Do not disrupt the program from, or underwater Accounting

Do not disrupt the program, or underwater AccountingDisruption of defense orders, the destruction of the defense industry, the lack of the necessary production capacity, outdated technology, no money, the Defense Ministry has put its requirements, manufacturers do not agree with them, and so on. Familiar completely abstracts from the near past. Accidents 5 percent of the GOZ-2011? on the views of some professionals, could result in the failure of all the programs from modernization, the scheduled 2020 (GPV-2020). But the remaining contracts all the same have been concluded and, as it were problems are expected. But only "sort of" because the 280 billion rubles allocated for the same contracts — not too far past in the program. At least since before its completion is eight years old and is in the future, too, can be a problem with the agreements, rates and other production and economic things.

Most of the allocated funds this year will go to the construction of submarines. And the main cost component is the construction of four submarines of Project 885M "Ash" — 164 billion or about 60% of the total. Still about 13 billion. get SPMBM "Malachite" the finalization of the project. Also, the order of 40 billion dollars. will be allocated CDB "Ruby" to update the "Borey" project to a "955A". Others, which are least bit of allocated 280 billion will be spent on repairing the existing boats and construction of surface vessels.

What we want and what we have

Considerable sums, and therefore require special attention. Taking into account the fact that the contracts for the renovation projects and construction of new ships have already been signed, it can be concluded that the Defense Ministry has no claims on general amounts and components. In absolute terms of funds allocated for the subs do not look very well and good, but a comparison with other municipal costs change memory. So, for example, up to 2015 on the renewal of the Emergency vehicles get more than four billion rubles, on the 30% of today's latest technology in the 15-year reincarnated as 80%. At the same time, almost the same amount should go to the construction of only one boat 885M project, even if the parent or the modernization of "Boreas". Another time, obviously does not add clarity rassredotachivaniyu funds lies in the nature of renovation projects. If 955A is more or less clear (to 16 launchers for the missiles will add four more appropriately and finalize equipment and construction), then with the "Ash" the situation is more difficult. Open data, there is little, and sometimes have to rely even on the rumors. These studies show that most of the innovation in the project will deal with the introduction of Russian materials, components, etc. At the same time, there is reason to believe that the upgrade will affect not only the origin of devices: 885 project still is not brand new, and therefore asks the harsh improvements.

Total is composed of our navy will include new boat 2-projects. But those boats that are only planned to build in some measure different from the existing ones. So, for example, at least three boats "Borey" project will comply with the initial project, and the other will be built as 955A. A similar situation exists with the project "Ash" — tested at the moment, "Severodvinsk" is based on the initial 885-mu, and "Kazan" (built in 2009) corresponds to the project already 885M. It turns out that in the fleet will be new boats 2-projects, but 4 "subspecies". There is reason to be afraid of some problems with the financing and operation of comparable due to a small degree of harmonization.

Indeed, the number of types of equipment operated directly affects the costs. In the last couple of decades, our country has to seriously pay for the construction of the submarine fleet. Because of the lack of conventional financing, regular and clear views on the fate of the fleet and precise strategy to a certain time were built in the main only the leading ships of different projects. For obvious reasons, ignores all that is even more expensive than the mass creation. In turn, the lack of plans for the development of its own fleet can be considered as a consequence of the "reforms" of the late 80's and early 90's. Then an arbitrary decision control of the country was destroyed developed system that connected customers, developers, scientists and producers. Research universities (Central Research Institute. Academician AN Krylov Central Research Institute of Shipbuilding Technology, etc.) performed all the proper research on the prospects of the fleet and that helped both the Ministry of Defense, and the design office. So Makar, the system allowed thoroughly work through all prepyadstviya associated with the development strategy of the fleet and the creation of technology under this strategy. After the destruction of the entire system update real part was going more and more common, but not profitable method. Navy issued the developer requirements, and the one created by their project. Other options and proposals are now almost come to be seen. In addition, the market economy led each project or production company to "pull the blanket over himself." The latest in the fleet of the latest situation was — a lot of different types at a great cost.

