Russian oil does not help out

Russian oil will not saveA year or so back in the article "Russia before and after the election," we were given a few options for the development of the situation. In general, we can say that the version of the future, which we considered more feasible, justified, even in spite of the fact that the internal policy of the Russian Federation presented a sudden surprise in the form of a significant part of the awakening of society to civilian activities.

Putin last de facto supreme ruler of the Russian elite and bureaucracy in the always "reign" zits President Medvedev, and who returned for a formal presidential possibilities on the basis of controversial elections in the spring of this year, did not introduce any significant configurations in economic policy. As expected, he was the president of a large oligarchic business, which in the Russian reality hard to judge and city it or not — so cramped corporate interests in the modern RF intertwined (in the main through the mechanisms of corruption) to the interests of state bureaucracy. With regard to social policy, then headed by Putin municipal unit on the path of repression aimed at the suppression of civilian self-contained society, which has not yet been able to find a decent favorites, able to consolidate and classify his protest, sending it in a constructive way of non-violent regime change.

On the surface, the socio-economic situation in the country vorachivaetsya to normal "oil coma." The highest oil prices supported the super soft monetary policy was in "liquidity trap" of developed economies and fueled expectations of further monetary stimulus, yet allow Putin to keep inefficient and repressive municipal car, and even raise allowances security officials and the military. Commodities revenues allow for economic policy, founded more Kudrin, who is now retired from Municipal Affairs and tries to position itself as the 1st of modders dialogue between the government and opposition to anti-system (the role of little significance, taking into account that the dialogue, as this is not, and not expected). The essence of the course, we have not once read as — linking monetary emission in export earnings. Part of the issue comes to the federal budget in the form of taxes, federal spending to stimulate domestic demand across the country, which is so Makarov, is aggressively due to external demand and foreign economic conditions. In the main, this rate remained constant, although it must be admitted that the Bank of the Russian Federation now, in moments of Short-term relapse in the global credit markets, spend a few more flexible policy than before.

There, but, and the changes that began in the past year. Last year was the first in the history of post-Soviet Russian Federation, where rising commodity prices and export revenues was accompanied by an outflow of capital from the country. This year, this trend has continued and there is reason to believe that it will increase in the long term. The Central Bank of the Russian Federation in the revised "Guidelines for monetary policy" for 2012-2014 predicts the outflow of capital in the current year of $ 70 billion. Greater outflow was observed only in a crisis 2008, $ 133.7 billion. With all of this the average price of Brent crude oil in 2008 was — $ 94, and in the first half of 2012, the barrel of dark gold cost on average — $ 112.

Russian oil will not save

Data for the last two years (pre-election and post-election first) point to the obvious raskorrelyatsiyu dynamics of global commodity markets and serious cross-border flows. When measured suitable external economic situation and there are growing signs that correspond to the crisis, which allows to conclude that the crisis is all the same, and he — internal, intrasystem. The reason for this negative trend, in our view, ordinary: that now continue to believe in the long-term prospects putinism, or should, cleave to good fortune, a blind eye to the continued worsening of social and inter-elite conflict in the country, or to be cheated of state propaganda man. Among those who have the means and the opportunity to bring them to foreign banks or real estate, that in the case of virtually inevitable at some point, worsening socio-economic situation in the country, to go to a temporary or permanent emigration — these people a little.

Top can not

By analyzing the domestic chain of events that started with a moment of "castling" Putin-Medvedev, to the latest outrageous politically targeted by the courts, it is easy to conclude that the split of the elites in Russia, as well as the split of the Russian society, can be considered a fait accompli. The split of the elites may have been brewing for the past year, exacerbated by the decision to make a castling Putin and Medvedev, which resulted in the resignation of Kudrin, and quite took shape after the election, when the government was formed Medvedev despite the fact that part of the Prime Ministers Putin went to the Administration Putin's presidency.

