Bad Russian troops coming in 1942

Failures of the Soviet offensive in 1942

Strategically successful, regardless of their bloody, winter battles in 1941 at Moscow, Yelets, Rostov, Tikhvin, if not led to an environment, but at least the Germans to retreat — a trivial unwillingness of German troops for battle in the winter criteria have led to an incorrect assessment of Stalin's war potential of Germany. This assessment had found its reflection in the famous directive to members of the military councils of the fronts on the strategic goals of military operations in winter 1942, which sets the task victorious end of the war in 1942 Germany's military defeat was evident, but victory was still far away. Unfortunately, our expected victory in 1942 turned out to be a mirage. Calculations of the Supreme Command wrest the strategic initiative from the enemy by holding the winter and spring of 1942, a number of personal offensive operations were not justified. Instead of more victories followed by a series of failures, significantly worsened the situation on the Soviet-German front.

"After the Red Army managed to quite weary German troops, she ran across the offensive and drove to the West Germanic invaders. To delay our progress, the Germans fled on defense and began to build defensive positions in trenches, fences, field fortifications. Germans expect to hold such makarom our coming up in the spring to the spring, gathering strength, re-enter the coming against the Red Army. Germans want, as it should, to gain time and to get a break. Our task is not to give the Germans of this respite to drive them west without stopping, to force them to use up their reserves before spring, when we will have new huge reserves, and the Germans will not be more reserves, and to provide such makarom complete rout of Nazi troops in 1942 "- so thought Stalin. Stalin was at that time still was not feeling great need for councils trained military professionals and was mesmerized by the amount of cash divisions, without taking into account their actual combat power. In general, this was like Hitler Stalin. German plans for the coming year of 1942 differed a great adventurous.

Winter offensive of the Red Army were no roads in the criteria, with the result that it was impossible to rapidly carry out operations on the deepest encirclement and destruction of German compounds. Advent conducted by Strategy First World War: the infantry and cavalry supported by artillery, that the criteria of winter, the chilling maneuver off-road cover them with the support of German Defense Fri, resulted only in the expulsion of Germans from populated Fri (in military reports of those years are mentioned first names released small villages Fri, not the number of captured Germans), with all this Reddish Army suffered tremendous loss. While systemic front operations command of Headquarters and the Western Front was not planned, and the local military operation to take individual human Fri (and even towns) huge operational and strategic of success even more so — the big defeat of the enemy — not bring. Neglect of Stalin functions of the General Staff led to bad proschitannosti (in terms of supply by lengthening communications actually coming on winter road connections) the intended coming. In the end, despite the unprecedented heroism of the advancing Russian troops in the harshest winter criteria in January 1942, specifically due to the absence of the desired supply planned results are not achieved.

Fight for Demyansk boiler — the battle, which lasted for a year and a half a month, and as follows, which was the longest battle in the environment on the Eastern Front. Demyansk boiler was absolutely blocked by Russian troops from 25.02.1942 till 04.23.1942 Then, the Germans broke through the front and form a so-called Ramushevsky corridor. Demyansk ledge existed prior to February 28, 1943 For the first time in military history of a German Corps of 6 divisions sheathe of about 100,000 people — almost an entire army — well stocked with everything needed by air. Specifically, in the Valdai Hills in Russia acted first in the history of warfare airlift. About 100 aircraft were to fly into the cauldron and fly away from it every day. In certain cases, the number reached 150 aircraft.

As recalled Rokossovskii: "In the counter-attack army troops fled without pause. The further they are moving away from Moscow, the stronger the enemy resisted. Even before the approach to the turn of Volokolamsk Front Command has to resort to the creation of groups is the same, then on the other site, why what -that part of the forces transmitted from one army to another. Related improvisation provided a local success. With the release of our troops in the same limit of Volokolamsk became quite clear that the enemy was able to recover from the impact of acquired and that his defense is organized. Proceed to the coming of the available time we force with the expectation of a decisive break defense and the future development of success has been impossible. came a moment when both our high command were to loaf on the extraction utility of the gained results and start a rigorous training for the summer campaign of 1942. To the chagrin of the majestic, it does not work out, and the troops, carrying out orders, continued to advance. This command front was tasked to: harry the enemy, not giving him any respite. Here it was incomprehensible to me.'s one thing to wear down the enemy's defensive operations, ensuring alignment of forces that we did before moving to the offensive. But to harass and weaken its offensive operations in the apparent correlation of forces is not in our favor, and even in the terrible winter criteria, I do not understand in any way he could. Repeated reports of our commanders on the front languid state of the army as a result of sustained losses, on the inconsistency of its forces and tasks that put the front in front of us, were not taken into account. Had with an effort to advance, pushing the opponent is on one, then on another site. ABOUT break the enemy's defense is not out of the question. exhausted our ability to extreme, and the enemy continued to replenish their troops freshest forces, transferring them from the west. " With difficulty the accumulated reserves of 9 armies to spring 1942 was spent in these unfortunate battles.

