Cubmariny against surface ships
Almost the most unique acquisition of the XX century in naval armaments began submarines (submarine). Not having seem they have generated a lot of unfulfilled hopes and vindicated. Believed that the new military vehicles will produce a revolution in naval warfare, leveling the «old values» as armadas of battleships and armored (linear) cruisers; negate the general melee as the main means of solving military confrontation at sea. Now more than 100 years, curious to assess how confirmed so bold predictions.
In fact, more perfectly PL showed themselves in the fight against trafficking, which have gained really impressive results. From the standpoint of the highest strategy is not comes in contradiction with the idea of achieving the main goals of the war. «The destruction of trade» especially hurt by Lupita Island, a highly developed states, and usually very dependent on exports and imports; in addition, discredited the notion of «mastery of the seas», considered the prerogative of the majestic and stately maritime powers fleets. First question about the opposition of Germany and Britain and its allies in the global war against the United States and the Land of the Rising Sun. These most extensive and mentoring examples formed the basis of a broad and profound analysis, finding patterns, right up to develop targeted views on the use of submarines in the future.
With regard to anti-submarine capabilities of navies, their main forces, this section discloses the least thoroughly and leaves a lot of questions.
Noteworthy that even now it is not a routine-scholastic question of naval history or application development sections of the combat use of the torpedo guns (BITO). He burning in determining the prospects for the construction and development of the fleet. Overvalued enthusiasm excites him impartially available prepyadstviya State nuance. It’s no secret that the Navy, particularly in the period after the war, had a noticeably excellent underwater orientation. And this despite the fact that the two world wars resulted in the defeat of the official idea of submarine warfare. After the First World War — the introduction of convoys and «Asdikom», in the second — the introduction of radar and aircraft. Generally, following a similar logic to bet on the future submarine seemed silly. Yet we have done it, as we did to the Germans during the second world war. Hitherto not subside debate about the legality of such a step and a real cool Navy during the war as justified proved a similar step in the current criteria? The issue is complex, still waiting for its own competent researchers.
Most «thin» place an impartial analysis, and as it should, in the formation of a definite answer is unsupported by his combat experience. Fortunately for the world’s population and inconvenience for professionals able to rely on such has been missing 67 years. Is it about the theorem: only practice — an aspect of the truth, in the military anyway. Because so valuable and unique experience considered Falklands crisis in 1982 between Britain and Argentina. But it only attaches to the conviction that, like any far left submarines in their own development — equipping them directly to NPU of cosmic communication and navigation, advanced electronics and nuclear weapons — they could not absolutely free from the inherent nature of this force cargo features and restrictions. Falkland «underwater experience» was doubly fascinating. It is the experience of fighting against surface ships (NC) opponent. But let’s stick to history and start with the role of submarines in the global wars.
Features introduction of submarines in World War I
Submarines as a sort of naval forces a little more than 100 years. Starting wide combat systems and their development is just saturated and refers to the period of the First World War. This debut as a whole can be considered successful. About 600 submarines (372 of them were German submarines, and the Germans lost more than all — PL 178), consisting then armed belligerents, sent to the bottom of more than 55 large warships and hundreds of destroyers, totaling more than 1 million tons and 19 million . b.r.t. (Gross registered ton — a unit of volume equal to 2.83 cu. Meters, is not currently used) merchant tonnage. More widespread and efficient Germans were recorded on own account more than 5,860 sunken ships, totaling 13.2 million b.r.t. merchant tonnage. Shot hit the main trade of Great Britain and was very rezultativen.
Record sunk tonnage will be repeated, but not surpassed in the second world war and, as is typical, still a huge number of submarines. But belonging to the German commander Arno de la Perriere personal record — over 440 thousand b.r.t. — No one reached. Best of submariners second world war, too Teuton, Otto Kretschmer descend from the arena with a score of 244 thousand b.r.t. and 44 ships sunk in the spring of 1941.
If we look at the impact of submarines against enemy naval successes even more modest, even where such acts are specifically planned. It’s tough to be consistent with the hopes and expectations from the first resounding success Veddigena Otto, who already in the first days of the war on the primitive U-9 per hour with a small recessed three armored cruisers. There are other merits sonorous German submariners in large part defeat NC opponent, but it will be later. And while the «mobilization» of almost all the available (about 20 units) PL for mopping the North Sea, allegedly infested dreadnoughts have not yielded any result. Previously learned about the operation, the British removed from the North Sea all the valuable NC.