This split of the elites can not be called a split on the "liberal" and "conservative" wing. "Liberalism" as well as "conservatism" in Russian political realities impossible to realize because of their generally understood within the Western political culture from which these definitions have moved into Russia. In Russia, more quickly, you can read about the company on the adherents of an open society and the country's rule of law, and for traditionalists, "statists", whose ranks are very colorful, but united opposition to the Western experience of building societies and countries, and the West as a whole. As for the elites are corrupt to the same extent regardless of political affiliation and sympathies of civilization, there occurred a split between supporters of globalization and the legalization of accessories in the weave parochial interests of foreign-invested and moderate supporters of isolationism and legitimize accessories through proximity to power resources. 1st willing to rely on the relatively "liberal" part of society, second, security officials and those close to him circles — conditional on "conservatives."

Recent social. Surveys show that the social base of the siloviki and the traditionalists are now declining, and this process will prevent the increase of almost commodity export revenues, as the efficiency of conversion of earnings into domestic demand plummets. Revenue growth, if at all, for the most part will settle in the pockets of the elite offshore, making its contribution to the outflow of capital.

Maneuvers by Igor Sechin, indicate which direction will develop intra-elite processes. Starting as expropriator Yukos in favor of the country, he retrained now from municipal bureaucrat in the head of the very shattered Yukos, is now available under the brand name of Rosneft, council package is scheduled for privatization. It seems that it is not conditional "liberals" will podmyaty security forces, and the formal victory, coupled with Putin security forces, acquiring control of the corporate state property, which in the future will be the personal evenly go into camp conventional "liberals." This is inevitably going to happen, because as the loss of the social base, there
is no other way to maintain the status and influence within the existing Russian economic system that is closely and tightly connected now with the export and import of financial flows and, as a consequence, the global monetary system, with security forces no. Traditionalists may not offer the Russian Federation, is now tightly integrated into world trade and the global financial system, which is close to reality and workable programs from socio-economic development and reflect their nostalgia for the days when our country in the form of the Soviet Union was a successful and advanced for its time economic autarky. Entertain the same illusions that "damned West" is about to be bent under the weight of its own cardboard debts (which will open the way to a new RF "bright future") while these same debts are, on the balance of the Bank of the Russian Federation, the lion a little bit of Russian security ruble is becoming harder and harder.

In light of the emerging trends in intra logical that Putin last zits during Medvedev's presidency, the main obstacle Medvedev planned large-scale privatization, at the moment, following in line with the interests of "liberalize" siloviki, reincarnated as her follower. Those gullible, who beheld in Putin patron of the power of the oligarchy, capable of focusing on the will of the majority, restore justice, violations against the people in the 90s, will be aggressively disappointed if not disappointed so far. Putin's victory means only that the security forces were on the coming couple of years, the window of abilities in order to massively sit in a "liberal train" the latest privatization.

This process, but will not proceed smoothly, and "liberal Train" will be able to get very far, not all simply as accessories, taking into account the appetites of more senior and have not yet "otovarennyh" members of Putin's elite, all is not enough, even if the rob all those in the country who have it still has the Yeltsin era. Tickets to the future in the negative. In this light, clear and completely understandable as the excessive zeal of the investigative committee and its controversial head, and the zeal of the "party of power" in the shortest possible time stamping repressive laws. For all those who do not belong to the top league of Russian politics, the entrance to which is likely through the control of large supplies and corresponding cash flows now account for all the forces to demonstrate their loyalty. According to another does not deserve their place in the caste of the elect, or those close to them. And for those who do not fall into that caste is not in store large blocks of shares of privatized companies, and the "Magnitsky list" and exposing the criminal and corrupt activities within the framework of an imminent further curtailment of the elite, under which now preparing a new law banning bureaucrats have accounts and property abroad.

