Most of these images come from photographs made in the summer of 1941. Almost all of these photos, and of documentary chronicles were made after the fights, when days are gone a week. Made in the battle image comparable small, not previously. In addition, most of the shots made on the busiest routes where were going and went back and forth large numbers of Nazis. But not all fights, battles were fought along the main roads, a substantial number of vehicles, lined in battle, could be found in thousands of villages, towns, in copses, on the back roads.
And because there was the myth of the small mehanizirovannosti of the Red Army, of which only Tipo moved on their own or with two horses, and the Wehrmacht was only by car. Although if you compare states Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army infantry, the gap is not, in fact equal to mechanization. There was plenty in the Red Army and mechanized corps, tank brigades.
Against the background of such paintings was created the myth of the unwillingness of Russian fighter to wage war for the Bolsheviks, Stalin. Although even in Russian was published quite a while materials that talk about the heavy battles of the war starting step, heroism, the exploits of border guards, pilots, tank, artillery, infantry.
These legends and other such speculations are due to misunderstanding of the real picture of life in the pre-war period and the first war, or, even worse — they do consciously, leading the information war against our country and people. We need to realize that even the rich can not keep the government at a time when there is no war, vast army under arms, severing millions of healthy men from actual production. In the border areas are the troops that will be the basis for grouping the first operation of the war, with only a declaration of war triggered a huge mobilization mechanism. But even potential military mobilized first, do not gather in peace time in the band 50-300 km from the enemy, they are mobilizing, where they live and work. Even the current call and officers can not be on the border with the enemy, and in the Caucasus, in Siberia, in the Far East. In other words, the border troops are very limited, far not all of the payroll of a peacetime army. Solely in the case of mobilizing troops grow up to wartime, large numbers of people and vehicles driven to the front, it may be possible just yet.
Mobilization can be started and before the outbreak of hostilities, but this requires a very fundamental reasons, a political solution management of the country. At this moment created the myth that "the intelligence report to the" despot but stepped ... Home mobilization — is not just an internal event, and pitch great political significance, causing a big stir in the world. Hold it nestled virtually impossible, possible enemy can use it as an excuse for war. Because for that to almost start a war, required a very tangible, concrete foundation. Start a war with the political, military and of points of view, it is unreasonable, major defense construction plans were completed in 1942. The basis for such decisions would be intelligence or analysis of the political situation. But, despite the common opinion about the power of Russian intelligence real intelligence were very inconsistent. Crumbs principled and useful disk imaging simply drowned in a mass of gossip, outright misinformation.
From a political point of view, the case between the Reich and the Union were quite normal, there was no danger: the financial and economic cooperation, the absence of territorial disputes, non-aggression pact, the delineation of spheres of influence. Besides, it also had the most important role in the evaluation of the date of the outbreak of war, the Kremlin realized that it is very possible in the coming term, the third Reich was linked by the war with England. Is not yet resolved the issue with Britain, to wage war with Russian Union was very adventurous step outside the usual logic. Berlin diplomatically sent any signals, which usually run from war — territorial claims (as in Czechoslovakia, Poland), requirements, ultimatums.
When Berlin did not respond to a message from TASS June 14 (it said that published abroad messages of impending war between the USSR and Germany have no reason), Stalin began the processes of mobilization, but without declaring it: to put forward the Rim of the depth of the border military Districts Division, began the nomination by rail neotmobilizovannyh troops from the interior districts to limit the Western Dvina and Dnepr. Conducted and other activities that absolutely reject speculation on the topic: "Stalin did not believe."
Reddish Army almost went to war without completing mobilization, so that at the beginning of the war there were 5.4 million people, and on the mobilization plan of February 1941 (MP-41) in wartime, it was supposed to be a strength of 8 , 68 million people. That's why in the border divisions when joining the fight was about 10 thousand people, instead of the CB position. 14 thousand more terrible was the situation in the rear units. Cross-border and internal troops of the military districts were broken into three operational unrelated parts — the part of the concrete at the border, at a depth of about 100 km from the border troops and about 300 km from the border. The Wehrmacht was able to take advantage of a number of personnel, number of pieces of equipment and destroy the Russian army units.
Wehrmacht to 22 June 1941, was one hundred percent mobilized, its population increased to 7.2 million people. Shock troops were concentrated at the border and milled Russian border division before Reddish Army could change the balance of forces. Exclusively in the battle for Moscow the situation could change.
The myth of the superiority of the defense over the attack, by the new western border of the USSR in the years 1940-1941 were building a line of fortifications, fortified (fortified), they are also referred to as "Molotov line". By the war, many buildings were unfinished, unmasked, without communication, etc.. But, more importantly, on the border was not in enough strength to hold back the German army strike, even with an emphasis on urs. The defense could not hold back the Wehrmacht, the German army had extensive experience breaking lines of defense since the days of the First World War, using it in 1940 on the border with France. To break through the use of assault with combat engineers, explosives, flame throwers, aviation, artillery. For example: the 22 th under the city of Siauliai in the Baltic 125th Infantry Division took up defensive positions, but the Wehrmacht struck her less than a day. Hide behind the border of the division and could not provide the desired density of Defense. They were sparse on the tremendous space, because the German attack groups pretty quickly broke the defense, though not at the pace as expected.
