The first of these research works — "Report of the ad hoc group of the Scientific Committee of the Ministry of Defence (NKMO) on scientific and technological feasibility of the nuances of applets Missile Defense of early interception ", the second — National Research Council report (NIS) of the National Academy" Understand the Anti-Ballistic Missile »(Making Sense of Missile Defense).
In some cases, the gap between what the public presents a Missile Defense Agency (TNA), and the scientific evidence is simply amazing. For example, in its official statement, posted in August 2011, the POA said: "We will have the potential of early interception of ballistic missiles, short-and medium-range ballistic missiles and states representing the current time in a regional threat, by 2020 or earlier."
But a month later NKMO concluded that the interception of early itself to itself "is not a useful purpose from the standpoint of missile defense." In other words, the scientists of the Department of Defense were required to specify how the POA has gone from the physical basis of their own systems.
Held on March 6, 2012 hearing of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services Loretta Sanchez (Loretta Sanchez), a Democratic Congresswoman from California, noted that NKMO and NIS have expressed concern about the overall effectiveness of the American system Missile Defense. In response, the head of the ADF, Lieutenant General Patrick O'Reilly (Patrick O'Reilly) said that to improve the reliability and accuracy will allow Gallakticheskaya system precise tracking (PTSS).
Perhaps, Lieutenant General O'Reilly knew that the creators of the study of NIS advised complete development of PTSS. The study notes that PTSS «too far from being able to provide useful information on how to recognize, does not negate the need for a high-altitude hover with infrared radar (OPIR) and very expensive."
So, contrary to the requirements of the plans APO practical physics.
APO and its prime contractors, with the support of many congressmen are concerned about the development and introduction of the first operational military equipment rather than physical realities Missile Defense.
In 2002, President Bush ordered deployed in Alaska and California land-based system to intercept ballistic missiles in the middle portion of the line of motion (GMD) by 2004, giving such Makar, just two years to develop it. The following flight tests have shown that this system can not be considered temporary even a scarecrow. 5 of 7 trials to intercept missiles, conducted in November 2004, ended in failure.
On nedavneshnem NATO summit in Chicago also succumbed to the demand of the early development of weapons of war and decided that the initial combat readiness programs from Euro phased adapted approach (EPAA), designed to "protect" Europe must be achieved by the ability of 2015. But NKMO reports that the radar Aegis SPY-1 "does not meet the requirements, putting the needs of impartial EPAA», that the ground-based radar TPY-2 deployed in Turkey, located in the wrong place, should be twice the size and mounted on a turntable, to build in more than one direction.
Discovering potential missile asks accurate scientific data. Without their existing system not be able to navigate the confusion of battle. Without the deployment of expensive military equipment is throwing money down the drain.
NIS advised to cancel the fourth step EPAA, which is intended to intercept Iranian missiles distant radius of action (which Iran has, as it were not). In addition, the NIS report on the shortcomings GMD system in Alaska and California. To solve these problems, he advises to use less big and more than frisky interceptors, also a new place their home on the East Coast, for example at Fort Drum (State of New-york) or in the state of Maine.
Perhaps most importantly, as outlined in both research papers — is that the South American ABM will not be effective without being able to distinguish between enemy missiles from the rocket debris and invalid targets.
Two studies demonstrate true that to increase the efficiency of today's architecture of American missile defense systems it needs to be rethought. At the POA is no exact plans, which increases costs and schedule delays and worsens rather weak scientific developmental work of these projects, their former first discrepancy.
Yet, the administration announced plans to perpetrate another 2-regional missile defense systems (except EPAA): one for the protection of Iran's neighbors, and the other — to protect the neighbors of North Korea.
The administration and Congress should pause and think again about the aims and objectives Missile Defense, taking advantage of all that the most reliable scientific data. Procurement of all the new tools ineffective will not do any utility.