In addition, the huge losses of the Red Army, often promoted by the fact that the march replenishment consisted entirely of poorly trained conscripts. Exclusively in 1942 hit upon the idea that the replenishment of parts to build the derivation of them from the battlefield, complementing with all this mixed composition of the parts of the new recruits and experienced fighters. In accordance with the directive of the Stalin ordered in 1942 to move in all directions coming. January 8, 1942 began the first large (grouping — more than 1 million people.) Strategic offensive Rzhev-Vyazemskaya operation by the destruction of Army Group "Center". 39th Army (General Maslennikov NKVD) Kalinin Front has made a successful breakthrough of the front a bit to the south west of Rzhev with the following build-up and impact, developing breakthrough 11th Cavalry Corps, went to the principal railway Sychevka station. German forces at Rzhev hit the critical situation: the recognition of the German High Command, Panzer Army without supplies being able to fight acts of less than 3 days.

Almost immediately, 20th Army of General Vlasov successfully crossed the river Lama and the 2nd Guards Cavalry. body started to move westward from
Volokolamsk on Jags — to connect to the 39 th Army and the end of the German encirclement Rzhev grouping. From the area of Sukhinichi Medyn to find gaps in the German defense (continuous band edge was not), to the north (on Vyasma) began to attack the 33rd army Ephraim and the 1st Guards Cavalry. Belova body. In the area west of Viaz'ma was thrown airborne troops. The troops of the North-Western Front moved an unprecedented march through thick woods in the snow to the rear German groups "North" and "Center". The Germans are generally not expected coming from this direction. Supply of Russian troops on the longish winter road was made poorly, the main resource supplies were captured, occupied in the cities Andreapol, Toropets.

But the German defense outposts — Knoll, Lofty Luke Velizh, Snow White, venison left in the hands of German troops. The only fundamental result of the coming of the band 3rd and 4th Shock Army was the weakening of the German defense connectivity: the principal road was cut Lofty Luke — Rzhev. The successful start of operations at the Kalinin and Western Fronts Stalin led to the conclusion on the sufficiency of forces in the direction of Rzhev, and he, despite the pleas of Zhukov threw the 1st Shock Army, right neighbor of the 20th, in the North-Western Front for the German groups in the environment Demyansk ledge. This eased the pressure on the front of Rzhev — Sychevka, and the 20th Army bogged down in the assault position area. In the hands of the Germans remained strategically basic steel and auto road Smolensk — Vyaz'ma who decided the final bout. The Germans formed a strike team "Rzhev" (two panzer divisions 3rd TA — 5th and 7th, SS Division "Das Reich" and other parts) at the expense of the passive sections of the front and closed the breach at Rzhev. Just as well they shut down and a break from Medyn, cutting communications 33rd Army. Surrounded were, apart from the 33rd Army, and the two cavalry corps.

South of Lake Il'men coming 1st Shock Army from the north succeeded by February 20, completely encircle the two army corps (six divisions), the German 16th Army in Demyansk protrusions formed after the successful promotion of the 3rd and 4th shock armies in the south-west from Demyansk majestically towards Bow. Early on there was an attempt to break the blockade of Leningrad Army troops 4 (4, 59, 2nd shock — a former 26th new formation — and 52-I) Volkhov Front (Meretskov), who held the defense along the river. Volkhov from Lake Ladoga to Ilmenski. But coming was poorly prepared: the surprise was not achieved, air cover and support virtually absent in the first, crucial step was not created the desired concentration of forces. After crossing the Volkhov and break through the front by 1 March 2nd shock army moved 75 km. and was encircled with parts of the 59th Army (of 7 divisions and six brigades plus Cavalry. Corps). By mid-March in the "pot" and "bags" were sitting 33rd Army under Viaz'ma, 2nd shock between the Miracle and Novgorod and symmetrically with respect to her Il'men lake on the eastern shore of Lovat — 6 divisions (two cases), the German 16th Army under Demyansk.