The only way to stop the enemy breakthrough was their counterattacks mechanized corps. Border neighborhood had mechanized corps, which first sent new type tanks — the T-34 and KV. On 1 June 1941 the Red Army had 25,932 tanks, self-propelled guns and tankettes (though some of them were in combat-ready condition (as in the current time in the parks is a certain number of units, and ready to fight at once — 60 percent) in Western special area was 13 981 units. mechanized corps were in "hostage&
quot; overall unfavorable situation, in view of the collapse of the defense in several directions at once, they were obliged to throw between multiple targets. Besides Mechanized Corps conceded in the organizational part, the German panzer groups numbered 150-200 thousand . man of few motorized corps, reinforced by artillery, motorized infantry and other units. Russian mechanized corps were of about 30 thousand people. Panzer Wehrmacht, with fewer tanks than the Red Army, helping them stronger motorized infantry and artillery, including anti-tank.
Overall control strategy of the Red Army was completely true — the operational counterattacks, only they could suspend the strike forces of the enemy (tactical nuclear weapons have not been). In contrast to France, his angry reddish Army counterattacks could buy time to inflict heavy losses, which ultimately led to the failure of the plan "lightning war", and means and the war. Well, management has made the conclusions of the Wehrmacht, it became more usmotritelnym (not Poland and France), more attention was paid to the defensive flanks, further slowing the pace of Advent. It is clear that the organization of counter-attacks was not up to par (and not for us to judge today's armchair prosecutors would not be able to organize their similarity), a weak concentration was not sufficient air cover was, parts rushed into battle with the march parts. Mechanized Corps had to go on the attack, not suppressing the enemy's defense artillery, it was not enough, and the one that was behind. It was not enough, and private support for the infantry attack tanks. This resulted in huge losses of armored vehicles, the Germans simply burned tanks types of old times. New type tanks were more effective, and they can not change a vsepolnotsennuyu attack with air support, artillery and infantry. The myth of the invincibility of the T-34, KV for the Wehrmacht Only just another fabrication. Say, if Stalin had ordered them, "rivet" in sufficient quantities, the enemy would have stopped at the border. The Wehrmacht had a 50-mm antitank gun PAK-38, which pierced the armor of even the HF, with piercing projectiles. In addition, in the Wehrmacht were anti-aircraft guns and heavy field guns, which are also pierced the armor of the latest Russian tanks. These tanks have achieved operational development were at the technical level are unreliable, so the diesel engine B-2, in 1941, his passport resource is not exceeded 100 hours on a shield and an average of 45-70 hours in the tank. Often, this has led to failure of the new tanks on the marches for technical reasons.
But specifically Mechanized Corps infantry rescued from total destruction. Delayed the movement of the enemy, Leningrad rescued from captivity in stride, kept promoting the German Panzer Group E. von Kleist in the South-West direction.
The myth of the fall due to the fighting capacity of the body shell of repression does not hold water. Percentage of total repression commanders is very small, lower property training commanders linked to the growth of the high-spirited armed forces of the USSR in the prewar period. When in August 1939 Reddish army numbered 1.7 million, in June 1941 — 5.4 million people. In the High Command on the top left happy commanders, who later became the best captains the second world war. A significant role was played by the factor of lack of a significant part of the combat experience of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht was already an army of "taste of blood" and won a series of victories, the Army of France, for example, was listed then the best in Europe.
Need to be aware of the fact that large columns of prisoners of war, who often show on TV, may be not the military. The Wehrmacht in other towns and villages in the camp drove all military service of 18 years. In addition, we must realize that the division is not all the fighters of the first band — about half of them. Others — are gunners, signalmen, many builders were (before the war were carried out extensive work to strengthen the border), the military logistical services. Once in the environment, part of the beat, trying to break through, while there was fuel, ammunition, food. In the situation report of Army Group "Center" for June 30, stated: "captured a lot of trophies, a different instrument (priemuschestvenno art. Guns), a huge number of different techniques and a lot of horses. The Russian bear bolshennye loss in killed, prisoners are few. " "Tylovikov" were worse trained, their mental preparation was also worse than that of the first band of fighters, most of which were killed with a gun in his hand. Or were injured. Imposing a column for a newsreel of the grooms, communications and builders could just type in the 1st Corps, and in the environment got the whole army.
The Wehrmacht ground the border division, so called "deep" in the body of 100-150 km from the border, they could not stop the enemy, very different "weight classes", but did the maximum — gained time and forced the enemy to throw a fight of who planned to enter into fight in the second step "blitzkrieg". Not a small minus was the fact that the waste parts of the Russian had to throw an unlimited amount of equipment that has run out of fuel and that could, in other criteria, to return. Mechanized Corps were burned in the fire of war, and to bring them back until there was nothing — if the first in June and July 1941 in the hands of the Russian commanders were mechanized corps, by August — October, they were not. This was one of the reasons other catastrophes of the first year of the war: the Kiev "boiler" in September 1941, Viazemsky, Bryansk and Melitopol "boilers" — in October 1941.
German soldiers inspect the destroyed and scorched artillery tractor T-20 "Komsomolets". Visible scorched driver, who was killed while trying to get out of the car. 1941.
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