Brand new doctrine of war in the XXI century

The new doctrine of war in the XXI century

Reflecting the desired guesswork and long-lasting paradigm of "Doctrine of War" — a list of the principles enshrined since 1949 in the Army Field Manual 3-0 "Operations", and later in other official doctrines, these bases (Mass, Maneuver, Unity of Command and others) were more than half a century . This reflects their practical value, although their yavna need serious revision, as well as conflicts in old fields fights Mesopotamia and Afghanistan have become obsolete.

The era after the end of the war has made the Cool new vulnerabilities and new forms of enemies and combat applications. Decade of labor and complex operations, "pulled out the roots of" strategic thinking and operational habits, calculated on the response against the whole risk. This danger no longer exists but it is imprinted in the South American military culture. Calls to adapt to the new requirements, new threats and evolving nature of the conflict. We have to discard what is no longer applicable, and strengthen everything permanently or hard. Subsequent to the consideration offered united society participants in the war — a brand new doctrine, which must be placed above all:

Awareness: The art of strategy and operations based on detailed understanding of the military nature of the conflict and its specific context (cultural, social, political and geographical), in which military force should be provided and used.

STRATEGY, anthropology, sociology

Strategist Bernard Brodie at one point, saw that "good strategy involves a good anthropology and good sociology." Fundamentally war involves iterative competition between nations, whose behavioral patterns are the result of a complex pattern of reasons. In our society, the public safety there are experts who are monitoring and studying the strategic and military culture of the opposing states and assess the military capabilities of opponents. As for the war, we did Cool shots of professionals in Russian history, language and culture. Once cool the war we lost this examination. We become what General Anthony Tsinni, past head of Central Command, called the "order of battle aimed at" — focused on the numerical measurement of recognizable enemies and look forward to his ability, based on standard templates. Criticism of Major General Michael Flynn in 2010, reconnaissance operations in Afghanistan reflects the impact of such mentality.

We need to gain a profound and detailed awareness of at least some of the conflict in which we are entering, and get very probable idea of the nature of the enemy. It contains a good awareness of the culture of the enemy and its social and political system.

This will help us in the future, in accordance with the nature of what Harvard Samuel Huntington called the "fault line wars". This type of rich cultural, ethnic or religious intolerance conflicts that occur between different cultures or civilizations. Such protracted war, full of violence and is very contagious. Unfortunately, this is exactly the kind of conflicts in which we will be involved in the next few decades (although not just us.) War to break (fault-line wars) give an advantage to those who deeply understands and other components of the state's strategic culture — its public culture. This is not a brand new idea, Michael Howard wrote many years ago: "War — it's not tactical exercises … This conflict societies, and they can be completely understood only if you understand the nature of the society with which to fight. The roots of victory or defeat are often far away from the battlefield — in political, social or economic factors. "

Also, this is not news to those who are familiar with the traditional charter of the Marine Corps' small wars Charter »(Small Wars Manual), in which is written:" The campaign plan and strategy should be tailored to the liking of the people with whom there is a collision. "

It is unrealistic for lawmakers or military succeed without a deep knowledge of the local culture and it is possible to see on past South American intervention. Our awareness of the nature of the defect once the Vietnam war and civilian weaknesses of the South Vietnamese government was decisive for our defeat there. Also, our lack of understanding of the ethnic divisions in Lebanon, where our support to the government, which was dominated by Christians, posed a danger of our Marines and sailors in Beirut. Also, the South American invasion of Somalia in 1992-1993 was doomed limited knowledge of the clan system in this impoverished country.

The same problem for a long time, working against our efforts in Iraq. With years of progress in the operational and tactical level in the last decade and should be institutionalized framework, educational facilities and organizational improvements to preserve and enhance the ability of U.S. forces to think in terms of culture and build things from the standpoint of the other person.

Yavna need for exploration of the culture and the knowledge in virtually every phase of "Operation Iraqi Freedom» (Operation Iraqi Freedom). There are countless stories and funny stories about the prevalence of the additive effects of culture and the difficulties they bring to the place of battle.

"We are absolute newcomers in this environment," — says the young officer. "This is alien to us. It's hard to find a place in the world that would be alien to the Yankees more than Iraq. " "The complexity of their culture is staggering," — says another.

Others express surprise importance of religion: "There was nothing to what I would be ready." Efforts to instill some awareness of culture in the military educational programs from Prof. were eventually taken. Additionally, initiatives have been made such as "human Teams territory» (Human Terrain Team). The effectiveness of such measures is mixed, naughty reviews by Flynn a few years back. It is clear that we have gained progress, but less clear, we are focused on the correct configurations, or should we look for best practices, in spite of future budget cuts.