During March — June 1942 lasted a bloody battle in the swamps of the corridors surrounded by armies, during which temporarily fell into the "bag" in the area to stay with the same 54-Army (Fedyuninsky), punching bloody frontal attacks towards the 2nd shock. The Germans brutally bombed surrounded and starving 2nd shock bombs, extra heavy gauge, and in the battles against the 54th Army in a country churchyard (in June) applied new languid tanks T-6 — "Tiger". The result was sad for the Red Army: Commander 33rd Army Efremov shot himself after the actual defeat surrounded by the army, and General Vlasov, surrendered and in June led the ROA (Russian Liberation Army prisoners of war), fiercely fought against the Red Army at the end of the war.

Sunk loss Volkhov Front and the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front for the four months of fighting are estimated at 100 million people (including 20 thousand captives). The exact figure no one knows to this day in the swamps are the remains of the victims, whose number exceeded 70 thousand first (if you do not take it the Smolensk battle of the summer of 1941), Stalin strike cost is very cheap: only in the Rzhev-Vyazma operation killed above 250 thousand Red Army soldiers were wounded — over 500 thousand is the same level of loss was mentioned in the Battle of Smolensk. Then, in 1941, and at this point, in 1942 — is a consequence of an illiterate Stalinist control. The reason for the defeat (discrepancy between the results and costs) — the impossibility of creation of the desired concentration of forces in the key sectors of the coming of the attackers because of bad security. Overall — an obvious miscalculation (and wine) and the Russian General Staff of the stakes in the risk assessment of the operation. The numerical advantage of Russian troops did not work, and the reserves were spent in vain. At once heroic and inglorious page stories of the war.

One of the most difficult and unsuccessful offensive (such as languid as Smolensk, and the same bad as Vyazemskaya) the operation of the Red Army during the war unfolded in the Crimea in the spring of 1942 she began brilliantly — landing troops in the Kerch and Feodosia stormy winter weather in December 1941, the Germans had the situation critical: on the Kerch peninsula at their was only one infantry division and feeble Romanian units. The commander of an army corps Count Sponeck decided to quit the Kerch peninsula during the retreat of the Germans lost their artillery on the frozen roads. Sponeck was given a court martial and sentenced to death. During the 2-week Russian command had a real opportunity to enter the communications Manstein to Djankov. Truly-lost victory. As Manstein wrote: "… even with an advantage of a triple is capable of, the enemy did not dare to brave the deep operation that could lead to the destruction of the 11th Army." The commander of the Transcaucasian Front DT Kozlov, who had no combat experience, whose headquarters was in Tbilisi (!) Has truly fateful decision: He suffered at the beginning of the coming 10 days, without warning for all that neither the commander of the Maritime Army nor the Black Sea Fleet.

As a result, the coming of the Maritime Army from Sevastopol and landing landings are not supported with the advent of the Kerch Peninsula, led only to the victims. A January 15, Manstein struck at the junction of the 44th and 51th armies, and on January 18, took Theodosius. Front Command has decided to build up strength before moving on to the offensive: the ice (!) Road from the Taman peninsula was transferred another (47th) army. In the end, from February 27 to April 9, three times started coming, but time was lost — the Germans organized the defense on a narrow isthmus. As Simonov wrote: "All mired in the mud, the tanks did not go, guns stuck somewhere behind the machine, too, holding a tray of shells. People at the forefront of a lot of it was silly. Neither earlier nor later I beheld such a huge number of people killed not in combat, not in the attack, and at periodic artillery attack. stamped People did not know what to do. Around there were no trenches, no cracks — nothing. Everything happened on the nude, dirty, completely open on all sides of the field. Corpses drowned in the mud, and death here on this field, for some reason seemed especially dire. "

Eighth day of May the Germans, having numerical advantages, fled in coming, end in disaster for the whole of the Crimean front: the loss of people and vehicles have been horrendous (150 thousand prisoners). Manstein trivial "cheated" Kozlov in the direction of impact, front and broke through, forcing the anti-tank ditch, came only a tank division in the rear of the main forces in the north of the peninsula. Two months later, disaster underst
ood and Maritime Army: after fierce fighting with a rich use of artillery (caliber 305.600, and even 800 mm) and air Germans bolshennymi loss (in the advanced battalions remained in the ranks of 10%!) Broke through to the North Bay and suddenly crossed it NIGHT MODE. Army under fire evacuation by sea was not feasible. At night on the submarine were taken only top management. Heroic Maritime army completely lost on the last line of defense at Cape Chersonese. This catastrophe — the personal human miscalculation Stalin (the result of its creed: "an indispensable not"), including the result of his indulgence crazy NKVD repression against the commanders of the Red Army in 1931 and 1937-1938.