The role of the submarine in the battle of Jutland, on which were pinned great hopes — in fact in 1916 the submarine had already gradually manifest themselves — generally discouraged. They’re even found nobody. Major naval forces turned and came together in the greatest naval battle in history without even being seen. Indirect PL success, however, believe the death of the War Minister Field Marshal Lord Kitchener British cruiser «Hampshire», stepped on a mine, but it is less than comforting «bonus».
Strictly speaking, were unfulfilled goals and to combat trafficking. Blockade of Britain, the German management hastily declared war first, was not achieved, because was not backed by real forces. There followed a string of bans due to international scandal over the «Lusitania», accompanying declines in submarine warfare, return to the principle of the prize law. Did not help and the belated announcement of unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917: the enemy had time to prepare.
But back to the frustrated hopes in part to combat submarines with NC. Should see that in the interwar (1918-1939 years) period, there were shortcomings in the analysis, researchers and theories on this subject, the deepest and more interested than in Germany. If all the abundance in the circumstances and to identify the main explanations and discard personal, biased and minor, having, by the way, extensive walking on «scholastic-Cadet» level, the bottom line — the lack of action in the database of the German Navy in World War I and, accordingly, its task to a real level strategy.
At once, the tremendous pressure of all German forces managed to build his own second in the world fleet. In conjunction with recognized best army it engendered hopes to occupy a dominant position in Europe, and not just in it. Besides so harsh military manufacturing, according to the laws of the strategy have an irreversible character. But here’s respective strategic guidelines relating to the war at sea, in the military-political control and German naval command was not there. This first recognize their own researchers professionals. Following from the general to the personal, appropriate to extend this dilemma and to the account of the submarine fleet, while quite young kinds of forces. This, apparently, have to find the main reason for not achieving the war German submarine fleet.
This can be seen quite profound and general operational and strategic implications. Let us not forget that the English Grand Fleet was almost a third of the stronger German High Seas Fleet, and join forces with such a ratio in the general fight itself was a little thoughtless. Proceeding from this, the plan of the German naval command was to weaken earlier in the Grand Fleet, lured into the sea part of the British forces and their catching the superior forces there, leveling forces to fight the coming general. After Admiral Hugo von Pohl December 14, 1914 a similar missed a unique opportunity, hope to equalize forces focused more around the success of submarines. 200 of more than 5,000 transports killed by mines (1.5 million lbs) submarine.
With regard to other circumstances made read: World War II the Germans entered the strategy and tested system of excellent preparation and implementation of the submarine force. Compared with the second first global war without exaggeration battle was professional, daring and adventurous divers single. This is understandable, a branch of the young had not enough experienced professionals submarine had limited up to the war tactical and technical characteristics. Near the Command fleet out precise and clear eyes on the use of submarines. Young submarine commanders with their moderate captain lieutenant’s stripes and immediately valuable suggestions on the background of sparkling and venerable flagship captains and the High Seas Fleet just lost. Because there is nothing unusual in the fact that major decisions on the conduct of submarine warfare adopted without profound knowledge and specific use of submarines. Throughout the war, the submarine fleet operators and for the high command and remained inside the thing itself.
Acts submarine during the second world war
In World War I Germany managed to do without a strategy, albeit with a fleet, and to the second acquired strategy, but did not have time to build a fleet. It is close to the truth. Indeed, to start a war with England at the existing balance of forces at sea for Germany was a hassle impudence or madness. Not at times, and an order of magnitude and more than Imperial fleet, especially in the totality of the French, which they operated together, superior fleet of the Third Reich in 1939-1940. But Hitler was knocked out of the game to France, almost seizing and its fleet. Only the absolute indifference of the geopolitical situation was saved by the Fuhrer. He then joined either to own a bit later though and small but well cooked navy beautiful in high regard Italian, and also the French fleet, the situation could arise not in favor of England. In particular, taking into account such critical factors as a result of the acquisition of Norwegian and French campaigns important strategic position with access to the ocean. In such strategic criteria strangulation UK conducting full tonnage war (economic blockade islands) does not look fancy. But pretty soon submarine forces commander Admiral Germany Lucifer with their submarines left alone in this war against the Tsar’s fleet, and then — and the U.S. Navy.
Lucifer opposed any attempt to strategic management «pull apart» his submarine puzzles and other fronts. In his contribution to realizing the objectives of oppression under the trade blows in continuous submarines were supposed to be coming to the UK. Because studying prepyadstviya effectiveness against an enemy fleet submarines, have to resort to rare cases of derogation from this rule. This Norwegian operation, acts of submarines in the Mediterranean, maybe episode, known as «The Hunt for the» Bismarck «.