Nisa zahochut

The split of the elites and opposition protests — is not the only risk of public issues in 2012. Not a lot of people giving their attention to the inflationary trends in modern Russian economy. As you know, the rise in prices, especially for food and essential services, thrashes most by poorer citizens, the structure of which use products and utility services are a priority. Just a few months grain in Russia has risen in price by more than 20%, sugar by 12%. The growth of tariffs for housing and communal services from July 1, according to Deputy Minister of Economic Development Andrei Klepach, will add to the official annual inflation still 1-1.5%, and to the social, the calculated on a basket potroebleniya average Russian, more tangibly. According to surveys by the Levada Center, in July of this year, 85% of Russians were waiting for the upcoming price increase at least at the same rate, and the third part of them was afraid of accelerating inflation in the coming months. It seems that these expectations will be met.

Power risks being in a situation of zugzwang: an attempt to compensate for the rise in prices increasing social payments even more to increment inflation and trigger the acceleration of capital outflows, leading to an increase in interest rates, deterioration of credit and bad for business. The attempt in this situation is to balance the budget in such cases classical devaluation of the ruble, support the producer and the financial sector, but for the population will only aggravate the situation. If you do not do anything, have to put up with the fall in real incomes less secure parts of society, and specifically, it is still the main social support of Putin's regime. So Makarov, this fall, if macroeconomic stability is not sacrificed to social stability, soc protest will be supplied not only the political system discontent, and dissatisfaction with the social and economic situation. If macroeconomic stability will be sacrificed to populism, it will only speed up the development of the economic situation in direction when a populist regime will not continue in the pocket.

Who will be the last?

Summarizing the above trends, one can predict the emergence of the country's double-revolutionary situation, reflecting the growing tension between the people and the elites, and between different sections of the elite. On the one hand, people's "lower classes" to an ever greater extent will not be inclined to resign ourselves to live a "as usual" on the other hand, the "elite upper classes", responding to the challenges of their own security, both on the part of the masses, and from external factors, will, all the same, act and knit in a new capacity. But with all this "extreme" will be "elite lower classes", which are again, very willing to live by the old one in the budget and corruption bird feeders. They are at risk of being between a rock and a hard place the supreme power of popular anger.
What is or was a similar situation at the end of the Soviet Union, and accidental intra-party processes, collapse of the USSR, later dubbed "the second revolution of the secretaries." Then elite The center, unable to transform their party into power in anything new criteria will appear in the democratization lost the regional elites. If you look at today's elite of, situation in something similar, in something — diametrically opposite to the one developed by the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Now the top of the elite that is in their power to transform the changing criteria, but the middle and lower level risk being irrelevant. Zahochut they become uncomplaining sacrifice that High School will present to the people in the form of tough anti-corruption, or as anything else that will allow Putin and his entourage to find, thanks to the legitimacy of such a sacrifice in a new capacity?

End of Gorbachev's "perestroika" can not be called Velvet Revolution, which now want to make those who dream of a non-violent dismissal of Putin from power. Moreover, it is not the end of the match the desires of most of the Russian people and the Russian elites. The future end of the Putin of the Russian Federation may also be abrupt. It is unlikely that this will be a "velvet revolution." It is possible that devalues in the process of losing public support, legitimacy and institutional forms of power, in the end, do not hold nor Putin conditionally liberal elite, nor the part of the security forces, who will join her. Since entering into conflict with the middle link of the elite, they will destroy the other vertical, on top of which are due to which, in fact, are "higher" in the hierarchy of power. Especially since the government does not pick favorites opposition of public opinion, which can be and are successful in the anti-Putin propaganda, and catalyze the aggravation of the situation, but powerless as organizational and manageme
nt bureaucracy.

What forces can emerge from the depths of the corrupt state apparatus, which people will be able to naudit pretty small fish in troubled waters, that turn out to be the heroes of the future of the troubled times? The answer to this question at the moment, the situation here is unpredictable. According to this unpredictable risk will gain strength, and by comparing the dynamics of oil prices to the dynamics of the export of capital from the country, have come to the conclusion that this risk is fully comparable with the risk associated with the volatility of global commodity markets.

Alexei Vyazovsky, senior analyst FG Kalita-Finance
Dmitry Golubovskii, independent analyst

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