The command of the South-West direction (YUZN) Russian Front under Tymoshenko, in accordance with a general indication of the coming of Stalin in 1942, planned a terrific offensive to liberate the Kursk, Belgorod, Kharkov (the South-Western Front — Kostenko) and the Donbas ( the Southern Front — Malinowski). As witnesses testified, the mystical overtones of this plan was to increase the Tymoshenko own "rating" in the eyes of Stalin and return to themselves, perhaps after a quick victory, the post of Commissar of Defense. The balance of forces, but it is not possible to solve such a large strategic tasks. First, in 1942 at the approximate equality in the number of Russian and German groups on the southern front (about 1 million). Germans outnumbered tanks and artillery. In the spring they began secretly to focus reserves for preparing the coming of the Caucasus, namely three new panzer divisions from France (22, 23rd and 24th). But none of the goals (liberation of Donbass and Kharkiv) could not be reached — the Germans have prepared a strong positional defense and forces a decisive advantage at the Russian troops were not. In February, Tymoshenko has decided to limit the capture of Kharkov. A decisive contribution to the breakdown of the coming of the Russian armies shock defeat at Kharkov and Barvenkovsky grouping Russian troops brought Stuka dive bombers Richthofen, brought in from the Crimea on the orders of Hitler. Severed group (6, 57, and 9th Army) bombarded without interruption. It was a true massacre. Samples Release surrounded west of the Donets troops have not been successful, in part because of a strong air resistance. Came out of the encirclement fought only 20 million people, more than 200 thousand were taken prisoner and killed.

"… Within 3 weeks of the South-Western Front due to our own carelessness not only lost a half to win the Kharkov operation, but still managed to give the opponent the 18-20 division … It is a question also of error of all members of the Military Council, and the first comrade. Tymoshenko and comrade. Khrushchev. If we told the country in its entirety on the disaster, which has experienced front and still continues to suffer, then I'm afraid that you would have acted very cool "- so spoke Stalin South-west front of the Military Council. Kharkov disaster after Stalin on a gun shot did not admit Marshal Timoshenko to develop plans for military operations. Zhukov pointed to another significant consequence: "In the main I agreed with the operational and strategic forecasts Supreme, but he could not agree with him in the amount of proposed front offensive operations, considering that they suck our reserves and thus become complicated preparations for the next general offensive of the Russian troops'

Russian General Staff planned for the summer of 1942 to the coming of a great eagle (the Germans knew about it — Halder noted, referring to the coming of the Kharkiv Russian: "Soon such as" movie "will look about the Eagle"), why in the Bryansk Front were concentrated large armored units in 5 separate buildings (1,000 tanks) and a spare, not so long ago formed and located in the area Eltsa 5th Panzer Army (Hero of the Russian Union of Lizyukov) within the 700 tanks. Russian troops have an advantage here in numerical tanks. A natural solution stakes in a situation that appears to organize a counterattack from the north flank of the advancing German group. Presented a good case to disrupt the German strategic offensive. But there was no element of surprise: the Germans were aware of the presence of a tank army — that was it taken into account, ie counterstrike was expecting them. In the end, the Germans organized a strong anti-tank defenses, including tank ambushes and mine warfare, and saturated ground attack aircraft Russian tank units, especially fatal to the artillery and light tanks (amounting to 50% of Russian armored forces).

Bad management of counter-attack by the command of the Bryansk Front and Rates, expressed in a hurry and there is no air and artillery support, and led to the loss of the desired concentration factor of success for the forces. Tank units were introduced in a hurry to fight in parts of infantry in combat against unsuppressed strong anti-tank defense, and without air cover. In the GHQ inadvertently believed that "all the tanks are" (completely forgotten about trouble armored counterattacks exactly a year ago in the summer of 1941). Arithmetic advantage in tanks again did not work: the whole of July unsuccessful tank attacks were carried out against the German defensive line that protected the rear of the advancing south strike group. How much for all that was lost tanks and people — only God knows (you have to think — about 1,000 tanks). Among the other died in the battle on their own CV and Commander — Lizyukov.