But it is not only the destruction of the system of interaction entities associated with the fleet, badly affected the state of the Navy. In the 80 years of the last century in okoloflotskih circles, as noted by some people in this environment have already felt the need to update the concept of Russian Navy. The principle of warfare around the world sought to combat the growth of the fleet. With this industry is governed, but the accompanying infrastructure often lagged behind the pace of military equipment. By the beginning of Perestroika overdue need for a revision of the doctrine of the introduction of the fleet, but the management of the country were already other valuables. In 1990, the management of Central Research Institute. Krylov's last attempt to push through the Ministry of Shipbuilding idea about how to update the views of the Navy. Attempt was without result — first senior officials considered a proposal early and later began far not the best period for the Navy, and for the industry and for the country as a whole. Since the early 2000s there has been a number of positive trends. In the middle of the rest, at this time evenly the restoration of the existing system of interaction. At the current time the overall management of the establishment to produce a fleet of Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Industry and the Military-Industrial Commission. Coordination of various projects CRI produces them. Krylov — his main task is the work in the same direction are not duplicated and actually projects conform to the requirements of the customer.

In general, a reason for optimism: reduced funding, again work together on new projects has been a lot of organizations, and the government indicates its intention to continue the initiated directions. The main thing — that optimism is not turned into a shapkozakidatelstvo, as is often the case. Namely, a "dangerous plot" in the life-affirming look nuance total tonnage of the planned construction. From open sources it is clear that only the new ships until the 20th year will be built on 500 thousand tons. With all of this in the second half of the 2000s was built almost 10 times less. The final argument against the optim
istic plans for the assessments of the prospects of the Russian shipbuilding. According to the report of the President of the "United Shipbuilding Corporation" R. Trocenko (Forum "Marine Industry of Russia", May 2011), to the "deadline" in 2020, our shipbuilding in the continuation of existing trends in the development will be mastered by almost 300 thousand tons. And out of this number must also take export and civilian construction.

5 Fri academician Flap

How to achieve the desired volume? There is a completely logical, but controversial method: Plans to reduce to a reasonable level. More complicated and more effective way is to focus on the development of the shipbuilding industry. But perhaps the most fascinating and full proposal presented research manager director of Central Research Institute. AN Krylova, academician VM Flank. Their eyes to increase efficiency, consisting of a 5 pt, he published the article "Boat discord." Look for these five areas as follows:

1. Strategy. Urgent action is needed to redefine the concept of the Russian Navy, and make re-program from 2040. Part of the GPV-2020 does not explicitly include it, but it is imperative to take into account. There should also be the reduction types of ships being built without harm to the desired class composition. We currently being built or repaired about 70 types of ships, submarines, boats, etc. technology applied in the power structures. For comparison, in the United States before the 20-year plan to build an aircraft carrier, 16 destroyers, 36 small ships, four landing craft, 2 transport dock, and 18 submarines. Total half-dozen types of planned taking into account the constant cuts in defense spending.

It may also be to start reducing and range of classes, but it's a much more complicated matter. Central Research Institute. Krylov has offered to make a single reference submarine platform, which can be equipped with a cruise and strategic missiles. This offer is on the initial survey did not matter. But not so long ago, the United States announced the launch of its own project similar platform. It is promised that this boat is a South American production will cost up to one and a half times cheaper than the first special.

Reduction of operating and planned types of equipment, according to the views of Flank, should significantly reduce the cost of construction of the ships — in this case, the technique will be built in series, rather than in single parent counterparts. With the launch of a mass creation can make accurate fixed price lists on all the necessary work, even taking into account inflation and other factors. In the end, might be to reduce prices burst boats 1.5-1.7 times relative to the head.

2. A reasonable approach to the equipment. One of the main reasons that influenced the duration of the test submarine "Yury Dolgoruky", often referred to as nedovedennost its main armament. Similarly, the often the case with the other boats and ships. At the finish building the ship already installed equipment that has not yet passed the test and, as a consequence, the constant refinement of its most direct impact on the final price of the ship itself. In the world of good is the use of at least 20-30% of the latest equipment. And even with that of the total price of the share of various electronics up to 80% of the price of the vehicle. But ultimately suffers not only the customer's wallet — is almost always coupled with the price of "swim" and time.

