A number of American think tanks last ordered the Pentagon study, the main aim of which is to develop a good structure of the armed forces are able to solve puzzles as long inside the country and abroad.
The crotch of the results of research have shown that the concept of reforming the armed forces in the direction of creation of highly mobile, well-armed military units capable of immediate blow to solve most of the problems standing in the criteria for long-term guerrilla war on the type of Iraq and Afghanistan proved to be ineffective.
In addition, during the research identified a number of other issues normal functioning of the armed forces in wartime criteria. Namely, in the criteria, when 20 teams were involved in operations outside the United States, it became clear that an unproven system was mobilizing reserve in case of need for a substantial increase in the number of troops, not enough time for training and combat coordination of units derived from the theater military action to recharge and rest; supply system was overloaded army units and units operating outside the country the United States, which led to a significant increase in the time of supply of army equipment, spare parts for military equipment and armament. All this resulted in disruption of the schedule rotation of personnel, delayed recovery and staffing of weapons and military equipment, and in some kinds of cases and the need for configuration planning of military operations due to the shortage of ammunition, fuel and lubricants.
In this context, professionals noted that battle experience of the U.S. Army shows a more reasonable rotation schedule languid and medium-sized teams, when the personal composition of the compound is up to 2-year deployment to the same places every year spent in operations outside its own database. But the lack of units during the Iraq and Afghan companies (in the case that unfolded over eight brigades) led to the fact that the personnel trained and rested at home in less than 6 months. This is a very negative effect on the morale of both the personnel and the quality of training and combat coordination.
In addition, the requirements for mobilization readiness when units must be prepared to perform tasks within 10 days after receipt of the order, and the ability to return to the role in the follow-up operation, not later than 30 days after the tasks are quite demanding, which also asks improvement mobilization of troops and supplies. All this formed the basis of the analysis and the upcoming revision of the mobilization plans and units. Also, the establishment of efficient ratio of light, medium and languid brigades in the structure of the U.S. Army.
In view of the above, it can be argued that a detailed analysis of the patterns of mobilization deployment of units and formations, also available operating reserve (including configurations taken in the planning and conduct of mobilization on the experience of Iraqi and Afghan campaigns), allows to evaluate the possibility of the introduction of military forces and conduct ground operations by the U.S. Army in the case of aggravation of the military-political situation in the world.