The maximum clear need to explore other cultures and the creation of a more profound level of awareness, if the strategic and operational effectiveness is to have meaning. This prototype is true for a meeting of legislators in Washington, DC, and for dusty bazaars of Marjah and Kandahar.

"What will be important for the U.S. Armed Forces in the 21st Century" — writes the South American historian Williamson Murray — "is as fine South American favorites at all levels understand their own opponents: their history, their culture, their political framework of their religion, and even their tongues. "

At this point it should be clear that awareness is "the first in the middle of equals" when it comes on the principles of war. Without a profound awareness of the nature of war and involved companies to find achievable goals or end state — an exercise in delirium. Without deep knowledge of history and war impossible to design an offensive campaign or retain the initiative after the first clashes. Not a bad plan asks ramifications and alternatives, rather than a fixed plan.

Awareness on the part of the commander and his aides need to cook these different ways, and because awareness is the basis for adaptation and flexibility. When concentrated or distributed combat force, or when to
apply the saving of forces — is dependent on the awareness of the abilities of the enemy and hints about his preferences (habits, addictions). As the achievement of surprise or its compliance with safety awareness asks that the opponent (decision-maker) to predict or wants to do. All cheats majestically Captains are based on the supply of suitable opponent hints that interests him. Unity of command requests the general awareness that a senior commander wants to achieve, and how he wants it to achieve, as well as the knowledge of the context in which the operation takes place. There can be no unity of purpose in relation to the overall task without a genuine awareness.

All existing guidelines suggest awareness, but historical examples demonstrate that the 1st implying not enough. Awareness needs to be more than the principle and training, and for warfare.

Because we have to prepare the future generation of warriors with the ability to work mostly with other people's cultures, the ability to understand the specific knowledge and awareness of the crisis areas in the shortest possible time. Faster than focusing on network-centric (network-centric) forms of war, the importance of culture-centric war, to what our soldiers and sailors will be prepared with the highest degree of cultural reference and the need to provide "global scouts" to improve our interaction with other cultures. This is not the type of disk imaging, which can be rapidly assembled satellites and drones. Instead of this degree is achieved by awareness of human networks, and this information can be successfully interpreted by military, armed with the deepest knowledge of the historical and cultural context in which there was a conflict. Military and educational reforms proposed by these councils, more wide.

Because, despite the tax cuts faced by the Pentagon, the South American military decided to put education at the center for the future, including the study of history and culture.


The principles of war and are not immutable, and not out of date, if there is a corresponding perception of their implementation. Because the way the war is constantly changing, we should wait for the configurations in the principles that made public and taken for execution. The principles have not been developed to simplify things by those who can not stand critical scrutiny, has the habit of contemplation or patience for deep study of history. They can be cheat sheets for lazy students of the war. But for those who are willing to take the unpredictability and endless complication of human conflict, the principles for themselves by themselves never enough. They only help to define the scope of our study of the war, so to simplify the translation of theory into the practice of burning. What we need is a clear commitment virtually endless pieces of human conflict and gentle homage to the changing features and ways of war.

The conclusion is consistent with the main expression of General Martin Dempsey, head of the Joint Command, uttered in January at the Institute for Duke.

"I think one of the challenges of this century, education, and, of course, one of the challenges for us — the development of leaders," — he said — "we need to develop the favorites, who can accept the facts of the situation, the context of use and understand."

This is the essence of awareness. Our system of military education should seek to apply this perspective to tomorrow's housing officers and our civilian high schools not to harm themselves if they continue to instill awareness of the strategy and related military operations in their own learning program notes. Many aspire to it.

But we should not introduce another principle, if our true goal is to codify common principles. They will never be able to change a serious and lean training, and can not be a template for the introduction of the special assessment without continuities and discontinuities of distinguishing specific context. Again Brodie describes it: "Without the prospect we have nothing, nothing will save clichés, which acts on behalf of old times, and presumably permanent principles. These clichés are also perceived by many as the final decision tomorrow problems. But it is not. If that were the case, things could be even easier. "

But to win in tomorrow's Zapyataev and uncertain wars will not be easy. Conduct of the war has never been easy and definitive answers to tomorrow's problems are never in the list of common words or fine statements. And the art and science of war should be based on the creative use of the human brain. There is no "formulas indicate a successful strategy and course of the war." But adding to the list of awareness of the principles of war will be a good step forward towards the creation of the necessary context to identify future strategies and lead for future wars.

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