3. Forecasts and projects. Required finish to create a system that coordinates the creation of forecasts, the production of the required form of the fleet and the development of new projects. In this direction have already made a couple of steps, including the Military-Industrial Commission under the Government had issued the Regulations on the order of creation of the project and a criterion for the supply of products ship within the Municipal defense order. In these documents the Central Research Institute. Krylov plays a leading role in all steps of planning, evaluation, assessment of projects, etc. Pashin believes it is necessary to give the status of the Regulations of Government decisions on the decision of the Institute will have no Krylov lowest value than the world fleet management. In the end, forecasting and developing terms of reference should work efficiently.

4. Pricing. No industrialist will not argue with the fact that the customer is generous — it is excellent. But, as pointed out by the experience of some countries at the cost of excessive generosity of the customer on the final product can take just indecent matter. What's all the same to the producers, they are all a delight to master all the allocated funds. To combat money "razduvatelstvom" Pashin has put in front of any of the leading shipbuilding CRI latest task: development of regulations on the price of all kinds of works. At times, they need to be adjusted in accordance with forecasts and 3-year budget.

In addition, you must complete to create a civilian court for private customers in the municipal defense plants due to the peculiarities of the economy of the latter. It is unlikely that private traders will pay for the indirect costs of the enterprise and, as a consequence, the plant will be required to bear the uncollectible amount on military contracts. If the Department of Defense does not want to indirectly "sponsor" commercial organizations, the military shipbuilding factory should produce only military goods and civilian — only civilian. At least since the principles of pricing in these areas is quite different.

You can use foreign experience. Since 2005, the U.S. Navy on course to reduce costs. First, the South American fleet requests from manufacturers to reduce "collateral" costs and improve processes. It is expected that by all measures implemented in 2020, the boat of the "Virginia" will cost almost twice cheaper than the lead ship of the project. In addition, significantly reduced and the duration of construction. It is a useful initiative that should be replicated.

5. Discipline. To ensure tribute to the diligence of the customer and performer Pashin proposes to introduce a system of fines. The industry must be punished for the failure of the ruble terms of construction and the failure of the tactical and technical requirements. The military, in turn, should be responsible for disruption of funding, delays in signing contracts, and for requirements change after the start of construction. Maybe someone thinks these methods are very tough, but specifically so you can not only ensure the implementation of plans to build, and to plant customers and performers unhappy mutual respect.

Again, you can refer to the South American experience. U.S. law is the so-called Amendment Nunn — McCurdy. It was at a time when defense spending began to take huge and incomprehensible dimensions. The main essence of the amendment is to follow: if the prices of programs from 15% of the scheduled conference call in the kind of commander in chief of the armed forces, for which a draft. The Commander in Chief has to explain to congressmen, which requires additional funding and justify its necessity. If you exceed the price of a quarter of the project immediately locked. Its preservation can be only if the Secretary of Defense Congressmen justify the relevance of the security of the country and give a personal guarantee that the singer cope with the task.


And yet the implementation of the "Five Fri Flank" does not guarantee the full implementation of all plans. But to raise the productivity of using this technique, of course, you can. If you still do not have enough of its own production capacity, it may be, will be decided some place orders without having strategic importance in overseas factories. Our country has already had exp
erience with the construction of the equipment for the Navy overseas. At the same time, the political motives of the early XX century led to very severe consequences for the fleet of imperial Russia. So before making an order abroad should be twice or even three times to check all its nuances and, of course, do not trust strangers hidden technology.

Summarizing and understanding of the complexity of ensuring the Russian fleet with the latest technology, hunt hope that the Ministry of Defense, the Military-Industrial Commission and other bodies have an exact plan of action. Maybe there is a complete and definite program for you but some of the judgments it just will not be published. But the fact of the publication, you see, is not so important — the main thing that the responsible person did everything because it should.

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