Corresponding to 1942 and is particularly rich application Germans dive bombers: the Memoirs of war veterans, for some reason specifically in 1942, the German bombing was particularly intolerable. Our troops were completely defenseless against the massive bombing: as previously mentioned, the direct loss from the bombing reached 50% of total losses, in addition, many unpunished bombing exerted tremendous demoralizing effect on the staff of the infantry formations.

19 August 1942 the mobile group of the enemy broke through the Soviet defenses north Kalach and 23 August, headed for the shore of the Volga north-east of Stalingrad. But neither had to be moved to Stalingrad more and more troops, no battalions and military courts, no scolding Stalin himself — nothing helped. AM Wasilewski bitterly stated: "Despite all the activities we carried out 23 and 24 August, eliminate approached specifically to the outskirts of the town of the enemy, to close the corridor and back position in those days could not." Why? AM Wasilewski gives honest answer: "He hastily created shock troops consisted usually of weak infantry units in combat. Troops also directed at stake by rail, acted slowly and without completing the concentration, once introduced into the battle … Time to prepare counterattacks to practice communication and organization of command and control was not enough. " September 2, German troops have gained the outskirts of Stalingrad. In order to prevent them from coming into wedging defensive orders 62nd and 64th armies, Stalin ordered GK Zhukov, who was on the Stalingrad front from August 26 as a representative of GHQ, to organize a counterattack against the flank had broken through the enemy force. 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 September Russian troops attacked head-on perfectly fortified enemy positions, carrying a heavy loss. While the 1st Guards, 24th and 66th army proceeded with blood in aimless assaults, the Germans wasted no time. Shock troops from the 4th Panzer Army Gotha significantly expanded the gap between Stalingrad and South-eastern front and continued to displace the 62nd and the 64th Army in the town.

September 13, German troops started to common assault Stalingrad. The city was defended by all of the same fighters Chuikova and Shumilova for which earlier were the most stringent measures in accordance with the requirements of the order number 227. But the p
romotion of Germans produced a snail's pace. What is it? The reason was the Ordinary Germans have lost their freedom of maneuver, they had to attack every house and every step forward to pay with blood, blood, and blood. From the second half of September, the battle for Stalingrad, the Germans came to a very unprofitable phase of the struggle of attrition. Now solve the final struggle of the reserves. In these criteria the German High Command had pull additional forces into the city, weakening the flanks.

In the Russian General Staff is closely tracked down these movements. Was in full swing to develop "Operation Uranus," the purpose of which was to the environment the entire grouping of German troops at Stalingrad. The plan of the operation was, that the application of massive attacks on the flanks crush puny Romanian and Italian troops and close the ring around Paulus army. November 19 began Stalingrad offensive. Russian troops had achieved complete surprise. Romanian units without causing severe resistance, appealed to the chaotic flight. As a result, skillfully executed attacks on troops converging fronts Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts, with the active assistance of the right wing of the Don Front, Nov. 23 together near Kalach. In the ring were 22 German divisions. This was the first large entourage of enemy forces since the war began.

In addition to the operation "Uranus" Russian The General Staff developed a different, larger in scale and objectives offensive. It was called "Saturn". South-Western Front was to strike a blow at the Rostov-on-Don by Kamensky. It was assumed that the success of this operation may make the conditions for the complete destruction of all enemy forces in the south of the Soviet-German front. With all of this in the boiler was provided not only an army of Paulus, and the 1st and 4th Tank, the German 11th Army, 3rd and 4th Romanian, Hungarian 2nd and the 8th Italian Army. Practically it was about achieving a decisive victory over the armed forces of Germany and the radical change in the course of the second world war. Inflict catastrophic defeat Hitler has assumed for the winter campaign of 1942-1943. But at this crucial moment, the Russian command was making one mistake after another. First, according to AM Vasilevsky, the General Staff seriously miscalculated the estimation of abundance surrounded by German troops in Stalingrad. Before the offensive was believed that the environment will be 85-90 thousand soldiers and officers of the enemy. But then it turned out that the real figure is about 350 thousand people. In the GHQ caused concern and the presence on the insignificance of distance from the boiler German army groups "Don" and "Gollidt", the latter of which was surrounded by a group of only 40 kilometers.

