. Another thing that implement it, if it will be in the rejection of the liberal scenario, and will be a bit later. In general, longer than is tightening, the harder and harder it will be necessary to act.
Note that although the West is now supporting intensive Russian liberals, he is seriously considering the ability of a purely non-liberal forms of management of the economy and society. Suffice it to recall an employee GoldmanSaks, printed in the "New York Times", in what ways the work of this vkladyvatelnogo bank referred to as "immoral." Obviously, to complete failure of these methods still far away, but the trend has been called, delineated!
In any case, since prior to the current day or any anti-crisis committee, Putin was not the first months of his new government will be quite messy. Liberals will insist that the financial situation obviously improved ("enough to look at the official statistics of the United States") and the only "consistent enough" implementation of liberal reforms in the country does not lead to economic growth. Corrupt (and liberals, too) will take bribes — and at an accelerated rate as the risk of loss of space has grown. Bureaucrats will be desperate to fight for their places. Find out in this chaotic activity of the signs of purposeful activity will be quite difficult. For this reason, I think that here and there in October to supplement the forecast. Especially since the year is not easy and doing it on a fairly lengthy findings is not so.