The outbreak of war, as in 1914, was promising. On the Mediterranean theater of operations the German commanders had to «sharpen» his weapon to fight the enemy fleet, and the results were not long in coming. Their effort is best commented British Prime Minister. At an emergency meeting of the House of Commons closed in 1941, Churchill said that as soon as possible, a few weeks, lost or incapacitated for a long time, almost a third of all large ships Tsarskoye fleet.
Admiral Lucifer is not very cunning, promising to strangle UK submarines. Slightly their number raised to the stated figure of 100 units in the position success has exceeded 700 thousand b.r.t. that overlap reproduction vessels. But calculations were valid for 1939-1941 years. Time lost momentum, and by the time of «celebration» of his thoughts to raise U.S. CONTRIBUTE reproduction tonnage up to 2 million tons, and complete event PLO soon allowed to win «The Battle of the Atlantic».
Achieving the goals of «tonnage war» did, in fact, irrelevant hunt for the enemy fleet. From this came the morning star and is not considered likely to spray force. Hence, apparently, and more than moderate, than you would expect, the results achieved by the German submarine fleet against the allies.
As in World War I, the Germans has eluded secretive management naval forces. More than 75% of the cases turned out to be the enemy in the course of their goals, the position of submarines and cleft Svor ocean pelegovalos. Germans failed to make the interaction with other kinds of submarine navy and air force on a permanent basis, which significantly impact on combat effectiveness. With the deployment of communications for maneuvering anti-submarine forces, filled with aircraft and radars, submarines were driven into the water that completely deprived them of maneuverability, and with it — and results. Samples resist this circumstance only multiplied the loss.
View postwar Navy leads to the idea that it was more of the submarine fleet. And even as he passed through the more than 200 nuclear and more than 400 diesel submarines. He had to solve puzzles in the ocean, where no other type of naval forces simply did not meet the requirements of combat resistance. Lack of aircraft carriers, this means a more universal solution to the problem, try to make up an unusual specialization submarines. More on the final 50-s began to appear underwater carriers cruise and ballistic missiles.
Along with the introduction of the submarine on nuclear power plants, missile and torpedo deployment of nuclear weapons, submarines reporting entirely new tactical abilities faster pace began to develop ocean navigation areas, very close to the projected area of combat deployment.
In general, the particular choice we did not leave, taking into account the risk of undisguised surprise attack by aircraft carriers strike groups (CSGs): 6th and 2nd operational fleet of the U.S. Navy from the west, 7th and 3rd — from the east and 5 th — from the south. With all this AUG 6th, 7th and 5th Fleet were deployed on the basis of unchanged and maneuvered in close proximity to the borders of the lift aircraft — all decked up to 240-270 aircraft.
At least four or five nuclear submarines (SSNs) possible opponent almost periscopes considered outputs of the main naval bases in the North and Far East, ready to detect and disrupt the overall deployment of our Navy. Someone had to fend off these quite trivial and constant danger, including the creation of a possible enemy «symmetric inconvenience.» Not counting the submariners, it was certain to do. So Makarov, Navy submarines during the war were cool on the main line combat fleet possible opponent. Because the question of the viability of their fighting on the list of the main tasks in the main direction, including anti-aircraft carriers, becomes fundamentally important.
To begin with, that a possible opponent in those years he was not inclined to underestimate the degree of danger posed by the Navy. His anti-activities in its scope and intensity conform to the norms of wartime. The problem of anti-submarine warfare was built in state status. It was the best estimate of the submarine forces of the Navy. Possible opponent faster pace develops submarine force and assigns them to the combat effectiveness of the principal value, which is also a recognition of the high status of the Navy submarine. And, in the end, remains to be seen what the actual state of the structure and organization of the Navy’s submarine fleet leaving so rich field for improvement in their impossible not to consider the massive untapped reserves.
It seems to be now or reviled in some one point «Minghui» creators nedavneshnee our past, including the choice of strategy and development of the Navy generally recognized own and other professionals, the Navy during the war as a whole cool fulfilled his puzzle. As for the rumors and opinions about Tipo our defeat occurred in the cool war, these claims are not the military, and even more so, not to military Mariners.
Despite the show in the midst of the 60s division and torpedo missile nuclear submarines, a huge number of exercises with complex background with tactical missile and torpedo firings, uncertainty remained, and quite significant.
As for diesel submarines in the main direction, this uncertainty was destroyed during the Cuban missile crisis. In the criteria for active opposition to possible enemy fleet, acting according to the standards of wartime, on the way to Cuba were discovered almost all of our submarines, which meant that their wartime destruction.
In evaluating the combat effectiveness of nuclear-powered submarines have to rely on a truly invaluable experience Falklands crisis, where both warring sides were modern and comfortably. Deserves special attention PLA implementation experience in a remote area of the ocean theater, without reliance on coastal infrastructure. (Or so many years acted our nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean.) Formally PLA Navy Tsarskoye performed their assigned tasks: established a blockade of the disputed islands, made a real danger of enemy attack groupings and even drove in the Argentine navy base attack and defeat the light cruiser » General Belgrano «.
Together, the experience of the introduction of combat submarines in the South Atlantic and forced to think very very burdened task not only command Tsarskoye fleet, but all professionals. Reasons for ecstasy was not enough. Sinking an old cruiser, «crawling» in the district at a speed of 13 knots, at the inactivity of his ship escort hard to recognize the great success. Immediately 2 other British submarines was lost with the aircraft carrier escort ships. Specifically, he and his «long arm» as «Super Etendard» RCC «Exocet» posed a real danger to the Expeditionary Force in England. In addition to counter this danger, not counting submarines was completely nothing. Followed soon death destroyer «Sheffield» confirmed all the thoroughness of similar fears.
Revelation became limited ability to search without the help of other existing submarines in the ocean, there is no reliable torpedo guns, which forced to resort to the use of old «linear actuators» MK-8, was designated an acute shortage of modern anti-ship missiles aboard submarines constraint when tracking at high speeds, especially in the criteria shallows. But the main problem was the imperfection of submarine control, remaining almost at the level of the First World War. It almost jeopardized the success of the whole operation.
Decentralization in the distance and the dynamics of theater events Admiralty seemed very bold step. Be more flexible management, business, certainly not limited to references to indirect efficiency achieved. It was about to attack the Argentine AUG. There can be no question about how something condescending assessment of the actions of the British submarines in the South Atlantic. Faster, in contrast, had the discretion that the issue of the introduction of submarines in remote areas is universal, famous and ordinary temper.
Active appeal in the Navy mid 80s to the problem of decentralized control groups submarine solves one puzzle, too dolled up. We «slept» the problem of deploying anti-ship missiles (ASM) on all submarines. The very possibility of search and discovery of a large ship in the open ocean connections technical means even modern submarines, acting without the assistance of others, is very problematic task.
Conclusions can be reduced to answering two questions. Can I was in the Navy’s own «underwater format» during the war, to give an adequate cool rebuff a possible opponent? And there is a stark prospect in PL in the future?
The answer to the first question just involves evaluating the consistency of the submarine fleet against the main forces of the enemy fleet. This answer is not simple to the same as the creator in his time for more than 5 years as head of heterogeneous grouping of forces in the direction of shock combat aircraft carriers in the fleet. Always a risk of bias, no matter how honest answer may seem. In addition, the decor and the first real correlation of forces did not remain unchanged. With the growth of our abilities possible shock the enemy vigorously increased efforts to improve anti-submarine, anti-(missile) defense, increase their operational depth. Evolved the idea of defeat major enemy targets — from nuclear to non-nuclear embodiment of destruction, which could not affect the operational performance solving the problem. Had a huge impact outcomes Falklands crisis. «Aegis» SERTAS, SGAR came after him. On our side, not missile submarines and missile submarines and supersonic missile-carrying aircraft, Curb wonderfully new missiles with artificial intelligence and target designation system of cosmic forces were opposed to a potential adversary.
Certainly, to crush the first shock echelon opponent Navy was able to. However, the mechanism of solving the problem is dependent on the properties of the control actions of commanders and crews of submarines and aircraft. What after all is the fate of the second echelon and following, the question turns on the problem of withdrawal of combat and «recharge» first missile. But that’s another story and more than the highest prerogative to address the issue!
Regarding the second question, it is more important for the construction of a new fleet deployed, almost from scratch. Voices often not in favor of the submarine. Oppose carriers submarines, to put it mildly — and unreasonable nepriznatelnoe occupation. Just look at the experience of the majestic navies in the world. Besides, we have more than a decent state experience submarine.
In the criteria of advanced missile technology development and wide dissemination prospects in achieving guaranteed fire damage increasingly shifting towards underwater at one point used guns. Its reliable carrier are usually specifically submarines. But it takes a full «revision» of the park torpedo guns in favor of giving him a modern tactical and technical characteristics, deployment RCC on all submarines, immediate and widespread use airindependent power plants on all non-nuclear submarines, including the method of modernization in the repair process, as the implementation of network-centric technologies. Procrastination is still a year or two like death.
Yuri Kirillov — Rear Admiral retired
Rights in this material belong to independent military review.