It was decided to "temporarily abandon" the operation "Saturn." Instead of hitting Rostov on Don Southwest Front reorienting to the flanker tormosinskoy grouping. From that day or the previous plan of operation was divided into two parts: the operation of the "Big Saturn", which provided for the environment of the southern wing of the German troops, was postponed, it was introduced to replace the action in "Operation Little Saturn" that turned the main forces of the Southwestern Front to the south, in the direction of Morozovskaya. As for the idea of dissection group Paulus, it had one significant drawback. As you know, around Stalingrad and in the town in the summer of 1942 had made a massive defensive zone. The Germans broke off for all the teeth, breaking them for 4 months. Now Paulus used the building for the organization of a strong defense inside the ring. A Russian troops stormed them. What came out of it, you can find out in the memoirs AM Vasilevsky: "Meeting the stubborn resistance of the encircled enemy, Russian troops had to stop the advance of carrying out instructions … Betting, we are in early December again tried to dismember and kill surrounded by a group, but now much-or not have gained significant results. Enemy, emphasizing on a network of perfectly cooked engineering defenses, angrily resisted answering fierce counterattacks to our every attempt to advance. "

The debate over "Operation Saturn" lasted for another two weeks. By the time the troops of the Stalingrad and Don fronts completely bogged down in a battle with a group of Paulus. 12 December Manstein began coming from the area of Kotelnikovo, triggering a rush of Headquarters gloomy moods. Because December 14 was a final decision: to change the direction of the head hitting the Southwest and the left wing of the Voronezh Front. Instead of Rostov, in the rear of all enemy troops on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front, the task now is to defeat only the Italian 8th Army and return to the rear of the troops stein. This was the "Little Saturn". But the puzzle posed in front of Russian troops on the plan "Operation Little Saturn" failed. Manstein saw the danger on the part of the South-Western Front and led his forces from the flank attack. After two and a half months of the 57th Panzer Corps, along with other parts of Manstein took an active role in the smashing of the Red Army at the Battle of Kharkov. They were all the fruits of the "Small Saturn".

Rejection of the operation "Saturn" was naikrupneyshey of the war a mistake Russian command. How, then, this operation can be conducted? The best option was to synchronous operations "Uranus" and "Saturn". With all of this was highlighted by the fact that achieved an absolute surprise. Forces had enough. Beat Stalingrad and Don fronts wore a facilitating and Voronezh and South-West — the head. In fact, and meant to Headquarters and General Staff until they learned the real number of groups Paulus. Naturally, the enemy made an attempt to break out of the ring. But what were his abilities in this regard? At first, all fear of the Russian command against Paulus army were unfounded. General Paulus, on-1's, did not have a corresponding order of Hitler. And in-2, the termination of the transportation fuel technology has transformed the 6th Army into a pile of dead metal. Paulus reported to the Fuhrer that his tanks, of which about 100 were ready for battle, fuel, there was less than 30 km running. In order to provide the breakthrough needed to throw on the "air bridge" of 4,000 tons of gasoline. Naturally, it was unreal.

In this type of action of the Red Army troops Gollidta and Manstein did not have time to slip out of the trap. The fact that the distance from the position of the 8th to the Italian army Rostov was only 300 miles. Because Russian troops have moved ahead of 100 km. So Makarov, was achieved by not only taking Rostov. In March 1943, the Germans would have almost nothing to carry out offensive operations in the Kharkov region. Curious to see the potential ability of the collapse of the entire southern wing of the German Eastern Front. First, the loss of such masses of troops could not be made up for anything. Nor did the Germans of such reserves, in front of the band gap width arose almost 400 km. Again, just close it was nothing. Reddish Army, unlike the Wehrmacht possessed considerable reserves, could solve two problems: the defeat of Army Group "Center" by the attack on the flank and rear, and the development of profound breakthrough in the Ukraine, the release without any special losses of Kiev Donbass, Crimea, access to the state border. Practically it was a complete defeat of Nazi Germany in 1943. A storm of Berlin would be held in the spring of 40 fourth.

In reality, it is recognized that to radical change was still more than half a year. The loss of troops Stalingrad group, of course, was a disaster, but not so weighty, that actually change the course of the fighting in favor of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, and quite
break down mentally, and militarily. After a little more than a month has passed since the surrender of Paulus, when Russian troops suffered a heavy defeat at the Battle of Kharkov and retreated under the pressure of the enemy at 150-200 km to the east. All this is a shame it did not sound, not states in favor of the approval of radical change. The real fundamental change came after the Battle of Kursk. Then the German army in truth suffered a final defeat and one hundred percent lost the initiative. But it could happen even earlier. Proof of this can serve as a word stein: "It seems to be no great was the winning Russian troops, still they failed to achieve a decisive victory — the liquidation of the entire southern flank, that we could do nothing to make up."

Like this post? Please share to your friends: