RIA "Novosti" publishes interviews, Doctor of Historical Sciences Valentin Falin with military observer Viktor Litovkina agency. In this conversation reveals previously unknown pages of World War II, describes the closed to the public and spring mechanisms for decisions at the highest level, which often provided a decisive influence on the course and outcome of the fighting.
VL: In modern historiography of the Second World War, there are various estimates of its final phase. Some experts argue that the war could have ended much earlier — are known, in his memoirs of Marshal Chuikov, who wrote about it. Others believe that it could be delayed further, at least for a year. Who is closer to the truth? And what is it? What point of view you have children?
VF: On this issue, arguing not only today's historiography. On the timing of the war in Europe, and about the time it ended discussions were still in the war. They were held continuously since 1942. To be precise, this question politicians and the military from the forty-first year, when the vast majority of public figures, including Roosevelt and Churchill believed that the Soviet Union will hold a maximum of four to six weeks. Only Benes believed and claimed that the Soviet Union resist the Nazi invasion and eventually defeat Germany.
— Eduard Benes, if I remember correctly, was the president of Czechoslovakia in exile. After the Munich Agreement of 1938 and the capture of the country he was in the UK?
— Yes. Then, when these assessments and, if you will, our resilience prices have not come true, when Germany was under Moscow's first emphasize strategic defeat in the Second World War, opinion changed drastically. In the West, began voicing concerns that the Soviet Union did not come out of this war is too strong. And if it really is too strong, it will determine the future face of Europe. So said Berle, Deputy Secretary of State, Coordinator of American intelligence. This view was and around Churchill, including a very respectable people that developed before the war and during the war doctrine of the British armed forces and the entire British politics.
This explains, in many ways, the resistance of Churchill open a second front in 1942. Although Tiverbruk, Crippen in the British leadership and, especially, Dwight Eisenhower and other U.S. military plans developers believed that there were technical and other preconditions to defeating Germany in the forty-second year. Use the fact that most German armed forces in the East and, in fact, open to the invasion of two thousand kilometer coast of France, Holland, Belgium, Norway, and Germany itself for the armies of the Allies. Along the Atlantic coast of the Nazis did not have any permanent fortifications.
Moreover, the U.S. military insisted and tried to persuade Roosevelt (there are several memoranda from Eisenhower to that effect) that a second front requires that a second front is possible that the opening of a second front war in Europe will, in principle, short-term and force Germany to surrender. If not in the forty-second year, then at the latest, in the forty-third.
But such calculations does not suit Britain and conservative figures on the American Mount Olympus.
— Who do you have in mind?
— Well, for example, is extremely unfriendly towards the Soviet Union was the whole State Department, headed by Hull. This explains why Roosevelt did not take Hall to the Tehran Conference, and the minutes of meetings "Big Three" U.S. Secretary of State received for review in six months after Tehran. The irony is that the protocols were Hitler Reich's political intelligence in three or four weeks. Life is full of paradoxes.
After the Battle of Kursk in 1943, the Wehrmacht was defeated on August 20 in Quebec sat Chiefs of Staff U.S. and the UK, as well as Churchill and Roosevelt. On the agenda was the question of a possible withdrawal of the United States and Britain of the anti-Hitler coalition and join the alliance with Nazi generals for a joint war against the Soviet Union.